History of the Army of the Cumberland : its organization, campaigns, and battles, written at the request of Major-General George H. Thomas chiefly from his private military journal and official and other documents furnished by him

NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES

3 3433 08179834 4

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LIBRARY OF THE VETERANS,

TT T ^ T n T? V '^'"^'^ regiment, N. G. S. N. Y.

Xl 1 ^5 1 W H 1 f^^y^ YORK, N. Y,

Army of the Cumberland

ORGANIZATION, CAMPAIGNS, AND BATTLES

"WRITTEN AT THE REQUEST OF

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

CHIEFLY FROM HIS PRIVATE MILITARY JOURNAL AND OFFICIAL AND OTHER-
DOCUMENTS FURNISHED BY HIM

BY

THOMAS B. VAN IIORNE, U. S. A.
I

ILLUSTRATED WITH

campaig:^ and battle maps

COMPILED BY

EDWAED EUGBE

LATE SUPERINTENDENT TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEER OFFICE, HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND

TWO VOLUMES' AND ATLAS

VOL. I

CINCINNATI
EOBEET CLAEKE & CO

1875

THE NEW YORK
PUM.IC LU'TIAHY

969S88A

ASTOR. LENOX AJtD
K

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1875,

THOS. B. VAN HORNE AND EDWARD RUGER.
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.

Stereotyped by Ogden, Campbell & Co., Cincinnati.

§tVuntxfin.

THESE VOLUMES AKE DEDICATED

TO THE

SURVIVING MEMBERS OF THE, ARMY

WHOSE ACHIEVEMENTS THEY NAKKATE — SOLDIERS, WHO,

IN STRENGTH OF PATRIOTISM AND VALOR

IN BATTLE, HAVE NEVER

BEEN SURPASSED.

CO

X

00
CO

PREFACE.

During a conversation with General George H. Thomas, at
Nashville, Tennessee, in the summer of 1865, some remark
was made relating to the achievements of his army, when he
said to me, " I wish you to write a narrative history of the
Army of the Cumberland." Taking a moment for reflection,
I replied, that if, upon trial, I should meet his expectations, I
should be glad to produce such a work. He then said : " "Write
nothing but the truth. You will contravene received opinions,
and you must fortify yourself." These short but comprehen-
sive sentences constituted my instructions, and taken in con-
nection with the fact that the materials for the work were
mainly collected and supplied by General Thomas, gave him
as close a relation to it as was possible without direct author-
ship.

It is not known when it first occurred to General Thomas
to have the history of his army written, but had it been his
purpose from the beginning of his connection with it, in the
organization and command of its first brigade, he could not
have been more exhaustive in collecting the materials upon
which it is based. His " Military Journal," accurate in the
mention of the operations of each day, was a safeguard against
errors in chronology, gave brief notes of the more important
facts and events, and was suggestive of lines of investigation,
for which ample resources were provided in the copies of
orders, telegrams, official reports, and other papers, unofficial,

(V)

ri PREFACE.

but equally authoritative as the muniments of a truthful nar-
rative, which in greatest profusion he placed in my hands.
He gave especial attention to the collection of pertinent doc-
uments after the work had been projected, and received assist-
ance from General W. J). Whipple and Colonels A. L. Hough,.
S, C. Kellogg, and J. P. Williard, members of his staff in
nearest relation. From the time the composition of the his-
tory was begun until his death, I was in constant communi-
cation with him, and he knew fully its scope and the pivotal
facts which would constitute its framework and determine its
purview, and lived to examine and approve several completed
chapters relating to campaigns and battles in which he was a
prominent actor. The historj' and the maps which illustrate
it, have been prepared through independent research, but from
the same sources of knowledge, and under identical relations
to General Thomas.

I am also greatly indebted to many of the corps, division,
and brigade commanders, and other ofBcers of the army, for
suggestions and encouragement during the years s]3ent in pre-
paring this work.

It may not be irrelevant or inappropriate for me to state
that, in investigation and description, I have followed the
logical order, tracing operations from inception to issue, and
interpreting them by their objects as well as their results.

The manuscript was completed in December, 1872. Upon

my return to my post in January, 1873, I left it in the East,

and did not see it again until I began to read the proof-sheets,

in July, 1875.

THOS. B. VAN HORNE.

September, 1875.

CONTENTS VOL. I.

Introduction xi

CHAPTER I.
Dkvelopment of the Status of Kentucky 1

CHAPTER II.
Internal Military Affairs of Kentucky 8

CHAPTER III.
Organization of United States Troops in Kentucky 14

CHAPTER IV.
Command of General Anderson 20

CHAPTER V.

Operations of General Thomas, in Kentucky, under General

Sherman 36

CHAPTER VI.
Operations of General Thomas, in Kentucky, under General

BUELL, INCLUDING THE BaTTLE OF MiLL SPRINGS 4(5

CHAPTER VII.

Organization and Operations of the Second, Third, Fourth, Eiftu,

AND Sixth Divisions fiS

(vii)

Vlll CONTENTS.

CHAPTEK VIII.

Operations op General Nelson, Colonel Garfield, and General

Carter IN Eastern Kentucky 74

CHAPTEK IX.

General View of the Situation in the Central Theater of War,

from the beginning to the Fall of Nashville 80

' CHAPTER X.

Advance of the Army of the Ohio from Nashville to Savannah,

AND THE Battle OF Shiloh 97

CHAPTER XI.
Operations against Corinth 125

CHAPTER XII.

Operations of General O. M. Mitchell, General Negley, General
G. W. Morgan, and Colonel Duffield, and the Expedition
to Destroy Railroads in Georgia 130

CHAPTER XIII.

The Advance toward Chattanooga from Corinth, and the Re-
treat FROM Southern Tennessee to Louisville, Kentucky 139

CHAPTER XIV.

Operations of Generals G. "W. Morgan and Wm. Nelson in Ken-
tucky 176

CHAPTER XV.
Campaign of Perryville, Kentucky „ 184

CHAPTER XVI.

The Concentration of the x\rmy of the Cumberland at Nash-
ville, Tennessee, and Subordinate Contingent Opera-
tions 207

CHAPTER XVII.
Stone River Campaign 219

CONTENTS. ix

CHAPTER XVIII.

Operations during the Army's Encampment of Six Months at Mur-

freesboro 287

CHAPTER XIX.

TuLLAHOMA CAMPAIGN 302

CHAPTER XX.

The Movements of the Army over the Mountains and Tennessee

River, and Battle of Chickamauqa 310

CHAPTER XXI.
Siege of Chattanooga 386

CHAPTER XXII.
Battles near Chattanooga 405

INTRODUCTION-

The election, by the Republican party, of Abraham Lincoln, as Presi-
dent of the United States, on the Oth day of November, 1860, was the
occasion for an attempt to compass the destruction of the Union. The
men who made that attempt had for years meditated the establishment
of a confederacy comprising all the slaveholding states. The antago-
nisms which culminated in the secession of eleven of these states may be
traced to the remote past. They were revealed even in the Convention
of 1787. John C. Calhoun gave logical consistency to the doctrines of
state-rights, and in the effort to give them practical realization, in 1832, very
nearly anticipated the struggle that has recently deluged the land with blood.
Compromises, often repeated in our history, promising eternal harmony,
had failed to give more than temporary quiet to the country. The near
approach of each successive presidential election furnished the occasion
for some new j^resentation of the old issues, and invited the renewal of
the contest for sectional dominance. And thus every fourth year re-
vealed, with greater j^lainness, the relentless character of the antagonism,
between the free and slave states. Questions of political supremacy and
material interests were mingled with the less dangerous discussion of ab-
stract differences in the theory of government ; and the sober, thoughtful,
patriotic men of the country saw, with growing alarm, that every presi-
-dential canvass gave proof that political issues were becoming more posi-
tive, in correspondence with the increasing intensity of sectional ani-
mosity.

During the political campaign which preceded the presidential election
of ](S60, the Southern leaders of the school of Calhoun used all possible
influences to commit the Southern people to secession, in the event of the
success of the Republican party. The specious assumption of inveterate

(xi)

xii INTRODUCTION.

diflferences in the type of civilization, North and South: the vaunted asser-
tion of superior manhood and transcendent chivah\y ; the declared certainty
of hostile interference with slavery by the party electing Mr. Lincoln, and
the appeal to passion and prejudice, gave these men the jjower to precipi-
tate eleven of the slaveholding states into secession and rebellion. It
may be safe to aver that the majority of the Southern people, if they had
been allowed a free and forcible expression of their opinions and feelings,
would have decided against secession. But the Union men of the South
lacked organization, and, acting without concert, were unable to resist the
large and ambitious minority, which, compassing great wealth and talent,
with organization compact and firm, was controlled by men of reckless
daring and acknowledged power.

On the first Monday in December, 1860, the official announcement of
the election of Mr. Lincoln was made in due form in the Senate chamber
at Washington. On the 20th of the same month, a convention of the
people of South Carolina passed an ordinance of secession. Six states,
Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas, withdrew in
quick succession from the sisterhood of states. Soon the bold announce-
ment of a new nationality — the Confederate States of America — startled
the country and the world. The actors in this, the greatest political crime
in history, at once prepared for war — the usual consequent of the assump-
tion of independent national existence — and thi"eats of Northern invasion,
in the event of war, were proclaimed as boldly as the existence of the
new government.

Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas delayed secession
for some months. The legislature of Virginia proposed an informal na-
tional convention, to devise measures to prevent the dismemberment of
the Union, and consequent civil war. Tennessee decided, by a heavy
majority, against calling a convention to consider the question of
secession. North Carolina was also without a convention. The conven-
tion of Arkansas, after a somewhat protracted session, adjourned with-
out taking definite action. These states thus awaited the consequences of
the secession of the Gulf States.

Although the majority of the people of the United States did not admit
that the right to secede was reserved to the individual states, and regarded
the conduct of the Gulf States, if persistently continued, as the actual
initiation of civil war, and although these states, beyond their act of
secession, had committed open acts of war, some of which were even
perpetrated before the passage of ordinances of secession, still the gen-
eral government took no step looking to the suppression of the rebellion

iNTRODUCTioisr. xiii

inaugurated by secession. War was so distasteful to the government and
people, that the purpose was patent to avoid it if possible. Forts and
arsenals had been seized, and portions of the national army had been sur-
rendered to the insurgents, but still the nation hesitated to draw the
sword.

During this period of hesitancy, there were indications of reaction in
the seceded states, while the more northern slaveholding states grew
more decided in the expression of their purpose to remain in tlio Union.
Thus it became apparent to the leading insurgents that something start-
ling must be done, or these states would be lost to the projected Southern
Confederacy.

All the important forts on the coasts of the seceding states, except Pick-
ens and Sumter, had been seized by the insurgents. The bombardment
and fall of the latter constituted the second great act in the drama of rebel-
lion. South Carolina had been the first to secede, and her assumed lead-
ership in revolt and traditional disloyalty, alike required that her guns
should inaugurate the war with emphasis and call the nation to arms.
On the 12th day of April, 1861, in obedience to orders of Jefferson Davis,
President of the so-called Confederate States, General Beauregard com-
menced the bombardment of Fort Sumter. The gallant Anderson and
his equally gallant command resisted the tremendous cannonading for
nearly two days. But being without food and ammunition, exhausted by
constant exertion, and almost stifled by the heat and smoke of the burn-
ing outbuildings, the heroic garrison made such terms with the enemy as
would best conserve their own honor and that of their country, and re-
tired from the fort under their colors.

On the lltli (lay of April, the day after the capitulation, Abraham
Lincoln, President of the United States, issued a proclamation, calling
forth the militia of the several states of the Union, to the aggregate num-
ber of seventy-five thousand, to suppress the combinations in the seceded
states, which were too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary coui'se
of judicial proceedings. Then Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and
Arkansas, by conventions, or through the less legitimate action of legis-
latures, promptly seceded, and made common cause with the states al-
ready in open rebellion.

The four border slaveholding states — Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky,
and Missouri — now filled the chasm between the two sections, which were
hurrying their preparations for war on a gigantic scale. The situation of
these states was critical, whatever might be their action. Their citizens
were divided in political sentiment, and of all the states, Nofth or South,

xiv INTRODUCTION.

tliey were most exposed to the j^erils of war. Their geographical position,
their common interest in slavei'y with the revolted states, and their
identity in other great interests with the Northern States, necessitated
delay in action, and produced vacillation in choice of Northern or South-
ern alliance. Delaware and Maryland, however, soon declared their pur-
pose of remaining in the Union. Kentvicky and Missouri having more
slaves and more attachment to the institution of slavery, could not so
easily determine their status. The governors of these states were in
sympathy with the Southern cause, while a large and influential party in
each state favored the Northern. It is safe to assert, too, that in other
respects the loyalists of Kentucky had more to embarrass them in the
positive declai-ation of their attachment to the Union, than the citizens
of the other states that declined secession.

As the first organized loyal regiments of Kentucky troops constituted
the nucleus of the Army of the Cumberland, this history is commenced
with a retrospect of the situation in that state during the first months of
Ihe war.

LIBRARY OF THE VETERANS,

Ninth r.egiriient,N. G.S.N. Y.

NEW YORK, N. Y,

HISTORY

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND

CHAPTER I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATUS OF KENTUCKY.

At the inception of oiir gigantic civil war, the leading types
of political sentiment prevalent throughout the entire country
were represented by large classes in Kentuck3^ Bold union-
ists confronted arrant secessionists ; timid loyalists and waver-
ing rebels joined hands in an impracticable conservatism. As
an expression of the reigning chaos of opinion, and by the
consent of multitudes in direct antagonism, Kentucky as-
sumed the position of neutrality. All her citizens not rad-
ically and unconditionally for the Union, protested against
the march of armies for the suppression of the rebellion upon
the soil of the State. It was the great blunder of Southern
Union men, that they so early and so fully committed them-
selves against the coercion of the seceded states, or the main-
tenance of the Union by force, that when war was actual,
they were driven into rebellion in no small degree by their
previous false position. The loyal men of Kentucky barely
escaped the common fate of the Union men in other Southern
States. Several prominent men in Kentucky had, from the
time of the election of Mr. Lincoln, been so bold in opposi-
tion to the secession of the state, and so open in their decla-
ration of purpose to sustain the general government, that co-

■« STATUS OF KENTUCKY.

ercive measures were hailed with delight. But very mauy of
those claiming to be Uuiou men, while ostensibly opposing the
secession of Kentucky, were reticent with regard to their action
in the event of war. They were not in o])cu sympathy with
the secession movement, but clamorous in their demand for
armed neutrality as the legitimate and only safe position for
Kentucky. So prevalent was this opinion, and so bold its ex-
pression, that "armed neutrality" was the accredited status
of the state before her legislature gave it the more formal
pretense of legitimacy.

Governor B. Magoffin, in his message to the legislature con-
vened in extra session January 17, 1861, recommended that
the state militia should be put upon a war footing, in readi-
ness for the forcible assumption of such position as the State
might choose. He also recommended that a convention
should be called, and plainly indicated his desire for the seces-
sion of the state.

The legislatures of the more Southern States were mainly
composed of men elected upon other issues, but generally
pledged to secession. Hence their readiness to call conven-
tions, and even assume the prerogatives of conventions. But
fortunately for Kentucky, the Union men in her legislature
were too prudent and too patriotic to unite with the secession-
ists in calling a convention; and thus they prevented the usual
initial step in secession. ISTeither did the legislature meet the
governor's expectation in providing for the equipment of the
state militia.

The history of Kentucky, during the period beginning with
the presidential election and ending with the fall of Sumter,
furnishes no facts of great moment beyond the steady resist-
ance of the masses of her people and the majority of her legis-
lature to every movement inclining to secession. There were,
however, marked indications of divided sentiment and pur-
pose. One instance may serve as the type of many. It was
determined by the loyal citizens of Louisville that the national
flag should be raised with suitable pomp upon the court-house
on the 22d day of February. Hon. James Speed delivered a
patriotic address on the occasion. The address elicited no dis-
loyal demonstration ; but when the flag was raised, Simon B.

STATUS OF KENTUCKY. J

Buekirer, in chief command of tlie state guard as inspector-
g-eneral of the state, gave no order to sahite, as required by
the published progranmie and patriotic duty. In manifest
disloyalty to the flag, Buckner, and a large portion of his
command, moved from the court-house yard. ]\Iajor Woodruff
and his battalion, the " JSIarion Rifles," in emphatic contrast
remained and saluted the national colors. The two officers,
and those acting with them, represented not only the antago-
nistic sentiment of the state guard, but also of the citizens
of the entire state.

But though political afihirs in Kentucky were chaotic dur-
ing the early months of 18G1, the issues of the grand contest,
whose sweep and power were soon to solve with inexorable
deflniteness all the problems engrossing the thought and sen-
timent of the whole country, were gradually assuming positive
shape. Fort Sumter fell on the 14th day of April. On the day
following, the President issued the proclamation calling for
seventy-five thousand men, and assigning the quotas of all the
states. In response, Governor Magofiin addressed the follow-
ing message to the Secretary of War :

"Frankfort, April 15, 1861.
"Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War:

" Your dispatch has been received. In answer, I say em-
phatically that Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked
purpose of subduing her sister Southern States.

"B. Magoffin,
" Governor of Kentucky."

This bold presumptuous answer, though not prophetic, gave
hope to the South that Kentucky would secede. Radical se-
cessionists, as a class, were noisy, madly assertive, and in the
realm of hypothesis, amazingly unprophetic; and Governor
Magoflin, interpreting public sentiment by his own feelings,
and mistaking secession clamor for the revealed purpose of
Kentucky, defiantly ignored the constitutional subordination
of the state to the general government. As yet Kentucky
had taken no steps indicating secession as a probable contin-
gency; neither had she made unequivocal assertion of loy-
alty ; and as in the past, so now in the crisis of the border

4 STATUS OF KENTUCKY.

slaveholding states, tlie official declaration of her governor
was only the expression of individual opinion.

Kentucky, as a state, was not yet ready to furnish troops
for the United States service, hut there were citizens in great
numhers ready to commit themselves to the unconditional
support of the general government. And while at this period,
as previously, the flag of revolt had heen boldly unfurled
throughout the state, and men had heen openly recruited for
the rebel army, there were many eager to take position under
the flag of their country.

On the 6th day of May, the legislature of Kentucky con-
vened in extra session, for the third time since the election of
Mr. Lincoln. The message of Governor Magoffin evinced the
expectation that the state would immediately secede. The
legislature affirmed " armed neutrality " as the status of the
state, and then by implication censured the governor for the
lauffuag-e of his official announcement. Still, the fact was
patent that Kentucky, as represented by her legislature,
though advancing in loyal expression, was yet far from active
loyalty. ISTeutrality, in such a contest, was itself, proof of a
lack of fealty. During this extra session, another advance
was made in the right direction. The militia law of the state
was so amended as to compel the state guard to take the oath
of allegiance, not only to Kentucky, but also to the United
States. This act recognized the obligation of the state to the
general government, but it did not reach active support.

Wliile the politicians in the seceded states took the lead in
all treasonable movements, and were far in advance of the
people in intensity of disloyalty, those in Kentucky who were
loyal, were in the main far behind the masses in loyal feeling,
and were far more timid in open resistance to the formidable
organized effort to precipitate the state into alliance with
those in rebellion. As soon as the grand issue was fairly
made by the bombardment of Fort Sumter, undercurrents
against the rebeUion, compassing, for the most part, quiet citi-
zens, set in with great power. During the extra legislative
session of May, and while the old political leaders, though
claiming to be loyal, were timid to the degree of moral cow-
ardice, a few citizens of Louisville, unknown to the political

STATUS OF KENTUCKY. 5

arena, 'gave existence to an organization that doubtless deter-
mined the status of Kentucky. This organization was called
the " Union Club."

Previous to the 17th of May, the Union men of Kentucky
had no such organization as could determine their numerical
strength and consolidate their power. The " Citizens and
Working Men's Association " had triumphed in the election
of J. M. Delph, as mayor of Louisville. This association
claimed to be, par excellence, the Union party of Louisville. It
demanded fidelity to the Union at the expense of former party
affiliations, and on this simple issue, unaided by a single jour-
nal of the city, carried the municipal election. The adminis-
tration of the city government, conducted under circumstances
which demanded great prudence and firmness, demonstrated
the wisdom of those whose votes placed Mr. Delph in office.
This organization, however, had not sufficient compactness for
a revolutionary period. The rebels in Kentucky and through-
out the entire South were most thoroughly organized, in an-
ticipation of the necessity of overriding majorities. The no-
torious Bickley, at the head of the " Knights of the Golden
Circle," was at this period drilling squads in the streets of
Louisville. Outspoken loyalists were threatened with assas-
sination. Under the pressure of such circumstances, G. A.
Hall, C. C. Hull, K. E. Hull, J. P. Hull, R. L. Post, C. Z.
Webster, H. G. S. Whipple, Thos. A. Morgan, W. B. Hegan,
F. H. Hegan, Robert Ayars, and a few others, on the 17th day
of May, 1861, organized this " Union Club." The members
were solemnly sworn to unconditional loyalty. The ritual
was mainly compiled from the grand declarations of Washing-
ton, Webster, and Clay. It especially enforced the patriotic
affirmation of the latter : " If Kentucky to-morrow unfurls the
banner of resistance, I never will fight under that banner. I
owe a paramount allegiance to the whole Union ; a subordi-
nate one to my own state." With such declarations, as
expressive of its purpose and patriotism, this organization
was meet for the times. Secret associations are the concomi-
tants of modern revolutions, powerful for good or evil, in ac-
cordance with the principles they embody and the ends they
subserve. This one was potent, if not decisive, in saving Ken-

6 STATUS OF KEXTUCKY.

tucky from secession. It soon diffused itself thronghont the
state, reaching the legislature with its influence, and on the 1st
of July, the day for a special congressional election, it gave a
hundred thousand loyal votes. During the months of July
and August the development and expression of loyalty was so
marked, that the secessionists despaired of the withdrawal of
the state, except through an appeal to arms. The election
held early in August demonstrated that a large majority of
the people of Kentucky were opposed to secession. This fact
did not deter John C. Breckinridge and his compeers in treason
from efforts to force the state from the Union. ISlot beins:
ready for the execution of the war measures which they were
planning, they called themselves the Peace party. Though
they held the doctrine of state-rights, they declined acquies-
cence in the declared purpose of the state to remain in the
Union, and while clamoring for peace, they secretly arranged
with the so-called Confederate government to supply them
with arms, and extend its military jurisdiction over the state.
There was no thought of submission to the overwhelming pub-
lic sentiment which had been repeatedly expressed through
the previous elections. These traitors assumed that the JN'a-
tional government was broken up ; that the Confederate gov-
ernment had attained lawful existence, and that Kentucky,
whether the majority of her people were willing or unwilling,
belonged to the Confederate government.

Washington, Ajmlld, 1861.
To his Excellency, Beriah Magoffin :
Call made on you by to-nigkt's mail for four regiments of militia for

immediate service.

SIMON CAMERON,

Secretary of War.

ExECUTiTE Office, Frankfort, April 15, 1861.
To Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, Washington City :

Your dispatch is received. In answer, I say emphatically, that Ken-
tucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sis-
ter Southern States.

B. MAGOFFIN,

Governor of Kentucky.

STATUS OF KENTUCKY. 7

- PEOCLAMATIOX OF GOV. MAGOFFIN, APRIL 24.

Recent events are of so startling a character as to render it impera-
tively necessary, that the legislature of Kentucky be again convened in
extraordinary session. It is now apparent that the most energetic meas-
ures are being resorted to by the government at Washington to pros-
ecute a war upon an extended scale with the seceded states. Already
large sums of money and supplies of men are being raised in the Northern
States for that purpose. The tread of armies is the response which is
being made to the measures of pacification which are being discussed
before our people ; whilst up to this moment we are comparatively in a
defenseless attitude.

Whatever else should be done, it is, in my judgment, the duty of Ken-
tucky, without delay, to place herself in a com})lete position for defense.
The causes for apprehension are now certainly grave enough to impel
every Kentuckian to demand that this be done, and to require of the
legislature of the state such additional action as may be necessary for
the general welfare. To this end I now call upon the members of the
General Assembly to convene at the capitol in Frankfort, on the 6th day
of May, 1861.

In testimony whereof, I, Beriah Magoffin, governor of the Common-
wealth of Kentucky, have hereunto subscribed my name, and caused the
seal of the commonwealth to be affixed. Done at the city of Frankfort,
the 24th day of April, 1861, and in the sixty-ninth year of the common-
wealth.

By the Governor : B. MAGOFFIN.

Thos. B. Monroe, Secretary of State.

By J AS. W. Tate, Assistant Secretary.

ACTION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MAY 16.

Considering the deplorable condition of the country, and for which the
State of Kentucky is in no way responsible, and looking to the best
means of preserving the internal peace, and securing the lives, liberty,
and property of the citizens of the state, therefore —

1. Resolved, hy the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, That
this state, and the citizens thereof, should take no part in the civil war
now waged, except as mediators and friends to the belligerent parties ;
and that Kentucky should, during the contest, occupy the position of
strict neutrality.

Resolved further, That the act of the governor in refusing to furnish
troops or military force, upon the call of the executive authority of the
United States, under existing circumstances, is approved.

CHAPTER 11.

INTERNAL MILITARY AFFAIRS OF KENTITCKY.

The history of military affairs in Kentucky during the year
1861 can not be complete, even in outline, without adequate
mention of the " State Guard" and " Home Guard."

The prominent disunionists in Kentucky doubtless knew,
long before it occurred, that the presidential election of 1860
would either give national sway to their radical views of state
sovereignty, or furnish the pretext for the dissolution of the
Union. Men of the state-rights school in the Gulf States
could not entertain strong assurance of their independence
without the co-operation of the border slave-holding states.
Their alliance in the event of war, and their support in the
event of peaceable secession, were regarded as conditions of
success. And as the latter states would be the first to suffer
the consequences of secession, if secession should result in
war, it was a matter of great moment to the secessionists in
Kentucky, as well as those farther south, that there should be
a military force on the border, ready for war. For this pur-
pose, doubtless, the organization of the militia of Kentucky
was effected. This object was so disguised that men the far-
thest removed from disloyalty co-operated in the passage of
a law authorizing an army in Kentucky of compactness and
numbers equal to some of the standing armies of Europe.

The act of the legislature which gave existence to the " State
Guard," became a law by approval of the governor, March
6, 1860. It was drafted mainly by S. B. Buckner, and gave
great power to those who had chief command of the troops
organized in conformity to its elaborate provisions. The citi-
zens capable of bearing arms were divided into three classes,
(8)

MILITARY AFFAIRS OF KENTUCKY. 9

designated " The Militia of Eeserve," " The Enrolled Militia,"
and " The Active, or Volunteer Militia."

The militia of reserve consisted of white persons, resident
in the state, less than eighteen years of age, and more than
forty-five, and of all persons exempt by law from enrollment
and military service, and not members of the "Active Militia."
In extreme danger the reserve militia could be called to active
service.

The enrolled militia consisted of all able-bodied white male
persons between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, who were
citizens or residents of the state, except persons who had
served fire years in the army or navy of the United States,
persons who were members of the active volunteer militia, and
those exempted from military service by the laws of the United
States or the State of Kentucky.

The volunteer militia, or state guard, were organized into
companies, battalions, brigades, divisions, and army corps, with
uniforms and equipments complete. Most of the independent
military companies of the state became component parts of
the state guard upon its organization. Provision was made
for the election of one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, and as
many majors as necessary in each county. General officers
were to be multiplied in proportion to the extent of the organ-
ization. The inspector-general of the state, under the gov-
ernor, was commander-in-chief of the volunteer militia, with
the rank of major-general, wearing, when on duty, the uniform
of a lieutenant-general. This officer had power to disband at
will such companies, or larger organizations, as failed to con-
form to the law or his view of military propriety. Thus,
through the rigid subordination of ofiicers, from the highest
to the lowest, there was a concentration of power in the com-
mander-in-chief unusual in a free state during actual war.

At first, beyond the election and appointment of officers of
high rank, political influence did not palpably rule in the or-
ganization of the state guard. S. B. Buckner was appointed
inspector-general, and Thomas L. Crittenden elected brigadier-
general. In the end, many of the ofiicers joined the Confed-
erate army, while many became commanders in the United
States service. The prominent Union men of Kentucky give

10 MILITARY AFFAIRS OF KEXTUCKY.

concurrent testimony to the fact tliat it was the original design
of the authors of the "Act for the better organization of the
Kentucky militia," to use the forces authorized hj its pro-
visions to precipitate the state from the Union. It is certain
that the encampments, discipline, and general conduct of the
state guard were adapted to prepare a force for revolutionary
surprise. The history of the commander-in-chief warrants
the belief that it was his intention, when the foreshadows of
war were plainly visible, to use his command to force Ken-
tucky out of the Union, if possible, and in the event of failure
in this, to transfer it to the rebel army. Wlien the issue came,
the scheme failed in its main purpose, and almost entirely in
its contingent one. A prominent cause of failure was the in-
ability of Governor Magoffin and his inspector-general to
provide arms for such a military estahlishment as their pur-
poses demanded. The legislature refused adequate appropri-
ations, and such arms as they desired could not be purchased.
Hence, the " armed neutrality " of Kentucky consisted more
in assumption than in actual military strength. Strenuous
efforts, however, to secure arms were made. Governor Ma-
goffin, soon after the fall of Sumter, accredited Buckner to
the I^orth and Dr. Blackburn to the South for their purchase.

Colonel Prentiss, at Cairo, engaged the attention of Buck-
ner in a direction opposite to that of his mission, but Dr.
Blackburn brought arms from the extreme South, so nearly
worthless as, in his own language, to be " suitable for neu-
trals." If, however, Dr. Blackburn did not purchase good
guns for his rebel friends in Kentucky, he revealed their inten-
tions in a speech in IsTew Orleans. Having been called to the
rostrum upon the arrival of a military company from Ken-
tucky, the doctor boldly pledged his state to the rebellion.

For some time after war was threatened, it was deemed de-
sirable that the loyal men in the state guard should remain, but
when the time came for loyal organization it was at first found
to be difficult for them to withdraw. Later, the requirement
by the legislature of a new oath afforded easy means of with-
drawal, as discretion was allowed. Thereafter, the state guard
was known to be acting in the interests of the rebellion.

Another military organization, though of less imposing

MILITARY AFFAIRS OF KEXTUCKY. 11

form, exerted more power in the struggle in Kentucky than
the state guard. This was the home guard. Improvised,
loosely organized military companies called " Home Guards,"
sprang into existence in the city of Louisville and other j)laces,
when first the cloud of war began to gather blackness. Their
avowed object was home defense. Those comprising them
represented the parties contending for supremacy in the state,
with a predominance of the loyal element.

The " Home Guard " proper was originally organized by
authority of an ordinance enacted by the general council of
the city of Louisville, and was subsequently extended to other
portions of the state. The ordinance approved by Mayor
Delph, May 25th, was nominally based upon a vague provision
of the city charter. The imminence of revolution, rather than
the charter, induced the city authorities to provide for the for-
mation of the " Home Guard." The ordinance made provis-
ion for a brigade of two regiments, with the necessary field
and staff ofiicers. The members were required to take the
oath prescribed for other city ofiicers, and were further re-
quired to swear that they would obey all orders of ofiicers
legally placed over them. The mayor was the commander-in-
chief, with power to appoint a brigadier-general and other of-
ficers. Lovell H. Eousseau was first appointed as brigadier-
general. He soon became an officer in the United States
service, and James Speed succeeded him in command. The
home guard was soon filled to its maximum strength. The
Marion Rifles, already favorably mentioned as a portion of the
state guard, found congenial associations in this loyal organi-
zation. The opposition to it by the state guard and seces-
sionists generally was open, persistent, and menacing. Buck-
ner, the commander of the state guard, formally called on
General Speed and threatened bloodshed. But Speed and his
brigade were too much in earnest, too patriotic and brave, to
give heed to private or official threats. Arms were obtained
from the general government through Lieutenant W. ISTelson,
of the navy, and ammunition from Governor Morton, of Li-
diana.

During the winter and spring, Lieutenant ITelson, a native
of Kentucky, had repeatedly visited the state. His purpose

12 MILITARY AFFAIES OF KENTUCKY.

was to ascertain the undercurrents of sentiment and the
probable action of prominent men should the government be
forced, in the prosecution of the war, to disregard, directly or
indirectly, the neutrality of Kentucky. He reached the con-
clusion, in mingling with all classes, that the Union sentiment
needed the support of bayonets. He learned that such sup-
port of the Southern cause was meditated, and believing that
prompt action would prevent the secession of Kentucky, he told
President Lincoln that he must furnish the loyal men with
arms, or, in the end, fight for the restoration of the state to
the Union. The President acted upon this suggestion, and
made Lieutenant Kelson the agent for the transmission of arms
to Kentucky. Ten thousand guns were placed at his disposal,
and money furnished to pay for their transportation. Lieuten-
ant ISTelson went to Kentucky in advance of his guns, and
arranged with Joshua F. Speed, of Louisville, for a secret
meeting of prominent Union men at Frankfort. This meet-
ing occurred in the latter part of April, and was attended by
J. J. Crittenden, Garret Davis, James Harlan, Joshua F. Speed,
James Speed, Charles A. "Wickliffe, Thornton F. Marshall,
Lieutenant N"elson, and four others. Men were designated
who could be safely intrusted with the disposition of arms.
iN'elson's guns reached Kentucky soon after the formation
of the home guard of the city of Louisville. The regiments
of the city, and all companies of fifty men, in the northern,
central, and eastern portions of the state, were supplied by
Lieutenant N'elson, upon the order of Joshua F. Speed, who
had been designated by President Lincoln for this duty.

Thus armed, the home guard confronted the state guard,
and defeated the schemes of the secessionists in respect to
Kentucky. Encampments of the state guard were ordered
subsequently, and its companies and battalions were drilled,
but all to no purpose. Armed Union men were soon in the
ascendant, and " armed neutrality " waned in proportion to
the number of guns in their hands. Collisions were threat-
ened, but fortunately for the secessionists, they never occurred,
as the parades of the two organizations revealed the superi-
ority of the home guard. The magazine containing the
ammunition belonging to the state, was under the control of

MILITARY AFFAIRS OF KENTUCKY. 13

Bucknel*, but Mayor Delpli boldly demanded the keys, and
overawed by the strength of the mayor's command, Buckner
reluctantly surrendered them. Subsequently, the state guard
was despoiled of their arms by the mayor's order, and as fugi-
tives they drifted to the Southern army.

CHAPTER III. '

OKGAIJIZATION OF UNITED STATES TROOPS IN KENTUCKY.

During the excitement which immediately succeeded the
inauguration of war at Charleston, it was unsafe in Louisville
and other parts of the state to utter Union sentiments ; much
greater danger was incident to an avowal of purpose to enlist
troops for the United States service. Still there were men bold
enough to do this, despite threats of assassination. Immedi-
ately after the President's call for troops, James V. Guthrie, a
resident of Covington, Ky., and W. E "Woodruff, major
commanding the battalion of Marion Riiies of Louisville,
offered their services to the President, and asked authority to
raise two regiments, as a part of the quota of their state.
The authority was given on the 23d of April. Their camp
was established on the north bank of the Ohio river, just
above Cincinnati, and was designated " Camp Clay." On the
6th day of May, two full regiments of three months' men
were mustered into the service of the United States, as the
1st and 2d regiments of Kentucky Volunteer Infantry — the
former under the command of Colonel Guthrie, the latter
under Colonel Woodruff. Though thus styled, the majority
of the enlisted men were from Ohio.

Colonels Guthrie and Woodruff at once concluded that
men enlisted for the short period of three months would be
of little value in a war that already promised protraction, and
sought and obtained permission to reorganize their regiments
for three years' service, or during the war. The length of the
proposed term deterred many from re-enlisting. Very many
of those who refused to re-enlist were from Ohio, and in the
reorganization of the regiments, recruits were drawn from

(14)

ORGANIZATION OF TROOPS IX KENTUCKY. 15

Kciitneky. Colonel "Woodruff and liis officers, in full iiinform,
openly recruited in Louisville and other parts of Kentucky,
and soon refilled their regiment. Their action induced denun-
ciation and threats. Recruiting for the Southern army in the
state had heen open and demonstrative. It had not been un-
usual to see the Confederate flag flying above men on the
march for the Soutli, as the enemies of their country, hut to
enlist for loyal service was regarded as an invasion of rights.

Colonel AYoodruff 's regiment was remustered into the ser-
vice of the United States on the 9th of June, Colonel
Guthrie's on the day following, each with designation un-
changed. As Kentucky had not recognized these regiments,
they were armed and equipped by the authorities of Ohio.

On the 9th of July, the First and Second Kentucky Infan-
try, as a portion of the brigade of Brigadier-General J. D.
Cox, embarked on steamers for Western Virginia. Colonel
Guthrie went up the Kanawha, and Colonel AYoodruff passed
up the Ohio to Guyandotte. The river was at a low stage, and
it was frecpiently necessary for the regiment to disembark,
that the steamer might pass the bars. YHienever practicable,
the landing was made on the Ohio side, but in one instance
it was impossible to avoid the Kentucky shore. As a conse-
quence, the neutrality of the state was first formally violated,
by her own sons marching under the national flag on her soil.
After efficient service in Western Virginia, these regiments
Avere transferred, in January, 18G2, to the Army of the Ohio.

Early in June, Lovell H. Eousseau repaired to Washington,
to impress the national authorities with the necessity of en-
listing troops for the United States army, and to request
authority to raise one or more regiments in Kentucky.
Kousseau, as senator in the legislature of Kentucky, had been
very bold in opposing the plans of liis disloyal compeers, and
had been remarkal)ly earnest in urging the committal of the
state to the support of the general government. lie, with
General J. T. Boyle and a few others, had opposed the neu-
trality policy from its first mention. It was fitting then, that
lie should be amongst the first to propose the organization
of troops in Kentucky.

Kousseau was appointed colonel, and invested with author-

16 ORGAIVIZATIOX OF TROOPS IN KENTUCKY.

ity to raise two regiments ; but the location of his camp was
to be determined by a few of the most prominent Union men
of Kentucky.

Upon Rousseau's return from Washington, General James
Speed, in compliance with instructions from President Lin-
coln, called a meeting at Louisville, to determine the location
of Rousseau's camp. Hon. James Guthrie was chairman of
the meeting. There were present, in addition, Garret Davis,
C. D. Pennabaker, Samuel Gill, James Speed, J. F. Speed,
Samuel Lusk, J. T. Boyle, Morgan Yance, T. E. Bramlette,
E. Graves, A. B. Hobson, J. H. Ward, James Harlan, Col-
onels Hawkins, Dudley, and Rousseau. Of these, James
Speed, Vance, Ward, and Rousseau were in favor of estab-
lishing the camp in Kentucky. The majority, fearing that
this step would affect unfavorably the congressional election,
appointed for the first of July, urged its location in Indiana.
Accordingly, "Camp Joe Holt" was established on the north
bank of the Ohio river, between Jeffersonville and I^ew
Albany. Influenced by the same consideration, Lieutenant
ISTelson had previously commenced the enrollment of troops
in central Kentucky without an encampment, and his action
was regarded as a judicious precedent, in view of the para-
mount importance of electing Union men to Congress.

His camp having been established, Colonel Rousseau, with
the aid of his oflicers and a few friends of earnest loyalty,
but in the face of menacing persistent opposition, soon re-
cruited the "Kentucky Legion" (afterward the Fifth Kentucky
Infantry), "Stone's Battery," and several companies of infan-
try and calvary, which subsequently became the initial ele-
ments of the " Sixth Kentucky Infantry " and the Second
Kentucky Cavalry.

" Camp Dick Robinson," situated between Danville and
Lexington, Ky., was established by Lieutenant j^elson, on the
2d day of July, 1861. The oflicers of four regiments had
previously been appointed, and nearly two thousand men had
been very quietly recruited. These went immediately into
camp to the amazement of rebels, " constitutional union men,"
and " neutrals." The rebels threatened in vain;, timid Union
men expostulated with JSTelson and his prominent associate

ORGAJ^IZATION OF TEOOPS IN KENTUCKY. 17

officers; on the ground tliat tlie camp was irritating the people,
and sent a delegation to Washington to request President
Lincoln to remove the camp from the state. Governor
Magoffin officially demanded its removal in order to prevent
civil war. The President refused compliance on the ground
that the troops were Kentuckians, and were not menacing
their fellow-citizens. The camp was therefore maintained and
fortified. The first four regiments organized at this camp
were the Third, Fourth, and Seventh regiments of infantry,
and the First Kentucky Cavalry, commanded respectively
by Colonels T. E. Bramlette, Speed S. Fry, T. T. Garrard, and
Frank Wohford.

Commonwealth of Kentucky, Executive Department,
Frankfort, August 19, 18G1.
To his Excellency, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States.

Sir : — From the commencement of the unhapjDy hostilities now pend-
ing in this country, the people of Kentucky have indicated an earnest
desire and purpose, as far as lay in their laower, while maintaining their
original political status, to do nothing by which to involve themselves in
war Up to this time they have succeeded in securing to themselves
and to the state, peace and tranquillity as the fruits of the policy they
adopted. My single object now is to promote the continuance of these
blessings to the people of this state.

Until within a brief period the people of Kentucky were quiet and
tranquil, free from domestic strife, and undisturbed by internal commo-
tion. They have resisted no law, rebelled against no authority, engaged
in no revolution, but constantly proclaimed their firm determination to
pursue their peaceful avocations, earnestly hoping that their own soil
would be sjoared the presence of armed troops, and that the scene of
conflict would be kejjt removed beyond the border of their state. By
thus avoiding all occasions for the introduction of bodies of armed sol-
diers, and offering no provocation for the jiresence of military force, the
people of Kentucky have sincerely striven to preserve in their state do-
mestic peace, and avert the calamities of sanguinary engagements.

Recently a large body of soldiers have been enlisted in the United
States army, and collected in military camps in the central portion of
Kentucky. This movement was preceded by the active organization of
companies, regiments, etc., consisting of men sworn into the United
States service under officers holding commissions from yourself Ord-
nance, arms, munitions, and supplies of war are being transported into
the state, and placed in large quantities in these camps. In a word, au

2

18 OEGANIZATION OF TROOPS IT^ KENTUCKY.

army is now being organized and quartered within the state, supplied
with all the appliances of war, without the consent or advice of the au-
thorities of the state, and without consultation with those most promi-
nently known as loyal citizens. This movement now imperils that peace
and tranquillity which, from the beginning of our pending difficulties,
have been the j^aramount desire of this people, and which, up to this
time, they have so secured to the state.

Within Kentucky there has been, and is likely, to be no occasion for the
presence of military force. The people are quiet and tranquil, feeling no
apprehension of any occasion arising to invoke protection from the Fed-
eral army. They have asked that their territory be left free from mil-
itary occupation, and the present tranquillity of their communication left
uninvaded by soldiers. They do not desire that Kentucky shall be re-
quired to supply the battle-field for the contending armies, or become the
theater of war.

Now, therefore, as governor of the State of Kentucky, and in the
name of the people, I have the honor to represent, and with the single
and earnest desire to avert from their peaceful homes the horrors of
war, I urge the removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military force
now organized and in camp within the state. If such action as is hereby
urged, be promptly taken, I firmly believe the peace of the people of
Kentucky will be preserved, and the horrors of a bloody war will be
averted from a people now peaceful and tranquil.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. MAGOFFIN.

REPLY OF THE PRESIDENT.

Washixgtox, August 24, 1861.
To his Excellency, B. Morjoffin, Governor of the State of Kentucky.

SxR : — Your letter of the 19th inst., in which you urge the removal from
the limits of Kentucky of the military force now organized and in camp
within that state, is received. I may not possess full and accurate knowl-
edge of this subject, but I believe it is true that there is a military force
in camp within Kentucky, acting by authority of the United States,
which force is not very large, and is not now being augmented.

I also believe that some arms have been furnished to this force by the
United States. I also believe this force consists exclusively of Kentuck-
ians, having their camp in the immediate vicinity of their own homes,
and not assailing or menacing any of the good people of Kentucky.

In all I have done in the premises, I have acted upon the urgent solici-
tation of many Kentuckians, and in accordance with what I believed,
and still believe, to be the wish of a majority of all the Union-loving peo-
ple of Kentucky.

While I have conversed on this subject with many eminent men of
Kentucky, including a large majority of her members of Congress, I do not
remember that any one of them, or any other person, except your excel-

OEGANIZATION^ OF TROOPS IX KENTUCKY. 19

lency and the bearer of your excellency's letter, has urged me to remove
the military force from Kentucky or to disband it. One other very
worthy citizen of Kentucky did solicit me to have the augmenting of the
force suspended for a time.

Taking all the means within my reach to form a judgment, I do not
believe it is the popular wish of Kentucky that this force shall be re-
moved beyond her limits; and with this impression, I must respectfully
decline to so remove it.

I most cordially sj^mpathize with your excellency in the wish to preserve
the peace of my own native state, Kentucky. It is with regret I search
and can not find in your not very short letter, any declaration or intima-
tion that you entertain any desire for the preservation of the Federal
Union.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN,

CHAPTER IV.

COMMAND OF GENERAL ANDERSON.

The foregoing topical presentation of affairs, civil and mili-
tary, in Kentucky, has been made, that explanatory digressions
might be avoided, and that the narrative might proceed with
events, as far as practicable, in their exact chronological order
and logical connection.

On the 28th day of May, 1861, that portion of Kentucky,
extending one hundred miles south of the Ohio river, was con-
stituted a military department, designated as the " Department
of Kentucky," with Brigadier-General Robert Anderson as
■commander. As the national authorities, at this period, were
dealing very gently with Kentucky, General Anderson's head-
quarters were established at Cincinnati, Ohio. During the
months of June, July, and August, his command of this de-
partment was only a nominal one. He did not directly inter-
fere with the movements of loyal men or secessionists. Colonel
Prentiss, of another command, as early as the 5th of June,
had broken up a Confederate camp live miles inland from
Cairo. But otherwise, Kentucky, though claiming neutrality,
but unofficially furnishing troops for loyal and disloyal service,
was allowed the untrammeled management of her own afiairs.
Rousseau and Kelson were enrolling troops for the United
States army, not strictly according to prescribed forms, but as
best they could, improvising what was not supplied by gov-
ernment, and forcing success in the midst of formidable diffi-
culties.

During this period of Kentucky's neutrality, collisions and
bloodshed were anticipated by all parties. A conflict was es-
pecially imminent at Louisville on the 22d of July, the day

(20)

COMMAND OF GENERAL AN^DERSO?^. 21

following the defeat of General McDowell at Bull Run, as then
the secessionists of the city, under the leadership of the noto-
rious Tompkins, local chief of the " Knights of the Golden
Circle," plainly indicated their purpose to control the city or
hazard a conflict. As, however, in olden time it often occurred
that great armies accepted the issues of dualistic contests be-
tween leaders or champions, so in Louisville, the killing of
Tompkins hy G. A. Green, a loyal policeman, seemingly at
least, arrested the preparations for a general struggle. The
excitement consequent upon this event revealed such a host of
loyal men in the city, that secessionists were intimidated in
the midst of their exultation over their victory in Virginia.

The month of August was the crisis. The plans of the se-
cessionists were fully matured at a meeting in Scott county, on
the 17th of August. The governor's protest against Camp
Dick Robinson was one feature of it, and its purpose doubtless
was to remove all the national troops from Kentucky, that
with the help of Confederate soldiers from Tennessee, the se-
cessionists might commit the state to the rebellion. This hav-
ing failed, their next efforts were to embarrass the organization
of national troops, and secretly organize themselves to co-
operate with external forces to compel Kentucky to take her
proper place amongst her " sister Southern States."

The soldiers at Camp Dick Robinson were without arms,
except ordinary rifles and shot-guns, and it was a difficult and
delicate matter to secure a supply. The government, at the
request of Lieutenant l^elson, now acting brigadier-general,
had sent six thousand muskets, one hundred thousand rounds
of ammunition, and a quantity of powder and lead had been
shipped to Cincinnati. The secessionists knew of this and
were determined to prevent their transmission to Camp Dick
Robinson.

The munitions were first put on the cars at Covington, Ken-
tucky, and sent toward Lexington. The train was stopped
in ]Iarrison County by a band of armed men and compelled
to return to Cincinnati, and the principal stockholder of the
road was notified that it would be destroyed if it was used to
transport arms into Kentucky. The arms and ammunition
were next shipped on a steamboat for the Kentucky river, to

22 COMMAXD OF GENERAL ANDERSON.

be delivered at Hickman's bridge near the camp. The steamer
was stopped in Owen county and forced to return. They were
then shipped to Louisville, and thence by a special train to
Lexington. General l^elson having been advised of their
shipment by telegraph, sent Colonel Thomas E. Bramlette to
Lexington, with instructions to send them by railroad to ISTich-
olasville, whence they were to be hauled to camp in wagons
guarded by a squadron of Colonel Wolford's cavalry, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Letcher. When near Lexington, Colonel
Bramlette, having learned from Captain Dobj-ns and Lieu-
tenant Wheat, that great excitement was prevailing in the
town in regard to the arms, and that the secessionists were
preparing to seize them, and had so alarmed the othcials
of the road as to prevent their farther transportation by
rail, directed the captain and lieutenant to proceed to Nich-
olasville and order up the transportation and cavalry with all
possible speed. On reaching Lexington, he found that Dr.
Ethelbert Dudley, afterward colonel in the national army,
who had a company of " Home Guards," had made arrange-
ments for the prompt assembling of his men should the seces-
sionists attempt to seize the arms. Upon the arrival of the
cavalry, this class became intensely excited and rallied under
the leadership of J. C. Breckinridge, who threatened to drive
the " Lincoln hirelings " from the town. John H. Morgan as-
sembled at the armory the " State Guards " under his com-
mand, to assist Breckinridge in his work of treason. Mes-
sengers were sent requesting Colonel Bramlette to withdraw
his troops from the town to avoid bloodshed, promising that
Breckinridge would then use his influence to have the arms
pass unmolested. Colonel Bramlette replied " that he would
not depart without the arms and munitions, and that if armed
rebels appeared upon the street, blood would be shed, and he
would not leave a living secessionist in Lexington." He then
loaded the arms and munitions, and took them to Camp Dick
Robinson without further molestation.

On the 15th of August, General Anderson's command was
extended so as to embrace the States of Kentucky and Ten-
nessee, under the title of the " Department of the Cumberland ;"
his headquarters, however, were not removed from Cincinnati

COMMAND or GEXEEAL AXDERSOX. 23

until tHe 1st of September, when they were established in
Louisville. By this time it was plainly manifest that even the
nominal neutrality of Kentucky could be maintained no longer.
The leading secessionists had despaired of the secession of the
state through the independent action of Kentuckians, and
many of them had joined the Confederate forces, encamped
on the northern confines of Tennessee. As these men could
no longer organize rebellion within the limits of Kentucky,
they invited invasion as the only means untried to force her
into alliance with the Confederacy, against the expressed decis-
ion of the majority of the people — a course which was a bur-
lesque upon their vaunted attachment to the doctrine of state-
rights.

At this time there were three Confederate generals with
encampments and organized troops near the southern boundary
of Kentucky. General Polk was on the Mississippi river, in
the northwest corner of Tennessee ; Buckner, who had recently
exchanged the uniform of a lieutenant-general, which he had
worn as inspector-general of the " State Guard," for that of a
brigadier-general in the rebel army, was at Camp Boone, sit-
uated near the Louisville and l^ashville railroad within the
limits of Tennessee, and Zollicotfer was in Tennessee, south
of Barboursville, Kentucky. These generals were waiting for
a pretext to invade the state.

The initial invasion was made bj' Leouidas Polk, who, hav-
ing thrown aside his insignia as a minister of the " Gospel of
Peace," had grasped the sword.

This quondam bishop occupied Hickman and Chalk Bluffs,
Kcntuck}', with his command, on the 5tli of September, under
the pretext of military necessity, and on the 7th took posses-
sion of Columbus. As a counter movement, on the Gth,
Brigadier-General U. S. Grant landed troops at Paducah, with
two gunboats in support, and was reinforced on the 7th. A
few days later, ZoUicoffer occupied Cumberland Gap, and
threw a portion of his forces into Kentucky. Thus the armies
of the United States and those of the so-called Confederate
States were upon the soil of Kentucky, and she was compelled
to abandon her neutrality, and choose alliance with one or
the other belligerent power, or retain her position by resist-

24 COMMAXD OF GENERAL AXDEESOX.

ing botli. Fortunately, a loyal legislature was in session to
take action in the crisis — a legislature whose members could
not reflect the sentiments of their constituents and attempt
the maintenance of neutrality, or withhold positive allegiance
to the national government. On the 9th, General Polk, hav-
ing flrst obtained an official approval of his act from the Con-
federate President, informed Governor Magoffin, that under
a military necessity he had occupied Columbus. The governor
promptly communicated the facts to the legislature, by special
message, and the legislature, on the 12th, by a large majority
of votes, directed the governor to issue a proclamation order-
ing the Confederate troops, encamped in the state, to evacuate
the soil of Kentucky, and resolutions were adopted asserting
the wanton violation of the peace and neutrality of Kentucky,
the invasion of her soil, and the infringement of the rights of
her citizens by the so-called Confederate forces ; empowering
the governor to call out the military forces of the state to
expel the invaders ; invoking the United States to give such
assistance to Kentucky as was warranted by the fourth article
of the national constitution, and requesting Brigadier-General
Robert Anderson to enter upon his duties as commander of
the district embracing Kentucky. This action terminated
formal neutrality, and committed the state to the positive sup-
port of the national government.

This position of Kentucky has historic interest, from the fact
that the experiment had such issue that its repetition is not
probable. ITeutrality considered as a principle, or viewed in
relation to the organic subordination of the individual state to
the general government and the imperative requirements of
patriotism, is wholly without justification. As an expedient
even, its assumption by loyal men can not be justified or
palliated by the fact that advantages may have resulted from
it. That Kentucky's neutrality was not wholly evil is very
apparent, and to this day many of the leading loyal men of
the state, some of whom opposed the position from first to
last, believe that the cause of the " Union " gained more than
that of the " Rebellion " by the equivocal status of Kentucky
for the first six months of the war. As, however, the results
of the early positive loyalty of the Union men of Kentucky

COMMAND OF GEXEKAL ANDEKSOX. 25

can ncfw be only conjectural, the consequences of their
neutralit}', in comparison, can not be determined. It is
not, however, improbable that had the \ayii\ people pre-
cipitated action, the proximate results would have been
disastrous, as under the pressure of passion and prejudice,
secession might have resulted, since the secessionists were
organized, and loyal citizens were not. At the beginning of
the war, it was evident that a large portion of the people of
Kentucky were in heart}' sympathy with the rebellion,
and the strength of this party was seemingly much greater
than it really was, in consequence of their surpassing noisi-
ness. Another large class was entirely undecided. Delay
of state action gave time for reflection, for the organization of
loyal men, and the development of the true issues of the war,
and threw open to the vision of the far-sighted the terrible
consequences of secession. The statesmen of Kentucky must
have foreseen that neutrality could not be maintained through
a protracted war, involving the decided action of all the other
states, but in view of the apparent strength of the disloyal
and the uncertainty with regard to a loyal majority, it may
have been expedient for them to delay final action as long as
.possible. ISTeutrality practically was only procrastination in
the choice of JSTorthern or Southern alliance. The intelligent
of the whole country knew that the bombardment of Fort
Sumter rendered futile all further efforts for the conciliation
of the two great sections. The purpose of the JSTorthern
States was not dubiously revealed, that the "National Flag"
which was lowered at Charleston should float there again, no
matter how long or how bloody might be the intervening Avar.
And the Southern people knew full well that their independ-
ence could only be gained by the sword.

The fame of Kentucky has suffered through her neutrality,
but still her fifty-six thousand loyal soldiers, displaying gal-
lantry and patriotism in the great Western battles, give war-
rant to the historian to say, with emphasis, that though the
state was tardy in the expression of loyalty, she made a good
record, especially for a slaveholding state, in a war which
overthrew the institution which commanded her inveterate
attachment. Great honor should be awarded the multitudes
in Kentucky, who, though they hesitated at the threshhold of

26 COMMAND OF GENERAL ANDERSON.

unconditional loyalty, yet at last, true to the traditional pa-
triotism of the state, and despite their community of material
interests, and their social and political harmonies with the
revolted states, did reach that high type of loyalty, which has
its revelation on fields of blood. Some hesitation was natural,
if not commendable, at a time when the final action of the state
in the event of a general war was problematical to her wisest
statesmen. But most emphatic praise is due to those who, in
face of what seemed to be the dominant sentiment of the peo-
ple of the state in April, boldly drew their swords for the
maintenance o± the Union. And, in striking contrast, the se-
verest condemnation should rest upon those who were alike
disloyal to the nation and their own state — supporting the re-
Ijcllion against the general government and fighting against
Kentucky.

August 15th, Brigadier-General George H. Thomas relieved
Lieut. William iN'clson as commander of Camp Dick Eobin-
son ; the latter was soon after raised to the rank of brigadier-
general, and assigned to duty at Maysville, Kentucky, to or-
ganize a force to operate in the eastern portion of the state.
The going of the former to the camp was known to the seces-
sionists, and combinations were formed to prevent it ; but
from some cause he was not molested in the passage. He
found four partly organized Kentucky regiments, in almost
total destitution of quartermaster and commissary stores.
Directing personally the minutest details, he hurried the com-
pletion of what ISTelson had begun — the organization and equip-
ment of the primal Kentucky brigades. Beyond his camp he
was connected with matters which imposed additional respon-
sibility and labor. The general direction of the "Home
Guard " in central Kentucky devolved upon him ; his prox-
,imity to the capital connected him with the interests there
focalized, and what was of greater moment, the enemy was in
his front. Zollicofier's strength and attitude were regarded as
extremely threatening. His movement had been made to
subserve several purposes : to prevent the escape to the national
lines of loyal East Tennesseeans ; to oppose an advance to
that region to succor Union men, and cut or hold the Tennes-
see and Virginia railroad; and with the ulterior intention of

COMMAJ^^D OF GENERAL ANDERSON. 27

co-opci*ating witli Polk and Buckner in the permanent occu-
pancy of Kentucky. The members of the legislature, and
loyal citizens in central Kentucky, fearing invasion and revo-
lutionary surprise, General Thomas was requested by the
formal action of the former, to send troops to Lexington for
the protection of Union men.

General Thomas soon mustered into the service four Ken-
tucky and two Tennessee regiments, and organized the First
Kentucky brigade, the first formed in the state, which was
consequently the first brigade of the Army of the Cumberland,
and its nucleus. This army had other lines of origin. But
as among the initial sources of rivers, one spring, from the
force and direction of its living current, has precedence, so has
this brigade in the organization of this army. The Third and
Fourth Kentucky Infantry and the First Kentucky Cavalry
were the first formed in the state, and the two former were
at first designated as the First and Second Kentucky Infantry ;
but Avhen the state became ofiicially loyal, her legislature re-
cognized the two regiments that Colonels Guthrie and Wood-
rutf had organized in Ohio, then Bramlette's and Fry's
regiments became the Third and Fourth. Besides, this bri-
gade has claims as the leading source, because the troops
composing it were the first to perform duty in Kentucky as
soldiers of the United States. Thus from the time of the or-
ganization of this brigade, the number of troops embraced,
their movements in the state under the national colors before
any others, and its subsequent designation as the first brigade,
first division of the army, its claims, as tlic nucleus, are unques-
tionable.

A second invasion was conducted by S. B. Buckner, on the
17th of September. As the commander of the state guard,
this Kentuckian and ex-ofiicer of the United States had served
the Southern cause to the extent of his power. Just before
he entered the Confederate army he visited Washington, and
had the freedom of the city and its defenses by virtue of his
declared purpose to be a non-combatant during the war. But
three weeks from the day he left Washington, having in the
meantime gone to Richmond and accepted a commission as
brigadier-general from the Confederate President, he moved

28 COMMAND OF GENERAL ANDERSON.

from liis camp in Tennessee to capture Louisville. Rumors
of his advance had been current in Louisville for a day or
two. Even reliable information had reached General Ander-
son that he meditated this movement. Dr. J. M. Bailey, late
consul to Glasgow, and surgeon of the Twenty-sixth Kentucky
during the war, residing at the time in the vicinity of Camp
33oone, learned on the 15th that an effort would be imme-
diately made for the capture of Louisville, and the day fol-
lovv^ina: communicated the fact to General Anderson. Buck-
ner planned a surprise. He doubtless knew that General An-
derson had no organized army, and but few troops of any
type. Anticipating assistance in Louisville, he was sanguine
of an easy capture. He seized the morning train in passage
to the North, cut the telegraph wire, and started toward
Louisville. The earliest indications of his coming were the
delay of the train due early in the evening, and the inter-
ruption of telegraphic communication. These occurrences,
however, were not rightly interpreted at first. A train was
sent to relieve the one expected, on the supposition that an
ordinary accident had detained it. As this train did not re-
turn, a locomotive was sent. The locomotive was seized as
the train had been ; but from the engine a fireman had es-
caped, who hurried to Louisville on a hand-car and made
known what had occurred. Invasions by railroad had not
this early in the war been reduced to a science, and Buckner
having failed to anticipate the difficulties of such an advance,
where all were not friends, was suddenly arrested in his roll-
ing march. The displacement of a rail between Bowling
Green and Elizabethtown, by Crutcher, a loyal young man,
caused the locomotive to leave the track, and produced a de-
lay fatal to his success.

As soon as General Anderson received positive information
of the advance of Buckner, he sent Brigadier- General W. T.
Sherman, second to himself in command, to Camp Joe Holt
to order Colonel Rousseau to report with all his available
troops, as quickly as possible, at the Nashville depot in Louis-
ville. In the meantime, in obedience to the order of Mayor
Delph, the home guard, under command of Major A. Y.
Johnston, chief engineer of the fire department of the city,

COMMAND OF GENERAL ANDERSON. 29

in great numbers assembled at the depot. Before midnight
their train was ready to move. As it started, the van of Rous-
seau's command entered the depot. Rousseau soon followed,
and overtook the advance train at Shcphcrdsville at dawn
next morning.

General Anderson threw forward at once about three thou-
sand men, nearly all his available force. There were twelve
hundred in Rousseau's command, the remainder were of the
home guard. He placed General Sherman in command,
deeming it his duty to remain in the city that he might hurry
forward the troops expected from the adjoining Northern
States. General Sherman moved very cautiously during the
darkness. He had with him in the front car Mr. Fink, super-
intendent of the railroad, and Major Johnston, that he might
be advised concerning the country, and be ready to make his
dispositions with respect to the train and troops in the event
of an emergency.

On reaching the Rolling fork of Salt river. General Sher-
man ascertained that the railroad bridge had been burned by
order of Biickncr, to prevent the rapid advance of our troops,
as he had learned on reaching Elizabethtown that they were
in motion toward him. During the day the troops under
Rousseau forded the stream, and advanced to guard Mul-
draugh's hill. The home guard went into camp at Lebanon
Junction, using the tents of which the state guard liad l^een
despoiled. In the evening, Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. John-
son, of the Third Kentucky Cavalry, bringing with him some
additional companies of the home guard, reached the camp
and assumed general command, by order of General Ander-
son.

Buckner having failed in his main purpose, soon withdrew
to Bowling Green and intrenched himself. General Sherman
established his camp at Muldraugh's hill, and guarding the
railroad in his rear, awaited the coming of reinforcements.
The waiting was not protracted. The home guard had been
ordered to active duty for ten days ; but previous to their re-
turn to Louisville, several regiments from Ohio, Indiana, and
Illinois had reached Sherman. The earlier regiments were the
Sixth, Thirty-eighth, and Thirty-ninth Indiana, respectively

30 COMMAND OF GENEEAL AXDERSOX,

under Colonels Crittenden, Scribner, and Harrison; tlic Forty-
ninth Ohio, under Colonel Gibson; and the Twenty-fourth
Illinois, under Colonel Heckcr.

In conjunction with Buckner's movement upon Louisville,
ZollicofFer advanced from Tennessee, through Cumberland
Gap, to Cumberland Ford, threatening Camp Dick Robinson.
Zollicoffer's vanguard reached Barboursville on the 18th, and
skirmished with a small body of the home guard. General
Thomas threw forward Colonel T. T. Garrard, with the
Seventh Kentucky Infantry and the First Kentucky Cavalry,
to Rock Castle hills, with instructions to obstruct the road
and oppose the advance of the enemy. Captain Brown was
advanced to London, as a party of observation, and to inter-
cept any small body of disloyal citizens seeking to join the
enemy. These dispositions and Buckner's retreat from Mul-
draugh's hill, caused Zollicofi'er to retire.

Simultaneously with these movements, the secessionists hith-
erto discomfited in every effort to invite or force Kentucky
from the Union, made a final eflbrt to accomplish this end. A
call was published in the various newspapers throughout the
state in the interests of the rebellion, as also in posters scattered
broadcast, urging the " State-Rights " and " Peace Men " to as-
semble at Lexington on the 20th of September, for the purpose
of having a camp drill, to continue for several days, under the
supervision of Major J. C. Breckinridge, Colonel Humphrey
Marshall, and other distinguished men. Information received
by General Thomas indicated that under cover of this call the
disloyal element of the state intended to concentrate and organ-
ize at Lexington, seize upon all the arms there and in the ar-
senal at Frankfort, then to unite with Zollicofi'er in the expect-
ation that the combined forces could compel the evacuation of
Camp Dick Robinson, and subsequently, in conjunction with
Buckner, to reach Louisville and secure Kentucky to the rebel-
lion. On the 18th, General Thomas directed Colonel Bram-
lette to move immediately to Lexington and occupy the " Fair
Grounds," with instructions to observe the gathering very
closely, and in the event of any demonstrations or movements
of hostile nature, to arrest the persons making them ; but
should there be none, not to arrest those having assembled.

COMMAXD OF GENERAL ANDERSON. 31

In compliance with these instrnctions, Colonel Bramlette
marched to JSTicholasville, seized a train of cars, and moved to
Lexington, occupjdng the fair grounds at 4 p. M. on the 19th.
The secessionists had heen notified of his approach ahont mid-
night, and Major Breckinridge, Colonel "William Preston,
George C. Hodge, and others fled through the mountains
toward Virginia, Colonel Marshall to his camp, and John H.
Morgan and his men joined Buckner at Muldraugh's hill just
before his retreat. Zollicoffer's advance prevented General
Thomas from sending Wolford, with a part of his cavalry, to
Lexington, to co-operate with Bramlette as he had intended,
otherwise many of these men might have been captured.

The presence of rebel armies in Kentucky had no tendency
to make rebels of Keutuckians. The rampant secessionists
who had left the state had made their Southern friends l^elieve
that the military occupancy of Kentucky would insure her
withdrawal from the Union ; but the eliect was antipodal to
the one anticipated. As has been mentioned, the legislature,
as early as September 12th, by resolution directed the gov-
ernor to issue a proclamation ordering the invading forces to
leave the state, and had invited General Anderson to enter
immediately upon the active discharge of his duties as com-
mander of the department.

In response to this invitation. General Anderson assumed
command by proclamation issued September 21st, in which he
earnestly invoked the citizens of his native state to arm them-
selves for self-defense and for the expulsion of the invaders.
About the same time, General Thomas L. Crittenden, com-
mander of the " State Guard," with equal earnestness urged
the members of his command to repair to places designated
for rendezvous, to be mustered into the service of the United
States. On the 25th of Sei^tember, the legislature passed a
bill providing for the enlistment of forty thousand volunteers,
to serve from one to three years.

This turn of afiairs imposed heavy duties upon the depart-
ment commander, and General Anderson's health failing, he
was relieved, at his own request, October 7th. The day fol-
lowing, General Sherman assumed command of the depart-
ment.

32 COMMAND OF GENERAL ANDERSON.

[GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 57.]

War Department, Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, August 15, 186L
L The States of Kentucky and Tennessee will, in future, constitute a
separate military command, to be known as the Department of the Cum-
berland, under the command of Brigadier-General Robert Anderson,
U. S. Army.

By order: L. THOMAS,

Adjutant- General.

Executive Department, Frankfort, September 9, 1861.
Gentlemen of the Senate and Souse of Representatives :

I have received the following dispatches, by telegraph, from General
Leonidas Polk, which 1 deem proper to lay before you.

B. MAGOFFIN.

Columbus, Ky., September 9, 1861.
Governor B. Magoffin :

A military necessity having required me to occupy this town, I have
taken possession of it by the forces under my command. The circum-
stances leading to this act were reported promptly to the President of the
Confederate States. His reply was, the necessity justified the action. A
copy of my proclamation I have the honor to transmit you by mail.

Respectfully,

• LEONIDAS POLK,

Major- General Commanding.

Columbus, Kt., September 9, 1861.
Governor B. Magoffin, Frankfort, Ky.

I should have dispatched you immediately, as the troops under my
command took possession of this position, the very few words I addressed
to the people here ; but my duties since that time have so pressed me,
that I have bvit now the first leisure time to communicate with you. It
will be sufficient for me to inform you, which my short address here will
do, that I had information on which 1 could rely, that the Federal forces
intended and were preparing to seize Columbus. I need not describe
the danger resulting to West Tennessee from such success. Realizing
my responsibility, I could not permit them quietly to lose, through the
command intrusted to me, so important a position. In evidence of the
information I possessed, I will state as the Confederate forces occupied
this place, the Federal troops were formed in formidable numbers in po-
sition upon the ojiposite bank, with their cannon turned upon Columbus;
the citizens of the town had fled with terror, and not a word of assur-
ance of safety or protection had been addressed to them.

Since I have taken possession of this place, I have been informed by

COMMAND OF GENERAL ANDERSON. 33

highly responsible citizens of your state, that certain representatives of
the Federal government are setting up complaints of my act of occupy-
ing it, and are making it a pretense for seizing other positions. Upon
this course of proceeding I have no comment to make, but I am prepared
to say that I will agree to withdraw the Confederate troops from Ken-
tucky, provided she will agree that the troops of the Federal government
be withdrawn simultaneously, with a guaranty, which I will give recip-
rocally for the Confederate government, that the Federals shall not be
allowed to enter or occupy any point of Kentucky in the future.
I have the honor to be your obedient servant, respectfully,

LE0NIDA8 POLK,
Major- General Commanding.

PROCLAMATION BY THE GOVERNOR.

In obedience to the subjoined joint resolution adopted by the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the government of the
Confederate States, the State of Tennessee, and all others concerned, are
hereby informed that " Kentucky expects the Confederate or Tennessee
troops to be withdrawn from her soil unconditionally."

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my name, and caused the
seal of the commonwealth to be atBxed. Done at Frankfort, this 13th
day of September, a. d. 1861, and in the seventieth year of the common-
wealth.

By the Governor : B. MAGOFFIN.

Thos. B. Monroe, Jr., Secretary of the State. t

Scpteynbcr 14, 1801.

Resolved, by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, That
his excellency, Governor Magoffin, be, and he is, hereby instructed to in-
form those concerned that Kentucky expects the Confederate or Ten-
nessee troops to be withdrawn from her soil unconditionally.

THE KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS.

Offered in the Kentucky Senate, September 9, 1861, by Senator Whit-
taker, and adopted September 12, 1801.

Resolved., That Kentucky's peace and neutrality have been wantonly
violated, her soil has been invaded, the rights of her citizens have been
grossly infringed by the so-called Southern Confederate forces. This has
been done without cause ; therefore.

Be it resolved by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, That
the governor be requested to call out the military force of the state to
expel and drive out the invaders.

Resolved, That the United States be invoked to give aid and assistance,
that protection against invasion which is granted to each one of the states

3

34 COMMAND OF GENERAL ANDERSON.

by the fourth section of the fourth article of the constitution of the
United States.

Resolved, That General Robert Anderson be, and is hereby requested to
enter immediately upon the active discharge of his duties in this military
district.

Resolved, That we appeal to the people of Kentucky by the ties of pa-
triotism and honor, by the ties of common interest and common defense,
by the remembrances of the past, and by the hopes of future national ex-
istence, to assist in repelling and driving out the wanton violators of our
peace and neutrality, the lawless invaders of our soil.

PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL ANDERSON.

Louisville, Ky., September 21.

Kextuckians : — Called by the legislature of this, my native state, I
hereby assume command of this department. I come to enforce, not to
make laws, and, God willing, to protect your property and your lives.

The enemies of the country have dared to invade our soil. Kentucky
is in danger. She has vainly striven to keep peace with her neighbors.
Our state is now invaded by those who professed to be her friends, but
who now seek to conquer her. No true son of Kentucky can longer
hesitate as to his duty to his state and country. The invaders must, and,
God willing, will be expelled. The leader of the hostile forces, who now
approaches, is, I regret to say, a Kentuckian, making war on Kentucky
and Kentuckians. Let all past differences of opinion be overlooked.
Every one who now rallies to the support of our Union and our state, is
a friend. Rally, then, my countrymen, around the flag our fathers loved,
and which has shielded us so long. I call you to arms for self-defense,
and for the protection of all that is dear to freemen. Let us trust in
God and do our duty, as did our fathers.

ROBERT ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General U. S. A.

PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL CRITTENDEN.

To the Militia of Kenhichj :

By the authority which you yourselves have appointed, you are called
upon to defend your state. Misguided countrymen, whom you loved too
well to fight, despite their wrongs to you, waging unnatural war, have
tarnished the bright fame of Kentucky, and for the first time since your
sires bequeathed to you this noble state, the soil is polluted by the tread
of hostile armies.

I will not impugn the patriotism and courage of my countrymen by
supposing that any appeal, however eloquent, could arouse them to energy
and prompt action as this simple statement.

But to the State Guard I must add a word. Now is your opportunity to
wipe out every reproach that has been put upon you. You owe it not

COMMAND OF GENERAL ANDERSON. 35

only to ymir duty as men and citizens, but to that solemn obligation of
soldiers which you can not forget without dishonor, to respond to this
call.

The State Guard will rendezvous as soon as possible at Louisville, and
report to me. The residue of the militia and such of the Home Guard
as choose to volunteer, will rendezvous as soon as possible at Louisville,
Frankfort, Camp Dick Robinson, General Sherman's Camp, New Haven,
and Henderson.

Come in battalions, regiments, companies, or come as individuals, and
you shall be mustered into the service under pay at once.

T. L. CRITTENDEN,
Brigadier-General Kentuclcij Slate Guard.

[GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 6.]

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Louisville, Ky., October 7, 1861.
The following telegraphic order was received yesterday at these head-
quarters :
^^ Brigadier- General Anderson :

"To give you rest necessary to restoration of health, call Brigadier-
General Sherman to command the Department of the Cumberland. Turn
over to him your instructions, and report here in person as soon as you
may, without retarding your recovery.

"Washington, D. C, October 6, 1861. Winfield Scott."

In obedience to the above orders, I hereby relinquish the command of
the department to Brigadier-General Sherman.

Regreting deeply the necessity which renders this step proper, I do it

with less reluctance, because my successor, Brigadier-General Sherman, is

the man I had selected for that purpose. God grant that he may be the

means of delivering this department from the hands of marauding bands,

who, under the guise of relieving and benefiting Kentucky, are doing

all the injury they can to those who will not join tliem in their accursed

warfare.

R. ANDERSON,

Official: Brigadier- General U. iS. A., Commanding.

0. D. Green, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[GENERAL ORDERS, NO 7.]

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,

Louisville, Ky., October 8, 1861.

Brigadier-General Robert Anderson having relinquished the command

of this department in General Orders No. 6, of this date, tlie undersigned

assumes command of this department.

W. T. SHERMAN,

Brigadier- General.

CHAPTER V.

OPERATIONS OF GENERAL THOMAS, IN KENTUCKY, UNDER GEN-
ERAL SHERMAN.

As yet, no effort had been made to give an army organiza-
tion to the troops of the department. Those on the Louis-
ville and ISTashville railroad were without even regular
brigade organization. There had been too much hurry in
their movements to allow this initial step. But now, as regi-
ments in great numbers were coming into the department,
and as the establishment of numerous camps of rendezvous
and instruction for volunteers promised the speedy formation
of a large number of Kentucky regiments, the organization
of a grand army became the paramount duty of the hour.

There were, however, nnusual embarrassments attending its
performance. Many of the regiments were of very recent
organization, and all had been hurried to the front to repel
invasion, and at the same time to link themselves together in
the simple and complex relations of a great army, in the imme-
diate presence of the enemy. With them the school of the
soldier involved the experience of war, and as a consequence
the facts of organization and the events of actual conflict
demand concurrent narration. At first, troops were massed
as emergencies required. Subsequently, these improvised
commands were transformed into brigades and divisions.
And as there was no general movement of the forces in Ken-
tucky until the advance of the " Army of the Ohio," under
Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, after the fall of Fort Donelson,
it is obviously appropriate to group anterior events, as con-
nected with the troops comprising each division, beginning
with the first.

Yery soon after the formation of the Kentucky brigade,

(36)

GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL SHERMAN. 37

composecT, as lias been stated, of four Kentucky and two Ten-
nessee regiments, several regiments from Ohio and Indiana
were added to the command of General Thomas, Such, how-
ever, w'as the necessary diiFusion of these troops that regular
brigade or^'anization could not at once be effected.

The first movement General Thomas meditated for his com-
mand was an advance from Camp Dick Robinson to Cumber-
land Ford. The threatening attitude of the enemy, and the
protection of Union men on the southeastern border of Ken-
tucky, already clamorous for help, rendered it imperative that
an advance toward Tennessee should be undertaken as soon
as practicable. But an immediate advance was plainly imprac-
ticable. It was know^n that the rebel authorities were trans-
porting troops in large numbers from Virginia and the far
South to Barboursville, Kentucky, and that the force under
the Confederate general, Zolli coffer, was augmenting more rap-
idly than the command of General Thomas. Besides, the
national troops w^ere raw, and destitute of adequate equip-
ments, artillery, and transportation. Under these circum-
stances. General Thomas used the " Home Guard " to protect
roads and keep the disloyal element in awe, and holding his
other fooops for emergency and discipline, waited impatiently
for reinforcements and munitions.

Immediately after the withdrawal of Zollicoffer, General
Thomas suggested to General Anderson the importance of
concentrating for an advance to Knoxville, Tennessee, to seize
the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad, destroy all the
bridges for some distance east and west from Knoxville, and
then to turn upon Zollicoffer while in the passes of the Cum-
berland Mountains, and by getting between him and his sup-
plies, effect the capture or dispersion of his army. The de-
sirableness of tliis movement was enhanced by the fact that
ISTashville had recently been made a base of supplies for the
Confederate army in Virginia. Its success would sever the
most direct railroad connection between the Confederate
armies east and west, and relieve from tyranny the loyal people
of East Tennessee.

But barely sufficient troops for successful defense were fur-
nished, and in a few days General Thomas was again thrown

38 GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL SHERMAN.

upon the defensive, by the advance of Zollicoffe*' to Loudon,
In this emergency, he sent forward all the Ohio troops and
the Third Kentucky Infantry ; ordered the obstruction of the
Richmond road, on the north side of Rock Castle hills, from
the river to Big Hill, and the one connecting the Richmond
and Mount Yernon roads, and urged Brigadier-General 0. M.
Mitchell, in command at Cincinnati, Ohio, to send reinforce-
ments and artillery. As, however, the enemy made no effort
to force the passage of Rock Castle hills, and soon retired to
Cumberland Ford, General Thomas was again urgent for
such reinforcements as would justify him in the assumption
of the offensive. He suggested, in addition, that a column of
four regiments should move up the Big Sandy through the
counties of Floyd, Letcher, and Harlan, in co-operation with
his own advance by Barboursville to East Tennessee. In
response, six regiments were sent to him, but they were desti-
tute of such munitions as would warrant an advance to East
Tennessee. A few days later he asked for four well-equipped
regiments and two field batteries, believing that this addition
to his force and requisite transportation would assure the cap-
ture of Knoxville. The regiments were furnished, but as in
the case of others before them, in destitution of such appoint-
ments as were necessary for such a campaign as he proposed.
Anxious to assume the ofl'ensive, he was nevertheless forced
to await the pleasure of the enem3^

To give support to the troops at Rock Castle hills. General
Thomas ordered Colonel Connell, in command of the Seven-
teenth Ohio Infantry, to move from Camp Dick Robinson to
Big Hill, to observe the Richmond road. He subsequently
directed him to advance to London, but as the force at Rock
Castle hills was again threatened by Zollicotler, Colonel Con-
nel's destination was changed, while en route to the latter
place, where he arrived on the 20th of October. General
Thomas also sent from Camp Dick Robinson, Brigadier-Gen-
eral Albin Schoepf, who had recently reported to him for duty,
with the regiments of Colonels Coburn, Wolford, and Steed-
man, and Standardt's battery, to Colonel Garrard's support.
General Schoepf, with Coburn's and Wolford's regiments,
reached Rock Castle hills during the afternoon of the 20th.

GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL SHERMAN. 39

On tlie following morning, Steedman and Standardt arrived
witli their commands.

The arrival of reinforcements was opportune, as late in the
forenoon of the 21st, Zollicolfer, having fonnd his command in
close proximity to the positions of Colonels Cobnrn and Wol-
ford, and under concealment of a dense forest, suddenly ap-
peared in their front. The foremost rank bore their hats on
their bayonets and claimed to be friends. Soon throwing off
disguise, they opened fire, which being unexpected and vigor-
ous caused decided confusion in the ranks of the national
troops. The enemy's advantage, however, was only tempo-
rary, as Colonels Coburn and Yv^olford soon rallied their regi-
ments and gallantly repulsed him. Colonels Connell and
Steedman, assisted by Standardt's battery, engaged the enemy
with similar result. In the afternoon, Zollicoffer made another
assault, pressing most heavily against the position of Colonel
Garrard, but he was again repulsed at all points, and during
the following night retreated toward London. The enemy
fought bravely, coming within fifty yards of the works. Their
loss was thirty killed and a large number wounded. General
Schoepf s loss was five killed and eighteen wounded.

The issue of this engagement rendered fruitless the move-
ment of three or four thousand rebels, a few days later, from
Burksville to Albany, with their advance thrown forward to
Monticello, menacing Somerset, held by the Twelfth Ken-
tucky Infantry under Colonel W. A. Hoskins. This force
was doubtless intended for co-operation with ZollicoflJer in the
invasion of central Kentucky, in the event of his success at
Rock Castle hills. The union of this force with his com-
mand, would have given Zollicoffer an army of ten or eleven
thousand men, adequate in the extravagance of Southern arro-
gance and expectation, for the grandest achievements.

The defeat of Zollicoffer prevented the projected conjunc-
tion of these columns, and the one at Monticello, having
knowledge of this defeat, and of the reinforcements sent to
Somerset by General Thomas, withdrew into Tennessee with-
out inviting an engagement.

Immediately after the battle of Kock Castle Hills, General
Thomas resumed preparation for an advance to Cumberland

40 GEXEEAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL SHERMAN.

Gap. He moved the command of General Sclioepf, augmented
by tlie Tennessee troops, to the junction of the Richmond and
Crab Orchard roads, subsequently posting it at London, and
established his headquarters and a depot of supplies at Crab
Orchard, But circumstances beyond his control still prevented
his long-contemplated campaign. Before leaving Washington
for a command in Kentucky, assigned to him at the earnest
solicitation of General Anderson, he had tried to impress Gen-
eral Scott with the necessity of full preparation to meet a heavy
force of the enemy in the direction of East Tennessee,, and
upon his assumption of command at Camp Dick Robinson, he
had addressed himself to the accomplishment of this object.
His oft-repeated requests for troops, had only secured tardy
reinforcements of raw troops, destitute of adequate equip-
ments, artillery, and transportation. He now held the line
from the Ohio to London, and from Lexington to Frankfort;
Cincinnati was his base of supplies, and Camp Dick Robinson
his main depot. His communication by rail terminated at
Nicholasville. Foreseeing defeat, should he attempt the in-
vasion of East Tennessee without having an arm}^ of ample
strength and equipment, as he was persistently urged to do by
prominent loyalists from that region, he repeated his request
for such appointments for his command as the proposed cam-
paign demanded. Hitherto, General Sherman had approved
his plans and his eiforts for their execution, but now, fearing
that the long weak line which connected General Thomas with
his base of supplies might be severed by the enemy, he forbade
his farther advance.

On the 11th of IsTovember, General Sherman informed Gen-
eral Thomas that he had received a telegram from Brigadier-
General A. McD. McCook, at Camp Xcviu, that the enemy
had disappeared from Green river, and that there was a rumor
that Buckner was moving in force upon Louisville, between
him and General Thomas. Giving partial credence to this ru-
mor. General Sherman ordered General Thomas, if not en-
gaged in front, to withdraw his command back of the Ken-
tucky river, and act as circumstances should demand. General
Thomas replied that he did not credit the report, but would
give orders at once for the retrograde movement. He accord-

GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL SHERMAN. 41

ingly ordered General Sclioepf to break up liis camp immedi-
ately, and join liim with all his troops, at Crab Orchard or
ISTicholasville. The following day, General Sherman expressed
the conviction that the rebel General Albert Sidney Johnston
who had assnmed command of theinsnrgent army at Bowling
Green, with Hardee and Buckner as his lieutenants, was pre-
paring " to strike a great blow in Kentucky, by moving from
Bowling Green with a force not far short of forty-five thousand
men, with a large portion of artillery," and directed General
Thomas to hold himself in readiness for a prompt withdrawal
to Danville, leaving the Tennessee troops and Colonel Garrard
near Eock Castle river, to watch the enemy in the direction
of Cumberland Gap. General Sherman was not fully assured
that Johnston meditated so bold an assumption of the offen-
sive, but regarded such an event as very probable. On any
other supposition it seemed difficult to account for the activity
of the insurgent forces in Kentucky, or the boastful expect-
ancy of secessionists, that the day of their triumph was near.
Johnston had impressed a large number of wagons in the vi-
cinity of Bowling Green — a fact which pointed to the probable
advance of his army. Zollicoffer had retired into East Ten-
nessee, and had blockaded the roads in his retreat — a step which
might indicate his re-approach by Somerset from a more reli-
able base of supplies, or his union with Johnston on his north-
ward march. A force of nearly three thousand men were also
reported in motion from Tompkinsville, toward Columbia,
menacing Colonels Grider and Hazzard, who were recruiting
regiments at the latter place. As, however, the purpose of
the enemy was in doubt. General Sherman directed General
Thomas to remain at Crab Orchard, ready to move to Somerset
or Danville, as circumstances should require, but to make ef-
fort to intercept the force moving from Tompkinsville.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Louisville, Ky., October 25. 186L
General Geo. II. Thomas, Camp Dick Hohinson.

Sir: — Do n't push too far. Your line is already long and weak. I can
not now re-enforce you. Nelson has got into difficulty with the militia,
and 1 have no person to send there. An interruption of the railroads,

42 GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL SHERMAN.

by an incursion from Prestonburg, would cut you off from that source of
supply. Call to your assistance the regiment from train. The state
board is impressed with the necessity of energy in the organization of
volunteers, but we are still embarrassed for want of clothing and arms.
Promises are a poor substitute for them, but are all we have. I will
again urge on the department the pressing necessity for more good offi-
cers and large re-enforcements of men.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

Camp Dick Robinson, October 31, 18G1.
Brigadier- General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Department of the Cumberland,
Louisville, Ky.
General : — T shall start for the Crab Orchard Springs to-day. T have
directed the quartermaster to make arrangements to have all the stores
for the troops hauled from Nicholasville to Crab Orchard, by contract,
and will endeavor to have a government train organized to transport the
supplies from the latter place to the camp, in advance, and gradually
work out of the confusion into which the transportation has fallen, in
consequence of the inexperience of those gentlemen who have been per-
forming the duties of quartermaster.

* -x- * ^:- -» * * * ■»

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Brigadier-General U. S. A., Commanding.

Cincinnati, 0., September 20, 1861.
To General George II. Thomas, Commanding Camp Dick Robinson, Ky.

Dear Sir: — I commenced the shipment of wagons to you, and before I
had fairly gotten under way, I had orders from Western Virginia for four
hundred. The consequence is, you are left without for the present. I
will cheerfully do anything I can for you at any time, but these same
difficulties will be constantly occurring. General Rosecrans' orders must
of course take precedence.

JOHN H. DICKINSON,

Captain and Assistant Quartermaster.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Louisville, Ky., November 5, 1861.
Brigadier-General Thomas, Crab Orchard.

Sir: — In the present aspect of affiiirs, it is impossible to say how or
where we shall winter. This will depend on our enemies ; they will not
allow us to choose. I have done all iii my power to provide men and ma-
terial, adequate to the importance of the crisis ; but all things come dis-
jointed— regiments without overcoats, or wagons, or horses, or those

GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL SHERMAN. 43

essentials to movement. McCook has a good body of men, but the force
of the enemy far exceeds him, and the railroad on which he depends, is
in such a country that it requires large guards. All of these, in case of
attack, would be terribly exposed. I can hardly sleep to think what
would be your fate in case the Kentucky River bridge should be de-
stroyed, or the railroad to your rear ; and I have demanded again and
again a force adequate to all these vicissitudes, a very large force beyond
the ability of the states to furnish. Nelson and you ought simply to
guard those avenues of approach to the interior, but from this point we
should have made a bold forward movement; but I have never had a
force apiDroximating the magnitude of the occasion. I wish I oould make
your communications perfectly safe, and the cost would be nothing.
There should be at least ten good regiments to your rear, capable of sus-
taining the head of your column at London, but I am unable to provide ;
and hereabouts the army should be such as to prevent all idea of attack ;
but Buckner and Hardee have across Green river a very large force, and
may advance at their pleasure.

In this stage of the case, I can only repeat my former orders for you
to hold in check the force of ZollicotFer, and await events. The road to
Richmond depending on the ferry, appears to me less safe to you than
the one crossing Kentucky river by bridge. 1 have nothing from Nelson
for some days.

Truly yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Brigadier- General Commanding.

Louisville, Ky., November 11, 1861.
General Tliomas :

I am just in receipt of a telegraphic dispatch from McCook, at Camp
Nevin, that the force in his front along Green river has disappeared, and
that there is a rumor that Bucicner is moving in force toward Lexington
between us. If not engaged in front, at once withdraw your force back of
Kentucky river, and act according to the state of facts then. If it be true
that the force at the Gap has been increased, as represented, to twenty-
thousand, it would be madness to contend. My information is positive as
to the state of affairs along Green river, but conjectured as to the other,
and I send a special messenger to convey it to you.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Brigadier- General.

Crab Orchard, November 12, 1861.
General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Department of the Cumberland, Louis-
ville, Ky.
General : — Your dispatch received. I will give orders at once for a re-
trograde movement, but I am sure the enemy ai'e not moving between
us. All my information indicates that they are moving South.

44 GENEEAL THOMAS UNDEE GEXEEAL SHEEMAN.

I send this by Lieutenant Jones, Second Regiment Kentucky Volun-
teers, who will take back any orders you may have for me.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Brigadier- General.

Headquarters, Crab Orchard, November 13, 1861.
General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Department of the Cumberland, Louis-
ville, Ky.
General: — Colonel Bramlette writes me from Somerset, on the 11th,
but does not think that the enemy have any intention of advancing.

From General Schoepf 's camp the report is that Zollicofl'er has retired
beyond Cumberland GajD, leaving some cavalry pickets on the Tennessee
side of Cumberland Ford. I will send you a copy of Colonel Bramlette's
report to-night by mail.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Brigadier-General U. S. V.

Louisville, Ky., November 12, 1861.
General Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding Crab Orchard.

Sir : — I sent a special dispatch to you last night, intimating the neces-
sity of withdrawing your forces further back. I am convinced from
many facts that Sidney A. Johnston is making herculean efforts to strike
a blow in Kentucky ; that he designs to move from Bowling Green on
Lexington, Louisville, and Cincinnati. I may be in error, but he has
pressed into service some one thousand five hundred wagons at and near
Bowling Green, and his force is not far short of forty-five thousand men,
with a large portion of artillery.

The movement may depend on new circumstances, but I think the
best disposition of your forces is to leave the Tennesseeans and Colonel
Garrard in a kind of ambush, near Rockcastle river, and draw back of
Danville the balance. Establish communication with Bramlette and
Wolford, and with the other Kentucky regiments, such as Bruce's and
Barnes'.

Have all things planned, and defer the execution of them till you
know from the direction of Greenville, Campbellsville, and Lebanon,
that my conjecture is right.

If the movement be made in force, our effort should be to concentrate
before they reach the neighborhood of Danville. We can not trust the
telegraph, but when I telegraph to Nicholasville, " your application by
letter is granted," you will understand that my conjectures are correct.
When 1 telegraph, it is denied, then my information is wrong. We find
it impossible to penetrate their designs, excejat I know their force is very

GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL SHERMAN. 45

large, 'and they have pressed in all the wagons from several counties, for
which they could have no other use than what I name.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Brigadier- General Commanding.

Headquarters, Louisville, November 1^, 1861.

To General Thomas, Crab Orchard:

Your application is granted.

W. T. SHERMAN,

Brigadier- General Commanding.
Received at 4.30 p. m.

Headquarters Louisville, November 16, 1861.
To General Geo. H. Thomas, Crab Orchard.

General Buell has arrived and assumed command. He will send you
orders. In the meantime, remain at Crab Orchard.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Brigadier-General Commanding.
Received at 2.20 p. m.

CHAPTER VI.

OPERATIONS OP GENERAL THOMAS, IN KENTUCKY, UNDER GENERAL
BUELL, INCLUDING THE BATTLE OF MILL SPRINGS.

By general orders No. 97, war department, issued N"ovember
9tli, the Department of the Cumberland was discontinued,
and the Department of Ohio constituted, embracing the States
of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky (east of the Cumberland
river), and Tennessee, and Brigadier-General D. C. Buell was
assigned to its command.

General Buell assumed command of the new department on
the 15th of IsTovember. General Sherman advised General
Thomas of the fact, and directed him to await orders from the
new commander.

On the 17th, General Buell ordered General Thomas, by ver-
bal message, expressed through Captain T. S. Everts, assistant
adjutant-general, to move his command to Columbia, leaving
the First and Second Tennessee and Seventh Kentucky regi-
ments, under Lieutenant Carter, U. S. IST., acting brigadier-
general, at London, to observe any approach of the enemy
through Kentucky, from Cumberland Gap. Four days later,
General Carter was ordered to break up camp at London,
and join General Thomas at Lebanon. This movement was
considered so urgent, that he was directed to impress wagons
if he could not hire them. Still the order requiring it was re-
voked before the troops were put in motion, and with the ex-
ception of the sick who were sent to Crab Orchard, the com-
mand was left temporarily at London. In moving as directed.
General Thomas sent General Schoepf, with the Fourteenth
Ohio and Fourth Kentucky regiments, and Standardt's and
Kinney's batteries, by way of Stanford and Danville, the pre-

GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL BUELL. 47

scribed 'route tliroiigh Liberty being impassable, and followed
witli the Tenth, Seventeenth and Thirty-eighth Ohio regiments,
the Thirty-third Indiana having been left at Crab Orchard, un-
til the sick could be removed aud the depot broken up. He
had previously sent Colonels Bramlette's and Wolford's regi-
ments from Somerset, to assist Colonels Grider and Ilazzard
at Columbia, in opposing the rebel force approaching from
Tompkinsville, which, without making or inviting an attack,
fell back into Monroe county.

General Thomas reached Danville, November 22d. At this
time, General Schoepf, with a part of his command, was en-
camped at Broomfield, between Danville and Lebanon. Col-
onel Steedman and Captain Standardt had taken the wrong
road at Stanford, and were moving on Lebanon through Hus-
tonville. On the ^6th, General Thomas ordered General
Schoepf to move to Lebanon, and directed Colonels Connell
and Bradley to march their regiments from Danville to the
same place. By his order. Colonel Barnes proceeded from
Irvine, through Richmond, Lancaster, and Danville, to the
same destination. This movement of troops was both costly
and fruitless. The roads were exceedingly bad, the march
was a hurried one, and no enemy was found at Lebanon or
Columbia, and none even threatening these points, with Louis-
ville and Cincinnati as ultimate objectives, as had been antici-
pated by the department commanders.

"While General Thomas, in obedience to orders, was concen-
trating his command at Lebanon and Columbia, Zollicotfer
having marched from Cumberland Gap through Jacksboro',
Huntsville, and Jamestown, Tennessee, made his appearance
with a strong force at Monticello, Kentucky, and threw for-
ward a detachment to the Cumberland river, threatening Col-
onel Hoskins, in position near Somerset. Officers on the out-
look at remote points reported the approach of the enemy.
General Carter, at London, through a reconnoisance by Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Spears, with six hundred men, in the direction
of Cumberland Ford, had learned as early as the 24th that
Zollicoffcr had moved with nearly all his troops toward James-
town. A day or two earlier Colonel Hoskins, near Somerset,
and Colonel Bramlette, at Columbia, had each ascertained that

48 GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL BUELL.

he had reached Monticello. Each of these officers communi-
cated the fact to General Thomas, who made prompt dispo-
sitions to arrest his advance at the Cumberland river. He
sent five hundred of Wolford's cavalry from Columbia to re-
inforce Colonel Hoskins, and ordered General Schoepf, with
Standardt's battery from Lebanon, and Colonel Connell and
Bradley's regiments, on loute thither, to move to the Cumber-
land river in front of Somerset, and fortify a position com-
manding the crossing and the river above and belov/ the
crossing. Captain Prime, of the engineers, was sent by Gen-
eral Buell to superintend the fortifications. General Schoepf
was also specially urged to ascertain the movements of the
enem}^, and promptly report them, and not only to resist his
crossing, but to prevent him from collecting the means of
crossing.

For some days the situation of Colonel Hoskins was very
critical. He was confronting an army in close proximity,
whose cavalry skirmished with his pickets at Mill Springs, a
point near his position. Doiibtful of his ability to maintain
his ground until the arrivn-1 of reinforcements from Lebanon,
he called upon General Carter, at London, for assistance, who
being restrained by his orders from General Buell, refused
compliance. Fortunately, the enemy made no effort to cross
the river before the arrival of General Schoepf, Avhich occurred
December 1st. General Schoepf at once selected a position
on the north bank of the Cumberland, six miles from Somer-
set, and well sheltered from the artillery of the enemy on the
opposite side of the river.

On the 29tli of November, General Buell placed General
Thomas in command of all troops east of ]S[ew Llaven, in-
structing him to make no important movement except in the
event of danger, without his approval, but to prepare for
emergencies, while avoiding a threatening attitude. The line
of defense assigned to him extended from London to Colum-
bia, and his troops were di^stributed as follows : The First and
Second Tennessee, and Seventh Kentucky regiments, under
command -of General Carter, held London; the Fourth and
Tenth Kentucky, Fourteenth Ohio, and Tenth Indiana regi-
ments, and battery E, First Ohio Artillery, were posted at

GENEKAL THOMAS UXDER GENEEAL BUELL. 49

Lebanon ; the Third Kentucky Infantry, and First Kentucky
Cavahy, at Columbia ; tlic Thirty -third Indiana at Cral) Or-
chard ; the Thirty-first Ohio regiment, and battery A, First
Ohio Artillery, at Camp Dick Robinson ; the Seventeenth and
Thirty-eighth Ohio, and battery B, First Ohio Artillery, con-
fronted Zollicott'er near Somerset ; and the Eighth Kentucky
and Thirtj^-fifth Ohio were in motion toward Lebanon.

On the 2d of December the enemy made a brisk but lia-rm-
less bombardment of General Schoepf 's camp, and then moved
toward Mill Springs. Believing that this movement looked
to a lodgment on the north side of the Cumberland, General
Schoepf sent Captain Dillion with two companies of cavalry, to
guard the ford and prevent his crossing, and ordered Colonel
Connell, with his regiment, the Seventeenth Ohio, three pieces
of artillery, and one company of cavalry, to march from Somer-
set to co-operate with Captain Dillion. The latter, in palpable
disregard of orders, went into camp two miles from Fishing
Creek, and neglecting even to post pickets to watch the ford,
allowed ZollicofFer to establish himself on the north bank of
the Cumberland, not only without opposition, but without his
knowledge. Ignorant of the success of the enemy, Colonel
Connell reached the vicinity of the ford to find himself con-
fronted by a strong force on his own side of the river, and
with such means of crossing reinforcements as not only
to preclude his own attack, but even to imperil his com-
mand. Waiting for the aid of darkness, he withdrew his
troops in safety back of Fishing creek, in absence of a tenable
position in closer proximity to the enemy. As the lodgment
of the enemy on the north bank of the river, and his threat-
ening bearing, revealed a purpose beyond mere menace, Gen-
eral Schoepf, on the 5th, requested General Carter, at London,
and Colonel Coburn, at Crab Orchard, to move to his support
and discovering that the force of the enemy on the north
bank, already superior to his own, was constantly increasing,
and that his position, being between roads leading from the
different ferries, was susceptible of easy lateral approach, he
withdrew to a strong position, three miles beyond Somerset,
commanding the Crab Orchard and Stanford roads, and
4

50 GENEEAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL BUELL.

again urged General Carter to come to liis assistance. General
Thomas, however, had previously made provision for General
Schoepf s reinforcement. December 3d he ordered Colonels
Walker and Vanderveer's* regiments from Camp Dick Robin-
son to Somerset, and Captain Hewitt's battery from Broom-
fields. While these regiments seemed easily available for the
emergency at Somerset, and were in motion thither, Colonel
Walker was remanded to Camp Dick Robinson by General
Buell. It is evident that at this time, and for some weeks
subsequently. General Buell did not anticipate any serious
trouble from Zollicoffer at Somerset. Acting upon this belief,
he turned back troops en route to Somerset, and reversed
orders in other cases requiring the movement of reinforce-
ments to that point. He even forbade General Thomas to
send other troops to General Schoepf until he had first secured
his approval, asserting that the force at Somerset was sufficient.
His apprehension of the situation, however, was not enter-
tained by general officers in Southern Kentucky, and General
Cai'ter, deeming the danger to the command at Somerset a
justification for moving without direct orders, left London
with the First and Second Tennessee regiments December 7th,
and reached General Schoepf on the 9th. When he started
he sent a messenger to recall Colonel Garrard from a recon-
noissance which he was conducting toward Barboursville, that
he also might follow as quickly as possible ; but subsequent
orders required Colonel Garrard to remain at London.

On the 2d of December, General Buell issued an order giv-
ing brigade and division organization to the troops under his
command, styling them collectively the "Army of the Ohio,"
and assigning brigade and division commanders. By this
order the brigades were numbered consecutively throughout
the army and not by divisions. On the 6th, in obedience to
the general order of the department commander. General
Thomas formally assumed command of the First Division.
This division comprised four brigades, and other troops, desig-
nated as follows :

* Colonel Vanderveer liad been ordered to Camp Dick Robinson while en
route to Lebanon.

GEiS^ERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL BUELL. 51

First Brigade.
Brigadier- General Albin Selioepf commanding.
33d Eegiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel John Coburn.
ITtli Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel J. M. Connell.
12th Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel "VV. A. Iloskins.
38th Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel E. D. Bradley.

Second Brigade,
Colonel M. I). Manson commanding.
4th Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel S. S. Fry.
14th Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel J. B. Steedman.
10th Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel M. I). Manson.
10th Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel J. M. Harlan.

Third Brigade.
Colonel Robert L. McCook commanding.
18th United States Infantry, Colonel H. B. Carrington.
2d Regiment Minnesota Volunteers, Colonel II. P. Van Cleve.
35th Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel F. Vanderveer.
9th Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel R. L. McCook.

Twelfth Brigade.
Brigadier-General S. P. Carter commanding
1st Regiment East Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel R. R. Byrd.
2d Regiment East Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel J. P. S. Carter.
7th Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel T. T. Garrard.
31st Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel M. B. Walker

Troops not assigned to Brigades.
1st Regiment Kentucky Cavalry, Colonel F. Wolford.
Squadron Indiana Cavalry, Captain Graham.
Battery B, 1st Kentucky Artillery, Captain J. M. Hewitt.
Battery B, 1st Ohio Artillery, Captain W. B. Standardt.
Battery C, 1st Ohio Artillery, Captain D. Kinney.

Major W. E. Lawrence commanding artillery.

As ZollicoiFer, having a force greatly superior to General
Schoepf, withheld attack, General Buell still feared that,
under cover of his offensive attitude at Somerset, he might
advance with the greater portion of his command on Colum-

52 GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL BUELL.

bia, and then unite with Buckner, he ordered General Thomas
to place Brigadier-General J. T. Boyle in command at Colum-
bia, with instructions to fortify his position, and observe the
enemy very closely toward the Cumberland river. He also
directed General Thomas to move Brigadier-General Ward,
Avith his command, from Campbellsville to Green river, in
readiness to reinforce General Boyle in case of need. In har-
mony with these precautions, Colonel Wolford, with a portion
of his regiment, was posted for outlook at "Williams' farm, six
miles from the Columbia and Somerset road, with his pickets
well oifered toward the enemy, to give timely notice of his
approach to Columbia, or of his march into central Kentucky,
through Caseyville.

In the meantime, Zollicofl'er became more demonstrative in
the vicinity of Somerset. His cavalry on the right, proA'oked
a spirited skirmish with the Thirty -fifth Ohio, three miles from
Somerset, which resulted in the loss of two or three men on
each side. The enemy had previously captured Major Helveti,
of the cavalry, and Captain Prime, who had been too venture-
some in making observations.

Fearing that General Schoepf might be overpowered by
Zollicofl^er, General Thomas requested General Buell to per-
mit him to go to his assistance. As lias been stated, General
Buell had previously directed him to withhold reinforcements,
and now, when danger seemed still more imminent, he for-
bade him to take troops to Somerset, expressing the hope that
General Schoepf would be able to drive Zollicoffer across the
Cumberland, and asserting that he did not intend to be diverted
from more important purposes by the annoying affairs at
Somerset. These purposes doubtless had reference to opera-
tions in the direction of Columbia, as he ordered General
Thomas to be ready for a quick transfer of one or two brigades
to that place. As the only help for General Schoepf at com-
mand. General Thomas, December 11th, ordered Colonel M.
B. Walker from Camp Dick Robinson to Somerset.

At this time, ZoUicotfer's cavalry were ravaging the country
about Jamestown and Creelsboro, and General Hindman, in
command of about seven thousand men, was threatening
Columbia from Bear Wallow and More's Hill. The cavalry

GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL BUELL. 53

of the enemy were driven back conjointly, by Colonel Wol-
ford from Williams' farm ; Licntenant-Colonel Letcher, of the
First Kentucky Cavalry, from Columbia, and Colonel Haz-
zard, in act of conveying a large party of loyal Tennesseeans,
from Burksville. Thus, General Ilindman's advance resulted
in nothingbe3-ond menace. The Confederate generals in Ken-
tuck}^, seemed reluctant to assume the offensive with such
positiveness as had been anticipated. Two facts may account
for their gentleness : Their armies were weaker than oiir
commanders had supposed, and they were doubtless waiting
for more active support from Kentucky secessionists. For
while it was true that Kentuckiaus swelled the Confederate
armies very considerably, Kentucky secessionists, as a whole,
were more noisy than warlike To quicken their zeal for the
rebellion and elicit their active support, Zollicoffer issued a
proclamation December 16th, in which he presented Southern
opinions concerning the causes of the war, and the purposes
of the I^orth in prosecuting it, and, appealing to their preju-
dices and passions, urged Kentuckiaus to assist him in driv-
ing the ITorthern hordes across the Ohio river. He intimated
that if brave Kentuckiaus would refuse to aid the disheart-
ened forces of the government in their effort to subjugate the
South, and heartily join their Southern l)rethren, the success of
the South would be assured. There was, however, no responsCj
even in approximate correspondence, with the boastful tone
of the proclamation.

A reconnoissance by General Schoepf, in strong force, with
artiller}', on the 18th, revealed the fact that Zollicoffer was
intrenching on the north side of the Cumberland, in the
angle formed by the junction of Fishing creek and that river,
with his lines of fortification extended to each stream. Gen-
eral Schoepf moved toward this position in two colimins, the
heavier under his own command, and the other under General
Carter. But not intending an assault, he accomplished nothing
beyond pushing back the cavalry of the enemy, and ascertain-
ing his probable purpose, as indicated by his rejDose behind his
fortifications. The same day Colonel Hoskins made a recon-
noissance to Waitsboro, but found no enemy.

General Buell, having finally concluded that it was Impor-

54 GENERAL THOMAS UXDER GEXERAL BUELL.

tant to dislodge ZoUicofFer, directed General Thomas, Decem-
ber 29tli, to communicate with General Schoepf, and arrange
for a combined attack. General Thomas was to move in force
from Lebanon, through Columbia, and strike Zollicoffer's left
flank, while General Schoepf should assault in front. Accord-
ingly, on the 31st, General Thomas started from Lebanon,
with Colonel Mauson's brigade and two regiments of Colonel
McCook's, to march by way of Campbellsville, Columbia, and
"Webb's Cross-roads. Heav}^ rains had swollen the streams
and rendered the roads almost impassable, and the progress
of the command was very slow, and at times was almost en-
tirely arrested. But after a toilsome march of eighteen da^^s,
portions of Mauson's and McCook's brigades and Kinney's bat-
tery reached Logan's Cross-roads, a point ten miles from Zolli-
coffer's intrenched camp. As the Fourth and Tenth Kentucky
regiments, the Fourteenth Ohio, and Eighteenth United States
Infantry were still in the rear. General Thomas halted to
await their arrival and communicate with General Schoepf.
He made a careful disposition of the troops in hand, posting
the Tenth Indiana, AVolford's cavalry, and Kinney's battery
on the direct road to the enemy's position, and placing the
I^inth Ohio and Second Minnesota regiments on the Roberts-
port road, three-fourths of a mile to the right. To prevent
surprise, he threw out strong pickets beyond the junction of
the Somerset and Mill Springs road with the one leading di-
rectly to the enemy, and posted cavalry pickets some distance
in advance of those of the infantry. After consultation with
General Schoepf, General Thomas directed him to send to
his camp the Twelth Kentucky, First and Second Tennessee
regiments, and Standardt's battery, to remain until the troops
in the rear should come up. Having heard in the evening of
the 17th of January, 1862, that a large train of wagons, with
its escort, was encamped on the Robertsport and Danville
road, six miles from the camp of the Fourteenth Ohio, he or-
dered Colonel Steedman to send his wagons forward under
strong guard, and then to march with his own and Colonel
Harlan's regiment to the place where the train and escort
were said to be encamped, and capture or disperse them.
The next day, the Fourth Kentucky regiment, the battalion

GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL BUELL. bo

of Micliigan engineers, and Wetmore's battery joined Gen-
eral Thomas.

General Crittenden, who had recently assumed command
of the Confederate army at Mill Springs, was not ignorant of
the approach of General Thomas, and hoping to crush him
before he could concentrate his command, moved against him
early on the morning of the 19th. At about 5J o'clock a. m.
the national cavalry pickets encountered the enemy, and,
slowly retiring, reported to Colonel Manson the approach of
the army. Colonel Manson immediately threw forward the
Tenth Indiana, ordered the Fourth Kentucky to move in sup-
port, and then in person made known to General Thomas the
state of affairs at the front. General Thomas sent him back
to his command, with instructions to hold the enemy in check
until the other troops could be brought into action. In a few
minutes all were formed and in motion to the field, except the
battalion of Michigan engineers and Captain Greenwood's
company of the Thirtieth Ohio, who were left as camp guard.

Upon going to the field soon after, General Thomas found
the Tenth Indiana formed in front of their encampment, ap-
parently awaiting orders, and threw them forward to the sup-
port of the Fourth Kentucky, which was the only entire regi-
ment then engaged. lie then rode forward to observe the
enemy, and make such dispositions as successful resistance
demanded. Wlien he reached the position held by the Fourth
Kentucky, Tenth Indiana, and Wolford's cavalry, he discov-
ered the enemy advancing through a corn-field to gain the left
of the Fourth Kentucky, which was resisting the foe in front
with persistent bravery. To thwart this flank movement, he
ordered up General Carter's brigade, which was yet some dis-
tance in the rear, and a section of Kinney's battery, and
promptly put Kinney's guns in position at the edge of the
field to the left of the Fourth Kentucky, which rendered efii-
cient service in arresting a regiment of Alal:)amians moving
against the left of Colonel Fry's regiment. He also brought
up the Second Minnesota and iS'nith Ohio, put the former in
the room of the Fourth Kentucky and Tenth Indiana, now
nearly out of ammunition, and placed the Xinth Ohio in line
on the right of the road.

56 GENERAL THOAIAS UNDER GENERAL BUELL. .

Immediately after these dispositious liad been made, the
enemy opened fire in such manner as indicated his determi-
nation to overwhehn General Thomas before additional troops
could be brought into action. For nearly half an hour the
contest was most obstinately maintained, on both sides, when
the two gallant regiments (Second Minnesota and Tenth Ohio)
were supported on the left by the First and Second East Ten-
nessee regiments under General Carter, and the Twelfth Ken-
tucky, under Colonel Hoskins. The fire of these fresh troops
soon caused the enemy's right to give ground, and while the
Second Minnesota kept up a most galling fire in the center,
the Ninth Ohio, with fixed bayonets, made a most determined
charge and completely turned his left flank, when the whole
line was swept from the field.

As soon as practicable the regiments were reformed, sup-
plied with ammunition, and pressed forward in vigorous pur-
suit. A show of resistance was made by a small body of
cavahy, which was routed by a few shots from Standardt's
battery, otherwise the whole force, in disorderly rout, hurried
to the protection of their intrenchments. Colonel Steedman,
Vt'ith his own regiment, and Colonel Harlan's, and General
Schoepf, with his brigade, joined General Thomas in time to
participate in the pursuit.

When near the intrenched camp of the enemy, the troops
w^re deployed, and advanced in line of battle to the summit
of the hill at Moulden's. From this hill vigorous cannonading
by Standardt's and "Wetmore's batteries was maintained until
dark. Kinney's battery was placed on the extreme right at
Russell's to deter the enemy from crossing at the ferry, and
full preparation was made for storming the intrenchments on
the following morning. But during the night the enemy
abandoned his fortifications, and everything within them,
crossed the river quietl}' and burned his boats. The national
troops moved upon the fortifications the next morning, but
found no enemy to defend them. The destruction of the
boats prevented immediate pursuit, and the dispersion of the
enemy in all directions in their utter demoralization and
haste to escape, rendered any subsequent general pursuit en-

GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL BUELL. 57

tirelj iTseless, and General Sclioepf s brigade alone followed
the enemy to Monticello.

The enemy left in his intrenchments all his badly wounded,
twelve pieces of artillery, a heavy amount of ammunition, a
large number of small arms, one hundred and fifty wagons,
more than a thousand horses and mules, and abundant quar-
termaster and commissary stores. His flags, left upon the
battle-field, gave evidence of his positive defeat, and the
wounded left in the intrenchments revealed his absorbing
anxiety to reach the south bank of the Cumberland.

General Crittenden moved against General Thomas with
ten regiments of infantry, besides independent companies, six
pieces of artillery, and two or more battalions of cavalry. He
was defeated by six regiments of infantry, one battery, and a
portion of Wolford's cavalry. He lost, as far as known, in
killed, wounded, and prisoners, three hundred and ninety-two
men. Of this aggregate, one hundred and ninety-two were
killed, including General Zollicofier, who was killed by a shot
from the pistol of Colonel S. S. Fry. As he fell in the crisis
of the engagement, his loss greatly contributed -to the discom-
fiture of the enemy. Lieutenant Bailie Peyton was also
among the slain. Both of these were men of prominence
and influence in the rebellion.

General Thomas lost thirty-nine killed, including one com-
missioned officer, and two hundred and seven wounded.
Among the latter were Colonel Robert McCook and Lieuten-
ant Andrew Burt, of the Tenth Ohio, acting aid-de-camp to
the general commanding.

The victory at Mill Springs was the first decisive one that
crowned the national arms, and it gave joy and hope to the
loyal everywhere. In its positiveness, it was the type of the
grander triumph at Nashville in the last but most decisive
field engagement which occurred in the West during the war.

The President issued a congratulatory order, and the gen-
eral in chief charged General Buell to convey his thanks to
General Thomas and his troops for this brilliant victory.
These oflicial expressions of thanks were not more emphatic
than was the spontaneous utterance of gratitude by the
people.

58 GEXERAL THOMAS UXDER GENERAL BUELL.

Immediately after the battle of Mill Springs, General
Thomas concentrated his command at Somerset, and there
awaited the development of general plans for offensive opera-
tions. The success of General Grant and Commodore Foote
at Fort Henry, on the Cumberland river, February 6, 1862, in-
duced General Buell to concentrate his forces for a co-
operative movement in pressing back the enemy's line. He
accordingly ordered the first division to Lebanon. At Leba-
non (February 15th), General Thomas received orders to move
his division as rapidly as possible by way of Bardstown, jSTew
Haven, and Munfordsville, to take part in the contemplated
operations against Bowling Green. Before this movement
could be executed, the order requiring it was revoked, and on
the 22d General Thomas was directed to proceed with his di-
vision, and the First Ohio Cavalry, then at Bardstown, by
forced marches, to Louisville, to embark for the Cumberland
river. This order was promptly executed, and on the 26th
the division took boats at Louisville and debarked at l^ash-
ville during the 2d, 3d, and 4th days of March.

[GENERAL ORDERS NO. 37.]

Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office,

Washington, November 'i, 1861.

The following departments are formed from the present Department of

the West :

*** ******

IV. The Department of the Ohio. To consist of the States of Ohio,
Michigan, Indiana, that portion of Kentucky east of the Cumberland
river, and the State of Tennessee, to be commanded by Brigadier-General
T>. C. Buell ; headquarters at Louisville.

*********

By order :

JULIUS P. GARESCHE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERA.L THOMAS U^DEE GENERAL BUELL. 59

[GENERAL ORDERS NO. 1.]

Headquarters Department of the Ohio,
Louisville, Ky., Novemher 15, 186L
I. In pursuance of General Orders No. 37, of the 9th instant, from the
Adjutant-General's office, Brigadier-General D. C. Buell hereby assumes
command of the Department of the Ohio.

By command of General Buell.

JAMES B. FRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General, and Chief of Staff.

Headquarters First Kentucky Brigade.
Crab Orchard, November 17, 1861.
Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, Commanding Department of the Cvmberkmd,
Louisville, Ky.
General: — Captain T. S. Evarts, Assistant Adjutant-General, arrived
to-day at 5 p. m. He informs me that j'our verbal orders are to move my
command in the direction of Columbia. Some of the vragons, belong-
ing to the regiments just arrived, have not yet reached this place, the
roads between this and London being in such wretched condition. The
regiments will not be ready to move before Tuesday. If the road from
here to London remains in the same condition as now, it will not be
possible to subsist the troops there through the winter, and I would re-
spectfully recommend that they be withdrawn. They now have on
hand nearly one month's supply of provisions, and forty rounds of am-
munition

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Brigadier-General U. 8. V. Commanding.

Headquarters Department of the Ohio,
Louisville, Ky., November 18, 18G1.
Brigadier-General Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding Division, Crab Orchard, Ky.

Sir: — General Buell directs me to say, that the orders he has given you
in reference to the movement of your command contemjilates the whole
of it, and it will in consequence not be necessary to continue the depot
from which you are now supislied. You will come upon a line, of which
Louisville, and rJot Cincinnati, will be the main dej^ot.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. FRY,

Assistant Adjutant- General, Chief of Staff.

60 GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL BUELL.

Louisville, Kt., November 22, 1S6L
General Tliotnas, Danville, Ky.

If the regiments at London have not started to move at the time you
can communicate with them, order them to remain at London.
By command of General Buell.

J. B. FRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Cliief of Staff.

Camp Terry Botle, Novemler 28, 186L
General Thomas.

General: — There is no doubt that ZollicofFer, with eight thousand men,

is in Clinton and Wayne, the advance being close to the Cumberland

river. They will cross the river in a short time and take Somerset, and go

on Danville, or Crab Orchard, if not prevented. They are at this time

constructing boats to cross the river.

FRANK WOLFORD.

Headquarters East Tennessee Brigade,
Camp Calvert, November 28, 18G1.
Brigadier-General Geo. H. Thomas, U. S. A., Commanding, etc., Danville.

General : — * -^ -x- This morning I received a dispatch from Col-
onel Hoskins, stating that he was threatened with an attack by the
rebels, whose forces were estimated at from three thousand to ten thous-
and, and asking me for assistance, but as my orders are to remain at Lon-
don, I can not, without authority from headquarters, go to his aid.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CARTER,
Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding,

Louisville, November 29, 1861.
General Thomas, Lebanon.

I have communication from General Boyle. He will speak to you on
the subject. 1 do n't expect ZollicofFer to cross the Cumberland in force,
but he will try by demonstration to drive us from Somerset, or even at-
tack there if we are not watchful ; and he will jjreijare the means of
crossing, so as to threaten our flank, if we advance. We will be organized
to-day. In the meantime consider j^ourself in command of everything
east of New Haven, but make no important move without referring to me,
except to avert immediate danger. ■«■*•» Get your regiments in order
as rapidly as possible, and be always ready to move. I wish to avoid for
the present anything like threatening demonstrations, and only be pre-
pared for emergencies, until we are ready to act.

D. C. BUELL,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

GEJ^ERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL BUELL. 61

BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS, LOUISVILLE, KY.

Lebaxox, December 6, 1861.
General Thomas:

Send no more reinforcements to General Schoepf, until you report to
me; his force was sufficient at first. Order General Boj'le to proceed to
Columbia to-morrow, and keep liis scouts well out toward the Cumber-
land; caution all officers to ascertain and report facts, not merely forward
rumors ; see that no more troops march without ammunition ; direct
General Schoepf to arrest Captain Dillion, and forward charges against
him.

D. C. BUELL,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

Headquarters First Divisio:^, Dkpartmext of the Ohio,

Lebanon, December 8, 1861.
Srigadier- General Schoepf, Commanding at Somerset, Kg.

General: — The following dispatch was received this evening froin de-
partment headquarters, per telegraph :

" The affairs at Somerset are annoying, but I do not intend to be diverted
more than necessary from more important purposes. I hope Schoepf
will be able to drive the enemy across the river again. Keep an ej'^e on
Columbia, and be prepared to push a brigade or two rapidly to that point.
Organize and equip your brigades as rapidly as possible; see that they
have ammunition.

[Signed,] " D. C. Bueli,,

"General."

The above was in answer to my telegram last evening, to know if I
should go to your assistance, General Buell having previously directed ine
to send no more reinforcements until 1 had reported to him. You must
do the best you can under the circumstances.

Respectfully,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

TJ. S. V. Commanding.

BY TELEGRAPH FROM HEADQUARTERS.

Lebanon, December 11, 1861.
To General Thomas :

Does General Boyle report the enemy as advancing on Columbia?
At what place, or on what road are they ? What kind of troops are they
composed of? Order General Boyle to take a strong position where he is
and fortify himself Order General Ward to move his command forward
at once to Green river, so as to be ready to reinforce Columbia in case of
an actual attack. Be prepared to move promptly in any direction, but
keep up the regular duties of your command. Can you not communicate
speedily with Schoepf through Liberty? Answer.

D. C. BUELL,
Brigadier- General Commanding.

62 GENERAL THOMAS UNDER GENERAL BUELL.

Headquarters Department of tue Ohio,
Louisville, Kt., December 29, 1861.

General : — I send you a sketch of the country about Somerset, which
shows more of the roads than your maps. We conversed about the ad-
vancement on Zollicoffer through Columbia, and if you remember my
idea it is hardly necessary to add anything on the subject. It is for you
to move against his left and endeavor to cut him off from his bridge,
while Schoepf, with whom of course you will communicate, attacks in
front. The maps will indicate the proper moves for that object. The re-
sult should be at least a severe blow to him, or a hasty flight across the
river. But to effect the former, the movement should be made rapidly
and secretly, and the blow should be vigorous and decided. There should
be no delay after your arrival. It would be better not to have under-
taken it if it should result in confining an additional force merely to
watching the enemy.

Take such portion of the cavalry from Columbia as you think neces-
sary. Draw all the supplies you can from the country, and move as light
as possible.

Having accomplished the object, be ready to move promptly in any
direction, but wait until you hear from me, unless circumstances should
require you to move without delaj^, as I may want you to proceed from
there to the other matter about wliich we have conversed.

Acknowledge receipt of this by telegraph and report frequently.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,
Brigadier- General Commanding.

Brigadier-General Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding First Division, Lebanon.

CHAPTER VII.

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH,
FIFTH, AND SIXTH DIVISIONS.

When General Sberman assumed cominand of tlie depart-
ment lie left Brigadier- General L. II. Rousseau, recently pro-
moted, in command of all the troops on the Louisville and
Nashville road, near Elizabethtown. The latter at once
moved his command to ^N^olin, fifty-three miles distant from
Louisville. Here, Camp Nevin was established, in which the
Second division was organized.

By General Sherman's order. Brigadier- General A. McD.
McCook assumed command, October 14th. He proceeded at
once to organize brigades. Hitherto the regiments had been
thrown together without definite relations. On the 18th,
General McCook announced the organization of the central
division, composed of three brigades, designated as the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth, and commanded respectively l^y Brigadier-
Generals L. II. Rousseau, T. J. Wood, and R, W. Johnson.
This division was simply a provisional one, and sustained no
special relations to other commands in the department. Such
organization was imperatively needed, both for the instruction
of new troops and for effective resistance, in the event of at-
tack. As separate regiments arrived, they were added to the
brigades already formed. But when the brigade under
Brigadier-General J. S. Negley reached Camp ITevin, its or-
ganization was maintained, and it was styled the Seventh
brigade.

Upon the organization of the "Army of the Ohio," General
McCook's command became the Soconcl division. This

• (C3)

64 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th divisions.

change of designation was officially announced December 3d.
Its permanent organization was as follows :

Fourth Brigade.
Brigadier-General L. H. Rousseau commanding.
1st Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantr}^, Colonel B. F. Smith.
5th Regiment Kentucky Yolunteer Infantry, Colonel II. M.

Buckley.
6th Regiment Indiana Yolunteer Infantry, Colonel T. T, Crit-
tenden.
1st Battalion, 15th U. S. Infantry. 1 ^^ . -p i tt t^-
1st Battalion; 19th U. S. Infantr3^/ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ H. Rmg.

Fifth Brigade.

Brigadier-General T. J. Wood commanding.
29th Regiment Indiana Yolunteer Infantry, Colonel John F.

Miller.
30th Regiment Indiana Yolunteer Infantry, Colonel Sion S.

Baes.
34th Regiment Illinois Yolunteer Infantry, Colonel E. IS".

Kirk.
77th Regiment Pennsylvania Yolunteer Infantry, Colonel F.

S. Stambaugh.

Sixth Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson commanding.
15th Regiment Ohio Yolunteer Infantry, Colonel M. R. Dickey.
49th Regiment Ohio Yolunteer Infantr}^ Colonel W. II. Gib-
son.
32d Regiment Indiana Yolunteer Infantry, Colonel August

Willich.
39th Regiment Indiana Yolunteer Infantry, Colonel T. J. Har-
rison.

Seventh Brigade.

Brigadier-General J. S. l^egley commanding.

1st Regiment "Wisconsin Yolunteer Infantry, Colonel J. C.

Starkweather.
38th Regiment Indiana Yolunteer Infantry, Colonel B. F.

Scribner.

2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th divisions. 65

78th Regimont Peunsjlvania Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Wil-
liam Sirwell.

79tli Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, Colonel H.
A. Ilambriglit.

1st Regiment Kentucky Cavalry, Colonel Buckner Board,
Battery A, 1st Ohio Artillery, Captain C. S, Cotter.
Battery A, 1st Kentucky Artiller}^, Captain D. C. Stone.
26th Pennsylvania Artillery, Captain Chas. F. Mueller.

E'early two months had now been spent in preparing this
division for active service. As yet no attempt had been made
to press back the enemy, and no fighting had occurred, except
a skirmish with the enemy's cavalry by a detachment of the
Thirty-ninth Indiana, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jervis, a few
miles from Camp ]^evin, which resulted in a slight loss to the
enemy. But on the 9th of December, pursuant to instructions
from General Buell, General McCook issued orders for an ad-
vance. The next morning General Johnston moved his bri-
gade toward Munfordsville, a village on the north bank of
Green river. He encamped at Bacon creek to await the con-
struction of bridges for the passage of trains and artillery, but
threw forward a detachment of the Thirty-second Indiana to
Green river, the enemy retiring as our troops advanced. Two
days later, the remaining brigades of the division reached
Bacon creek, and the Fifth brigade moved upon its vanguard
at Green river. Colonel Willich threw two companies of his
regiment across the river to prevent surprise during the con-
struction of a temporary bridge. By working day and night,
the Thirty-second Indiana completed the bridge on the morn-
ing of the 17th. Four companies of this regiment, under
Lieutenant- Colonel Von Trebra, at once crossed and advanced
to the declivity of a hill near Rowlett's Station, and an equal
number were placed at the bridge as a reserve. Early in the
afternoon the pickets observed the enemy in the woods to
their right and front, and Colonel Von Trebra sent two com-
panies against them. The enemy fell back without resisting,
and the national troops in pursuit suddenly received a volley
from a squadron of cavalry. They returned the fire, and then
5

66 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th divisions.

fell back in order. This was the commeucement of a spirited
fight, which was maintained for an hour and a half. "With
each alternation of advance and retreat, additional troops
were brought into action, until the eight companies were
hotly engaged with a greatly superior force, including in-
fantry, cavalry, and artillery. The enemy's cavalry made re-
peated charges, at times with temporary success, but with final
defeat, under the lead of Colonel Terr}^, of the "Texas
Eangers," whose fall caused their precipitate flight from the
field. At this juncture. Colonel Willich, who had been on
duty at brigade headquarters, appeared, and observing that
the right of his line was giving way before two regiments of
infantry, he drew back and made a new allignment. The
enemy then retreated. General Ilindman claimed in his of-
ficial report that he Avithclrew his command in consequence of
the approach of McCook's division. It was true that the di-
vision was on the north bank of the river, and that the prox-
imity of reinforcements was announced by Cotter's battery
from the south side ; but no other help was aftbrded the Thirty-
second Indiana.

The marked feature of this contest was the repeated repul-
sion of a heavy force of cavalry attacking Avith great gallantry,
by one-half of a full company of infantry, well handled in
resistance.

General Hindman's force consisted of two regiments and a
battalion of infantry, a regiment and a squadron of cavalry,
and a battery. The fighting, however, was done mainly by
the cavalry.

The Thirty-second Indiana lost Lieutenant Sachs and eight
men killed and ten wounded. The enemy's loss was undoubt-
edly greater, although General Ilindman's report only admitted
the loss of Colonel Terry and three others killed and ten
wounded.

General BucU commended the conduct of the Thirty-second
Indiana in orders, and authorized the name of " Rowlett's
Station " to be inscribed on their regimental colors.

The Second division, after marching and countermarching,
as the exigencies of the campaign required, followed the

2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, a?^d 6th divisions. 67

Third division to IS'asliville, reaching that city on the 3d of
March.

During the summer and fall, Brigadier-General 0. M. Mitchell
was in command at Cincinnati, chiefly engaged in equipping
troops, collecting supplies, and forwarding men and munitions
for the various campaigns in progress in the West. On the
19th of ITovember he was relieved and assigned by General
Buell to the command of Camp Jenkins, near Louisville, Ken-
tucky. He was soon after ordered to Camp John Quincy
Adams, at Bacon creek, to give discipline and organization to
troops there collecting. December 3d, he was assigned to the
command of the Third division, then created, which com-
prised three brigades.

Eighth Brigade.
Colonel J. B. Turchin commanding.
19th Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. B. Tur-
chin.
37th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Major J. S. Hall.
18th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel T. R. Stan-
ley.
24th Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Colonel G. Miha-
lotzy.

Seventeenth Brigade.

Brigadier-General E. Dumont commanding.
3d Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel John Beatty.
13th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel "W. S. Smith.
10th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel

J. W. Burke.
15th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Curran
Pope.

Ninth Brigade.

Colonel J. "W". Sill commanding.
22d Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. "W. Sill.
21st Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J, S. ISTorton.
2d Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel L. A. Harris.
10th Regiment Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, Colonel A. R.
Chapin.

68 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, axd 6th divisions.

Artillery.
Captain C. O. Loomis commanding.
Battery E, First Oliio Artillery, Captain W. P. Edgarton.
Battery, Fifth Indiana, Captain P. Simonson.
Battery, Cold Water, Michigan, Captain C. 0. Loomis.

A large portion of these troops, recently transferred to the
" Department of the Ohio," had seen service nnder General
Bosecrans in Western Virginia, and General ISTelson in Eastern
Kentucky. Their experience of war gave veteran character
to the division, and warranted its assignment to the van in the
movement upon Bowling Green and Nashville, and its subse-
quent perilous insulation on the Memphis and Charleston rail-
road. Wlien, on February 13th, the Second division was
turned back from Munfordsville in the effort to reinforce Gen-
eral Grant at Fort Donelson, the Third division moved with
great celerity toward Bowling Green to deter the enemy from
throwing troops to the beleaguered fort. Its arrival on the
north bank of Barren river, opposite Bowling Green, on the
day following, was announced by the roar of cannon, whose
bombs bursting in the city spread terror among the inhabit-
ants and hurried the retreat of the rear-guard of General
Johnston's army. During the night previous, the enemy
burned both bridges over Barren river, and before leaving the
city had set fire to the public buildings, railroad cars, and other
property. The swollen stream, without bridges, prevented the
immediate advance of the troops to arrest the conflagration.
The night following, however, by means of a small ferry-boat,
found a few miles down the river, Turchin's brigade and a few
troopers efiected a passage and occupied the city at 5 o'clock
the next morning, saving from destruction a portion of the
rolling-stock of the railroad.

The continued high water offered such a barrier to the trans-
fer of troops, artillery, and trains to the south bank, that a
week elapsed before General Mitchell could resume his march
toward ISTashville. Having, during this time, by great labor,
eftccted the landing of two brigades and a half on the south
bank, he, on the morning of the 22d, put them in motion with-
out trains, and marching by Franklin, Mitchellsville,and Tyree

2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th divisions. 69

Springs, reached Edgefield, opposite ISTashville, in the evening
of the 24th, simultaneously with General Buell, who, with a
thousand men, had used the rolling-stock captured at Bowling
Green. General Buell had learned on the 20th, that General
Johnston had withdrawn his troops from Clarksville, and had
fallen back to ^Nashville, burning botli bridges at the latter
place. He had also telegraphed to General Ilalleck, and sent
a courier to Clarksville, giving information of his movements,
and requesting that gunboats be sent up the river to ISTash-
ville.

Soon after. Lieutenant William ITelson, U. S. jN"., was super-
seded by General Thomas, at Camp Dick Robinson, he was
promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, and ordered to
Maysville, Kentucky, to organize a force to operate in the east-
ern part of the state. Haying driven the rebels from Eastern
Kentucky, he was, late in November, ordered with his command
to Louisville. On the 3d of December, he was placed in com-
mand of the Fourth division, composed of three brigades, des-
ignated and organized as follows :

Tenth Brigade.
Colonel Jacob Ammen commandino-.
24th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Jacob Am-
men.
51st Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel Stanley

Matthews.
36tli Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel William

Grose.
6th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel
K. L. Anderson.

Nineteenth Brigade.

Colonel W. B. Ilazen commanding.

41st Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel W. B. Hazen.

9th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Col. G. C. Moody.

6th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel W. C.

Wliittaker.

70 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, a?^d 6th divisions.

Twenty-second Brigade.

Colonel S. D. Bruce commanding.

20tli Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel S. D.

Bruce.
1st Regiment Kentucky "Volunteer Infantry, Colonel D. A.

Enyart.
2d Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel T. D.
Sedgewick.

Cavalry and. Artillery.

2d Regiment Indiana Cavalry, Colonel E. M. McCook.
Battery D, 1st Oliio Artillery, Captain A. J. Konkle.
Battery 10, 1st Indiana Artillery, Cap. J. B. Cox.
Battery 7, 1st Indiana Artillery, Captain S. J. Harris.

The division was immediately transferred to Camp Wickliffe,
near jSTew Haven. On February 13tli, General ISTelson, with
two brigades, moved from N^ew Haven to the Ohio river, to
embark to reinforce General Grant, at Fort Donelson. Kot
reaching this destination in time to participate in the reduc-
tion of the fort, he proceeded by water to ISTashville, arriving
there on the 25th. Here he was soon after joined by Colonel
Bruce with his brigade, who had marched thither by the direct
route through Bowling Green.

Early in October, General Sherman placed Brigadier-General
T. L. Crittenden, in command of the troops organizing at
Owensboro and in the vicinity of Henderson. These were
the Third Kentucky Cavalry, and the Eleventh, Seventeenth,
and Twenty-sixth Infantry, commanded respectively by Col-
onels Jackson, Hawkins, McHenry, and Burbridge. General
Crittenden was first directed to threaten the enemy's left by a
demonstration against Hopkinsville, held by a thousand men.
The enemy evinced activity on this flank, as on the other be-
fore General Thomas, and several slight engagements occurred
durino- October. Late in the month a force of four or five
hundred men threatened Colonel McHenry at Hartford.
General Crittenden sent Colonel Burbridge from Owensboro
with two hundred and fifty men, including infantry, cavalry,
and artillery, to his assistance. With his own command, aug-
mented by eighty men from McHenry's regiment, under Cap-

2d, 3d, 4Tn, 5th, axd 6tii divisions. 71

tain Morton, Colonel Burbriclge encountered tlie enemy at
Woodbury, and routed him, with a loss of about fifty killed
and a large number wounded. About the same time. Colonel
McHenry defeated a band of the enemy at Morgantown.

The most formidable menace, however, was made late in
IsTovember. During the earlier portion of the month the
augmentation of the enemy's forces at Ilopkinsville and Eus-
selville indicated, as was supposed, an effort to turn the right
of the line. On the 24th, General Breckinridge entered
Rochester with about four thousand men, and at the same time
a lai-ge force of cavalry advanced from Ilopkinsville and occu-
pied Greenville. The indications of this movement, for so
long a time before its execution, gave General Crittenden time
to take such measures for defense that Breckinridge refrained
from attack and retired to Bowling Green. He had doubtless
meditated the penetration of Crittenden's line, the destruction
of the locks on Green river, and probabl}^ the interruption of
McCook's communications.

On the 3d of December, General Crittenden was appointed
as commander of the Fifth division, comprising the Eleventh,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth brigades.

Mleventh Brigade.

Colonel S. Beatty commanding.

19th Eegiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel S. Beatty,

59th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. P. Fyffe.

13th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel W. E.

Hobson.
9th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel B. C.

Grider.
21st Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel S. "W.

Price.
3d Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel T. E.

Bramlette.

Thirteenth Brigade.

Colonel Charles Cruft commanding.

31st Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel C. Cruft.

44th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel II. B. Reed.

17th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. H.

McIIenry.
25th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel James

W. Shackelford.

72 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th divisions.

Artillery.
Captain John Mendenhall's Regular Battery.
Captain Joseph Bartlett's Ohio Battery.

Fourteenth Brigade.

Colonel J. G. Jones commanding.

42d Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. G. Jones.

11th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel P. P.

Hawkins.
26th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel S. G.
Burbridge.

Early in February, General Buell ordered the embarkation
of Colonel Cruft's brigade to join General Grant. This brigade
reached General Grant at Fort Henry after its reduction,
and participated elFectively in forcing the surrender of Fort
Donelson. The brigade was then transferred to General
Halleck. A few clays later. General Crittenden embarked at
Owensboro with the remainder of his division, descended the
Ohio, and in company with jSTelson proceeded up the Cumber-
land to ISTashville.

Brigadier-General T. J. Wood was relieved of the command
of the Fifth brigade, Second division, and ordered to Bards-
town, ISTelson county, Kentucky, on the 24th of December,
1861, to establish a camp of instruction for all arms of the ser-
vice, represented by the troops at that place. He was directed
to institute the most thorough system of discipline and in-
struction. General Wood displayed such energy, in compli-
ance, that by the 15th of the following month the Sixth
division was fully organized, and by order of General Buell
he was assigned as permanent commander. This division
comprised these brigades :

Fifteenth Brigade.

Colonel M. S. Hascall commanding.

17th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel M. S.

Hascall
58th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel M. S.

Kerr.
26th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel E. P. Fyffe.
3d Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel T. E-

Bramlette.

2d, 3b, 4x11, oth, and 6th divisions. 73

Twentieth Brigade.
Colonel C. G. Harker commanding.
65tli Eegiment Oliio Yolimteer Infantry, Colonel C. G. Har-
ker.
64tli Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. "W. For-

sythe.
51st Regiment Indiana Volunteer Inftxntry, Colonel A. D.

Streiglit.
13tli Regiment Michigan Volunteer Infantry, Colonel M. Shoe-
maker.

Tiventy -first Brigade.

Colonel G. T>. Wagner commanding.

15th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel G. T>.

. Wagner.

40th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel J. W.

Blake.
57th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Colonel W. S.

Hines.
24th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Colonel L. G.
Grigsby.

Artillery.
5th Ohio Battery, Captain C. Bradley.
6th Indiana Battery, Captain George Estep.
10th Indiana Battery, Captain J. B. Cox.

The 3d Ohio Cavalry, Colonel Lewis Zahm, was subse-
quently added.

The plan of operations in contemplation at this period re-
quired the accumulation of supplies at Somerset, and General
"Wood was ordered, in conjunction with General Schoepf's
brigade, of the First division, to employ his division in repair-
ing the road from Lebanon to Somerset through Danville. A
change of plan soon required the recall of the Sixth division
to Lebanon, and its prompt movement thence by railroad to
Munfordsville. Assisting in the repair of the railroad, it
moved through Bowling Green and Franklin to ITashville,
where it arrived March 6, 1862.

CHAPTER VIII.

OPERATIONS OF GENERAL NELSON, COLONEL GARFIELD, AND GEN-
ERAL CARTER IN EASTERN KENTUCKY.

When General l^elson was ordered to Maysville to organize
troops, it was anticipated that the insurgents would greatly
annoy the loyal people in Eastern Kentucky, and unless op-
posed would penetrate the central portions of the state. Early
in October it was ascertained that Colonel J. S. Williams had
collected a force of two thousand men at Prestonhurg, on the
Big Sandy river, threatening Central Kentucky by way of
McCormick's Gap. To repel this invasion, General I^elson
moved from Maysville to Olympia Springs with all the troops
in hand ; the Second Ohio, under Colonel L. A. Harris, having
previously marched to the latter place from Paris, and the
Twenty -first Ohio, under Colonel i^orton, from Mcholasville.
From Olympia Springs, General ITelson advanced to McCor-
mick's Gap, where he divided his command, sending Colonel
Harris, with his regiment, a section of Konkle's battery, and
Captain McLaughlin's company of Ohio cavalry, to West Lib-
erty, and retaining under his own direction the Twenty -first
Thirty-third, and Fifty-ninth Ohio regiments, under Colonels
Sill, N^orton, and Fyfle respectively, the Kentucky volunteers
under Colonels Marshall and Metcalfe, the remainder of Konkle's
battery, and a small body of cavalry, he advanced upon Hazel
Green. Both places were occupied on the 23d, the former
after a severe skirmivsh, in which Colonel Harris killed ten of
the enemy, wounded five, and captured six, with a loss to him-
self of one wounded. Advancing from these points, the two
columns united at Licking Station and followed the enemy to-
ward Prestonburg. At the latter place, General JSTelson again
(74)

OPERATIONS IN EASTERN KENTUCKY. 75

divided -his command, sending Colonel Sill, witli the Twenty-
first Ohio, two battalions of Kentucky troops, and a section of
Konkle's battery, by a detour to the right, to the rear of the
enemy in position on Ivy Mountain. On the day following,
he advanced with the remainder of his force on the direct road
to Piketon. Pressing on, he encountered the enemy in am-
bush, on the mountain side at Ivy creek. After a spirited en-
gagement, in which the Second and Twenty-first Ohio regi-
ments, Metcalfe's battalion, and two sections of Konkle's bat-
tery participated, the enemy was routed, leaving thirty men
either killed or badly wounded on the field. ISTelson's loss was
six killed and twenty-four wounded. This engagement oc-
curred on the 8th of October. Pursuit was commenced im-
mediately, but owing to the destruction of the bridges over
the swollen streams and obstruction of the roads. General l^el-
son did not reach Piketon until the morning of the 10th, find-
ing the place occupied by Colonel Sill, who, having met with
little opposition, had arrived the night previous. The enemy
retreated through Pound Gap, and General jSTelsou's command
was soon withdrawn to Louisville.

After the withdrawal of Il^elson's troops, the loyal people in
the valley of the Big Sandy were again subjected to depreda-
tions by irregular bands of Confederate soldiers. This state
of afi'airs demanded the return of the national troops to that
region. Colonel L. P. Moore, commanding the Fourteenth
Kentucky regiment at Catlettsburg, was directed to prepare
for a speedy advance up the valley. Soon after. Colonel Lind-
say commanding the Twenty-second Kentucky, was ordered
from Portsmouth to join Colonel Moore and assume command
of the two regiments. Pending the preparation for this ex-
pedition. General Humphrey Marshall invaded Kentucky
through "Whitesburg, with a force variously estimated as
ranging from three to six thousand men, and intrenched him-
self near Paintville, on the road from that place to Preston-
burg. To drive back these troops. General Buell organized
the Eighteenth brigade, comprising the Fourteenth and
Twenty-second Kentucky Infantry, and the Fortieth and
Forty-second Ohio Infantry, three battalions of Woodford's
Kentucky Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Letcher, and an

76 OPERATIONS IN EASTERN KENTUCKY.

indepeiideut battalion of Ohio Cavalry under Major McLaugh-
lin, with Colonel J. A. Garfield as commander. Having re-
ceived intructions from General Buell in person, Colonel Gar-
field proceeded to the month of the Big Sandy, arriving there
on the 22d of December. At this time the troops composing
his brigade were posted at ]\Iaysville, Catlettsburg, Paris, and
Lebanon, and were at once put in motion toward the enemy.
Colonel Garfield moved up the valley of the Sandy, from Cat-
lettsburg with the Forty-second Ohio, Fourteenth Kentucky,
and McLaughlin's troopers, reaching the mouth of George's
creek on the 25th. The necessary repair of the roads delayed
his advance from this point until the 31st. On that day he
moved up the creek and passed toward Paintville. On the
6th of January, while en route, he was joined by Colonel
BoUe's West Virginia Cavalry, and also by three hundred men
of the Twenty-second Kentucky, who had marched from
Maysville. The day following, Colonel Bolles drove the
enemy's cavalry from a strong position at the mouth of Jen-
nie's creek, losing two men killed and one wounded, and in-
flicting upon the enemy a loss of six killed and many wounded.
Marshall here offered no further resistance, and abandoned his
intrenched camp upon the near approach of Garfield's troops.
Colonel Garfield here rested for two days, and during the time
was joined by the Fortieth Ohio regiment, and three battalions
of Woodford's Cavalry, the latter having marched from Leb-
anon. Having now his entire command in hand, he determined
to provoke a battle or press the foe still farther toward Virginia.
Accordingly, on the 9th, with his cavalry in advance, and his
reserve at Paintville, he moved toward Prestonburg. Wlien
near this place, he ascertained that Marshall was some three
miles distant on Abbott's creek. Anticipating an engagement,
the next day he ordered forward his reserve under Colonel
Sheldon. The following morning, in making a detour in hope
of capturing the enemy. Colonel Garfield encountered his
cavalry at the mouth of Middle creek, opposite Prestonburg.
This force maintained a brisk skirmish while slowly falling
back upon the main body, which was strongly posted on the
hills near the confluence of the two branches of the stream,
two and a half miles distant. The ground occupied by Mar-

OPERATIONS IX EASTERN KENTUCKY. 77

sliall was so favorable for tlic concealment of liis dispositions
for defense, that Garfield was compelled to throw forward
several detachments to draw his fire at dilFerent points, and
thus disclose his exact position. These tentative movements
proved to have been so judiciously directed, that with subse-
quent provision against a flank attack, the battle was con-
ducted to a successful issue by the repeated reinforcement of
the several detachments which first advanced against the
enemy. The engagement was inaugurated mainly by two
Kentucky companies on the right, and two Ohio companies
under Captains Jones and Williams, from the Fortieth and
Forty-second regiments, on the left. Those on the right were
reinforced by Major Burke, with two companies from the
Fourteenth Kentucky, and those on the left, first by Major
Parker, with a hundred men from the Forty-second Ohio, and
subsequently by Colonel Cranor with one hundred and fifty
men from the two Ohio and Fourteenth Kentucky regiments.
While these troops were hotly engaged, the enemy attempted
to turn Garfield's right, l)ut was foiled and driven back by
Lieutenant-Colonel Monroe, with one hundred and twenty
men from the Fourteenth and Twenty-second Kentucky regi-
ments. At 4 p. M., Lieutenant-Colonel Sheldon reached the
field from Paintville with the reserve. Thus strengthened. Col-
onel Garfield pressed the enemy from his position, but dark-
ness prevented pursuit. Reaching the valley, Marshall burned
his stores and hurried on in disordered flight. The disparity
in numbers and losses in this engagement was remarkable.
Colonel Garfield reports the number of his own troops actually
engaged, to have been nine hundred ; his loss, one killed and
twenty wounded; while the force of the enemy was thirty-
five hundred, and his acknowledged loss, one hundred and
twenty-five killed, the number of wounded being unknown.
Twent^^-five prisoners were taken during the engagement, and
others the next day by Colonel Letcher, in pursuit.

Not being able to supply his command at Prestonburg,
Colonel Garfield returned to Paintville. Wliile there, he was
directed by General Buell to advance as soon as possible to
Piketoii, and drive the enemy from Kentucky. In obedience
to this order, early in February he commenced the concentra-

78 OPERATIONS IX EASTERN KENTUCKY.

tion of liis troops at Piketon, sending tlieni forward as Ms
supplies would warrant, but before preparations could be made
to advance from Piketon, Marshall withdrew entirely from
Kentucky, established his headquarters at Gladesville, and
evinced no purpose to re-enter the state. A month later,
Colonel Garfield having learned that he was collecting the
Virginia militia to defend the mountain passes, determined to
move against him at Pound Gap. Accordingly, with six hun-
dred infantry and one hundred cavalry, he advanced from
Piketon, The Gap was held by Major J. B. Thompson with
five hundred men, strongly intrenched. This force Colonel
Garfield proposed to attack in front, fiank, and rear, with the
hope of capturing it, but owing to the failure of the detach-
ment sent to the rear to cut ofi' the retreat of the enemy, he
only succeeded in routing and dispersing his forces. Having
thus freed Eastern Kentucky from the presence and depreda-
tions of the enemy. Colonel Garfield was ordered to Louisville
with his troops, and was assigned to the command of the
Twentieth brigade, Sixth division, Army of the Ohio.

On the 2Gth of January, General Carter's brigade, aug-
mented by the Sixteenth Ohio Infantry, Colonel De Courcey,
and the Forty-ninth Indiana, Colonel Kay, Major Mundy's
battalion of Kentucky cavalry, and Wetmore's battery, was
ordered from Somerset to London, preparatory to a prompt
movement upon Cumberland Gap. General Carter reached
London with his command early in February, and took posi-
tion at Cumberland Ford about the 10th of the month. This
advance was regarded as the first step toward the penetration
of East Tennessee by a large army, under General Thomas.
This projected invasion having been abandoned, for reasons
hereafter mentioned. General Carter was left in proximity to
Cumberland Gap, to prevent a counter invasion from. that di-
rection. Wishing to ascertain the strength of the enemy, he
sent Lieutenant-Colonel Mundy, with a detachment, to re-
connoiter the position. Colonel Mundy reached Cumberland
Gap on the 14tli of February, and having driven in the ene-
my's pickets, he approached sufiBciently near to discern the
formidable character of the defenses, and draw the fire of the

OPERATIONS IN EASTERN KENTUCKY. 79

artillery.* Subsequently, several recounoissances were made
in different directions, and one or two more expeditions, hav-
ing more serious purposes, resulted in successful skirmishes,
but in no way changed the relative positions of the contend-
ins: forces.

CHAPTER IX.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE CENTRAL THEATER OF
WAR, FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE FALL OF NASHVILLE.

The preceding narrative of facts, as related to the organiza-
tion and operations of the divisions of the army separately,
has failed to compass the broader features of the situation in
Kentucky and Tennessee, previous to the capture of ISTash-
ville, and hence a general view is here introduced.

The recognition of the neutrality of Kentucky by the Presi-
dent, and the demand for troops in Eastern and Western Vir-
ginia, prevented early provision for large armies in the great
central theater of military operations. The strategic impor-
tance of Cairo, Illinois, had not been overlooked, for soon after
the fall of Sumter, it was occupied by national troops. But
the accumulation of forces was slow, even at that point,
though" it was hedged in between the States of Missouri and
Kentucky, then in such critical hesitation with regard to
ITorthern or Southern alliance.

The insurgents, also, for a time, professed respect for the
neutrality of Kentucky. But they were not, in consequence,
less active in preparation for a bold policy, whenever the
interests of their cause should demand the invasion of the
state. Anticipating civil war as at least the probable result
of secession, the Southern people really prepared for such a
struggle before they attempted the withdrawal of the South-
ern States from the Union. And after the actual inauguration
of war, while the loyal states contiguous to Kentucky and
Missouri were sending most of their first equipped regi-
ments to the East, the Confederate generals were massing their

(80)

GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATIOX. 81

earliest 'Western volunteers on tlie nortlioni bomidaiy of
Tennessee.

Thus, when both the national and insurgent authorities
declined further respect for the false position of Kentucky,
President Lincoln could only throw a few raw regiments into
the state, to repel a hold and apparently threatening invasion.
General Anderson succeeded in defeating the effort of the
Confederate general, Buckner, to capture Louisville, but dur-
ing the period of his command in Kentucky, the state of
aifairs was considered critical in the extreme. In October,
General "W". T. Sherman assumed the administration of afiairs,
in room of the hero of Fort Sumter, under a weight of
responsibility and surcharge of embarrassments, which ren-
dered anxious and despairing the soldier who afterward was
hopeful in conducting campaigns of boldest aggression. Ap-
prehending the magnitude of the struggle, and seeing his
slender forces distributed from Henderson to the Big Sandy
river, and from Cincinnati and Louisville to London and
l^olin, confronting hostile forces of supposed superior
strength and of easy concentration for offense, he startled the
authorities at Washington and the people at large by
the announcement that he needed two hundred thousand
men. This estimate for an army resulted in his speedy
supersession by Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, through
an order from Washington. The main efforts of both Ander-
son and Sherman had been directed to defense, and in this,
each had been successful.

The earlier period of General Buell's command was devoted
to the same end. But he assumed the direction of military
operations under more hopeful circumstances. The insurgents
had gained no advantages in Kentucky since their primal
advance, and were now relatively weaker than when they first
made revelation of aggressive purpose. He came from Wash-
ington under instructions to inaugurate offensive operations,
and was hopeful of commanding the resources necessary for
their success. His instructions pointed to the especial im-
jDortance of sending a heavy column into East Tennessee.
The rapidity with which new regiments were thrown into
6

82 GENEEAL VIEW OF THE SITUATIOX.

Kentucky soon made it evident that General A. S. Jolinston,
who commanded the insurgent forces in the "West, had lost the
opportunity for the successful invasion of ISTorthern Ken-
tucky, if at any previous period he had had sufficient strength
to warrant such an enterprise. This rapid increase of troops
imposed upon General Buell the necessity of an offensive
initiative in some direction, as soon as a distinctive army
organization could be given to his forces.

The subsequent grandeur of the service rendered by the
Army of the Cumberland, then called the Army of the Ohio,
must be taken as full proof that he who first laid his organ-
izing hand upon it, did his work well, and transmitted his
personal influence upon it through all its accretions and bat-
tles to the end of the war. He transformed citizens into sol-
diers, by instruction, discipline, and drill ; exacted from his
officers the strictest attention to all their new duties ; elimi-
nated such as gave no promise of efficiency ; reduced the bag-
gage of his army, and consequently the wagons for its trans-
portation, and soon was ready for active operations.

After a careful study'^ of the East Tennessee enterprise,
he reached the conclusion that its success would require an
army of thirty thousand men — twenty thousand for an ad-
vancing column, and ten thousand for the line of communica-
tions, which involved wagon transportation for two hundred
miles, most of this distance through a barren and mountainous
region. In room of this movement, which in his view was so
beset with difficulties as to be altogether unpromising, if not
impracticable, he suggested an advance against j^ashville, by
the march of a column to the left of Bowling Green, through
Glasgow and Gallatin, co-operative with another which should
ascend the Cumberland river on steamers, under convoy of
gunboats, with dependence for supplies, after the conjunction
of the columns, upon river transportation. Hoping that this
plan would be approved at Washington, he held his forces in
readiness for its execution, and rather than change his dispo-
sitions, having reference to its prosecution, he permitted Zolli-
cofFer to threaten central Kentucky, from the north bank of

* General Buell's statement before the military commission.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION. 83

the Culnberland. river, near Somerset, for several weeks,
making no adequate etFort to dislodge him. However, in the
absence of official approval at Washington, he held his forces
in waiting to move against ISTashville, and continued his efforts
to provide sufficient transportation for the expedition into
East Tennessee, in consideration of the probability of being
required to conduct it. On the 29th of December, the attitude
of Zollicoffer became so threatening as to demand an effort for
his dislodgment from the north bank of the Cumberland. He
sent General Thomas to accomplish this work, and on the 1st
of January, renewed his request for permission to turn toward
the capital of Tennessee. As General McClellan, the com-
mander-in-chief, was ill at the time, the President directed him
to confer with Major-General Halleck, in command in Mis-
souri, with regard to the concerted action of their armies.-'^
In compliance, he addressed, January 3d, a lengthy communi-
cation to General Halleck, giving estimates of Johnston's
forces, at different points on his defensive line, and suggesting
a plan for the co-operation of their armies very nearly similar
to the one whose execution subsequently resulted in the cap-
ture of Forts Henry and Donelson, and the evacuation of
Bowling Green, N^ashville, and Columbus. His plan proposed
an advance upon N"ashville, through Kentucky, strong demon-
strations against the flanks of Johnston's line. Bowling Green
and Columbus, to issue in real attacks should Johnston weaken
these points to strengthen others, and the ascent of twenty
thousand men on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, under
convoy of gunboats. On the 6th, General Halleck replied,
that such was the demand for troops in Southwestern Mis-
souri, that he would have but ten thousand men to form a
movable column, and objected to the proposed plan as contem-
plating operations on exterior lines, but offered to make a
demonstration from Paducah, toward Columbus, and expressed
the hope that in a few weeks he could render material assist-
ance.

As General Halleck proposed no definite co-operation, and
as General Thomas' movement against Zollicoffer was peud-

* General Buell's statement before the military commission.

84 GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATIOX.

ing, General Buell was restricted to operations in his own cle-
j)artment, and to thoughts of aggression with his own forces.
He had not decided upon his first step in oiFeuse, when the
victory of General Thomas at Mill Springs, over Generals
Crittenden and Zollicoffer, resulted in the complete dispersion
of their army. This victory, on the one hand, opened the
Avay for the expedition into East Tennessee, as there was no
longer a strong guard to the mountain fortress at Cumberland
Gap and the contiguous passes, and rendered more inviting
the movement upon ISTashville, as it deprived Johnston's right
flank of a heavy supporting column. But the failure of co-
operation between Generals ITalleck and Buell, induced the
President and General McClellau to express to the latter their
conviction that the so long-meditated movement into East
Tennessee was of primary importance, and he again addressed
himself to preparation to push an army, under General Thomas,
in that direction.

Carter's brigade, accompanied by Wetmore's battery, was
at once advanced from Somerset to Loudon, and efforts were
made to repair the roads and accumulate supplies and trans-
portation. But again progress was slow; and on February
1st, General Buell advised the general-in-chief that he deemed
the enterprise impracticable, and that he would abandon it
and advance against !N"ashville. The fact that he had a day or
two previous been advised by General Halleck that he had
ordered an advance against Fort Henry, was doubtless a
strong incentive to change the direction of his offensive
operations, as the first step in his own plan was now upon
trial. General Halleck gave no information as to his plans,
and did not solicit co-operation. ^Nevertheless, General Buell
determined that, unless restricted by orders from Washing-
ton, he would at least accomplish what he had prescribed for
himself in his own plan, although the initial movement of it
had been undertaken by another, and in every way that was
possible contribute to the success of the aggression on the
Tennessee river. He therefore disposed the greater portion
of his troops for the advance upon Bowling Green, and sent
Colonel Cruft's brigade and eight new regiments to join the
column moving against Fort Henry. Having learned soon

GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATIOX. 85

after that this fort bad surrendered to Commodore Foote, and
that the works at Fort Douelson had been greatly strength-
ened and its garrison hirgely reinforced, and fearing tliat his
advance upon Bowling Green could not be sufficiently rapid
to prevent such further reinforcements as would endanger the
success of the effort to reduce it, he directed three divisions
toward Fort Donelson, by water, and three toward BowUng
Green. This force was sent to Fort Donelson in response to
a request from General Halleck for aid and co-operation. The
wisdom of General Buell's original plan was nov*^ apparent,
though in consequence of its initiation on the rivers without
the suggested co-ordinate movement, the enemy had thrown
the largest portion of his forces from Bowling Green to Fort
Donelson, instead of offering his main resistance at the former
place, as General Buell anticipated in the event of his own
advance simultaneously with General Halleck's column, as he
had suggested.

Fort Henry was surrendered on the Gth of February. Gen-
eral Grant disposed his troops before Fort Donelson on the
12th. AVhcn the former fell, the latter was weak ; but during
the six intervening days. General Johnston had sent sixteen
thousand men from Bowling Green, and when they arrived,
the forces within the iutrcnchments were superior to those as-
suming a beleaguering attitude under General Grant. Gen-
eral Buell's forethought made provision for this emergency, as
the troops that he had sent without solicitation from General
Halleck, reached General Grant, with the fleet of gunboats
under Commodore Foote, on the 14th. Had not General
Buell sent these troops before he had been requested to do so,
the issue at Donelson. might have been very different, as Avith
their efficient aid, success was at one time doubtful in the ex-
treme.

With a strange lack of forecast and provision for probal)le
contingencies, the Confederate general, Floyd, in chief com-
mand of the forces in the fort, had allowed General Grant's
investing lines to close the roads leading to JSTashville. Hardly
had this been done before it dawned upon Floyd and his subor-
dinates. Pillow and Buckner, that their safety lay in opening
these only avenues of escape. Urged by this conviction, they

86 GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION.

made a bold and well-sustaiued effort, early in tlie morning of
the ISth, to accomplish this paramonnt object. A heavy line
of troops, with a similar one in near support, was hurled
against the right of General Grant's line, resting upon the
coveted roads. After a somewhat protracted and very fierce
conflict, the right of the investing line was doubled upon the
center, and the enemy was in possession of the roads. Dur-
ing this conflict. General Grant was with Commodore Foote
on the gunboats, and upon his return he found his right wing
in disorder. The enemy had been partially repulsed by Colo-
nel Cruft's brigade of General Lewis Wallace's division, which
had been improvised at Paducah, and mainly formed from the
troops that General Bucll had sent. Colonel Cruft had been
thrown into the action l)y General Wallace, in response to the
request of General McClernand, whose division was holding
the right of the lino. lie maintained his position after all the
troops on his right and left had fallen back, and he was then
ordered to withdraw his command and occupy the slope of a
hill to the rear. Here he was again heavily engaged, and
though twice repulsing the enemy in his front, was forced to
retire to a new line. Colonel Thayer's brigade of the same
division was severely engaged also, and arrested the success
of the enemy to the left of Cruft. The action of these bri-
gades was essential to a reformation of the shattered troops.
Later in the day, Cruft's brigade, in co-operation with two
regiments, the Eighth Missouri and Eleventh Indiana, under
command of Colonel M. L. Smitli of the former, supported
by other regiments from Wallace's division, by a gallant
charge, under orders from General Grant, drove back the
enemy into his intrenchments and reclosed the roads. Troops
from McClernand's division advanced in support on their left,
but their action in restoring the investment on the right had
marked prominence. This success, coupled with the more
decisive issue of General Smith's assault on the enemy's works
on the left, was decisive of the general contest. For the next
day, after the responsibility and disgrace of capitulation had
been transferred from Floyd to Pillow, and from Pillow to
Buckner, the latter reluctantly surrendered without condi-
tions.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION. 87

The primal success of tlie enemy in the morning really
opened the roads for escape, but the hope of complete victory
led the generals away from this first object and wrought their
ruin.

The loss of this fort, commanding the navigation of the
Cumberland river, and the surrender of a large army, except
as the result of blundering management on the part of the
generals in immediate command, puts under condemnation
General Johnston's division of his forces. When, however, he
resolved " to defend IS'ashville at Donclson," it is not probable
that the loss of the greater portion of the army set for its
defense, was regarded by him as a possibility. lie doubtless
anticipated the reunion of the sundered portions of his army,
even if the larger one could not successfully defend the fort.
The two fractions were each on interior lines, with respect to
both Grant and Buell, and there were fewer contingencies to
bar conjunction than there were to jeopard his whole army in
the event of concentration against either. There had been no
recent period when he could have safely assumed the ofiensive
in any direction, and he had done well to make such impres-
sion of strength upon the generals opposed to him, as to pre-
vent an attack by General Buell alone, or a combination of the
armies of Grant and Buell, long before practicable. Neither
General Johnston, nor General Buckncr in previous command,
had ever had such strength as warranted an ofiensive move-
ment in force. "When Buckner first occupied Bowling Green,
after his pretentious but feeble movement upon Louisville, he
had only four thousand men. By the 15th of October, there
were about twelve thousand Confederate troops at that
place, with no further increase until December. The highest
number reported by the Confederate generals upon their defen-
sive line, from Mill Springs to Columbus, was thirty-seven
thousand. General Johnston, therefore, had been from the
first too weak to attack Buell, and during the later months of
the year too weak to resist him. In concentration, he would
have been stronger than Grant, but General Grant had been
beyond his reach, seated behind the Ohio river, upon whose
waters a fleet of gunboats steamed in proud mastery. Besides,

88 GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATIOX.

an advance against Grant wonld have uncovered N'asliville to
Buell.

There were objections quite as strong against concentrating
against Buell, who had an army sufficiently large to overAvhelm
him, in offense or defense, and the withdrawal of all his river
forces to Buell's front would have left them and l^ashville at
the mercy of Grant. Thus, as he had been too weak to con-
centrate for offense against either of his antagonists, he could
offer only feeble resistance to both combined. And in view
of actual events, the withdrawal of all his forces to a new line,
when he saw the two armies converging upon him, would
have been his safest course. The fact that he abandoned
Bowling Green the very day that Grant appeared before Don-
elson, shows that he had no thought of resisting Buell at that
point after he had sent away sixteen thousand men. And
when, as he neared ITashville, he learned that Fort Donelson
had fallen with its large garrison into the hands of General
Grant, he ordered the evacuation of Columbus, and passing
through the capital of Tennessee, he sought a new line and the
heaviest possible concentration far to the South, in hope to
regain what was then so plainly lost. Not being pursued
beyond IS^ashville, he stopped for a time at Murfreesboro to
gather together the troops that had held Bowling Green,
Clarksville, and JSTashville, the few that had escaped from Fort
Donelson before the surrender, and those that had been col-
lected from the dispersion at Mill Springs.

The victory at Mill Springs, the capture of Forts Henry and
Donelson, and the enforced evacuation of Bowling Green,
Columbus, and ISTashville, form a series of successes, which
gave the first marked prestige to the national arms, and in no
small degree revealed the power of the national government
to suppress the rebellion. The significance of these victories
produced a profound impression in the South. To the more
thoughtful, it suggested the possibility, if not the probability,
of the ultimate failure of their cause. The frenzied dismay
of the citizens of ISTashville at the fall of Donelson, and the
indefinite southward retreat of the legions Avhich had so long
stood between them and the national armies, was only the
complex feeling of disappointment and discouragement which

GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION. 89

pervaded the Southern people, finding expression even in oiR-
cial utterances from Richmond. From the inception of the
struggle, the Southerners had been exceedingly hopeful. The
more intelligent could not have expected uniform success, but
the masses anticipated the independence of the States Confed-
erate in rebellion, as the result of a succession of victories.
The issue of the first great battle of the Avar intensified this
hopefulness. The disorderly retreat of the Army of the Po-
tomac from Bull Run was jubilantly hailed as the typical
issue of all succeeding battles. But, now, a succession of
alarming disasters and defeats had made evident the realities
and the possibilities of the gigantic struggle, which the South
had so madly and so hopefully invoked — the national armies
were now to be feared, whether in open, battle or before in-
trenched positions. And their sweep far southward, with
serried ranks and boldest step, while producing intense dis-
appointments and dread, must have suggested, at least to
sober minds, that the independence of the South was by no
means assured.

In the ITorth, the results of the first great central campaign
were cheering in the extreme. The defeat at Bull Run had
produced mortification and depression, and the useless sacri-
fice of life at Ball's Blufi" had brought sadness to all loyal
hearts. And hitherto, success and defeat had been so nearly
balanced in the West, that the outlook had given no special
promise. But, with this experience of positive disaster and
uncertain prospects, there came a clearer discernment of the
character of the conflict, and while there was less hope than
at first of its speedy termination, the loyal people gave per-
sistent support to war measures of gigantic compass. The im-
portance, then, of these first great victories can not be measured
by the mere capture of forts, cities, prisoners, and munitions,
but by their inspiring moral effect as contrasted with the con-
sequences of disasters of equal range. In a war of such
proportions, involving so many occult causes of success and
failure, ruling influences and events may not always be deter-
mined with positive certainty ; but in searching for pivotal
events, the philosophical historian would not be likely to

90 GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION.

overlook the conduct and issues of the campaign which cul-
minated so gloriously at Donelson.

Headquarters Department of the Ohio,
Louisville, January 3, 1862.

General : — I received your dispatch, and, with more dela}^ than I
meant, proceed to the subject of it in compliance with your request, and,
I may add, also at the wish of the President.

I do not underrate the diflBculties in Missouri, but I think it is not ex-
travagant to say that the great power of the rebellion in the West is ar-
ranged on a front, the flanl^s of which are Columbus and Bowling Green,
and the center about where the railroad between these points crosses the
Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, including Nashville and the fortified
points below. It is, I have no doubt, within bounds to estimate their
force on that line at eighty thousand men ; including a column about
Somerset, Kentucky, in rear of tlieir right flank, it is more.

Of this force, forty thousand may be set down as at Bowling Green ;
twenty thousand at Columbus, though you doubtless have more informa-
tion on that point than I have; and twenty thousand at the center, con-
sidering railroad facilities which enable the enemy to concentrate in a
few hours on any single point of this front. You will at once see the im-
portance of a combined attack on its center and flanks, or at least of de-
monstrations which may be converted into real attacks, and fully occupy
the enemy on the whole front. It is probable that you may have given
the subject, as far as Columbus and the center are concerned, more atten-
tion than I have with reference to the former; at least, I can make no
more than the general suggestion already expressed, that it should be
fully occuj^ied.

The attack upon the center should be made by two gunboat expedi-
tions, with, I should say, twenty thousand men on the two rivers. They
should, of course, be organized with reference to the depth of the
water in the rivers; and whether they should be of equal or unequal
strength, would depend upon that and other considerations, and can
hardly be determined until the moment of departure. The mode of
attack must depend upon the strength of the enemy at the several points
and the features of the localities. It will be of the first importance to
break the railroad communication, and, if possible, that should be done
by columns moving rapidly to the bridges over the Cumberland and the
Tennessee. The former probably would not be reached at first, being
some thirty-one miles above the first principal battery that I know of, at
Dover. The other is eighteen miles above Fort Henry — the first I know
of on the Tennessee. If the expeditions should not be strong enough to
do the work alone, they should establish themselves firmly at the nearest
possible point, and remain at least until they ascertained that reinforce-

GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION. 91

ments froln my column or some other source would not reach them. By
uniting, they could establish themselves permanently under the protec-
tion of the gunboats.

I say this much rather to lay the subject before you than to propose
any definite plan for your side. AVhatever is done should be done speed-
ily, within a few days. The work will become more difficult every day.
Please let me hear from you at once.

Very truly yours,

D. C. BUELL,
Brigadier- General Commanding.
General H. W. Halleck, Oommanding Department of the Missouri.

Headquarters Department of the Missottri,
St. Louis, January 6, 1862.
Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, Louisville, Ky.

General : — I have delayed writing to you for several days in hopes of
getting some favorable news from the Southwest. The news received is,
however, unfavorable, it being stated that Price is making a stand near
Springfield, and that all our available forces will be required to dislodge
him and drive him out.

My last advices from Columbus represent that the enemy has about
twenty thousand men there. I have only about fifteen at Cairo, Fort
Holt, and Paducah, and after leaving guards at those places, I could not
send into the field over ten or eleven thousand. Moreover, many of these
are very imperfectly armed.

Under these circumstances it would be madness for me to attempt any
serious operation against CamjD Beauregard or Columbus. Probably, in
the course of a few weeks, I will be able to send additional troops to Cairo
and Paducah to co-operate with you, but at jji-esent it is impossible; and
it seems to me that if you deem such co-operation necessary to your suc-
cess, your movement on Bowling Green should be delayed. I know
nothing of the plan of campaign, never having received any information
on the subject; but it strikes me that to operate from Louisville and
Paducah or Cairo, against an enemy at Bowling Green, is a plain case of
exterior lines like that of McDowell and Patterson, which, unless each
of the columns is superior to the enemy, leads to disaster ninety-nine times
in a hundred.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

Major- General.

92 GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATIOX.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL BUELL'S STATEMENT BEFORE THE

MILITARY COMMISSION.

«

I had no communication with General Halleck since his reply to my
letter of January 3d; but on the 30th, I received a dispatch from him say-
ing, without giving particulars, that he had ordered an expedition against
Fort Henry.

On the 6th (February), I ordered one brigade from the mouth of Green
river, and eight new regiments, to re-enforce General Ilalleck's expedition.
They did not, however, arrive until after the capture of that place, which
occurred on the 7th, but took part in the subsequent operations against
Fort Donelson.

February 7, 1862.
To Colonel Cruft, Commanding Thirteenth Brigade, Calhoun, Ky.

Sir : — You are hereby directed to proceed with your brigade up the
Tennessee river, and join the expedition near Fort Henry, under Brig-
adier-General Grant.

The transport steamers have been ordered to take you on board at the
mouth of Green river, unless some other point should be preferable ; and
they must remain where they land you until you discharge them, which
will be done as soon as the nature of the case will admit.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. FRY,
A. A. G., Chief of Staff.

St. Louis, February 15, 1862.
General Buell, Louisville :

Telegram about division relieves me greatly. To move from Bowling
Green on Nashville, is not good strategy. Come and help me take and
hold Fort Donelson and Clarksville; then move to Florence, cutting the
railroad at Decatur, and Nashville must be abandoned precisely as Bowl-
ing Green has been. All we want is troops in mass on the right point,
and the enemy is defeated with scarcely a blow ; but I fear I have not
force enough for this new strategic move, and at the same time observe
Columbus. Come and help me, and all will be right. We can clear

Tennessee as we have cleared Kentucky.

H. W. HALLECK

At the date of this dispatch asking for help at Donelson, the division
which General Buell sent without solicitation, was fighting on the right
of Grant's line, driving back the enemy from the open roads for escape.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION. 93

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL GRANT'S REPORT OF THE CAP-
TURE OF FORT DONELSON.

Referring to the attack of the eiiemy, he said:

" About the close of this action the ammunition in the cartridge-boxes
gave out, which, with the loss of many field oflicors, produced great con-
fusion in the ranks. Seeing that the enemy d«d not take advantage of
this fact, I ordered a charge upon the left. — the enemy's right — with the
division under General C. F. Smith, which was most brilliantly executed,
and gave to our arms full assurance of victory. The battle lasted until
dark, giving us possession of part of their intrenchments. An attack
was ordered upon their other flank, after the charge by General Smith was
commenced, by the divisions under Generals McClernand and Wallace,
which, notwithstanding the hours of exposure to a heavy fire in the fore
part of the day, was gallantly made, and the enemy further repulsed."

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL WALLACE'S REPORT.

Referring to the ascent to the enemy's position, he said:
" About quarter the way up, they received the first volley from the hill-
top around which it ran, disclosing somewhat of the strength of the
enemy. Instantly, vmder orders of Colonel Smith, both his regiments lay
down. The skirmishers were the chief victims. George B. Swarthout,
captain of Company II, Eighth Missouri, was killed, gallantly fighting
far in advance. Soon as the fury of the fire abated, both regiments rose
and marched on ; and in that way, they at length closed upon the enemy,
falling when the volleys grew hottest, dashing on when they slackened
or ceased. Meanwhile, their own firing was constant and deadly. Mean-
while, also. Colonel Cruft'sline was marching up in support and to the right
of Colonel Smith. The woods through which he moved seemed actually to
crackle with musketry. Finally, the Eighth and Eleventh cleared the
hill, driving the rebel regiments at least three-quarters of a mile before
them, and halting within one hundred and fifty yards of the intrenchments
behind which the enemy took refuge. This was about 5 o'clock, and con-
cluded the day's fighting. In my opinion, it also brought forth the sur-
render."

EXTRACT FROM COLONEL CRUFT'S REPORT.

At about 4 p. M. an order was received from General Wallace to co-operate
with Colonel Smith's brigade (consisting of the Eighth Missouri and
Eleventh Indiana) in carrying the enemy's works on the right, in front
of Dover, by storm: The officers and men, though much fatigued from
the action of the morning, and worn from loss of rest and lack of food,
responded cheerfully to the order and wheeled into column. The enemy
was in force on the hill, under cover of the wood, on both sides of the
only road leading up in the direction of the works. It was necessary to

94 GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION.

cross an open space of several hundred feet exposed to the enemy's fire,
before the foot of the hill could be reached. The Eighth Missouri led
the advance up the road ; the Eleventh Indiana charged up the hill on
the left; Forty-fourth Indiana followed up the road; five companies of
the Thirty-first Indiana were ordered up the hill on the extreme left, and
the remainder of the regiment, with the residue of the brigade, were or-
dered to the right to outflank the enemy and attack in rear. The as-
sault was a complete success. All the regiments behaved handsomely.
The whole of my brigade was actively engaged. In a sharp and desper-
ate fight of a few minutes' duration, the hill was carried by storm, and
the enemy, with tremendous cheers, driven up to and within his breast-
works. The flank attack of the portion of my brigade up the hill, in a
line at right angle to the main advance, was gallantly conducted, and
contributed no doubt largely to the rout of the enemy.

GENERAL BUCKNER TO GENERAL GRANT.

Headquarters Fort Donelson, February 16, 1862.
Sir : — In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present
situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of
the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon
terms of capitulation of the forces and post under my command, and in
that view, suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,
Brigadier-Oeneral C. S. A.
To Brigadier-General Grant, Commanding TJ. S. Forces near Fort Donelson.

GENERAL GRANT'S REPLY.

Headquarters Army in the Field,
Camp near Donelson, February 16.
To General S. B. Buckner, Confederate Army :

Yours of this date, proposing an armistice and appointment of com-
missioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms
other than an unconditional surrender can be accepted. I propose to
move immediately on your works.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General U. iS. V. Commanding.

GENERAL BUCKNER'S LETTER OF SURRENDER.

Headquarters, Dover, Tenn., February 16, 1862.
To Brigadier-General TJ. S. Grant, TJ. S. A.
Sir: — The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to

GENERAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION. 95

an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under
your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the
Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous
terms which you propose.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,
Brigadier- General C. /S. A.

FROM POLLARD'S SOUTHERN HISTORY OF THE WAR.

About the middle of September, General Buckner advanced with a
small force of about four thousand men, which was increased, by the 15th
of October, to twelve thousand ; and though other accessions of force
were received, it continued at about the same strengtli until the end of
November, measles and other diseases keeping down the eflfective force.
The enemy's force then was reported to the War Department at fifty thou-
sand, and an advance was impossible.

Our own people were as much imposed upon as were the enemy, with
respect to the real strength of General Johnston's forces; and while they
were conjecturing the brilliant results of an advance movement, the fact
was, that inevitable disasters might have been known by the government
to have been in store for the Southern cause in Kentucky and Tennessee,
and to be awaiting only the development of a crisis. The utter inade-
quacy of General Johnston's forces was known to the government. The
authorities at Richmond appeared to hope for results without the legiti-
mate means for acquiring them ; to look for relief from vague and unde-
fined sources ; and to await, with dull expectation, what was next to
ha2:)pen. . . .

We have noticed before the extreme inadequacy of General Johnston's
forces. It is doubtful whether he ever had over twenty-three thousand
effective troops at Bowling Green. Of these, after reinforcing Fort Donel-
son, he had scarcely more than eleven thousand effective men. Shortly
after the disaster at Mill Sj^riiigs, Genei'al Beauregard had been sent from
the Potomac to General Johnston's line in Kentucky. At a conferenee
which took place between the two generals. General Beauregard expressed
his surprise at the smallness of General Johnston's forces, and was im-
pressed with the danger of his position. There is nothing more remark-
able in tlie history of war than the false impressions of the people of
the South as to the extent of our forces at the principal strategic point
in Kentucky, and the long and apathetic toleration, by the government
in Richmond, of a prospect that promised nothing but eventual disaster.
On establishing himself in Bowling Green early in October, General
Johnston wrote to the War Department : " We have received but little
accession to our ranks since the Confederate forces crossed the line ; in
fact, no such enthusiastic demonstration as to ju.stify any movements not
warranted by our ability to maintain our own communications." He re-
peatedly called upon the government for reinforcements. He made a

96 GENEEAL VIEW OF THE SITUATIOX.

call upon several states of the Southwest, including Tennessee, for large
numbers of troops. The call was revoked at the instance of the authori-
ties in Richmond, who declined to furnish twelve months' volunteers
with arms ; and General Johnston, thus discouraged and baffled by a gov-
ernment which was friendly enough to him personally, but insensible to
the public exigency for which he pleaded, was left in the situation of
imminent peril, in which General Beaui'egard was so surprised to find
him.

A memorandum was made of the conference between the two generals.
In the plans of General Johnston, General Beauregard entirely concurred.
It was determined to fight for Nashville at Donelson, and General John-
ston gave the best part of his army to do it, retaining only, to cover his
front, fourteen thousand men, about three thousand of whom were so en-
feebled by recent sickness, that they were unable to march.

In a letter to the President of the Confederacy, explaining the condi-
tions of his Kentucky campaign. General A. S. Johnston said : " I mag-
nified my forces to the enemy, but made known my true strength to the
cleiDartment and the governors of states."

CHAPTER X.

ADVANCE OF THE ARMY OF THE OHIO FROM NASHVILLE TO SA-
VANNAH, AND THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

The occupation of ISTaslivillft by the Army of the Ohio, and
of other strategic positions hy the army under General Hal-
leck, at that season of the year which invites military enter-
prise and the manifest urgency of renewed aggression before
the enemy could recover from recent defeats, forbade delay in
the formation of plans for new operations. General Johnston
had been hurled from his first chosen defensive line, and the
configuration of the region to which his standards pointed,
gave unerring indication of the location of his second. Moun-
tains, rivers, and railroads determine the grand strategic points
and lines of defense equally with those of aggressive maneu-
ver and supply, and palpable military possibilities gave
prophecy of the concentration of the western insurgent forces
at Corinth, Mississippi. Here the Memphis and Charleston
and the Ohio and IMobile railroads intersect, and thus form a
railroad center which sustains relations to the Mississippi and
Tennessee rivers and the railroad system of the South, es-
pecially with the great road connecting these rivers and Bich-
mond, Virginia. Hence, this position was regarded by the
enemy as sustaining important relations to all proximate and
remote military operations, and as had been anticipated by
the generals in command of the Western national armies, all
the insui'gent forces were speedily put in motion thither, as
the grand key-point east of the Mississippi in the solution of
their paramount Western problem — the maintenance of the
mastery of the lower portion of the Mississippi river.

In the preceding campaign. General Johnston had been
7 (97)

98 MARCH TO SAVA^^NAII — BATTLE OF SHILOH.

forced into error by public opinion in the South, in hokling a
long line against vastly superior armies, and now it Ijecame
evident that aggression and resistance by the enemy was to be
conducted with massed forces.

This attitude of the enemy demanded the intimate co-
operation, if not the actual consolidation of the armies com-
manded by Generals Halleck and Buell. While their fields
of operation were distinct, it was perhaps appropriate that
these commanders should sustain a common relation to the
chief at "Washington, But now a common objective required
that the two armies should be united under one field com-
mander. The necessity of co-operation had previously
existed, and there had been partial concurrence in their oper-
ations on the Cumberland river. Perceiving the necessity of
the still closer union of their armies to meet the palpable con-
centration of the insurgent forces, Generals Ilalleck and Buell
agreed upon a plan of operations early in March, whose exe-
cution would require their close association; and Savannah,
on the east or right bank of the Tennessee river, had been
designated as the point for concentration. So important an
olrject was not, however, left to the voluntary agreement of
the two generals, but was enforced by the President's war
order ]N"o. 3, which consolidated three Western departments
in one, under the command of Major-General Halleck, and
threw upon him the responsibility for general results flowing
from the various operations of the vast forces and resources
in the West. General Halleck at once ordered General Buell
to march his army to Savannah — a movement for which pro-
vision had been made in the plan of co-operation previously
agreed upon.

At this juncture the Army of the Ohio comprised ninety-
two regiments of infantry — exclusive of those which had been
sent to General Halleck — with an aggregate of seventy-nine
thousand three hundred and thirty-four men ; eleven regi-
ments, one battalion, and seven detached companies of cavalry,
aggregating eleven thousand four hundred and ninety-six
men ; and twenty-eight field and two siege batteries, with
three thousand nine hundred and thirty-five men. The grand
total was ninety-four thousand seven hundred and eighty-

3IAECH TO SAVANNAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH. 99

three' men. Of this aggregate, seventy -three thousand four
hundred and seventy -two men were in condition for the fiekl,
comprising sixty thousand eight hundred and eiglity-two in-
fantry, nine thousand two hundred and tliirty-seven cavahy,
and three thousand three hundred and sixty-eight artillery.

The- First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth divisions, com-
manded respectively by Brigadier-Generals Thomas, McCook,
l^elson, Crittenden, and Wood, with a contingent force of
cavalry, in all thirty-seven thousand effective men, constituted
the main ai-my, which, under the personal command of General
Buell, was to join General Halleck in the projected movement
against the enemy at Corinth, ;Mississippi. The remaining
thirty-six tliousand effective troops were disposed by General
Buell for the defense of his communications, the enforcement
of quietness within his lines in Kentucky and Tennessee, and
for two expeditions co-operative with the ruling movement —
one, under General Morgan, to seize Cumberland Gap, and the
other, under General 0. M. ^litchell, to strike the Memphis and
Charleston railroad south of ISTashville.

Before starting to Savannah, General Buell organized the
Seventh division of his army, and assigned Brigadier-General
G. W. Morgan to its command. This division comprised the
troops under General Carter, at Cumberland Ford; the
Eighteenth brigade, recently withdrawn from Eastern Ken-
tucky, and several additional regiments which had been posted
at various points in Kentucky. General Morgan was instructed
to operate against Cumberland Gap, and occupy East Ten-
nessee, in the event of an open way thither; and should the
offensive be impracticable, to hold the enemy in check. Briga-
dier-General 0. M. Mitchell, with his division, w^as ordered to
move upon the " ]SIemj)his and Charleston " railroad through
Murfreesboro and Fayetteville. The Sixteenth brigade, Briga-
dier-General W. T. Ward commanding, was posted at the camp
of instruction at Bardstown, Kentucky. Brigadier-General Du-
mont was placed in command of the garrison at !N"ashville.
Colonel Duffield, in command of the Twenty-third brigade, in-
cluding the Ninth Michigan, Third JNIinnesota, and Eighth
and Twenty-third Kentucky regiments, was ordered from
Kentucky to take post at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, to protect

SSeSBSA

100 MARCH TO SAVAXXAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH.

the road from Shelbyville to Lavergne, and reinforce eitlier
General Buell or General Mitchell, as circumstances might re-
quire. General Boyle's brigade, the Eleventh, composed of
the Third, Mnth, Thirteenth and Twenty-first Kentucky, and
the ]Srineteenth and Fifty -ninth Ohio regiments, and the Sixth
Ohio battery, was assigned to General Crittenden's division ;
and Colonel Brucc's brigade, the Twenty-second, comprising
the First, Second, and Twentieth Kentucky regiments, was
attached to General IsTelson's.

Having thrown forward a detachment of cavalry, to save, if
possible, the bridges between Kashville and Columbia, on the
15th of March,=^' General Buell put McCook's division
on the road in their rear, as the head of his infantry column.
The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and First divisions, in the order
mentioned, followed at intervals between the 15tli and 20th.
The cavalry saved all the bridges, except those over Euther-
ford's creek, four miles north of Columbia, and over Duck
river at that place. Rutherford's creek was soon crossed, but
the water in Duck river being forty feet deep, a somewhat
protracted delay was unavoidable.

General Buell had no pontoons, and he was forced to take time
to build a bridge or wait for the subsidence of the water. As
the reduction of the water to a fordable stage involved an in-
definite waiting, Johnson's brigade of McCook's division was
employed in the construction of a bridge. But though the
Thirty-second Indiana regiment was composed largely of me-
chanics, and the whole brigade worked euergeticall}^, the
bridge was not completed until the 29th. At a later period
of the war, when there were organized " mechanics and engi-
neers," and every army commander regarded pontoon trains
as essential as those for supply, the high water in Duck river
would have hardly caused a halt ; but as General Buell was
situated, it was a serious matter to pass this river with his
army and trains. As his delay at this point has such historical
significance, the truth requires that this embarrassment should
thus be mentioned, in connection with the fact that he was

* This was previous to the reception of an order from General Ilalleck
to make the movement.

MARCH TO SAVAXXAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH. 101

not under orders to hasten liis march to Savannah. He had
supposed that General Grant's army was on the east bank of
the Tennessee river, as the place designated for the conjunction
of the two armies was on that hank; and when on the
march, he learned first that General Grant's forces were on
the west bank, he was assured that there was security for
them in the natural strength of their position.

General Halleck's original object in sending a column up
the Tennessee by steamers, was to destroy the railroad con-
nections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt, and this expe-
dition, at first, had no recognized relation to the subsequent
union of the armies of the Ohio and Tennessee. This enterprise,
under the direction of General C. F. Smith, was a failure, in
consequence of the lateness of its inauguration, as the enemy's
strength at the objective points was such as to preclude all
efibrt to reach the railroad at either of them. After abandon-
ing the object of his expedition. General Smith steamed down
the river, and debarked his forces at Pittsburg Landing. Gen-
eral Smith did not select this point as one for the concentration
of the two armies to move against Corinth, as he was at the
time ignorant of any such purpose. Subsequently, when rein-
forcements were moved up the river with a view to the con
junction of the armies under Generals Grant and Buell for
offense against Corinth, under the immediate command of
General Halleck, they in great part took position at Pittsburg
Landing. Thus, without General Buell's knowledge, the place
of concentration was changed, and he was left to learn the
fact while on the march.

When, before the bridge at Columljia was fully completed,
it was ascertained that General Grant's army was on the west
bank of the Tennessee river. General ISTclson sought permis-
sion from General Bucll to ford the strc-iam, and move rapidly
to Savannah. Though not fully sympathizing with his ex-
citable division commander in his fear that the enemy would
attack General Grant before the reinforcing army could reach
him, General Buell gave him promise that, could he get his
men safely over the stream, with his trains, and all his artillery
and baggage, he should have the advance thenceforward to
the Tennessee river. This fact, exceedingly trifling in itself,

102 MARCH TO SAVAXXAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH.

had significance of intensest interest and greatest moment..
It gave the impetuous l^elson the head of Buell's army, whose
speed in the advance, rapid beyond expectation and the re-
quirement of orders, brought his division to Savannah the
day before the battle of " Shiloh," or " Pittsburg Landing."

At 6 A. M. March 29th, N'elson's division, Ammen's brigade
leading, plunged into Duck river, and following the tortuous
ford, reached the opposite bank and the head of the army.
The bridge was completed the same day, and the immediate
resumption of the march was resumed. On the 31st, with an
interval of six miles from the head of each division and the
one following, to give room for troops, artillery, and trains,
the Army of the Ohio moved toward Savannah. Only one'
route was practicable, a single narrow roadway, in poor con-
dition for the ordinary travel of a sparsely inhabited region,
and six miles was deemed requisite as the length of each di-
vision in unembarrassed movement. This road led throiigh
ISIount Pleasant and Waynesboro, and General Nelson, pass-
ing beyond the latter place earlier than had been anticipated
by General Buell, defeated the adoption of a measure that
would have prevented tlie participation of the Army of the
Ohio in the battle of " Shiloh," General Buell had not yet
received an intimation that General Grant was in any danger,
or that there was need of haste in the movement of his ami}',
and desiring to have his forces in good sliape to meet a com-
rade army, oljtained permission from General Ilalleck to stop
for rest at AVaynesboro. The army commander had also
under consideration the propriety of moving to Hamburg,
above Pittsburg Landing, and thence to place of conjunction.
Stronger evidence could not be adduced than this project of
stopping at Waynesboro, that neither General Halleck nor
General Buell, at this time, thought that there was anything
actual, prol)able, or possible, in the situation at Pittsburg
Landing, to demand the hurried advance of the Army of the
Ohio. But General JSTelson, ignorant of this proposal to halt
at Waynesboro, and alive to the prol)ability of an early attack
upon General Grant, harried through the place for rest and
trimming up for a handsome introduction to the Army of
the Tennessee, and by sweeping impetuously on the road to

MAECH TO SAVATs-^NAII — BATTLE OF SHILOH. 103

Savannah, he both defeated the deflection toward Hamburg
and the halt at "Waynesboro ; for before General Buell
thought it necessary to give orders to Nelson, other divisions,
to which the speed of the first had been communicated, were
also beyond Waynesboro, and could not then be recalled.

That General Grant felt secure at this time is equally mani-
fest. Telegraphic communications between him and IS'elson
were established on the 3d of April. The latter telegraphed
that he could be at Savannah with his division on the 5th.
On the 4th, General Grant'''^ replied that he need not hasten
his march, as transports to convey him to Pittsl^urg Landing
would not be ready before the 8th. Nevertheless, Nelson
hastened on, and it was well he did, for he gave motion to the
whole army behind him, and General Johnston was even then
on the march from Corinth, with his entire army, to crush
General Grant before General Buell could give him assistance.

During the 4th and 5th, the rain fell continuously, the
country was broken and the roads bad ; but Nelson's division,
by brigades, reached Savannah during the 5tli, and Critten-
den's division encamped at night a few miles distant. General
Buell also reached Savannah on the 5th, but did not commu-
nicate with General Grant, as the latter had previously made
an appointment for a meeting on the 6th.

A variety of facts support the assumption that neither Gen-
eral Ilalleck, General Grant, nor the division commanders on
the field beyond Pittsburg Landing, had the remotest expecta-
tion that the enemy would advance in otfense from Corinth
with full strength. General Ilalleck proposed to command
the united armies in their advance upon Corinth, and yet he
was not to leave his headquarters at St. Louis, Missouri, until
the 7th. On the 5th, General Sherman, though not the senior
division commander, yet virtually so, from the confidence re-
posed in him by General Grant, telegraphed to the latter : " All
is quiet along my lines now; the enemy has cavalry in our

* This fact has been asserted by General Buell in several papers pub-
lished since the war. He has been equally explicit in declaring his ignor-
ance of the establishment of the Army of the Tennessee, at Pittsburg
Landing, instead of Savannah, until he reached Columbia, although he
had inquired particularly of (Jeneral Ilalleck.

104 MARCH TO SAVAXXAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH.

front, and I think tliere are two regiments and one battery six
miles out." Again : " I have no doubt that nothing will oc-
cur to-day more than some picket firing. The enemy is saucy,
but got the worst of it yesterday, and will not press our pickets
far. I will not be drawn out far, unless with the certainty of
advantage, and I do not apprehend anything like an attack
upon our position." General Grant telegraphed the same day
as follows : " The main force of the enemy is at Corinth, with
troops at diiferent points east." " The number of men at
Corinth, and within supporting distance of it, can not be far
from eighty thousand men." " Some skirmishing took place
between our outguards and the enemy's, yesterday and the
day before." " I have scarcel}^ the faintest idea of an attack
(general one) being made upon us, but v\^ill be prepared, should
such a thing take place." " It is my present intention to send
them (Buell's three foremost divisions) to Hamburg, some
four miles above Pittsburg, when they all get here."

It has been claimed, and doubtless with truth, that the po-
sition of General Grant's army before Pittsburg Landing was
an exceedingly eligible one. Its surfiice was broken, and it
was flanked on right and left by creeks that, in a gi'eat meas-
ure, forbade turning movements. But the location of the
several divisions on the field did not indicate the expectation
of a defensive battle more clearly than did the utterances of
the commanders. General Sherman, with two brigades of his
division, held the advance position near Sliiloh Meeting-house,
on the main road to Corinth. One of his brigades was on the
right, guarding the bridge on the Purdy road over Owl creek ;
another was on the extreme left, guarding the ford of Lick
creek, on the Hamburg road. General McClernand's divis-
ion was in the rear of General Sherman; General Prentiss'
division was between the direct, or right road to Corinth, and
the brigade on the extreme left ; and the two divisions of Gen-
erals Hurlbut and C. F. Smith, General W. H. L. Wallace com-
manding the latter, were near Pittsburg Landing, two or
three miles in the rear. These divisions had thus their camps
mainly on the roads leading toward the enemy's position at
Corinth. They were widely separated, and did not sustain such
relations to each other that it was possible to form quickly a

MARCH TO SAVANNAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH. 105

connected defensive line ; they liad no defenses and no desig-
nated line for defense in the event of a sudden attack, and
there was no general on the field to take, by special authority,
the command of the whole force in an emergency.

While the national army was unprepared for battle, and un-
expectant of such an event, and was i:)assing the night of the
5th in fancied security, Johnston's army of forty tliousand
men was in close proximity, and ready for the bloody revela-
tion of its presence and purpose on the following morning.
General Johnston was already a day later, in attaining posi-
tion for attack, than he had anticipated, and this loss of a day
had brought the Army of the Ohio one day's march nearer to
the conjunction with General Grant, to prevent which was the
object of his advance. Usually the indications of approach-
ing battle are so palpable that the men in the ranks, as well as
ofiicers of all grades, foresee the deadly struggle and nerve
themselves to meet it. But in this case the nearness of the
enemy in force was not known in the national army, and
there was no special preparation for the conflict.

Early in the morning of the 6th of April, 1862, a Sal)bath
day of unusual brightness, cannonading in the direction of
Pittsburg Landing was distinctly heard at Savannah. Gen-
eral Grant supposed that it indicated an attack upon his most
advanced positions, and not waiting to meet General Buell as
he had appointed, and not leaving any instructions or sug-
gestions for his guidance in moving his army to the field, or
even expressing a desire that he should give him support, he
gave an order to General IsTclson to march his division up to
Pittsburg Landing, and taking a steamer, hastened toward the
noise of battle. He did, however, advise General Buell, by
note, that an attack had been made, whose occurrence he had
not anticipated before Monday or Tuesday; apologized for
not meeting him as he had contemplated, and mentioned
the fact that he had ordered General [tTelson to move with his
division " to opposite Pittsburg Landing." The omission to
request him to take any other divisions to the field, or even to
hasten their march to Savannah, must be accepted as conclu-
sive that General Grant did not at the time anticipate such a
battle as Avould require the assistance of other portions of the

106 MAECH TO SAYA^TNAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH.

Army of tlie Oliio. General Buell was thus left free to man-
age liis army; but being without any knowledge of roads,
and having no steamers for his troops, he could do little, ex-
cept to dispatch orders to the rear to hasten forward his near-
est divisions — Crittenden's and McCook's. As the day wore
on, the noise from the front more and more plainly indicated
that a general engagement was progressing, and General Buell,
to learn the true condition of affairs and procure transporta-
tion for his forces, seized a small boat and steamed up the
river. He subsequently received a note from General Grant,
addressed to the " commanding officer, advance forces, near
Pittsburg, Tennessee," advising him that his forces had been
engaged since early morning contending against an army es-
timated at a hundred thousand men, and that the introduc-
tion of fresh troops upon the field would inspire his men and
dishearten the enemy.

As General Grant had mentioned in his instructions to
General l^elson that he could obtain a guide at Savannah, the
latter at once instituted a search for one. Failing in this, he
sent Captain Kendrick of his staff, to discover, if possible, a
practicable route to the battle-field. During the absence of this
officer, the certainty of a general battle became manifest, in-
creasing the anxiety of those who were so near and yet unable
to reach the field. Incited b}^ the distant cannonading, the
nearest divisions pressed forward rapidly, the roads having
been cleared of trains by General Buell's order, that the
march of three additional divisions should be unimpeded.

About noon. Captain Kendrick returned, and reported that
the road nearest the river was impracticable, on account of the
overflow, but that the second was practicable for infantry and
cavalry, but not for artillery and trains. By this time a guide
had been secured, and the division was soon in rapid motion.
As the battle-field was approached, the character of the con-
flict and its issues became apparent. The artillery, at work
on the bluff above the landing, indicated the nearness of the
foe, and the louder roar of cannon up the river, gave proof
that the gunboats were battering the flank of the enemy, while
the masses of fugitives, huddled in terror under the river
bank, spoke plainly of broken lines and general demoraliza-

MARCH TO SAVAXNAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH. 107

tion. Moving steadily to tlie field tlirongli the'se proofs of
disaster, ISTelson's troops gave evidence of thorough discipline
and courage. The rear of an army in successful action is often
depressing to those going to the front, but such a scene as
Pittsburg Landing presented at 5 p. m., when ]!^elson suc-
ceeded in crossing Ammen's brigade, was enough to appall the
stoutest hearts. This brigade went into action at once, on the
left of Grant's line, at the very crisis of the final eflfort of the
enemy to break through to the river. It formed under the eye
of General Buell, and upon ground of his selection. A short
time previous. General Bragg, on the right of the line, had
hurled his command against General Grant's left, upon whose
stability rested the safety of his army. Bragg had partially
succeeded, when two regiments of Ammen's brigade, the Sixth
Ohio and Thirty-sixth Indiana, moved into position near a
battery, then entirely without support. The enemy no dou1>t
had anticipated a complete victory as the result of Bragg's
assault. To gain the landing, it was only necessary to press
back Grant's left flank one-eighth of a mile. This accom-
plished, and the position would have been no longer tenal)le.
Fortunately, the ground was favorable fo]' defense. It was
very uneven, and through it extended a deep ravine, full of
back water from the river. l^Tear the river, this ravine was
very deep, and barred attack on the extremity of the line.
Thus, the ground placed Bragg at disadvantage, while the
gunboats, fresh troops, and the persistent resistance of Ilurl-
but's division, eftected his repulse, and the maintenance of
the left saved the army. The night falling soon after this re-
pulse, the fighting ceased, and both armies rested on their
arms, with the consciousness that the conflict was to be re-
newed on the morrow. Having rendered efficient service
during the later hours of the day, throughout the night the
gunboats Tyler and Lexington threw their heavy shells, at
regular intervals, into the lines of the enemy, whose roar and
the heavy rain deprived the weary soldiers of both armies of
needed rest.

The Army of the Tennessee had fought at great disadvan-
tage from the fact that it had been attacked before it could be
well formed, and the isolated divisions and brigades had been

108 MAECH TO SAVAN:^AH — BATTLE OF SHILOH.

well euvelopecl before support could be rendered. But though
roughly handled by the enemy, barring the immense number
of fugitives, it had fought with g]-eat gallantry and persistence.
At the close of the day, with thinned ranks and broken or-
ganizations, it held a short line round the hill, upon whose
summit had been placed the heavy guns intended for offensive
purpose, but at last essential to defense. General Sherman
said, officially of his command, that " it had become of a mixed
character." His central brigades had been attacked very early
in the morning, and though other troops in the advanced po-
sitions had become vigorously engaged, it was not until about
8 A. M. that he " became satisfied for the first time that the en-
emy designed a determined attack on the whole camp. " The
divisions were hurried to the front, and throughout a day of
hardest fighting all the divisions had been driven back from
point to point, and all had been shattered. iNTearly all of
Prentiss' division, not killed or wounded, had been captured.
General H. "W. L. Wallace had been mortally wounded, and
his division had become fragmentary. The divisions of Mc-
Clernand and Hurlbut had maintained greater compactness,
but had lost heavily. But the last line of the Army of the
Tennessee before Pittsburg Landing was a demonstration of
the unaccomplished purpose of the enemy.

Each army was yet hopeful of final victory. The success
of the enemy warranted the hope of further advantage, and
he had not heard of the presence of a portion of Bucll's
army on the field, and the proximity of such other portions
as would on the morrow change essentially the conditions of
the conflict.

General Beauregard, who had succeeded to supreme com-
mand after the fall of General Johnston, about 2 p. m. the
previous day, jubilant over the palpable advantages gained,
and assured of complete victory, sent such dispatches to
Richmond as to evoke from Mr. Davis a message of con-
gratulation to the Confederate congress, asserting the total
defeat and rout of General Grant's army.

Late in the evening, General Nelson succeeded in cross-
ing the remainder of his division, and during the night
Crittenden's division reached the field on transports, which

MAECH TO SAVANNAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH. 109

had been sent to Savanuali at the request of General
Buell, when he first met General Grant. McCook's divis-
ion, by a forced march, reached Savannah late in the
evening, and finding that no provision had been especially
made for the transportation of his men, General McCook im-
pressed boats as they touched the shore. It was known that
this was the last division from the Army of the Ohio that
could reach the field in time for the battle of the next day.
But a fourth fresh division of General Grant's army, com-
manded by General L. Wallace, arrived at night from Crump's
Landing. General Buell examined the ground in front of
General Grant's line, and selected positions for his divisions,,
and gave directions for their formation. ISTo regularly defined
plan of battle was agreed upon between the army commanders.
There was simply an understanding that they would assume
the offensive the next morning, and that the Army of the
Oliio should take the left of the field. The battle-field is an
undulating table-land of very considerable elevation, breaking
into ravines along the Tennessee river, and bounded on the
south and west by Lick creek and Owl creek, which have
sources in proximity, but in their divergence compass a wide
space, mostly wooded, but only here and there so densely as to
embarrass the movement of troops. Small fiirms and culti-
vated fields occasionally broke the continuity of the forest,
but rather gave variety to the scene than suggested special
dispositions of troops.

General Buell first formed General Nelson's division next to
the river as the left of the battle front, and General Grant as-
signed Wallace's first division to the right flank near Snake
creek, below the mouth of Owl creek. Between these ex-
tremes the remaining forces were formed — Crittenden's divis-
ion on the right of Nelson's, with a s[)ace for McCook's on
his right when it should arrive, and on the right of the posi-
tion for this division the troops engaged the day previous,
somewhat refreshed, extended the line to "Wallace's left.

At 5 A. M. Nelson's division was formed in line of battle,
without artillery or reserves, and moved forward. The skir-
mishers soon met the enemy's pickets and drove them rapidly
for nearly a mile, too far for the security of his right, as Crit-

116 MARCH TO SAYAXXAII^ — BATTLE OF SHILOH.

teuden's division was yet some distance behind. Is^elson was
therefore halted, by General BucU's order, that Crittenden
miglit advance abreast. This done, the two divisions moved
forward again with a strong line of skirmishers in front and
on the left flank. ITelson soon encountered the enemy in
such force as not only to check him, but to force his slow
retirement. His need of artillery* was extreme, and Menden-
hall's regular battery from Crittenden's division was sent to
his support, whose well-directed fire deterred the enemy from
further advance.

The character of JSTelson's onset revealed to General Beau-
regard the presence of reinforcements to General Grant.
He says in his report of the l)attlc, that " at 6 a. m. a hot fire of
musketry and artillery opened from the enemy's quarter on
his advanced line, assured mo of the junction of his forces,
and soon the battle raged with a fury which satisfied me that
I was attacked by a largely superior force." The presence of
Buell was indeed the prophec}^ of his defeat, as from the first,
the enemy's assurance of victory was contingent upon the
failure of the Army of the Ohio to reach the field during the
conflict. This state of things, though dreaded previously,
was unexpected, as he had received the night previous a spe-
cial dispatch " that delay had been encountered by General
Buell in his march from Columbia, and that his main forces
therefore could not reach the field of battle in time to save
General Grant's shattered fugitive forces from capture or de-
struction on the following day."t With this hope he had dis-
posed his forces, the evening previous, for a renewal of the
conflict. There had been fearful disorganization in his own
army during the previous day. Many of his troops were
fugitives in the rear, and added to the usual causes of disorder
in desperate battle, there had been an overmastering tempta-
tion to many of his troops to straggle, to gather the rich spoils
of the captured camps of five divisions. But notwithstanding
this depletion of his army, from these causes and the severer
casualties of deadly conflict, and the clisappoinment of not

"■■■ His own was at Savannah.

■j- Quoted from his official report.

MARCH TO SAVAJ^NAH BATTLE OF SHILOH. Ill

having crushed Grant hefore Bnell could join him, he still
fought them hoth with such determination and persistence as
are usually born of hope.

At the time that the recession of ITelson's line was arrested,
McCook's foremost brigade, Rousseau's, moved into position
on the right of Crittenden, This brigade extended the line,
but Rousseau's flank was for a time as much exposed as Crit-
tenden's had been, as there was still a wide space between the
two armies. Before, however, the enemy could take advan-
tage of this exposure, Kirk's brigade reached the field and was
placed in reserve on the right flank. Each brigade of Buell's
army was now required to furnish its own reserves, while
Boyle's brigade of Crittenden's division was designated as a
general reserve, and was so placed as to be facile of movement
whenever there should be need of support. General Buell
also availed himself of the fragmentary forces of the Army of
the Tennessee, found in his rear.

The Army of the Ohio now ofiibred a battle front one mile
and a half long, about half the distance between J^elson's left
and Wallace's right. The left flank was covered with skir-
mishers, and was in some degree protected by the roughness
of the ground near the river. The right had no assured con-
nection with the Army of the Tennessee, but rested in a Avood.
To strengthen the right, thus exposed to an enfilading or reverse
fire, Gibson's brigade of McCook's division on coming to the
field was placed in reserve in proximity. In front of ITclsou
was an open field, partially screened by woods, which extended
beyond the enemy's line. Crittenden's left brigade and
McCook's right were covered by a dense undergrowth, while
in front of theii* right and left brigades respectively the ground
was open. The ground, mainly level in front of Nelson, formed
a hollow before Crittenden, which fell into a small creek, pass-
ing in front of McCook. The Hamburg road penetrated
the line near ITelson's left. The enemy was in heavy force
beyond the open ground in Buell's front, in a line slightly
oblique to his line, having one battery so posted as to com-
mand Nelson's left, another to sweep his front and the woods
before Crittenden's left, a third bearing upon the junction
of Crittenden's right and McCook's left, and a fourth in the

112 MARCH TO SAVANNAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH.

immediate front of the latter. Beauregard had massed his
forces on his right the evening previous, under General Bragg,
to grasp the landing, and in consequence this flank was strong
for defense in the morning.

As !N"elson'8 division was well offered to the enemy in this
complete formation, it soon became hotly engaged, as the intro-
duction to the general action, from flank to flank. The enemy
resisted all attacks most stubbornly, and in turn assaulted boldly
and repeatedly with temporary success. In the second effort
to advance the national line, Crittenden became most warmly
engaged. Ilazen's brigade, on ISTelson's right, captured, in
a charge, the second battery of the enemy, which had been
exceedingly annoying. But in this act the brigade was sub-
ject to a cross fire of artillery from the adjacent batteries, con-
jointly with an infantry attack, and was forced back with the
loss of the battery and a very large number of men. The
enemy followed this advantage and advanced to the front of
Crittenden's left, where he was repulsed and hurled back by
Smith's brigade. In the meantime, JN'elson was pressed by a
strong force, with evident intent to turn his left, held by Am-
men's brigade. This brigade fought gallantly to maintain a
position second to none on the field, but at length began to
give ground, and a decided advantage to the enemy seemed
inevitable, as Ils'elson had neither artillery nor infantrj^ to direct
to its support, Hazen's brigade having been shattered, and
Bruce's being needed in its own position. But the impending
disaster was averted by Terrell's regular battery of McCook's
division, which, having just arrived from Savannah, dashed
into position, and by its rapid and accurate firing silenced the
enemy's first batter}', which was aiding the infantry force press-
ing Ammen. Subsequently, the enemy repeated the attack,
and endangered both the brigade and Terrell's battery, the lat-
ter having lost very many gunners and beiug without adequate
support. In this emergency, the jSTineteenth Ohio, from Crit-
tenden's division, and the Second Iowa and Fifteenth Illinois,
from the Army of the Tennessee, were sent to N^elson's assist-
ance. This reinforcement permitted the Sixth Ohio to become
the special support of Terrell's battery, furnishing gunners in
room of those he had lost. The enemv, however, did not

MARCH TO SAVAXXAH BATTLE OF SHILOH. 113

at once relax his effort to turn tlie flank, but was finally forced
back. Then, by a flank attack by jSTelson, and a direct one by
Crittenden, aided by a concentric fire from the batteries of
Mendenhall, Terrell, and Bartlett, he was driven beyond the
position of his second and third batteries. Afterward, the
enemy assumed a new position some distance to the rear, and
again opened with artillery, but his guns were soon silenced
by Mendenhall, and were subsequently captured by Critten-
den's division. These successes decided the contest on the
left, and jSTelson swung round over the ground which had been
lost the day before.

The action in the center of the general line, or the right of
Buell's, was not less spirited or decisive than that on the left.
The initial attacks, by the extreme divisions of the two armies,
had been made almost simultaneously, and the intermediate
divisions became involved in turn from both left and right.
Thus, McCook followed Crittenden in attacking the enemy.
This division met the same stubborn resistance, and made fre-
quent charges. Rousseau's brigade, having taken an advanced
position early in the day, repulsed a charge as its introduction
to battle. It then gave a counter-blow, drove the opposing
force some distance, and captured a battery. The direction
of Rousseau's advance left an opening between McCook and
Crittenden, which the enemy perceived, and began to mass
troops to occupy. To prevent this. General McCook ordered
Colonel Willich, commanding the Thirty-second Indiana, to
drive back the enemy, and by the bayonet and bullet this was
gallantly accomplished. The remainder of Gibson's brigade
followed "VVillich, and soon both brigades, Rousseau's and
Gibson's, were in hottest conflict. "Willich's regiment at one
time became wedged between other forces, and receiving their
fire was compelled to withdraw. This led to confusion, but
order was soon restored. Kirk's brigade reached the field
just as Rousseau had exhausted his ammunition, and took his
position, that he might replenish. "While Rousseau was absent,
Gibson was severely pressed, as the enemy continued his
movements to separate Crittenden and McCook. His left
regiment, the Forty-ninth Ohio, was involved in imminent
8

114 MARCH TO SAVANNAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH.

danger and was compelled to cliange front twice under fire to
prevent the turning of tlie position. Upon the return of Rous-
seau, his brigade, and two regiments of Hurlbut's division
hitherto in reserve, went into line, when General McCook's
whole division thus supported, advanced and drove the enemy
boj'ond General Sherman's camps. The last severe fighting
was purely defensive on the part of the enemy to hold his
main line of retreat and cover his retiring columns.

Just as the fighting ceased. General "Wood, with two brigades
•of his division, arrived, and one of them, Wagner's, joined in
pursuit of the enemy. None of the troops followed far, as
their extreme fatigue and the approach of darkness prevented.
General Thomas' division was still in the rear. Being the last
on the march, its approach had been retarded by the trains of
the other divisions left on the road.

The losses of each army were heavy. According to ofiicial
reports. General Grant lost fourteen hundred and thirty-seven
killed, five thousand six hundred and seventy-nine wounded,
and two thousand nine hundred and thirty-four captured.
General Buell lost two hundred and thirty-six killed, one
thousand eight hundred and sixteen wounded, and eighty-
eight captured. The total loss in the two armies was twelve
thousand one hundred and ninety. The enemy lost one thou-
sand seven hundred and twenty-eight killed, eight thousand
and twelve wounded, and nine hundred and fifty-seven cap-
tured ; total, ten thousand six hundred and ninety-seven.

Early the next morning after the battle, Generals Sherman
and "Wood, with two brigades each, were sent forward by
General Grant to discover the position of the enemy, if in po-
sition, or to pursue him, if in retreat. The movement was
promptly made, and resulted in the discovery that Beauregard
had withdrawn his infantry and artillery beyond Lick creek,
and had left a large body of cavalry in his rear. General
Sherman encountered this force and drove it some distance
toward the main army, when he and "Wood returned to camp.
General Beauregard succeeded in removing the artillery, which
he captured on the Gth, but lost guns and munitions on the
7th, and was compelled to leave his severely wounded men
in hospitals near the field.

MARCH TO SAVANNAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH. 115

As was common during the war, especially at tlie beginning,
eacli army commander greatly overestimated the strength of
the other. General Beauregard computed General Grant's
forces on the 6th, at forty -five thousand, and his reinforcements
on the 7th at thirty-three thousand, claiming for himself about
forty thousand at the commencement of the battle, and not
over twenty thousand on the 7th. While General Grant
during the battle, was led to believe that he was fighting one
hundred thousand men, giving no other estimate after its
conclusion, at least in his ofiicial report. He had on the field
at the beginning of the battle about thirty -three thousand men,
and General Buell gave him the second day about twenty
thousand.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, the commander-in-chief
of the insurgent forces in the West, died on the field, from a
gunshot wound. G. M. Johnson, provisional governor of
Kentucky, and General Gladden were mortally wounded, and
four other general ofiicers were wounded. General Grant lost
but one general, W. H. L. Wallace, temporary commander of
General C. F. Smith's division.

The battle of " Shiloh," viewed in reference to the antece-
dent plans and movements which produced it, the strength and
losses of the armies engaged, and the persistent fighting of
each, both when flushed with success and hopeless of victory,
must be regarded as one of vast results as aftecting the gen-
eral struggle; also, as one unique in type as regards some at
least of its prominent features.

The position of the Army of the Tennessee, on the west
bank of the Tennessee river, awaiting the coming of the
Army of the Ohio, for co-operation in offense against the con-
centrated forces of the enemy in position in proximity, cer-
tainly invited the attack. The invitation was accepted with
such tardiness as prevented success. General Johnston did
indeed intend to deliver battle on the 5th ; but the fact that
he did not, or could not as he had planned, proves that his
forecast was at fault. General Grant did not anticipate bat-
tle before General Buell could join him, especially after he
was known to be near, and General Johnston deferred his ad-
vance until it was possible for Buell to partici[>atc, although

116 MARCH TO SAVAXXAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH.

he also knew that he was in motion to accomplish this ohject.
Thus this great battle was fought as the result of the mu-
tual misapprehension of the commanding generals of the
probabilities and possibilities to each. It was delivered too
early for General Grant's plans and those of his chief, and too
late for the success of General Johnston. The stern, soldierly
character of the great majority of the men of the Army of
the Tennessee saved it from overthrow when fia^htino^ under
conditions of positive disadvantage. The opportune and es-
sential aid of the Army of the Ohio was revealed in the type
and issue of the second battle. It was an extraordinary ex-
perience in the history of war, that two armies, under sepa-
rate commanders, should fight a successful battle without
definitely recognized relations or specific plan,-'= each fighting
almost alone on the same wide field, and yet each fighting for
the other as parts of the same army.

The compact line of the Army of the Ohio, the absence of
all stragglers, the space it occupied in the battle front, the
way it was handled, and the manner of its fighting from flank
to flank, give it a record for discipline and valor in its first
great engagement that will not sufibr in comparison with that
of any other army on any other field of the war. The exact
service it rendered on the bloody ground of " Shiloh " can not
be a matter of doubt. The ofiicial report of General Buell,
and those of the division, brigade, and regimental com-
manders, giving the details of the engagement on the left and
center, bring into bold relief the distinguished gallantry and
success of each unit, large and small; while the testimony
from the officers of the Army of the Tennessee, and even
those of the enemy, is erjually emphatic. General Sherman
used language of strongest compliment in his report. When
General Beauregard had despaired of success on his right, and
anxious to secure a safe retreat, had massed his forces on the
Corinth road, near the " Shiloh Chapel," and having there
made such impression upon the line as to threaten the isola-

* General Buell states in his official report, that he knew nothing of the
position of General Grant's forces, except a few regiments that he put in
position with his own troops.

MAECII TO SAYAXXAH BATTLE OF SHILOH. 117

tion of' Wallace's division, McCook's division sprang to the
front, and General Sherman thns speaks of its action : " Here
I saw for the first time the well-ordered and compact Kentncky
forces of General Buell, whose soldierly movement at once
gaA'e confidence to onr newer and less disciplined forces.
Here I saw Willi ch's regiment advanced npon a point of
water-oaks and thickets in heantiful style. Then arose the
severest mnsketry fire I ever heard, and lasted some twenty
minntes, when the splendid regiment had to fall back."
Again: " Willi ch's regiment had been repnlsed, but a whole
brigade of ]SIc Cook's division advanced beantifully deployed,
and entered this dreaded wood. I ordered my second bri-
gade, then commanded by Colonel T. Kilby Smith (Colonel
Stuart being wounded), to form on its right, and my fourth
brigade, Colonel Bnckland, on its right, all to advance abreast
with this Kentucky brigade before mentioned, which I after-
ward found to be Rousseau's brigade of McCook's division.
I gave personal direction to the twenty-four pounder guns,
whose well-directed fire first silenced the enemy's guns to the
left, and afterward at the Shiloh Meeting-house. Rousseau's
brigade moved in splendid order steadily to the front, sweep-
ing everything before it, and at 4 p. m. Ave stood upon the
ground of our original front line, and the enemy was in full
retreat. I directed my reserve brigades to resume at once
their original camps. I am now ordered by General Grant to
give personal credit where I think it is due, and censure where
I think it merited. I concede that General jSIcCook's splendid
division from Kentucky drove back the enemy along the
Corinth road, which was the great center of the field of bat-
tle, and where Beauregard commanded in person, supported
by Bragg's, Polk's, and Breckinridge's divisions."

General Wallace, whose division, it will be remembered,
held the extreme riglit, and had driven the cnen\y's left a
great distance, thus speaks of the action of Williclf s regi-
ment, in its etfect upon his own conmiand, which at the time
Avas in peril of complete isolation, as from the recession of
General Sherman's right, his OAvn left Avas exposed. General
Wallace had previously made a most determined effort to turn
the enemy's left by changing front by a left Avlieel, relying

118 MARCH TO SAYAXXAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH.

upon the forces on his left for the support of that flank of his
division. But the supporting troops had given ^y^J, his own
reserves had heen thrown to that flank, and dispositions had
been made to cover his retreat in the event of need. " For-
tunately," he states, " before the enemy could avail themselves
of their advantage, some fresh troops dashed against them, and
once more drove them back. For this favor my acknov.dedg-
meuts are especially due to Colonel August "Willich and his
famous regiment."

From these statements it appears that while Wallace had
wheeled upon the enemy's flank, and his own left flank was in
peril, that troops from the Army of the Ohio gave it security,
and that consequently General Buell's forces were holding
the whole battle front to the left of the imperiled flank of the
extreme right division of the two armies. General McCook's
division, fighting in view of the two right division command
ers of the Army of the Tennessee, deserved all the praise they
generously bestowed, but it was not more deserving than the
other two divisions of the army, Crittenden and ISTelson's,
which defeated and routed the whole right of the Confederate
army.

The results of this battle repeated the significance of pre-
vious ones — that the war was one of vast proportions, and
that its duration might extend far into the future. At its be-
ginning, hope of its early termination was entertained I^orth
and South, but as it progressed, great battles, whether decisive
or not, seemed only to feed the energy and intensify the ruling
sentiments of the two sections. After " Donelson " the enemy
took position far to the south, to gather strength for a decisive
ofi'ensive blow, to restore prestige to his arms, and regain the
vast fertile region of country which he had lost. General
Beauregard had been sent to the West to assist General John-
ston in the assumption of the offensive in Kentucky. A\nien
that was impossible, the two generals gathered troops from all
quarters at Corinth. Bragg's veterans from Fort Pickens,
and Polk's forces guarding the Mississippi river at Columbus,
Kentucky, were called thither, and the governors of the States
of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana were in-
voked for additional forces, that the speedy concentration of

MARCH TO SAVANNAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH. 119

a vast army might assure success. Their first object was to
overwhehn General Smith, should, he advance from the pro-
tection of the gunboats, and the second and greater one was
to strike a sudden blow to crush the army under General
Grant, in position before Pittsburg Landing, and in the direc-
tion of Savannah, before he could be reinforced by General
Buell. Perhaps no battle of the war was projected with
greater objects than that of " Shiloh." The aims were to
crush, first. Grant, then Buell, and then take the offensive
throughout the West. But the magnitude of the interests
involved, did not find correspondence in the strength of the
army gathered at Corinth, and the initial movement of the
grand scheme was undertaken too late to succeed. To cover
up the total failure of the plan, minor advantages were mag-
nified in the report of General Beauregard, and an adroit
apology was given for the withdrawal of the army from the
battle-field. The leaders declared themselves satisfied with
the result, and the press throughout the South expressed the
hopefulness of final triumph which General Beauregard
claimed for himself and his defeated army. But beneath this
show of hope there must have been the profoundest disap-
pointment. A hopeless defensive at once took the place of a
bold aggression, freighted with the grandest anticipated re-
sults. " Shiloh " buried hopes which had stronger founda-
tions than any of the admitted expectations of subsequent
campaigns and battles. This battle was to the enemy not
merely another proof of what " Mill Springs" and "Donelson''
had palpably revealed — the persistence and pluck of the na-
tional troops — but it was the miscarriage of a new mode of
warfare, for the quick destruction of two armies destined
for conjunction and co-operation in room of the diff'usion of
their forces to defend territory. This fact gives broad signifi-
cance to the issue of the battle of " Shiloh." A grand plan
there failed through inadequate resources and comparative
feebleness of execution. And failure from either cause, where
the possibilities lying beyond initial success were so promising,
meant the loss of the cause rather than that of a great battle.
But the l^orthern people, though claiming a victory, measured
its scope by the more palpable and immediate results. It was

120 MARCH TO SAVAXXAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH.

a victory because it was not a crushing defeat. The Confed-
erate army was not so crippled that it could not safely with-
draw from the field and enter upon preparations for battle on
some other field. It did not therefore appear especially de-
cisive. And this feeling, coupled with the sadness engendered
by the multitude of the slain, and the sufierings of the far
greater multitude of the wounded, was a heavy offset to the
joy which the victory produced.

Nashville, March 3, 1862.
General Hallcclc, St. Lovis :

What can I do to aid your operations against Columbus ? Remember
I am separated from you by the Tennessee river. Johnston is moving to-
ward Decatur, and burning bridges as he goes.

D. C. BUELL.

St. Louis, March 4, 1862.
General Buell, Nashville :

If Johnston has destroyed the railroad and bridges in his rear, he can
not return to attack you. Why not come to the Tennessee, and operate
vpith me to cut Johnston's line with Memphis, Randolph, and New Mad-
rid? Columbus has been evacuated and destroyed. Enemy is concen-
trating at New Madrid and Island No. 10. I am concentrating a force
of twenty thousand against him. Grant, with all available force, has gone
up the Tennessee to destroy connection at Corinth, Jackson, and Hum-
boldt. Estimated strength of enemy at New Madrid, Randolph, and
Memphis is fifty thousand. It is of vital importance to separate tliem
from Johnston's army. Come over to Savannah or Florence, and we can
do it. We then can operate on Decatur or Memphis, or both, as may ap-
pear best.

II. W. HALLECK.

Nashville, March 5, 1862.
General Halle cl\ St. Louis:

Your views accord with my own generally, but some slight modifications
seem to me necessary. At least there are details about which we ought
to be able to consult freely. Can we not meet at Louisville in a day or
so? I think it very important. The concentration of my troops and trans-
portation can not be completed for some days. We have had two for-
midable rivers to cross, and have forced ourselves here without trans-
portation or baggage. The thing which I think of vital importance is
that you seize and hold the bridge at Florence in force. Johnston is
now at Shelby ville, some fifty miles south ot this. I hope you will ar-
range for our meeting at Louisville.

D. C. BUELL.

MARCH TO SAVANNAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH. 121

St Louis, March 6, 1862.
General BucU, Na.tJtvillc :

I can not possibly leave here at the present time. Events are pass-
ing on so rapidly that I must be all the time in telegraphic com-
munication with Curtis, Grant, Pope, and Commodore Foote. "We must
consult by telegraph. News down the Tennessee that Beauregard has
twenty thousand men at Corinth, and is rapidly fortifying it. Smith
will probably not be strong enough to attack it. It is a great misfortune
to lose that point. 1 shall reinforce Smith as rapidly as possible. If
you can send a division by water around into the Tennessee, it would re-
<j[uire only a small amount of transportation to do it. Would receive all
its supplies by the river.

H. W. IIALLECK.

Nashville, March 9, 1862.
General Hallerl\ St Louis :

I did not get your dispatch of the 0th until yesterday, that of the 8th
to-day. I suggest the ioUowing : The enemy can move from one side of
the river to the other at pleasure, and if we attempt to operate on both
sides without the same facility of transit, we are liable to be beaten in de-
tail. The point 1 previously suggested is the only one from which we can
act centrally. That secured, we can act according to circumstances either
way. If you occupy that point, I will reinforce you by water or join you
by land. Otherwise I may detach too little to save you, or else so much
as to endanger Middle Tennessee, the importance of which I need not al-
lude to. If we could meet, I think that we could better understand each

other.

D. C. BUELL.

St. Loots, March 10, 1802.
General Buell, Nashville :

My forces are moving up the Tennessee river, as rapidly as we can ob-
tain transportation. Florence was the point originally designated, but on
account of the enemy's forces at Corinth and Humboldt, it is deemed
best to lantl at Savannah, and establish a depot. The transportation will
serve as ferries. The selection is left to C. F. Smith, who commands the
advance. Pope has turned Island No. 10, but the enemy shows no dis-
position to evacuate. Curtis is asking for reinforcements in Arkansas. I
must send him some troops intended for Tennessee. You do not say
whether we are to expect any reinforcements from Nashville.

H. W. HALLECK.

Nashville, March 10, 1802.
General Ilallcck, S(. Louis :

The possession and absolute security of the country north of the Ten-
nessee river, with Nashville as a center, is of vital imjiortance both in a
political and military point of view. Under no circumstances should it
be jeopardized. It enables us, with the Tennessee as a base, to operate
east, west, and south. All our arrangements should look to centralization

122 MARCH TO SAVANNAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH.

for that object. We can not tell now which direction to take when we
get within reach of the enemy. You can not well tell what force you
may meet at the west ; still less can I tell what may come in the direction
of Stevenson. With this view, the establishment of your force on this
side of the river as high up as possible, is evidently judicious; and with
the same view it would be unnecessary and inadvisable to change the
line on which I propose to advance. I can join you almost, if not quite
as soon as by water, in better condition, and with greater security to your
operations and mine. I believe you can not be too promptly nor too
strongly established on the Tennessee. I shall advance in a very few days,
as soon as oar transportation is ready.

D. C. BUELL.

[PRESIDENT'S WAR ORDER, NO. 3.]

Executive Mansion,
Washington, March 11, 1862.
Major-General McClellan, having personally taken the field, at the
head of the Army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved
from the command of the other military departments, he retaining com-
mand of the Department of the Potomac.

Ordered further : That the two departments now under the respective
commands of Generals Ilalleck and Hunter, together with so much of
that under General Buell as lies west of a north and sovith line indefi-
nitely drawn through Knoxville, Tennessee, be consolidated and desig-
nated the Department of the Mississii^pi ; and that, until otherwise or-
dered, Major-General Halleck have command of said department.
* -;5- ■«• * ^ * * * •»

ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
By order of Secretary of War.

L. Thomas, Adjutant-General.
Official.

Wm. D. Whipple, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Nashville, March 20, 1862.
To General L. Thomas, Adjutant-General, Washington :

The following is the force, in whole, of the late Department of the
Ohio, as nearly as can be ascertained at present:

92 regiments of infantry — 60,882 for duty — 79,334 aggregate, present
and absent.

11 regiments, 1 battalion, and 7 detached companies cavalry — 9,222 for
duty — 11,496 aggregate, present and absent.

28 field, and 2 siege batteries — 3,368 for duty — 3,953 aggregate, present
and absent.

The above figures include battalions of the hrth, lOth, 18th, and 19th
regular infantry, and 2 companies of regular cavalry. Will report more
particularly by letter.

MAKCH TO SAVANNAH — BATTLE OF SHILOPI. 123

The tlata are found in great detail in last department return, except

that eight regiments were detached for operations against Fort Donelson,

and have not been returned.

D. C. BUELL,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

[CIRCULAR.]

Headquarters Fourth Division,
Camp near Spring Hill, Tenn., March 28, 1872.

Reveille will he sounded to-morrow at 4 o'clock a. m. At 6 a. m., the
Tenth brigade will move with one day's rations in haversacks, in the fol-
lowing order: 1. The 24th Ohio regiment; 2. The 6th Ohio regiment;
3. The 36th Indiana regiment. The wagons will be carefully loaded,
with reference to fording Duck river ; tents and other articles not liable
to injury from water, at the bottom, and ammunition at the top.

On reaching the ford, the men will strip off their pantaloons, secure
their cartridge-boxes about their necks, and load knapsacks on the
wagons. Bayonets will be fixed, and pantaloons in a neat roll will be
carried on the point of the bayonets.

A halt Avill be ordered on the other side of the ford to allow the men
to take off their drawers, wring them dry, and resume their clothing and
knapsacks.

Strong parties will be detailed to accompany the wagons, to assist them
in crossing the ford. The rear guard to each regiment will consist of one
company under charge of a field officer, whose particular province will
be to assist the passage of the train over the ford. The ammunition
boxes of the artillery will be taken off the limbers and passed across the
river on scows.

By command of Brigadier-General Nelson.

J. MILLS KENDRICK

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

Savannah, April 6, 1862.
Brigadier-General William Nelson, Commanding Division in General Buell's Army:
An attack having been made upon our forces, you will move your en-
tire command to the river, opposite Pittsburg. You can easily obtain a
guide in the village.

By order of Major-General Grant.

JOHN A. RAWLINS,

Assistant Adjutant- General.

124 MARCH TO SAVANXAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH.

Savannah, April 6, 1862.
General D. C Buell :

Heavy firing is heard up the river, indicating plainly that an attack has
been made upon our most advanced positions. I have been looking for
this, but did not believe that the attack could be made before Monday or
Tuesday. This necessitates mj^ joining the forces up the river, instead
of meeting you to-day as I had contemplated. I have directed Nelson to
move to the river with his division. He can march to opposite Pitts-
burg.

Respectfully, your ob?dient servant.

U. 8. GRANT,
3faj or- General Commanding.

Pittsburg, Ap7-il 6, 1862.
Commanding Officer, Advance Forces, near Pittsburg, Tennessee.

General : — The attack upon my forces has been very spirited from
early this morning. The appearance of fresh troops on the field now
would have a powerful effect, both by inspiring our men and dishearten-
ing the enemy. If you will get upon the field, leaving all baggage on the
east bank of the river, it will be a move to our advantage, and possibly
save the day to us.

The rebel force is estimated at over one hundred thou!5and men.
My headquarters will be in the log building on the top of the hill,
where you will be furnished a staff oflBcer to guide you to your place in
the field.

Respectfully, etc.,

U. S. GRANT,

3£ajor-General,

This communication General Buell received, who states in his official

report of the battle that he requested General Grant to send steamers to

Savannah to bring up Crittenden's division, which had arrived during the

mornins;.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL BUELL'S REPORT.

I found upon the ground parts of about two regiments, perhaps one
thousand men, and subsequently a similar fragment came up of General
Grant's force. The first I directed to act with McCook's attack, and the
second one was similarly employed on the left. I sent other straggling
troops of General Grant's force immediately on General McCook's right, as
some fh'ing had already commenced. I had no direct knowledge of the
disposition of the remainder of General Grant's force, nor is it my province
to speak of them. I regret that I am unable to name those that came
under my direction in the way I had stated, for they rendered willing
and efficient service during the day.

MARCH TO SAVAXXAH — BATTLE OF SHILOH. 125

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL GRANT'S OFFICLiL REPORT.

As there is a deep and impassable ravine for artillery or cavalry, and
very difficult for infantry at this point, no troops were stationed here ex-
cept the necessary artillerists and a small infantry force for their support.
Just at this moment, the advance of Major-General Buell's column and
a part of the division of General Nelson ai-rived, the two generals named
both being present. An advance was immediately made upon the point
of attack, and the enemy was soon driven back.

During the night all was quiet, and, feeling that a great moral advan-
tage would be gained by becoming the attacking party, an advance was
ordered as soon as day dawned. The result was the gradual repulse of
the enemy at all points of the line, from 9 until probably 5 oclock in the
afternoon, when it became evident the enemy was retreating.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S REPORT.

After speaking of the call upon various governors of states for troops
the general gives this passage :

"At the same time, General Johnston being at Murfreesboro, on the
march to form a junction of his forces with mine, was called on to send at
least a brigade by railroad, so that he might fall on and crush the enemy
should he attempt an advance from under his gunboats. The call on
General Johnston was promptly complied with. Ilis entire force was also
hastened in this direction, and by the first of April our united forces were
concentrated along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad from Bethel to Corinth,
and from the Memphis and Charleston Pailroad, from Corinth to Tuka.

" It was then determined to resume the offensive and strike a sudden
blow at the enemy in position under General Grant, on the west bank of
the Tennessee at Pittsburg, and in the direction of Savannah, before he
was reinforced by the army under General Buell, then known to be ad-
vancing for that purpose by rapid marches from Nashville, via Columbia.
About the same time General Johnston was advised that such an opera-
tion conformed to the expectations of the President."

EXTRACT FROM THE MESSAGE OF MR. DAVIS TO THE CON-
FEDERATE CONGRESS, APRIL 8TH.

The great importance of the news just received from Tennessee in-
duces me to depart from the established usages, and to make to you this
communication in advance of official reports. From official telegraphic
dispatches, received from official sources, I am able to announce to you,
with entire confidence, that it has pleased Almighty God to crown the
Confederate arms with a glorious and decisive victory over our invaders.

CHAPTER XI.

OPERATIONS AGAIXST CORINTH.

After the failure of General Beauregard's grand offensive
enterprise, the whole South was put upon a strain to prepare to
withstand at Corinth the combined armies under General Hal-
leck. Generals Van Doru and Sterling Price, with their forces,
were withdrawn from the scenes of campaigns and battles in
the far West. And while these and other troops were con-
centrating at Corinth, General Beauregard threw forward
toward Pittsburg, heavy detachments to resist all ordinary
reconnoitering forces, and retard the advance of the national
armies.

General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing, April 11th,
and lost no time in arranging for a vast concentration of armies
to advance against Corinth, prepared for any type of resistance
which might be offered. He called to him the divisions of
Generals Davis and Asboth, made veteran by battles and
marches in Missouri and Arkansas, and the Army of the Mis-
sissippi, under General Pope, fresh from its victories at ISfew
Madrid and Island ISTo. 10. In the unification of his immense
forces, General Halleck designated the grand units, as right
wing, center, left wing, reserves, and cavalry, commanded
respectively by Major-Generals George H. Thomas, D. C.
Buell, John Pope, and J. A. McClernand, and Brigadier-
General A. J. Smith. The " Bight Wing " comprised four
divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, and the First of the
Army of the Ohio, under command of Major-General W. T.
Sherman, and Brigadier-Generals T. W. Sherman, J. A. Davis,
S. H. Hurlbut, and J. J. McKeau ; the center, the divisions of
Brigadier-Generals McCook, iSTelson, Crittenden, and Wood,
(126)

OPERATIOXS AGAINST CORINTH. 127

of tlie Army of the Ohio ; the left wing, the divisions of Briga-
dier-Generals E. A. Paine, D. S. Stanley, and S. Hamilton ;
the reserves, the divisions of Major-General L. Wallace and
Brigadier-General II. M. Jndah ; and the cavalry division,
nnder the command of Brigadier-General G. Granger. This
plan of organization gave nnity to the whole force without
materially changing the formation of the distinct armies of
which it was composed. Major-General U. S. Grant was an-
nounced as second in command.

For the moment, the general struggle was resting upon the
two immense armies concentered in Virginia and on the west
bank of the Tennessee river. Never, during the war, did
heavier masses, in the aggregate, confront each other, than in
the two opposing armies in the East and the two in the West.
The people of the country had not yet entirely given up the
idea that a few great battles would terminate the war, or at
least give such preponderance to one party or the other as to
foreshadow the final result. Hence, at no time before the end
was distinctly in view as contingent upon a single battle or
surrender, did two campaigns focalize more interest or hope
than those before Eichmond and Corinth. But in the first
stages of a war, which, from the peculiar causes of its existence,
was not likely to terminate until one of the contending parties
should be exhausted, battles of marked decisiveness were not
probable, and the spring and summer of 1862, seemingly pro-
phetic of decisive conflicts, passed away without materially
changing the relative strength of the warring sections.

General Ilalleck, though greatly stronger than his adver-
sary, studiously avoided either inviting or provoking a general
engagement, adopting the policy of gradual approaches by
parallels. And step by step, by short advances, fortifying each
new position, he slowly neared his objective. General Beau-
regard resisted each successive encroachment with greater
stubbornness and stronger forces, but never in such strength as
to precipitate a general battle, as for such an issue he was not
prepared.

On the 3d and 4th of May, General Halleck advanced his
whole line, and repeated this movement on the 7th, 17th, and
28th. These advances always involved heavy skirmishing,

128 OPERATIOXS AGAIXST CORIXTH.

and at times very sharp figliting by strong lines ; and the
national armies were not always the aggressors. May 9th,
General Paine's division, in the advance of the Army of the
Mississippi or left wing, was assailed by the enemy in heavy
force, at Farmington, Mississippi. Paine was not reinforced,
and having fonght manfnlly for several hours, was able to
withdraw in safety across Seven Mile creek, to General Pope's
main line. Had not reinforcements been forbidden by the
commander-in-chief, there might have been a heavy engage-
ment, as the enemy, stimulated by the hope of capturing the
isolated division, threw forward strong columns. The same
day there was a similar eflbrt, with similar issue, to capture an
advanced detachment of McCook's division. The advance of
the 17th brought on a spirited combat of respectable pro-
]3ortions on the right. General T. W. Sherman then drove
the enemy across Bridge creek, and occupied the ground north
of the creek on the Monterey and Corinth road. Whereupon,
General Thomas directed General W. T. Sherman to recon-
noiter the enemy's left. This movement resulted in driving
back that flank some distance, and in a corresponding advance
of the whole " Right Wing."

The advance' of the 28th met far more opposition than any
j)receding one. The enemy then attempted to retake a posi-
tion which had been wrested from him by the right Aving, but
was repulsed. He also attacked McCook's division in the
center of the general line, but was defeated again.

This seeming boldiiess in aggression was only a feint to
cover the retreat of General Beauregard's whole army from
Corinth. The near approach of the national lines, now ready
for the complete envelopment of his position, made it neces-
sary for him to give battle in some form, retreat, or allow liim-
self to be shut up by a siege. He chose retreat, though it is
evident that he did not lightly esteem the advantages of the
position which he was compelled to abandon. It was the
vaunted " strategic position " of the campaign, but he was
unable even in defense to cope with General Halleck's armies,
and in leaving it, he hoped that there might be some compen-
sation for its loss, by again changing the theater of the war

OPEEATIOXS AGAIXST CORIXTH. 129

in the West, and causing the diffusion of the forces in array
before him.

The explosions at Corinth, early in the morning of May
30th, revealed General Beauregard's purpose and its accom-
plishment. For several days he had been sending off his mu-
nitions and stores, and during the night of the 29th he had so
quietly and secretly withdrawn his army, that his own pickets
at post did not know that they had been left, a sacrifiee for
the safety of their comrades. A reconnoissance verified tlie
supposed significance of the explosions, and the " Left Wing,"
forty thousand strong, moved at onee in pursuit, and General
Buell, with McCook's, Crittenden's, and T. W. Sherman's di-
visions, followed in support. Although the railroad had been
seriously damaged at Booneville by Colonel Elliott, in com-
mand of cavalry, having passed through luka to that point
on the 29th, there was no such protracted detention at that
place as to enable the pursuing forces to overtake the rear
guard of the retreating army. General Beauregard halted at
Okolona; the national cavalry, under General Granger, ad-
vanced to Baldwin and Guntown, and the campaign was termi-
nated. Thus, Corinth, made historic as the objective of an im-
posing campaign, fell at last without general engagement or
siege.

Soon after, Memphis, and all other points on the Mississippi
river above that city, passed to the control of the national
forces, and with them another section of the mighty river, aa
did also the whole region traversed by the "Memphis and
Charleston Railroad," to the borders of East Tennessee. The
possession of this vast region seemed at first a far greater ad-
vantage than it really was. To be utilized, it required a heavy
elimination from the offensive strength of the Western armies.
The insurgent army was not destroyed, nor even greatly di-
minished by losses, and hence the absolute strength of the
rebellion was not diminished in proportion to the loss of terri-
tory. The impression prevailed that this was the case, but
tlie subsequent diffusion of forces to guard it, and the facility
with which, in consequence, the enemy first changed the theater
of war and then assumed the aggressive to regain it, demon-
strated the fact, that at that period of the war, the mere grasp
of Southern territory was a waste of strength.

CHAPTER XII.

OPERATIONS OF GENERAL 0. M. MITCHELL, GENERAL NEGLEY, GEN-
ERAL G. W. MORGAN, AND COLONEL DUFFIELD, AND THE EXPEDI-
TION TO DESTROY RAILROADS IN GEORGIA.

Brigadier-General O. M. Mitchell, commanding the Sec-
ond division, left ISTasliville about the middle of March and
advanced to Murfreesboro. General Johnston, in retreating
from one place to the other, had destroyed all the bridges to
prevent pursuit, and the repair of these on the railroad first
commanded the attention of General Mitchell. He built
twelve hundred feet of heavy bridges in ten days, when being
relieved at ISIurfreesboro by the Twenty-third brigade, under
Colonel Duffield, he moved forward to Shelbyvillo and there
established a depot of supplies. From Shelbyville, he made a
bold and rapid advance through Fayetteville to Huntsville,
Alabama. Ilis van, consisting of Turchin's brigade, Colonel
Kennett's Ohio cavalry, and Captain Simonson's battery, en-
tered Huntsville early in the morning of the 7th of April,
completely surprising the citizens of the town, capturing one
hundred and seventy prisoners, fifteen locomotives, one hun-
dred and fifty passenger and freight cars, and other property
of great value to the enemy. Colonels Sill's and Lytle's
brigades and Loomis' and Edgarton's batteries followed
closely.

The next day, using the captured rolling-stock. General
Mitchell sent Colonel Sill eastward to capture Stevenson, the
junction of the Memphis and Charleston and l!^ashville and
Chattanooga railroads, and Colonel Turchin westward to seize
Decatur and Tuscumbia. Both expeditions were successful,
and thus, within a few days, one hundred and twenty miles

(130)

OPERATIOXS OF GE>rEEAL MITCHEKL. 131

of tliis important railroad, coimectiiig Corintli and Rielimond,
fell into liis keeping. To hold what he had gained, detach-
ments of troops were posted at the more important points,
and the whole command was kept in constant readiness to
move to any place on the line which the enemy might threaten
or attack.

The necessity for a movement in force soon occurred, as
General Kirby Smith advanced from Bridgeport against the
detachment beyond Stevenson. As rapidly as possible, on the
29th of April, General Mitchell moved from Hunts ville by
rail to oppose him. On reaching his menaced detachment,
four miles west from Bridgeport, he found that his troops had
driven the enemy's pickets back across Widow's creek, the
bridge over which had been burned. lie then sent a portion
of his force to i-einforce the detachment in front of the enemy,
to hold him there hj a feigned efibrt to cross, while with the
remainder he made a detour and advanced upon Bridgeport.
The enemy at this point was surprised and thrown into con-
fusion, and, mainly by the action of the artillery, was driven
across the Tennessee river. The railroad bridge, reaching
from the western bank of the river to the island, though fired
by the enemy, was saved, but the one extending from the
island to the eastern bank was destroyed.

Having routed one portion of Smith's force, General
Mitchell made preparation to attack the other, which was
guarding the crossing of Widow's creek before his own troops,
anticipating that the report of cannon at Bridgeport would
hasten their return to assist their comrades, and waiting their
approach, he dispersed them also with his artillery.

Unofficial reports place the enemy's loss in this engagement
at seventy-two in killed and wounded, and three hmich-ed and
fifty prisoners.

About the 10th of May, General Mitchell was placed in
command of all the troops between I^ashville and Huntsvillc.
lie at once ordered General ISTegley, who, with his brigade
from the Second division, had been left at Columbia when
the. main army moved upon Savannah, to move from that
place to Rodgersville, Alabama, held by a brigade of the
enemy under General Adams. He also sent a force, in com-

132 OPERATIOXS OF GEXEEAL NEGLEY.

mand of Colonel Lytle, from Athens, Alabama, to co-operate
with him. Upon the near approach of these two colnmns —
May 13th — the enemy dispersed and sought safety by crossing
the Tennessee river, and the two commanders co-operating
returned to their former positions.

The engagement at Bridgeport and the expedition against
Eodgersville gave General Mitchell the control of that por-
tion of Alabama lying north of the Tennessee river. This
region he held firmly, making the impression, by his rapid
movements, that his force was much larger than it really was.
The seizure of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, and the
complete occupancy of Northern Alabama, involved a series
of bold and brilliant operations, which had important rela-
tions to those before Corinth and at Cumberland Gap, and
also to the subsequent advance of the Army of the Ohio toward
East Tennessee.

On the 29th of May, General ]\Iitchell put in motion an
expedition against Chattanooga, Tennessee. General JSTegley
moved from Columbia to Fayetteville, and Avas there joined by
Turchin's brigade, from ITuntsville, and the Eighteenth Ohio,
under Colonel T. R. Stanley, from Athens. From Fayetteville
the column advanced through Winchester, Cowan, and the
University Place to Jasper. When near the latter place, Colo-
nel Hambright, commanding the vanguard, encountered a bri-
gade of the enemy, under General Adams. After a sh^rp
skirmish. General Adams fled, leaving behind him some twenty
of his dead, as many who were wounded, twelve others as
prisoners, and his ammunition and supply trains. From Jas-
per, General Kegley advanced to the north bank of the Ten-
nessee, opposite Chattanooga, arriving on the 7th of June.
Colonel Sill's command had been sent to Shellmound, to attact
the attention of the enemy and prevent his crossing the river
at that point. During the evening of the 7th and morning
of the 8th, General E'egley bombarded Chattanooga, mak-
ing a feint of crossing the river and assaulting the place, and
then withdrew. This attitude drew General Kirby Smith from
Knoxville to London, with a large portion of his command, on
his way to relieve Chattanooga. Here he learned that Gen-
eral Negley had withdrawn from East Tennessee. General

OPERATIONS OF GENERAL MORGAN. 133

iSTegley took position, on liis retnrn, at Shelbyville, and the
co-operative forces resumed their former positions. Tlie main
advantage resulting was the intensification of the enemy's
confusion, and the consequent derangement of his plans.

Brigadier-General G. W. IMorgan arrived at Cumberland
Ford, and assumed command of the forces in Eastern Ken-
tucky, April 11th. The Cumberland Valley was destitute of
supplies, the productions of the region having been exhausted
by General Carter's brigade and the enemy. Forage had to
be hauled at first from forty to fifty miles, and subsequently
from eighty to ninety, over roads almost impassable. General
Morgan couceutrated his entire command at Cumberland
Ford, consisting of tlie Twenty-fourth brigade (formerly the
Twelfth), the Twenty-fifth, Twenty-sixth, and Twenty-seventh,
commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals S. P. Carter
and J. G. Spears, and Colonels J. S. DcCourcy and John Co-
burn. -■' Some of the regiments were rearmed, and the artil-
lery was increased from six to twenty-two pieces. Supplies
and ammunition were brought forward, and a floating bridge
was placed upon the Cumberland river.

Soon after his assumption of command, General Morgan
ascertained, through a reconnoissance, that the defensive works
at Cumberland Gap had been grouped on the enemy's left, and
that the natural strength of the position was his dependence
on the right. This gap is a deep depression in the Cumber-
land range, being the great gateway through the mountains
for the roads of an extensive region. It is situated on the
eastern side of the boundary line between Kentucky and Ten-
nessee, and near the line separating Western Virginia from
Kentucky and Tennessee. The eastern slope of the moun-
tains is very abrupt, often presenting perpendicular heights of
several hundred feet. The western slope is less steep, but is
very much In-okcn by spurs, knobs, and ravines. The ascent,
therefore, on either side is exceedingly difiicult. Fast of the
Cumberland range, in close proximity, is a secondary parallel
range, called Poor Valley Ridge. On the west there is another,

*The Twenty-seventh bi-igade, in June, passed to the command of
Brii^adier-General A. Baird.

134 OPERATIOXS OF GEXERAL MORGAX.

inferior in height and extent. By personal observation, dur-
ing a reconnoissance, General Morgan perceived a knob to the
right of the fortifications, which commanded them, and sent
at once for siege guns to be used from that .point; but before
they could be l^rought, the enemy fortified this eminence and
defeated the plan. A subsequent reconnoissance, with Carter's
and DeCourcy's brigades, without the expectation of even a
skirmish, resulted in a spirited contest, brought on by an
attack by the enemy. The loss was not heavy on either side,
and except in demonstrating the ditfieulty and hazard of an
attempt to carry the position by storm, the reconnoissance was
fruitless.

General Morgan now determined to demonstrate on the ene-
my's left, and, if possible, force him to an open fight or to the
abandonment of his fortifications. To conceal his purpose,
and at the same time threaten Clinton, one of the enem3^'s
depots of supplies, he posted General Spears, with three regi-
ments, at the foot of Pine Mountain, on the road through Big
Creek Gap, this road having been blockaded by the enemy for
eighteen miles from the Gap toward Spears' position. This
action induced the enemy to place at the Gap two brigades of
infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and two batteries, under
command of Brigadier-General Barton. So large a force hav-
ing been detached from the main army. General JSIorgan pro-
posed to leave Carter's brigade at Cumberland Ford, and with
Baird's and DeCourcy's brigades cross Pine Mountain, and
passing the Cumberland chain at Rogers' Gap, del)ouch into
Powell's valley, and at the same time threaten Knoxville, Clin-
ton, and Cumberland Gap. Before, however, this plan could
be executed. General E. K. Smith, commanding tlie Confed-
erate forces in East Tennessee, advanced from Knoxville,
through Clinton, to "Woodson's Gap, with about eight thou-
sand men, having the double object of cutting Spears off and
threatening Cumberland Ford, by detaching a brigade for the
purpose.

On the 6th of June, with his whole command in hand, Gen-
eral Morgan moved upon the road leading through liogers'
Gap into Powell's valley. On the 10th, he sent two hundred
men to burn the bridge at Lowdon, and this was accomplished

OPERATIONS OF GENERAL MORGAN^. 135

witliout loss. By the 12th, two brigades were in the valley,
aucl General jMorgan had arranged to move against Cumber-
land Gap the next day with three brigades, Baird's, Spears',
and De Courcy's, when telegrams from General Buell were
received, which led him to order his command to counter-
march to "Williamsburg. In this movement, the siege guns
blockaded the Gap, and De Courcy was delayed in leaving
Powell's valley, and on the next day (the 13th) a rumor
reached him that the enemy was evacuating Cumberland Gap.
This rumor reached General Morgan, in conjunction with a
telegram from General Buell, advising him that General
Mitchell had been ordered to demonstrate against Chatta-
nooga, and induced him to resume his movement against Cum-
berland Gap.

General Smith, en route to relieve Chattanooga, threatened
by General IsTegley, heard at London of General Morgan's
advance into Powell's valley, and also of ISI'egley's withdrawal,
and immediately retraced his steps, turning his main column
toward Clmton to oppose Morgan, and sending General Bar-
ton to observe Rogers' Gap and the Knoxville road. On the
17th, General Morgan learned that Smith was moving towai'd
Clinton, that Barton was approaching the valley on his right
flank, that Pains with a force was at Baptist Gap, and that
General Stevenson was in supporting distance, but determined
nevertheless to move the next day directly upon Cumberland
Gap. Accordingly, on the morning of the 18th, he marched
his whole force rapidly up the valley, and reaching the forti-
fications late in the evening, found them vacant. Thus, this
position of wonderful natural strength, and strongly fortified,
was occupied by the national forces without an engagement.
The generals of the opposing forces must certainly have re-
garded a direct movement upon such a position improbable,
or else supposed that they would be able to prevent its success,
should it be made. But while maneuvering somewhat re-
motely from their stronghold, with ofi'ensive rather than de-
fensive intent, Morgan dashed upon it when there were no
troops to utilize its defensive advantages.

On the 11th of April, Colonel Dufiield, commanding at Mur-
freesboro, sent Lieutenant J. W. Childs, with a detachment

136 OPERATIOXS OF COLONEL DUFFIELD.

of the Seveiitli Pennsylvania Cavalry on a scouting expedition
toAvarcl McMinnville. Ascertaining that the Confederate
brigadier-general, J. P. M. Maur}^ was at his home, five miles
beyond McMinnville, Lieutenant Childs proceeded thither,
and captured him, taking him to Murfreesboro, whence he
was forwarded as a prisoner of war to ISTashville.

May 4th, Colonel John IL Morgan, returning from his at-
tack upon General Mitchell's train at Pulaski, with about
eight hundred cavalry, crossed the ISTashville and Chattanooga
railroad, moving toward Lebanon. Brigadier-General Du-
mont, from IlTashville, and Colonel Dufheld, from Murfrees-
boro' (both having been in previous pursuit of him), reached
the latter place the same day, and immediately gave chase,
with detachments of Wynkoop's Seventh Pennsylvania, and
"Wolford's and Green Clay Smith's Kentucky cavalry regi-
ments. Arriving at Lebanon on the 5th, General Dumont
surprised and attacked Morgan, and after a severe fight of an
hour and a half, completely routed him, following in pursuit
some eighteen miles. During the engagement, the citizens
kept up a galling fire upon the national troops, and while
Genercil Dumont was pursuing Morgan, sixty-five men, under
Lieutenant-Colonel "Wood, having secreted themselves in the
Odd Fellows Hall, unexpectedly opened fire upon a small
force under Colonel Dufiicld, who had been left to collect the
wounded and cai-e for them. Having rallied his men. Colonel
Dufiield advanced, under cover of the house, to close range,
and by a precise and rapid fire, forced the enemy to surrender.
There were six commissioned ofiicers in the party. Morgan
lost one hundred and fifty men captured, one hundred stand of
arms, and over one hundred and fifty horses ; his loss in killed
and wounded was not reported. Colonels AVolford and Smith
were both wounded, and there were six killed and twenty-
three others wounded, and one captured, in Dumont's com-
mand.

In the month of April, at the suggestion of Mr. J. J. An-
drews, a citizen of Kentucky, in the secret service of the gov-
ernment, General 0. M. Mitchell organized an expedition for
the destruction of the bridges on the '■ Western and Atlantic
Railroad," between Chattanooga and Atlanta, Georgia. The

EXPEDITION TO DESTROY RAILROADS. 137

party consisted of Mr. Andrews, the leader; William Campbell,
a citizen of Kentucky, and twenty non-commissioned officers
and privates, from the Second, Tw^enty-first, and Thirty-third
Ohio regiments,* selected because of their known bravery
and discretion. Dressing in citizens' clothing, having only
side-arms, and separating into squads, they set forth, April
11th. Twenty-two of the number reached Chattanooga, and,
without being suspected, took passage for Marietta, Georgia,
iirriving there at midniglit. The next morning they took
passage for Chattanooga, and at Big Shanty (wdiere there was
no telegraph office or extra locomotive), while the conductor
and engineer were at breakfast, detached the locomotive and
three box-cars, and started for Chattanooga at full speed.
Mr. Andrews had a schedule of the road,^ according to which
they should have met but one train that day, but two extra
trains had been put on, and in waiting at stations for these to
pass an hour was lost, which gave the pursuers opportunity to
overtake them. They made every possible effort to escape,
cutting the telegraj)h wdres, and placing obstructions on tho
track behind them, but all in vain. Wlien the relentless pur-
suers, wdio had followed them, by hand-cars and a coal-engine,
and afterward with a locomotive from a passenger train, were
in sight, they leaped from their cars, a few miles south of
Chattanooga, and sought safety by scattering in the woods.
The population of the surrounding country joined in search
for them, and all were captured — most of them in a day or
two, two not for three wrecks.

Private Jacob Parrott, of the Thirty-third Ohio, was fear-
fully flogged by a lieutenant to extort from him a confession
as to the object of the expedition; but his fortitude was
proof against suffering and threats. Mr. Andrews was tried
as a spy at Chattanooga, condemned, and subsequently hung
at Atlanta. Twelve of the party were transferred to Knox-
ville, and seven were there tried as spies and condemned,

*The names of the twenty were George D. Wilson, Marion A. Ross,
Perry G. Shadrach, Samuel Slavens, Samuel Robinson, John Scott, W.
W. Brown, Wm. Knight, J. R. Porter, J. A. Wilson, John Wollam, Jacob
Parrott, Wm. Bensinger, E. H. Mason, Mark Wood, M. J. Hankins, D. A.
Dorsey, Robert BufFum, Wm. Baddick, and Wm. Pettinger.

138 EXPEDITIOX TO DESTEOT RAILROADS.

tliougli in their trial it was clearly set forth by their counsel
that the expedition was purely military. Soon after the trial,
all at Chattanooga and Knoxville were transferred to Atlanta,
v/here, without time to prepare, the seven condemned at Knox-
ville were hung. Fourteen were now left, and anticipating
the fate of their comrades, they resorted to a hold measure to
effect escape. Wlien the door of their prison was opened by
the jailer to bring them food, they seized him, then disarmed
seven guards, and eight of them were beyond pursuit before
an alarm was given, six being recaptured. Of the eight, six
reached the national lines. The fate of the remaining two is
unknown. The six recaptured were sent to Kichmond, Vir-
ginia, and were finally exchanged as ordinary soldiers — an act
which condemned as unjustifiable the execution of their com-
rades. Had acts similar to theirs, in type and intent at least,
been similarly punished, the execution of captives would have
been a prominent element in the history of the war. The
bodies of those who were hung at Atlanta were subsequently
removed and reburied at the iNfational Cemetery at Chatta-
nooga. This expedition was authorized by General Buell.

CHAPTER XIIL

THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHATTANOOGA FROM CORINTH, AND THE
RETREAT FROM SOUTHERN TENNESSEE TO LOUISVILLE, KY.

The withdrawal of the Confederate army from Corinth left
General Halleck's comhincd armies without an immediate ob-
jective worthy of their collective proportions. This vast ag-
gregation of forces was therefore resolved into its original
parts, and separate fields were sought for the distinct armies
of which it had been composed. The opposing Confederate
army suffered similar disintegration. iJ^Teither of the belliger-
ents proposed yet to abandon JSTorthern Mississippi ; but each
resolved to enter upon active operations two hundred miles
eastward. And again small armies began to operate upon
fields so remote as to forbid all positive unity of purpose or
harmony of action on either side of the grand hostile front,
extending from the Atlantic ocean to the barren deserts of the
West.

From the beginning of the war, the occupancy of East Ten-
nessee in such force as to hold in permanent grasp that
mountain region, with the great railroad coursing through it,
which connected Richmond with the Mississippi Valley and
the central Gulf States, had been regarded by the authorities
at Washington and the Northern people as one of the most
important military advantages that could be attained west of
the Alleghany Mountains. For a time other objectives had
attracted the Army of the Ohio far to the West and South.
But as these had now been gained, this army was charged
with a campaign having for its primal object the capture of
Chattanooga, as the condition precedent to oflfensive move-
ments east and south from that strategic position. The series

(139)

140 THE ADVAXCE TOWARD CHATTANOOGA.

of grand ojDerations which terminated in the occnpatiou of
Corinth and Memphis, and the sweep of Mitchell's hold de-
tachments eastward and westward from Huntsville, had
wrested from the enemy the "Memphis and Charleston Rail-
road " throughout its whole length. The possession of the
roads passing from Stevenson, through Chattanooga, to Knox-
ville, and southward from Chattanooga and Cleveland to Dal-
ton, Georgia, was scarcely less essential to the suppression of
the rebellion than the opening of the Mississippi river to gun-
boats and transports which bore the national flag. And this
was the prescribed object of the projected eastward march of
the Army of the Ohio. To accomplish it easily, advantage
was to be taken of the concentration of the Western insur-
gent forces in l^orthern Mississippi.

After such disastrous defeats as the enemy had suffered, and
such consciousness of weakness as the refusal to give battle
at Corinth evinced, the leaders in the South could not be ig-
norant of the vital character of their next efforts. Thus far
in the West their attempts at offense and defense had alike
failed. Their armies had been pressed back the depth of a
state, between the Mississippi river on the west and the ITash-
ville and Chattanooga railroad on the east, and without some
interruption to this course of defeat their cause was hopeless.
In this emergency they adopted the wisest measures, and by
hiding them for a time under seeming passivity, they set to
work with greatest energy and earnestness to gather strength
for their execution.

If Chattanooga was vitally important to the national cause,
both as regarded strategy and political considerations, it was
not less so to the insurgents. They could assume the offensive
from no other point with any hope of success — at least this
place was a vital point in an offensive line. The very remote-
ness of Chattanooga from the recent theater of war, scarcely
less than its inherent strategic value, called thither the Con-
federate forces to spring thence to l^orthern Kentucky.

This common aim incited the eastward march of the two
armies, which were destined to severest conflict to the close of
the war. General Bragg, who had succeeded General Beaure-
gard, in Western command, put his columns in motion simul-

THE ADVAXCE TOWxiRD CHATTANOOGA, 141

taneoilsly witli the movement of the Army ol the Ohio. Each
part}' thought to take advantage of the heavy concentration
of the other in Northern Mississippi, so as to operate in East
Tennessee without strong opposition. But the advantage was
with General Bragg with respect to the ruling contingency
to each — the occupation of Chattanooga in force — as he had
an open way behind the hills upon the south bank of the Ten-
nessee, with communications established wdien he should get
there ; while General Buell's advance involved the supply of
his army without communications, and a vital draft upon his
strength to create them.

General Buell was informed that his army would return to
Tennessee, while he was moving with two of his divisions,
McCook's and Crittenden's, toward Brownsville, Mississippi,
to support General Pope. He at once turned these divisions
eastward, and sought General Halleck to confer with him in
regard to the proposed campaign. It plainly involved prob-
lems which previous campaigns had not compassed, and for
which, consequently, the conditions and experiences of an-
terior operations could not furnish a solution. Hitherto the
national armies had not moved far from a secure base of sup-
plies, and Pittsburg Landing and ISTashville were both con-
nected with Louisville, the primal base, by rivers navigable
always during winter and spring, and so guarded by gunboats
as to assure uninterrupted communications with this grand
source of supply. The advance to East Tennessee from Cor-
inth was conditioned upon the use of railroads for a great dis-
tance, either the one running east from Corinth, or those lead-
ing south from Nashville. And with Corinth or Eastport in
the west, or Nashville to the north, as the main secondary
base, without a large fraction of an army to guard communi-
cations, they would not be secure. General Halleck prefer-
red the Memphis and Charleston railroad as the channel of
supply, while General Buell regarded the Nashville and Deca-
tur, and the Nashville and Chattanooga roads, as far prefer-
able. The objections to the ]\Iemphis and Charleston road
were, that it crossed the Tennessee river by a long bridge,
which had been destroyed, and that it ran from Corinth to De-
catur parallel to the enemy's front, and was, in consequence,

142 THE ADVANCE TOWAED CHATTANOOGA.

liable to iuterruptions from raids. The otlier road did not
promise a line of supply free from perilous contingencies, but,
on the whole, General Buell considered it the more eligible.*

This difference of opinion, with regard to lines of supply,
induced disagreement as to the line of advance. General Buell
desired to move through Middle Tennessee to McMinnville,
and thence to Chattanooga, in accordance with his preference
for Xashville as a secondary base ; while his superior ordered
him to march on the line of the Memphis and Charleston road,
and to repair the track as he advanced. It would have been
well liad the forecast of the campaign compassed all the con-
ditions of its conduct, progress, and issue ; but in advance of
actual experiment, provision for the ruling contingencies was
not made. The necessity of all possible haste in transferring
the army to East Tennessee was enforced in official in-
structions, but the prescribed condition of march — the repair
of the railroad — barred rapidity of motion.

On the 11th of June, McCook's and Crittenden's divisions
moved eastward — the former from Corinth, and the latter from
Booneville. At the time, Wood's division was on the railroad
east of Corinth, engaged in its reconstruction. General
McCook reached Florence on the 15th, closely followed by
General Crittenden, who had touched the line of march first
at luka. In the meantime, General Wood had advanced be-
yond Tuscumbia, having left the repair of the railroad west of
Tuscumbia to the supervision of General ISTelson. To facili-
tate the march of the forces eastward, General Mitchell, and
Captain Morton, of the engineers, had been directed to prepare
the means of crossing the river at Florence and Decatur, and
the former officer had been ordered to collect supplies at
Athens. Ferry-boats having been provided at the places
designated. Generals McCook and Crittenden commenced
crossing their forces at Florence on the 22d, but the report of
an attack upon j^elson caused a suspension of the movement,
that support might be afforded him in the event of need. At

* General Buell has represented that General llalleck at first gave his
consent to his plans, and afterward insisted ui^on the Memjihis and
Charleston road as the line of sui^ply, and the more southern line of
advance.

THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHATTAXOOGA. 143

the same time, Major-General Thomas, liaving been first re-
lieved from tlie command of tlie Army of the Tennessee, and
then of the troops holding Corinth, and restored to the com-
mand of his former division in tho Army of the Ohio, was
ordered by General Buell to move from the rear to reinforce
Xelson. The falsity of tlie rinnored attack was soon ascer-
tained, and then the crossing at Florence was resumed. The
wagons and teams were first pnt over the river, and dispatched
to convey supplies over a gap in the railroad north of Athens.
On the 25th, the divisions of McCook, Crittenden, and Nelson
crossed and moved toward Athens, reaching that place on the
29th. Dnring this slow advance, supplies had been provided
A^■ith great ditficnlty. They were conveyed from Corinth to
Inka by a few cars, drawn by a half-serviceable locomotive,
thence to Eastport by wagons, and from that place to Florence
on light-draught boats. The boats could carry only from
thirty to forty tons over the shoals, and soon ceased running
altogether, when supplies were conveyed from Waterloo to
Florence by wagon trains on the north side of the river.

The embarrassments of the situation were now fully re-
vealed. Since early spring, from various causes, General
Buell's eifcctive force had been greatly reduced. His own
estimate was twenty-five thousand effective men for an of-
fensive column, and sixteen thousand variously disposed at
important points on the railroads in Middle Tennessee and
l^orthern Alabama. lie had no secure communications, and
w^as still more than a hundred miles from Chattanooga with
his main column. His outlying forces were scattered from
luka to Stevenson, and many of his smaller detachments were
remote from his line of march, and some on that line were ex-
posed to attacks from the superior cavalry of the enemy,
which since the evacuation of Corinth had been transferred
to the north side of the Tennessee river, while guerrilla bands
in !Rorthern Alabama, Middle Tennessee, and Southern Ken-
tucky liad been largely multiplied. He was still under orders
to repair the jNIemphis and Charleston road, and was urging
its completion with the least possible delay ; but distrusting its
reliability when completed, he was also putting tlie roads to
I^ashville in running order, which still further diff"used his

14:4: THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHATTAXOOGA.

forces. The offensive column, in advancing upon Cliattanooga,
could receive no accessions from the troops guarding the roads,
as matters then stood, and on the whole the outlook was very
unpromising. An immediate advance was impracticable, and
in the event of the activity of the enemy, delay assured the
miscarriage of the campaign.

June 29th, General Buell established his headquarters at
Huntsville, and grappled with the difficulties in his way,
making prompt dispositions for the attainment of several im-
portant objects — the repair of the railroads leading south from
ISTashville, the location of the grand units of his army so as
to conceal the purpose of the campaign, and at the same time
render their subsistence and concentration as easy as possible,
and to provide the means of crossing the Tennessee river at
Bridgeport whenever the offensive column should be ready to
dash on to Chattanooga.

As wagon transportation was not sufficient to carry supplies
over the gaps in the railroads and beyond Bridgeport, General
Buell became convinced that railroad connection with l^ash-
ville was one of the cardinal elements in the solution of the
problem of the advance to Chattanooga. Another scarcely
less vital matter was the defense of bridges, by stockades, that
all possible contributions might be drawn to the aggressive
forces. He therefore increased the force on the railroads with
engineer and other troops, and hired mechanics, and instructed
the military superintendent of railroads to hurry them to com-
pletion.

Apprehending an attack upon the detachments of Mitchell's
division at Battle Creek, and on the Xashville and Chattanooga
railroad, General Buell, early in July, ordered McCook and
Crittenden's divisions to advance from Athens to Battle Creek,
in order to show a strong front toward Chattanooga, and at
the same time put strong detachments from these divisions on
the jN^ashville and Chattanooga railroad. He left General
l^elson at Athens, with instructions to put a large working
party from his division on the N'ashville and Decatur road.
He directed General Wood to move his division across the
river at Decatur, and on the north bank guard that important
])]ace, the ferry and the town. In the meantime, General

THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHATTANOOGA. 145

Tliomas held the road from Tuscumbia eastward, witli a lieavy
detachment at Eastport to protect supplies, and a strong cav-
alry picket at Russellville, to observe the enemy in the direc-
tion of Fulton. General Buell himself organized regular
railroad guards, and reunited the regiments and brigades
which had been broken up by General Mitchell's diversified
operations, organized a brigade to move from the N^ashville
and Chattanooga railroad to McMinnville, ordered horses for
his cavalry, and made other minor preparations for the con-
templated movement into East Tennessee upon the opening of
railroad communications and the accumulation of sufficient
supplies. Generals McCook and Crittenden arrived at Battle
Creek about the middle of July. The former })ut a l)rigadc at
work on the railroad from Stevenson to Decherd.

Wliile these movements and preparations were going on, the
enemy's cavalry became more active in Kentucky, and in the
immediate rear of the army. Detachments in Kentucky and
Tennessee were captured, and General Buell's communications
far and near were endangered. This boldness was really more
threatening than was at first apparent, as it was an indication
of General Bragg's purpose to assume the oifensive from
Western Virginia to Corinth. After the refusal of battle at
Corinth, it was not anticipated by the national commanders
that the enemy would soon attempt general offense in the
"West. But with the change of commanders by the enemy,
there was formed a plan of general aggression, whose fore-
shadows were now seen. When Colonel John II. Morgan
appeared, early in July, in Kentucky, having swept from
Knoxville through Sparta, Tennessee, he announced in procla-
mation that his cavalry force (of twelve or fifteen hundred
men) was the vanguard of an army advancing for the liber-
ation of the state. This was so like his usual boasting, that,
in absence of other indications of such a movement, it was
not accepted as evidence. iJ^either did the dash of Colonel
Forrest, with his bold troops, from Chattanooga to Murfrees-
boro, without any other announcement than the destructive
force of his movement, indicate of itself anything beyond a
raid to interrupt General Buell's communications. And while
10

146 THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHATTANOOGA.

no columns of infantry assumed an offensive attitude, and no
rumors of a concentration of forces at Chattanooga were
wafted northward, there was no thought of changing the plan
of the East Tennessee campaign.

Provisions were made as soon as practicable, to save the
communications from serious interruptions, but only with par-
tial success. Generals Boyle and Green Clay Smith were active
in resisting Morgan in Kentucky, but his movements were so
rapid and adroitly concealed, that his blows could not be an-
ticipated, and he effected great damage without receiving harm,
as accurate intelligence of the combinations formed against
him was communicated by his numerous friends. He therefore
effected some damage, and drew to his colors many young
Kentuckians, to whom his partisan warfare was exceedingly
attractive.

Having crossed the Cumberland river at Celina, jSIorgan at-
tacked and defeated Major Jordan, commanding a detachment
of the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, at Tompkinsville, Ken-
tucky, July 9th. Moving thence by Glasgow, he threatened
Bowling Green, and advanced to Lebanon, sending a detach-
ment toward Lebanon Junction to destroy the railroad. Colo-
nel A. Y. Johnson, commanding at Lebanon, made effort to
gather reinforcements, but was forced to surrender, with the
loss of a large amount of government property. Morgan then
passed through Harrodsburg and Lawrenceburg, and threaten-
ing Frankfort by the way, crossed the Kentucky river, entered
Versailles, and then demonstrated toward Lexington. Having
destroyed portions of the railroads between Louisville and
Lexington, Lexington and Frankfort, and Paris and Lexing-
ton, he advanced rapidly on Cynthiana, arriving there on the
17th. Lieutenant-Colonel Landrum defended the place gal-
lantly but unsuccessfully, with three hundred poorly armed
home guards and forty regular soldiers. By this time, Morgan
perceived that he was in danger from various detachments
moving to intercept him, and turned toward Tennessee, moving
through Eastern Kentucky to Sparta, to be ready to co-operate
'With. General Bragg in his advance.

Forrest was still more successful in a smaller circuit. Brig-

THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHATTANOOGA. 147

aclier-Greneral Crittenden and Colonel Duffield arrived at Mur-
freesboro on tlie lltli of July ; the former to command tlie
post, and the latter to command the Twenty-third brigade,
destined for McMinnville. Wlien relieved at Mnrfreesboro
and Tullahoma, Colonel Lester, of the Third Minnesota regi-
ment, had been in command of the post in the absence of Col-
onel Duffield, and owing to unpleasant feelings among the
troops composing the garrison, he had scattered them some-
what widely in and about the town. For some reason not ap-
parent, neither General Crittenden nor Colonel Duffield as-
sumed command, and while there was a general lack of»unity,
harmony, and a proper disposition of troops for defense, For-
rest, having advanced from Chattanooga through McMinnville,
with a force variously estimated at from eighteen hundred to
thirty -five hundred men, appeared before the town at dawn on
the 13th. Dividing his force, he sent Colonel Wharton with
two regiments against the force posted on the Liberty turn-
pike, and with the remainder dashed into the town. Wharton
met a spirited resistance, but finally forced the detachment,
consisting of five companies of the !Ninth Michigan and a
squadron of the Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, to surrender. For-
rest overwhelmed the smaller force in the town and captured
it, including General Crittenden. Soon after, Colonel Lester,
without having offered very serious resistance at his post, on
the east bank of Stone river, surrendered himself and nine
companies of his regiment. The consequences of this disaster
were very serious, the loss of a large garrison, munitions and
stores, great damage to the railroad which had been opened
the day before, and the postponement of the occupation of
McMinnville.

To prevent further damage and dislodge Forrest from his
communications, General Buell dispatched General Nelson
with his division, from Athens, via Columbia and l^ashville,
to Mnrfreesboro. Nelson was delayed, first at Columbia, by
the washing away of a bridge, and then at ISTashville, by the
destruction of bridges north of Mnrfreesboro by Forrest.
These detentions gave the enemy time for more injury and
leisurely withdraw^al.

Simultaneously with the departure of General Nelson, Gen-

148 THE ADVAXCE TOWARD CHATTATs^OOGA.

eral Wood, with two brigades of liis division, was ordered to
move from Decatur to Shelby ville. Subsequently, he took post
at Decherd, to give greater security to the important bridge
over Elk river, and guard the route from the mountains
throuo;h Winchester into ISTorthern Alabama. His third bri-
gade was sent to Stevenson to construct defensive works to
assure the safety of the supplies there accumulating for the
projected advance to Chattanooga.

During the period of these changes, the enemy had been
comparatively quiet where his chief activity had at first been
anticipated — in front of General Thomas, between luka and
Decatur. Some skirmishing, provoked by reconnoitering par-
ties sent south by General Thomas, occurred, but there were
no indications of the presence of heavy forces. A regiment
of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Colonel Streight,
moved about twenty miles south from Decatur, to escort some
loyal mountaineers who wished to enlist in the national army.
Colonel Streight, in the expedition, encountered only cavalry
on local duty for purposes of observation and conscription.
The absence of the enemy in force on the western portion of
the line was another token of his aggressive purpose eastward.
But General Buell's own aggressive drift, rather than the appar-
ent attitude of the enemy, required that his rear division should
move eastward. Accordingly, July 15th, General Thomas
received orders to prepare to join the advanced forces as soon
as relieved from guarding the railroad by General Grant's
troops. At this time the main portion of the division was at
Tuscumbia, but the remainder was scattered in detachments
from luka to Decatur,

By the 21st, General Thomas was able to put his command
in motion. Schoepf 's brigade crossed the river at Decatur on
the 23d. The next day. Fry's crossed at Florence, and pro-
ceeded to Pulaski, to look after the safety of Reynolds' Sta-
tion and the trains running between there and Athens. While
the remainder of the division was yet scattered in small
detachments, a heavy force of irregular cavalry made a dash
on the railroad between Tuscumbia and Decatur, and by sur-
prising and capturing one detachment and frightening another
from its post, interrupted communications and caused a with-

THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHATTANOOGA. 149

drawal from tlie road. On the 27tli, General Thomas crossed
the river at Florence, with General Robert McCook's brigade,
and advanced to Athens. Fry's brigade was then recalled
from Pnlaski, and tlie division marched toward Dcclierd.
General Thomas left his command and proceeded to Ilunts-
ville, and after consultation with General Bucll took the rail-
road for Decherd. The same da}^, Brigadier-General liobert
L. McCook was killed by guerrillas, on the Hazel Green and
Winchester road. He was riding at the time in an ambulance,
prostrated by sickness. All the circumstances indicated that
lie was wantonly murdered, and General Buell instituted vigor-
ous m.easures to inflict punishment upon those who were
guilty. General ]McCook was a brilliant officer, and his death
was universally deplored.

About this time General Buell made earnest request for
more cavalry to protect his communications and pursue the
raiding troopers of the enemy, in large bodies. He had tried
stockades at bridges held by small detachments of infantry,
and found these ineftectual, in conjunction with his cavalry,
in giving security to his four hundred miles of railroad.

l\niile at Murfreesboro, General ISTelson constructed strong
field works, so that a small force could hold the place. He
then was ordered to McMinnville with his division, reaching
there on the 5tli of August. As the railroad between Nash-
ville and Stevenson had been completed on the 28th of July,
and the one from jSTashville to Decatur on the 3d of August,
the movement of troops to positions on the north of the Cum-
berland Mountains was in provision for an emergency, hitherto
unexpected, l)ut now threatening to arrest altogether the ad-
vance into East Tennessee.

For some time. General Bragg had been massing troops in
East Tennessee drawn from Mississippi and other states.
He had (listril)nted his forces eastward from Chattanooga,
carefully concealing his intention, strength, and main })oint of
concentration. He reached Chattanooga on the 20th of July,
and from that time rumors that he would assume the offensive
became current. Reports at first, however, were contradictory
iis to his movements, strength, and purposes. At one time, it
was asserted that he was crossing at Chattanooga, then at

150 THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHATTA^TOOGA.

Cleveland, and in turn at varions other points. To elicit the
truth if possible, General Buell sent reconnoitering parties in
all directions, and in the absence of reliable information con-
cerning the intentions of the enemy, made all possible prepa-
rations for defense. Fortifications were made at the most im-
portant points, so that they could be held by small garrisons
when it became necessary to concentrate the army. Fearing
that his department did not contain sufficient available troops
to enable him to cope with General Bragg, he requested per-
mission from Major-General Halleck, than commander-in-
chief at Washington, to call upon General Grant for troops
should his need become extreme.

At this juncture, the insurgents everywhere were exerting
their entire streno-th. Their defeats in the West and on the
South Atlantic coast had revealed to them the necessity of
forcing into their armies all the able-bodied men in the South.
This they had in great measure accomplished, while acting
merely on the defensive for several months. And now large
armies confronted General McClellan on the Peninsula of Vir-
ginia, General Morgan at Cumberland Gap, General Buell on
the confines of East Tennessee, and General Grant in JSTorth-
ern Mississippi.

This attitude of the enemy, from the Atlantic ocean to the
Mississippi river, was not revealed alone by the concentration
on the foreground, but by the incessant action of his cavalry
and guerrilla bands upon the communications of the national
armies. The bold troopers, Morgan and Forrest, again dashed
to General Buell's rear. The former captured the garrison at
Gallatin, and at other points toward ISTashville destroyed
trains, and by burning one inside the tunnel south of Gallatin,
wrought immense damage to it, and was only repulsed at
Edgefield Junction, a few miles north of Nashville. While
Morgan was dashing thus destructively upon the Louisville
and ISTashville railroad, doubly valuable at the season of low
water in the Cumberland river, Forrest was in close support
between Gallatin and McMinnville. General Buell's cavalry
M'as too feeble to cope with the enemy's, and his eftbrt to
withstand Morgan and Forrest resulted in disaster. Since
Morgan's first raid, he had withdrawn his cavalry forces from

THE ADVAT^CE TOWAKD CHATTANOOGA. 151

their service in detachments against guerrilla bands, and formed
them into two bodies for more effective resistance to the
regular cavalry of the enemy. One of these bodies, composed
of detachments of the Second Indiana, Fourth and Fifth Ken-
tucky, and Seventh Pennsylvania regiments, he placed under
the command of Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson, and sent
it against Morgan's force from McMinnville on the 11th of
August. In moving against Morgan, Johnson got between
him and Forrest. Fearing the result, General Buell endeav-
ored to support him with infantry, but failed. Johnson
pushed against Morgan at Gallatin, having sought him in
vain at other points, in hope of capturing him before Forrest
could render aid. The attack was made, but resulted in the
defeat and retreat of Johnson. Morgan pursued so closely as
to force him to battle, and after an unequal contest of a few
minutes' duration, forced him to surrender himself and the
small force then with him — about seventy-five men, who alone
remained firm to the last. General Johnson lost, besides, thirty
killed and fifty wounded. The remainder of his command
escaped in small parties to ISTashville. This disaster elimi-
nated a considerable portion of General Buell's cavalry at the
time that the strength of this arm was most important.
After this occurrence, Forrest swept around N^ashville, and
Morgan remained north of ISTashville, to prevent the repair of
the railroad. The enemy was equally active in the vicinity of
Columbia, Clarksville, and McMinnville. Major McGowan
defeated and routed an irregular force of the enemy infesting
Duck river, near Columbia ; Colonel Rodney Mason surren-
dered to Colonel Woodward at Clarksville ; Major J. II, Hart
repulsed the enemy at Fort Donelson, and Colonel Wynkoop
met a superior force and retired before it, when on a recon-
noissance toward Sparta from McMinnville.

It was now probable that General Buell's campaign, planned
for aggression, was to eventuate in defensive operations. His
army was well disposed for rapid concentration against Gen-
eral Bragg, should he advance from Chattanooga to the west
or northwest. Generals McCook and Crittenden were at Bat-
tle Creek; General IsTclson at McMinnville; the divisions of
Generals Thomas and Wood were on the Il^ashville and Chat-

152 THE ADVANCE TOWAED CHATTAXOOGA.

tanooga railroad, or near it ; and General Rousseau's (recently
General JMitchell's) was distributed on the other line, from
Huntsville toward IS'ashville.

General Bragg's infantry forces, under his more immediate
command, were massed at Chattanooga and Knoxville. Gen-
erals Hardee's and Polk's corps were at the former place, and
General Smith's at the latter. This disposition of his army
indicated a co-operative movement on separate lines of ad-
vance. The direct co-operation of these columns was not the
result expected by General Buel], unless in concentration against
his position, as he had not divined the purpose of his antago-
nist. His own dispositions looked to easy concentration
against the enemy approaclung across the mountains from
Chattanooga, or through ISTorthern Alabama, to turn his posi-
tion from the south or west. To provide against an attack
upon McMinnville, he directed General Thomas to repair the
railroad from Tullahoma to that place, and throw forward a
brigade to Pelham for observation. From the summits of the
mountains, near Battle Creek, his signal officers were watch-
ing the movements of the enemy in the valley, toward Chat-
tanooga, to give warning of an advance from that direction.

Deeming his forces insufficient to thwart the enemy, what-
ever might be his special plans, he requested General Grant to
send him two divisions. General Grant refused, on the ground
that he was himself under too great pressure to permit the
reduction of his army. This attitude of the enemy in Missis-
sippi was a part of the plan of general co-operation from
Knoxville to Corinth • and the fact that it prevented the re-
inforcement of General Bucll, gave proof of the completeness
of General Bragg's preparations and the wisdom of his initial
movement. For as the success of the general plan hinged
upon the advancement of his central column to the north of
the Cumberland Mountains, the prevention of reinforcements
to General Buell was an essential condition of the success of
his dominant movement.

The threatening bearing of General Smith before Cumber-
land Gap was an additional source of anxiety to General
Bucll. He was responsible, as department commander, for af-
fairs in Kentuck}'. He therefore, in advance of a state of

THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHATTANOOGA. 153

things wliicli subsequently induced the creation of a new de-
partment, with General Wright in command, relieved General
Nelson, August 16th, of the command of the Fourth division,
and sent him to Kentucky to take charge of aifairs in that
state, and organize the fresh troops arriving for its defense.
The raid of Morgan, in July, greatly alarmed the citizens of
Cincinnati and Louisville, as it revealed how easily a bold
raider could dash far behind the national army. So that Gen-
eral Buell wiis neither in advance by this step of a new alarm
nor of the actual danger, as General Kirby Smith was even
then in motion toward Central Kentucky.

AYlien General jSTelson was sent to Kentucky, General
Thomas was relieved temporarily of the command of the
First division, and ordered to McMinnville, to direct aifairs at
that important point. He assumed command on the 19th, and
on that day General Bragg threw across the river from Chat-
tanooga three thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry.
Fearing that these troops might be followed closely by Gen-
eral Bragg's whole army, General Buell directed General
Thomas to call Wood's division near to McMinnville, in readi-
ness to support the troops already there should the enemy ad-
vance in force upon that place, or in that direction. To be
nearer the new theater of operations, he transferred his own'
headquarters to Stevenson. General Buell regarded J^ashvillo
as General Bragg's objective, and made his dispositions to
give battle before he c(juld free himself from the embarass-
ments incident to oifensive warfare in a mountainous region.

His first object was to check the enemy before he could
reach the Sequatchie Valle3^ Accordingly, upon receiving
the first intelligence, on the 19th, of an advance, he directed
General ]McCook, with his two brigades, to move up the val-
ley from Battle Creek, to the Anderson and Therman road,
and hold the enemy in check, if possible. In the event of
being hard pressed, he was to fall back on the Therman road
until he should form a junction with General Thomas, who
would advance from McMinnville for his relief. lie directed
General Crittenden to move his division up the valley to the
Tracy City and Altamont road, to support McCook and ob-
serve the old Nashville and Chattanooga road, which enters

154 THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHATTANOOGA.

the valley at the point clesiguated. Should he be compelled
to fall back, he was to do so on the Higgmbottoni road, to-
ward Tracy City and Altamont, until he should meet rein-
forcements. He instructed General Thomas to hold his com-
mand in readiness to advance from McMinnville at the short-
est notice, either upon the Therman or Dunlap road.

In moving up the valley on the 20th, General McCook be-
came fearful that the enemy would intercept him before he
could reach the Therman road, and therefore retraced his steps
to the mouth of Battle Creek, and then moved on the road
leading up that stream for some distance, and then over the
mountain, as there was no road nearer the enemy practicable
for artillery.

Though it was now evident that General Bragg had assumed
the offensive, his plan of operations had not been indicated.
He had simply thrown his vanguard across the Tennessee river,
with evident purpose of crossing Waldron's Ridge, intervening
between Chattanooga and the Sequatchie Valley, but his prox-
imate and ulterior objectives could only be revealed by the
direction of his march after reaching the valley. Once in the
valley he could turn down and sweep past McCook and Crit-
tenden, and secure a route into ISTorthern Alabama, get be-
tween General Grant and General Buell, and then pass toward
Corinth or Nashville. If ISTashville was his ultimate objective,
he could adopt either of two routes — the one across the moun-
tains to McMinnville, or the one up the valley to Pikeville,
and thence directly to ISTashville. If Kentucky was his desti-
nation, the latter route would form a portion of it through
the valley and out of it.

At this time and for a few days later, General Buell could
only act upon probabilities. The peculiar topography of the
country gave great advantages to General Bragg, as he could,
if he chose, avoid General Buell wherever he might concen-
trate. Should he throw his army before him at McMinnville,
he could on a short line pass to Stevenson by Battle Creek.
Should he concentrate against him in the valley, to prevent
his taking this direction, there was an open way to him up the
valley, and concealing his movements behind the mountains,
he could get the start either to l^ashville or Kentucky. A

THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHATTAXOOGA. 155

concentration at McMinnville would alone place the national
troops before liim, against an advance to either Nashville or
Kentucky. The condition of resistance at that place, or at
any other point on the same side of the valley to the northeast,
involved no special risk, as General Buell would have his
army near his communications, or on a short line to ISTashvillo,
should General Bragg he able to press him back. The only
risk would have been in giving him the route into N'orthern
Alabama, tln'ough Battle Creek and Stevenson.

On the 22d, General Buell established his headquarters at
Decherd, to await the developments of the enemy. About
the same time it was ascertained that General Bragg's whole
army was on the north bank of the Tennessee. General Buell
now fully abandoned his long-meditated advance against Chat-
tanooga, and in manifest recognition of his defensive attitude,
removed his depot of supplies from Stevenson to Decherd.
General Bragg's ultimate objective was the fact of paramount
importance to General Buell, but it was studiously concealed.
In failing to perceive the intended direct co-operation of the
Chattanooga and Knoxville columns, General Buell ree-arded
Nashville as the paramount objective. In view of the past,
this Avas bold ; but it fell far short of his actual daring, and in
keeping General Buell in the dark with regard to his proxi-
mate and remote movements, he gave actuality to the condi-
tions of their success.

General Thomas differed from General Buell with regard to
General Bragg's destination. On the 22d he said : " I have
believed for a day or two that the demonstration in this direc-
tion is intended to cover the advance of his army toward
Kentucky ; " and recommended a concentration of the Army
of the Ohio at McMinnville. He reconnoitered very thor-
oughly to the east and south of his position, sending parties
to Altamont, Beersheba Springs, Dunlap, Spencer, Pikeville,
Sparta, and other less important points, and thus ascertained
that the enemy was not in force near him, nor even in the
Sequatchie Valley, and then advised that "Wood's division
should be sent forward to Sparta, to intercept the advance of
the main army ; that another division should be left at Dech-
erd, on the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, and that the

156 THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHATTANOOGA.

remaining forces should be concentrated at McMinnvillo,
prepared to offer battle should General Bragg advance on that
place, or meet him at Sparta or Allen's Ford should he pass
by ISIcMinnville. The movement of the enemy upon either
Nashville or Louisville recpiired that he should pass through
McMinnville or Sparta, and General Thomas advised that pro-
vision be made to defeat him, whichever of these cities miglit
be his objective. Even if Decherd should be his proximate
aim, defense could be made by the army from McMinnville ;
and if matters should so eventuate as to permit a return to
the original plan of invading East Tennessee, the proposed
concentration would be a step toward it. In making these
suggestions, General Thomas repeatedly expressed the opinion
that General Bragg had no thought of moving into IS'orthern
Alabama.

On the 23d, believing that the enemy would advance on the
Therman road, General Buell ordered the concentration of
five divisions at Altamont, that he might there offer battle.
He ordered Generals McCook and Crittenden to move up the
Battle Creek road over the mountain, and onward through
Pelham ; General Schoepf, commanding the First division, to
march from Elk river through Pelham, and General Thomas,
with Ammen's division (the Fourth) and Wood's, to ad-
vance from McMinnville, on the Therman road. The day
following, General Thomas received more explicit instructions
with regard to the concentration, attack, route, and manner
of retreat, should retreat become necessary. If the enemy
was found in superior force at Altamont, he was to force his
Avay to Hillsboro, and if not in such force as to forbid success,
he was to attack him and drive him back, and in the event of
any reverse, rendering it necessary for his whole command to
fall Ixick, he should retreat through Manchester and Beech
Grove, neglecting no opportunity to embarrass or check the
enemy.

General Thomas reached Altamont on the 25th, but found
no enemy there, and none nearer than Dunlap and Pikeville,
a brigade being reported at each place. General Bragg was
still struggling slowly over Waldron's Ridge, and General
Thomas, deeming it improbable that he would attempt the

THE ADVANCE TOWARD CHATTANOOGA. 157

passage of the mouutaiii by way of Altamoiit, on account of
the difficulties of tlie road and scarcity of water and forage,
returned to McMinuville with the Fourth and Sixth divisions.
General McCook's division reached Altaniont on the 29th,
and the day following moved to Hubbard's Cove, where his
advance met and routed Forrest's cavalry,* endeavoring to join
General Bragg by that route. The First division halted at
Pelham, and the Fifth (Crittenden's) at Ilillsboro. These
movements developed the fact that General Bragg was not
yet in threatening nearness, and that his purpose in advancing
was not indicated fully. His dispatch of the 27th to his
lieutenant-general, Van Born, in Mississippi, made known
his purpose, and his assurance that General Buell was falling
back. This purpose was to advance in four columns — one
through Eastern Kentucky, a second by Cumberland Gap,
another through Sequatchie valley to Kentucky, and the
fourth against General Grant. And the recession of General
Buell's forces from the line of the Memphis and Charleston
railroad, invited him to move rapidly forward with his whole
army.

General Buell did not start toward N"asliville, as General
Bragg supposed, on the 27th ; but on the 30th he gave orders

* He had been repulsed the day before, in an attack upon Colonel Grose,
near ^VoodburJ^ Forrest was defeated again, on the 29th, by a detach-
ment under Captain H. R. Miller, of the Eighteenth Ohio, at " Short
Mountain Cross-roads." The inclosure of a stockade had been com-
pleted, and the men were at dinner, a hundred yards from it, when For-
rest fell upon them. It was then a question which party should reach the
stockade first. Miller, however, by fighting as he ran, got into the stock-
ade with a portion of his men, and with these he repulsed an assault, led
by Forrest himself, with several hundred dismounted men. The men, cut
off in the race, fought from the woods near by, and reached the stockade
in safety, after the enemy withdrew. Forrest left behind him twelve dead,
forty-one wounded, eight horses, and thirty guns

On the 30th. he suffered a fourth defeat. Passing to the left of General
Wood's camp toward Woodbury, after leaving Captain Miller, he was soon
after roughly handled by Colonel E. P. FyfFe, whom General Wood had
sent with his regiment, the Twenty-sixth Ohio, to meet him. Colonel
Fyfte attacked him when in line of battle, at the intersection of two
roads, nine miles west of McMinnville, and by the suddenness and im-
petuosity of his attack, routed him witliout losing a man.

158 RETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KEXTUCKY.

for the movement of his whole army to Murfreesboro, assum-
ing, in advance of actual developments, or even a threatening
approach of the enemy in any direction, that I^ashville was
the objective. After giving a lengthy order, defining the
route and marching order of each division, and all the trains,
he still hesitated with regard to the movement, and asked the
advice of General Thomas with respect to it, on the 31st. His
latest advices left him in doubt with regard to the strength
and movements of the enemy. Heavy infantry forces had not
yet been certainly discovered. General Thomas advised that
as the movement had been begun, it would be best to continue
it ; but suggested a plan of operations from Murfreesboro, to
attack and rout Bragg's army, giving in outline the various
movements by which it could be accomplished. General
Bragg had but five divisions of infantry, and General Buell
had five before him, without dependence upon the forces on
the Nashville and Decatur road, those in his immediate rear
toward ISTashville, or the two divisions approaching from
General Grant's army.

As ordered, the several divisions and all detachments on the
railroads were put in motion during the first three days of
September, and united at Murfreesboro on the 5th. The troops
of General Rousseau's division, posted on the Nashville and
Decatur railroad, followed that road to JSTashville. Two divis-
ions from General Grant's army were on the march to join
the retreating forces, as, in response to General Buell's call for
troops, Brigadier-General J. C. Davis' division. General R.
B. Mitchell commanding, and General Paine's division, Gen-
eral J. M. Palmer commanding, had been dispatched from
Mississippi. The former reached Murfreesboro about the 1st,
and the latter arrived at Nashville about the 12th.

General Buell made no halt at Murfreesboro, but ordered
the movement of all his forces to Nashville. This action, sup-
plementing the withdrawal from McMinnville and adjacent
points, gave General Bragg free motion over the mountains
and through the valleys and out of them, and the undisturbed
choice of routes to Nashville or Kentucky. He chose the
shorter line, to invade Kentucky, down the Cumberland

RETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY. 159

river to Carthage, and thence through Scottsville and Glasgow
to the Louisville and I^ashvillc railroad.

At Murfreesboro, General Buell learned of the defeat of
General Nelson's troops at Richmond, Kentucky, and also that
General Bragg was moving so far to the East as to indicate a
purpose to invade Kentucky. The danger northward was now
fully apparent. The problem to solve was fraught with issues
of stupendous importance. The only condition of favorable
solution was the rapid advance of the Army of the Ohio to
Louisville upon the demonstration that General Bragg was
moving thither, and either beat him in the race, or move so
close to his rear as to paralyze his otFensive force northward.
He therefore, on reaching Nashville, crossed the Cumberland,
with McCook's, Crittenden's, Ammen's, Wood's, Rousseau's,
and Mitchell's divisions, and pushed on toward Louisville,
having assigned General Thomas to the command of Nash-
ville, with his own, and Negley's and Palmer's divisions, by
order issued September 7th.

In the meantime, General Bragg had crossed the Cumber-
land river at Carthage, and was moving rapidly toward Louis-
ville, with a good start in the race, having left General Breck-
inridge behind, with a heavy force of infontry, cavalry, and
artillery, to operate against Nashville and invest the place.

On the 12th, General Thomas was notified, by General
BuclFs chief of staif, that General Mitchell's division had been
ordered to return to Nashville and report to him. The same
day. General Bragg's troops tore up the railroad track between
Franklin and Bowling Green, and on the day following, the
head of his army, a brigade of cavalry, under Colonel Scott,
appeared at Munfordsville, north of Green river. The rail-
road bridge over Salt river had been burned on the 9th.
These developments induced General Buell to countermand
the order sending Mitchell's division back to Nashville, and to
order General Thomas, with his own and Paine's divisions, to
leave Nashville early on the 15th, and join the main army by
way of Bowling Green, but giving him permission to leave
the latter division at Nashville, if he should not deem it safe to
withdraw it.

The garrison at Munfordsville had been reinforced, from the

160 RETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KEXTUCKY.

l^ortli, as early as the 8tli, hj the Seventeenth Indiana Infan-
try, under Colonel J. T. Wilder. At 8 p. m. on the 13th,
Colonel Wilder declined to surrender upon the demand of the
enemy. Early the next morning an assault was made upon
liim, which was repulsed with loss to the enemy. During the
day the garrison was reinforced by seven companies of infantry,
under Colonel Dunham, from Louisville, and about one thou-
sand men and Konkle's battery, under Colonel Owen, from
Lebanon Junction. The demand for surrender was repeated
on the 14th, at 9 a. m., by General Chalmers, who represented
that he had six regiments of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, a
battalion of sharpshooters, and two batteries of artillery. The
garrison again refused to surrender, when the enemy withdrew
and moved north. On the morning of the 16th, the enemy
again appeared, and an attack was made. The fighting be-
came general on the south line of defense, but no effort was
made to carry the position by storm. Late in the afternoon a
flag of truce was received covering a note from General Bragg,
which stated that the place was surrounded by overwhelming
numbers, that reinforcements could not come, and then de-
manded the surrender of the post and garrison to save further
loss of blood. Colonel Dunham, then in command, by virtue
of superior rank, sent his refusal by Colonel Wilder, who,
from personal observations, learned that the force of the
enemy was indeed overwhelming. Having reported this fact
on his return, a council of war was held, and General Bragg
was requested to suspend hostilities until a decision was
reached. The council having decided that upon the verifica-
tion of the assumed strength of the enemy the surrender
should be made, and the fact of an immense force having been
subsequently ascertained, the capitulation was made at 2 a. m.
the ITtli. The terms permitted the garrison to leave with the
honors of war, the retention of side-arms, private property,
and four days' rations. The officers and men were at once
paroled. The reluctance of General Bragg to assault, and the
liberality of the terms, indicated that he did not consider the
post worth the cost of caiTying it by storm, while the prox-
imity of General Buell's army forbade the hope of its reduc-
tion in any other way. Besides, he could not have held the

RETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY. 161

position, except upon the condition of a general engagement,
and whatever might have been his expectations in the inva-
sion of Kentucky, he certainly, from first to last, avoided this
issue. He therefore disposed of ^lunfordsville as quickly and
easily as possible, so as to give freedom of motion to his army,
and put it out of the power of the garrison to reinforce Gen-
eral Bucll, who might yet be able to force a general battle
upon him.

General Thomas left JSTashville on the 15th, with his own
division, not considering it safe to withdraw Paine's, and on
the 20th joined General Buell at Prewitt's Knob. At the time.
General Bragg was here confronting General Buell, having for
two or three days shown some disposition to deliver battle.
His belligerent attitude, though involving skirmishing between
the armies, may only have been a feint, as on the 21st ho
declined an engagement when formally offered by General
Buell. It may have been that the arrival of General Thomas,
with his division, changed a positive plan involving battle.
On the 21st, while General Thomas, under instructions from
General Buell, was disposing Crittenden's and Wood's divis-
ions in order of battle, it was ascertained that the enemy was
retreating. General Bragg not only left General Bucll's im-
mediate presence, but he deflected to the east of the Louisville
and iN'ashville railroad, and gave an open way for the march
of the Army of the Ohio to Louisville. To this city General
Buell put his army in rapid motion, leaving General Tliomas,
for a day with his division, to protect the convalescent troops
and stores until they could be sent to Bowling Green, held at
the time by Colonel Bruce's brigade. On the 29th, the last
portion of the army reached Louisville. General Bragg moved
to Bardstown. Then both armies, in defiant attitude, took
rest while preparing for impending hostilities.

Corinth, July 8, 18G2.
Major-General Buell, Ilaiitsvllle :

The President telegraphs that your progress is not satisfactory, and
that vou should move more rapidly. The long time taken by you to
11

162 RETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY.

reach Chattanooga, will enable the enemy to anticipate you by concen-
trating a larger force to meet you. I communicate his views, hoping that
your movements hereafter will be so rapid as to remove all causes of com-
plaint, whether well founded or not.

H. W. HALLEGK.

Headquarters, Huntsville, July 11, 18G2.
Major-General H. W. HaUcch :

I appreciate the importance of moving promptly, though it is idle to
suppose that the enemy, with his railroad cominunications complete, and
our lines difficult and broken, will not always be able to anticiiiate us at
any important point. I regret that it is necessary to explain the circum-
stances which make my progress seem slow, though perhaps it is not to
be expected that they should otherwise he understood. I understand
what you have given me to do, and if permitted, I expect to accomplish
it without any unnecessary delay, and in such a manner as to neither
jeopardize my army or its honor, nor trifle with loyal citizens betrayed
to the vengeance of their enemies by a promised protection and a hurried
abandonment. The advance on Chattanooga must be made with the
means of acting in force; otherwise it will either fail or prove a profitless
and transient prize. The railroad communication as far as Stevenson
must be securely established. From that point the transportation must
at first be by wagons for twenty-five miles. The river must be crossed by
a pontoon bridge, which I am now preparing. It is not possible to estab-
lish the requisite communication by any means of ferrying which we can
provide. These arrangements are being joushed forward as industriously
as possible. The troops are moving forward to the terminus of the raiL
road without unnecessary delay, and one division has already arrived
there. It ought to be borne in mind that they have had a march of about
two hundred miles to make, with a large train, in hot weather, crossing
a wide river by a ferry. The report of General Mitchell led me to expect
that the Chattanooga road would be comjileted by the first of this month.
I do not censure him for being mistaken. I have since doubled the
force upon it, and it can not be finished before next Monday. The gap
of twenty-two miles on the Decatur road, the one we are dependent upon
for supplies, has, from the character of the road, made it more expedi-
tious to take another route forty miles long ; and it requires everj^
wagon that can possibly be spared to keep the troops from starving, and
at that we are living from day to day. We consume of provisions alone
about one hundred thousand jjounds daily, which, with our animals in
their present condition, it requires about sixty wagons to carry. The
trip, coming and going, can not be made in less than five days. Three
hundred and fifty wagons are required to haul provisions alone over this
gap. To haul forage over the same distance, even at half rations, would
require seven hundred wagons more. We are running about five hun-
dred vva>;ons, managing, with great difficulty, to subsist our animals mainly
upon tlie country, already nearly exhausted of supplies. It will be seen

EETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY. 163

that we can not advance beyond Stevenson nntil the road is completed,
so as to release wagons now absolutely required in the rear. Three mills
are getting out lumber for boats, which will be furnished as soon as possi-
ble. These are matters of fact which can not be got rid of by sophistry
or fair promises, however gratifying. The dissatisfaction pains me ex-
ceedingly. I request that this dispatch may be communicated to him.

D. C. BUELL.

Headquarters, Huntsville, July 23, 1862.

General Hallcch or General Thnmas, Washivgton, T>. C.

1 can not err in repeating to you the urgent importance of a larger

cavalry force in this district. The enemy is throwing an immense cavalry

force on the four hundred miles of railroad communication upon which

this army is dependent for its supplies. I am building stockades to hold

from thirty to one hundred men at all bridges ; but such guards, at least,

only give security to certain points and against a small force. There can

be no safety without cavalry enough to pursue the enemy in large bodies.

Twice already our roads have been broken up by these formidable raids,

causing great delays and embarrassment, so that we are scarcely able to

subsist from day to day. I am concentrating all the cavalry I can spare,

to operate actively in force. I don't pretend to know whether you have

cavalry that you can spare elsewhere, but if so, it can find abundant and

verv important service here.

D. C. BUELL.

Huntsville, August 19, 1862.
General Thomas, McMinnville :

The enemy crossed three hundred cavalry and three thousand infantry
at Chattanooga yesterday. This may be for the purpose of foraging in
Sequatchie Valley, but we must be prepared for more than that. Hold
your command in readiness to march at the shortest notice. You will
probably march on the Therman road or the Dunlap road ; l>ut you should
be provided with capable and reliable guides in all directions. General
Schoepf 's scouts also report the enemy in the mountains twenty-one miles
beyond him, in quite a lai-ge force. That is not very definite in any re-
spect. You should, by means of spies and scouts, keep yourself thor-
oughly informed of what is going on between you and Chattanooga.
There is a road leading along the mountains, from Spencer to Pikeville
and other points, by which an enemy could penetrate. You should also
look well in the direction of Sparta and Smithville, both for the purpose
of detecting any advance upon you, and any attempt to pass you toward
Nashville. Collect in a day or two all the forage, flour, and beef you can,
and then send your supply trains to Murfreesboro to be fed until required.
The McMinnville railroad will be open Thursday, and at any rate, you
should not keep on hand more supplies than you can carry away in your
baggage-wagons and haversacks. The great problem with us is supplies,
and that we must solve by management and starving, if necessary. It

164 RETEEAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY.

Avill be quite as difficult for the enemy. I shall concentrate your division
and McCook's at Tracy City or near there, and send Crittenden vip the
Sequatchie Valley to about Anderson road. We must be prepared either
to fight in detachments or concentrate rapidly, according to circum-
stances. I have prepared a code of signals by vyhich to control our move-
ments and communicate information; study it carefully. Call Wood's
division up to you, or at least have him within a few hours' march, which,
for the sake of supplies, will be better, as well as to give some protection

to the road.

D. C. BUELL,

Commanding.

Headquarters First Division, Army of the Ohio,
McMiNNViLLE, Tenx., Aur/ust 22, 1862.
Major- General Biicll, Decker d :

I have believed, for a day or two, that the demonstration in this direc-
tion is intended to cover the advance of the enemy toward Kentucky.
Forrest and Scott are said to be near Crossville. I have been reliably in-
formed that forage is being collected there in large quantities. My scouts
report no force of the enemy on Cumberland Mountains, this side of Se-
quatchie. Morgan, day before yesterday, was at Hartsville. Johnson is
this side of the Cumberland, near Carthage. The troops I sent to his
assistance are now at Smithville. Colonel Grose reports that Morgan is
trying to get east, probably to join Forrest; but to do so, he will have to
march by Johnson or Grose. We have captured two or three small
droves of cattle going east. Two men came in yesterday from near
Crossville, who report that the enemy's cavalry and some infantry, prob-
ably the advance guard, are at Jamestown, Fentress county. The citi-
zens here think that they will advance into Kentucky.

G. H." THOMAS,

Major-Gencral U. S. V.

Decherd, Aiigit.tt 22, 1862.
Gereral Thomas, McMimiviUe :

From General McCook's information this morning, it seems almost cer-
tain that Bragg is marching on McMinnville. His advance was at the
top of Waldron's Ridge last night. McCoun is said to be crossing at
Kingston, and Withers at Harrison. Of course, they will expect to unite.
What sort of ground can we take by concentrating at McMinnville?
How would it do to figlit at Altamont ? Is the ground such as to give us
the advantage of our artillery ? How many days' rations have you? Are
you provided with ammunition ? Be ready to march immediately.

BUELL,

Commanding.

EETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY. 165

TTEADQrAiiTKr.s FmsT Divisiox, Army of Ohio,
McMiNNViLLE, Auffusi 22, ] 862.
Major- General BveJl, Decherd:

By all means concentrate here. The enemy can not reach Nashville
by any other route across the mountains, iTnless by Sparta. At Altamont,
I am positively informed that the enemy would have an equal .advantage
with ourselves. Here we will have a most decided advantage, and by be-
ing here, should he march by Sparta, we can meet him either there or at
Allen's Ford, across the Caney Fork. He is obliged to pass this place or
Sparta to reach Nashville. 1 have six days' rations and plenty of ammu-
nition. Did you get my dispatch of to-day? I can not think that Bragg
is coming here either by the hill or Therman road. My reconnoitering
party went into Dunlap yesterday.

G. H. THOMAS,

Mujor-Gcueral U. S. V.

Decheru, Avgu.'it2% 1862.
General Tho7nas, McMinnville :

Of course, you will instantlj' recall your absent troops. I will probably
bring Second Kentucky bj^ rail, to march from here — that is, on the sup-
position that we will advance to attack in Sequatchie Valley. I can
hardly think the enemy will attempt the march across to McMinnville — •
at least not immediately. It appears to me that he will rather endeavor
to get into North Alabama, and perhaps strike across to Decherd. If we
advance to Altamont, we may thwart him in both, and preserve our com-
munication with Decherd and Nashville. If we concentrate at McMinn-
ville, we lose North Alabama and Decherd. "What think you ? The
great difficulty is in moving in the mountains with our trains. Of course,
we must cut loose from everything but our ammunition train and sub-
sistence for six days, most of it in haversacks.

D. C. BUELL.

Headquarters First Division, Army of Ohio,
McMiNxviELE, Tenn., Angust 22, 1862.
Major-General Buell, Decherd:

We can get neither forage nor water at Altamont. It will be as difficult
for us to march across the mountains to Sequatchie Valley, as for the en-
emy to come either to Altamont or this place. I would not advise con-
centrating here, except for battle or for an advance into East Tennessee.
I think our connection with Nashville will be better preserved by hold-
ing Decherd with a division, to enable us to concentrate either there, if
threatened, or at this place. I have also learned that Tupelo, Mississippi,
has been abandoned, and most of the enemy at that place have been sent
to Chattanooga. I therefore do not apprehend any attempt to seize
North Alabama.

G. H. THOMAS,

Major-General U. S. V.

166 RETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KEXTUCKY.

Decherd, August 23, 1862.
General Thomas, McMivnviUe :

There is no possibility of our concentrating at McMinnville. We must
concentrate in advance and assume the offensive, or fall back at least to
Murfreesboro. I deem the former the surest, and we will act accordingly.
I wish you, therefore, to move by a forced march to Altamont, there to
form a junction with McCook, and Crittenden, and Schoepf. McCook
and Crittenden started for Tracy City yesterday, from Jasper. I presume
they are now at Tracy City, though possibly not. Schoepf will march at
once. The junction must be formed to-morrow, and any division meeting
the head of the enemy's column first, must at least hold it in check
until a larger force arrives. One battery to a division would, I think, be
ample in the mountains. McCook and Crittenden have with them six
batteries; leave all of yours, therefore — at least, don't take more than
one. It will be necessary to leave some force with them — at least two reg-
iments ; and they should be put in a strong position and covered by
breastworks to-night without fail. I shall order Schoepf 's batteries here,
to be similarly disposed of. There must be no delay or failure. The en-
emy's advance was at the top of Waldron's Ridge, ten miles from Chat-
tanooga night before last, and talked of being at McMinnville to-morrow.
That is hardly possible; but they must be met at the earliest possible mo-
ment. Communicate with McCook to-night, by a trusty scout — the dis-
tance is thirty-two miles. He may possibly not be at Tracy City ; if not,
look for him on the road to Battle Creek. If you think best, you may
send your artillery to this place, which will relieve the force that would
be required to protect them there, though if they will be safe, there is
some advantage in having a force at McMinnville. Take no wagons ex-
cept what will be necessary to carry rations and cooking-utensils. I shall
probably leave here with Sill's brigade to-morrow for Tracy City. Com-
municate always in cipher, by telegraph, to this place, and by courier,
through Tracy City. Schoepf sends a report that Hardee is advancing
on the Dunlap road. Answer that I may know exactly what you do.
Your staff officer makes mistakes in the use of the cipher.

D. C. BUELL.

Decherd, Aiigust2^, 1862.
General Thomas, McMinnville :

In advancing to Altamont, take the Hickory Creek road instead of the
Therman road. That will put you on a shorter line of retreat on Mur-
freesboro by the way of Manchester, and brings us nearer together.
Start your trains for Murfreesboro at once, with the least escort that will
possibly suffice — say, one regiment and a battery — and let it go through in
thirty-six hours. In the event of any reverse which makes it necessary
for the whole force to fall back, do so by Manchester and Beach Grove,
making a stand to check the enemy whenever it can be done with advan-
tage. Keep your telegraph open until the last minute, and after that,
communicate frequently by couriers. McCook can, I think, get there by
twelve o'clock day after to-morrow. D. C. BUELL.

EETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY. 167

Headquarters First Division, Army of Ohio,
McMiNXviLLE, Tenn., .Uif/zist 24, 1862.
Major-General Buell, Decherd :

A reconnoitering party under Major Loughlin, First Ohio Cavalry, sent
by me toward Pikeville day before yesterday, Las just returned. Major
Loughlin reports that he reconnoitered (?) the enemy's advance scouts at
Spencer, and gained reliable intelligence from one or two citizens that a
force of two or three thousand infantry and some artillery was then at
Pikeville, and that the enemy intended advancing on this place by two
or three routes. A party sent out last night on the Chattanooga road re-
ports the enemy's pickets at Beersheba, and a force behind in Sequatchie
Valley. I have been delayed until this time, waiting for the return of
these parties. Will move this afternoon on the Hickory Creek road, in
compliance with your last orders. General Wood's division will be at the
foot of the mountains, if not the pass, to-night.

G. H. THOMAS,

Major-Gencral U. S. V.

Headquarters First Division, Army of Ohio,
Altamont, Tenn., August 25, 5 p. m.
Major- General Buell, Decherd :

The enemy no nearer than Dunlap. It is reported there is one brigade
there, and one at Pikeville. This I learn here, and wliich confirms the
report of Major Loughlin, First Ohio Cavalry. .

Water scarce — only one spring here; and not forage enough in the
neighborhood to last for one day. The road up the mountain is almost
impassable. General Wood has been from six o'clock till now, and has
not succeeded, in getting his artillery up the road. I deem it next to
impossible to march a large army across the mountains by Altamont, on
account of scarcity of water and forage, and the extreme difficulty of
passing over the road. I will therefore return to McMinnville and await
further orders. As 1 mentioned in one of my dispatches, I regard
McMinnville as the most important point for occupation of any. The
occupation of McMinnville, Sjaarta, and Murfreesboro will, in my opin-
ion, secure the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. I have sent out
Smith to put in operation a system of couriers, by which, I believe, we
can get reliable information.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

Major-General U. S. V.

Decherd, August 26, 1862.
General Thomas, McMinnville :

Keep your position at McMinnville, but make nothing like a perma-
nent establishment. Be always ready to move at a moment's notice.
That Bragg is this side of the river with a large force, is beyond all ques-
tion. It is hardly probable that it is merely for the purpose of demon-

168 RETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY.

stration, and ^ve must be prepared to concentrate promptly. Of course,
the passage of so large a force across the mountains is difficult, but not
so much so as you would suppose from the road you took. The Therman
road is very good, and the mountain quite easy of ascent The descent
on this side is easy enough by four roads, all diverging from Altamont —
the first going by Beersheba to McMinnville; the second by Ilickory
creek to McMinnville, or toward Manchester; the third also to Man-
chester and to Decherd by Pelham ; and the fourth by Oowan. The
Beersheba road is excellent for a mountain road. The question is, how
to meet an advance which may take either of these routes through Alta-
mont. The best position we could take would be McMinnville, Altamont,
and vn the Tlierman road, just this side of Sequatchie Valley. We should
not only be able to concentrate against an advance on that road or the
Sparta road, but also threaten his flank if he should attempt to go into
North Alabama by Battle Creek — a not improbable thing on many ac-
counts. The difficulty of supplying ourselves on the mountains is, I
think, the only objection to the disposition I mention. Did you leave
any force at Altamont? McCook, Crittenden, and Schoepf are at Pel-
ham. I have ordered the railroad and telegraph re-established immedi-
diately. Be sure to be informed the moment the enemy enters Sequat-
chie Valley, and which direction he takes. Forrest and Morgan are
reported at Lebanon, to attack Murfreesboro or Nashville. Give all the
information you can obtain. . . . Davis' division crossed at Eastport
four days ago, and Paine is across, crossing at Lamb's Ferry and Hood's.
Do you know a colonel fit to command a light brigade of cavalry, artil-
lery, and infantry to operate against Forrest ? McCook, Crittenden, and

Schoepf are at Pelham.

D. C. BUELL.

Headquarters First Division Army op Ohio,
McMinnville, August 28, 1862.
Major-General Buell, Decherd:

Saturday, three regiments of cavalry were at Pikeville, but fell back to
Robinson Cross-roads, hearing that I was advancing on that road. About
one regiment was reported to be at Dunlap, but since learned from a
brother of Smith that there were no troops there; he went to Dunlap ou
Saturday. It was reported to him that Bragg was at the foot of Waldron's
ridge, in the valley of the Tennessee, with forty thousand men, awaiting
rain to cross the mountain. Smith will send or bring me information by
to-morrow of the truth of Bragg's position. He then proposes to go to-
ward Pikeville, and endeavor to establish an express line to convey in-
formation. 1 have sent a brigade of infantry on the Murfreesboro road
after Forrest, who is at Woodbury with something over one thousand
men. I have also directed the commanding officer to escort a train of
provisions through to this place from Murfreesboro. Our provisions will
be out in three days, and none to be had in this region. Will you order
supplies here immediately by the cars ? We can get fodder here, but no

EETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY. 169

corn. Troops at this place can watch the direct Chattanooga road, the
Dunlap and the Harrison and Pikeville roads, and by the system of ex-
presses to be established by Smith, I think 1 can give you intelligence of
the enemy before he can cross Sequatchie Valley. Would not Colonel
Harker be a good light brigade commander ? I was favorably impressed
with him. Please send the First Ohio Cavalry here. It is very much
needed.

G. II. THOMAS,

Major-General U. S. V

Headquarters First Division Army op the Ohio,
McMiNNViLLE, August 30, 1862.
Major-General Buell, Decherd:

A citizen of Livingston came in this morning. He reports that he saw
a large force coming from Knoxville, six miles the other side of Sparta.
They told him they were on their way to Dickson Springs, near Harts-
ville, on the road from that place to Smithville. A citizen of Sparta told
him that provisions were being hauled from Sparta and neighborhood to
Marmaduke's brigade in the mountains southwest of Spencer. He also
saw six or eight pieces of cannon with the cavalry. They told him they
were going to Smithville to get on my flank and rear, ready to attack me
from that direction as soon as Bragg and Marm'aduke attacked me in
front. He saw them on last Thursday. He was a Mexican war pen-
sioner before this rebellion broke out ; belonged to James Thomas' regi-
ment of Tennessee cavalry. His name is J. W. Hall. His story seems
truthful. Will send dispatch again to-day.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Major-General U. S. F.

Headquarters First Division Army of the Ohio,
McMiNNViLLE, August 30, 1862.
Major-General Buell, Decker d:

Sent report of citizen from Livingston at 12 m. to-day. Eeceived dis-
patch from Captain Miller about 11 o'clock last night, from the railroad
bridge eight miles from McMinnville. He was attacked by Forrest's cav-
alry, one thousand five hundred strong, men dismounted. They were hand-
somely repulsed and fled, leaving fifteen dead on the ground. Sent General
Wood with a brigade and some cavalry on the Chattanooga road. He sent
cavalry, under Major Foster, to within five miles of Dunlap. Reports that
he encountered the enemey's jjickets eight miles this side of Dunlap,
which he drove in for three miles, coming in succession upon different
outposts. Learned that General Bragg was there with three brigades, en-
camped up and down the Sequatchie. There is also another force some
seven miles higher up the valley. People with whom Major Foster con-
versed thought the enemy was marching up the valley. These reports of
citizens not known are good for naught. Major Foster also reports no
water from the foot of the mountain this side to the foot on the other

170 RETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY.

side, a distance of fifteen miles. A small party was sent to Beersheba
Springs. Were told by citizens that a rebel force, fifteen hundred
strong (cavalry), were encamped yesterday on Big creek, six or seven
miles from Altamont, toward Dunlap. Heard from General McCook at
Altamont last night; has captured two of Bragg's body-guard, who re-
port that he has a large force, but not yet in the Sequatchie Valley. Ilis
cavalry think he has a division there. News from all sources seem to
confirm the report of the citizen from Livingston, Tennessee, that the
enemy will move his main force by Sparta. If he is moving on Mur-
freesboro by Sparta, I think the sooner we concentrate to meet him and
drive him back the better, and ]Murfree.sboro seems to be the point from
which we should operate. It would be very advantageous if one brigade
was stationed at Smithville to watch any movement of the enemy on
our left flank, as there seems to be some probability of a movement on
my left and rear, if the enemy can assemble force enough for that pur-
pose.

G. H. THOMAS,

Major-General U. S. V.

Headquarters, August 31, 1862.
General Thomas :

The general purpose of my order is to concentrate at Murfreesboro.
The rearmost detachments can not get up in there until the 5th instant.
Your movements should be to Clarmont on the 3d, and to Readyville on
the 4th, and to Murfreesboro on the 5th, and it is of course highly im-
poi'tant that you should conform to the movements of other columns ; but
it is also important that you should not risk a battle. You should, if
possible, keep a day's march between you and the enemy. It will not
answer to trust detachments. All must be left to your judgment.

BUELL.

TuLLAHOMA, August 31, 1862.
General Thomas :

I do not know what to make of information we get in regard to the
strength and movements of the enemy. Have you arrived at any con-
clusion about it? Answer at once. I once thought our information tol-
erably definite as to his force ; but he seems to have vanished. I hear of

nothing now but small cavalry guards.

D. C. BUELL.

Headquarters First Division Army of the Ohio,
McMiNNViLLE, Tenn., August 31, 1862.
Major-General Buell, Tullahoma :

Dispatch received. All that I know of the enemy's forces number
about five hundred on the Chattanooga road, about the same number near
Sparta, a small force near Pikeville, and Forrest's cavalry, said to num-
ber about fifteen hundred strong. The general impression is that the

RETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY. 171

enemy is advancing, but I have yet to see the person who has seen any
of the Chattanooga forces proper.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

Major- General U. S. V.

TuLi.AHOMA, Sepiewher 1, 1862.
General Thomas :

Do any circumstances present themselves which would make a change
in our movements advisable? Answer quickly; I will be here a few
minutes.

D. C. BUELL.

HEAbQUARTERS FiRST DIVISION ArMY OF THE OhIO,

McMiNNViLLE, /September 1, 1862.
General Buell, Tullahoma :

My dispatch last night gives all the information I can obtain. I think
as the movement has commenced, that it had better be executed.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

Major-General U. iS. V.

Headquarters First Division Army of the Ohio,
McMiNNViLLE, September 1, 1862.
General Buell, Murfreesboro :

Smith has returned from Dunlap. He saw four regiments of infantry,
and four pieces of artillery — 12-pounders — march up the Sequatchie val-
ley toward Pikeville, Saturday afternoon, three regiments of cavalry and
two small pieces of artillery having previously marched for Pikeville.
He was told that this was the advance of a force of forty-five thousand,
which was to march on this place by the Dunlap and Therman roads ;
also by Spencer and Sparta. He was also told that they were on their
way to Kentucky. From what he could see, these troops were not well
provided with provisions. Their arms seem to be good, but many had
shot-guns. They appeared to be in low spirits. Cheatham was in com-
mand. Hardee was there; his troops were expected next day. Smith
heard drums beating below Dunlap, Sunday morning, before he left home,
but did not see any troops. He met the same cavalry force on the moun-
tain which has so often been reported to you. He was informed that
Bragg had two steamers and one horse-boat at Chattanooga constantly en-
gaged in crossing troops, and that they would bring with them fifty pieces
of artillery.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

Major- General TJ. S. V.

172 RETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY.

Headquarters First Division Army of the Ohio,
McMiN-NTiLLE, Tenn., September 2, 1862.
General Buell, Murfreesboro :

I will start to-morrow. I have heard again that the enem}^ intends ad-
vancing on this place by the Therman, Dunlap, and Sparta roads. By
concentrating at Murfreesboro, we shall be within striking distance of.
this place. By convenient roads our main force can be thrown upon the
enemy between this and Decherd, or Hillsboro, overcome him, and drive
him toward Sparta, his longest line of retreat. A larger force of cavalry
and light infanti'y can be pushed across the mountain to Dunlap, by the
Dunlap and Therman road, attack him in rear, and completely rout
his whole force. I have studied the roads, and am now convinced that
this is our best plan of attack.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

Major-Oeneral U. iS. V.

September 11, 1862—11 p. m.
General Thomas^ Nashville :

Orders have been sent Mitchell to-night, to march to-morrow to Tyree
Springs, and to Mitchellville next day, and thence to Bowling Green, un-
less otherwise ordered. Send him at once an order to this effect, to pro-
vide against the accident of my note not reaching him. If he should
not be required, he will be sent back with a train of supplies. You will
understand from the movements of the enemy, that a battle is possible
near Mitchellville or Franklin, or in the vicinity of Bowling Green, and
j^ou must be in readiness and act according to circumstances.

FRY.

Mitchellville, September 12, 1862 — 8 p. m.
Major-General Thomas, Nashville:

Mitchells division is ordered to return and report to you, and to get
within five miles of Nashville to-morrow. The railroad was torn up to-
day between Franklin and Bowling Green, and it is not possible to send
a wagon train to you without bringing Mitchell up to escort it, and that
might endanger him. So you must depend upon yourself for supplies
for the present. Forrest, with his cavalry, is near here, naoving to the
north. All well here.

FRY.

September 13, 1862.
Major-General Thomas, Nashville :

General Mitchell is ordered to proceed on to Bowling Green, and will
not return to you. The indications are too strong that the enemy will
move the greater part of his force into Kentucky, to try to save the
troops he now has there, that this order is deemed best.

FRY.

EETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY. 173

September 13, 1862—8 p. m.
Major-General Thomas :

March with your own and Paine's division for Bowling Green on the
receij^t of this oi-der. You must reach Bowling Gi-een in three days and
a half at most, and will march directly on from there. You must march
by 3 o'clock on the morning of the 15th, day after to-morrow, and earlier
if possible. Leave the siege artillery and most of the cavalry with Xeg-
ley. It seems quite certain that the whole of Bragg's army is in, or
marching to Kentucky, and that it will be concentrated at Glasgow to-
morrow, if not sooner. If, liowever, you have positive information that
as much as two divisions of Bragg's army are near Nashville, or not
marching to cross the Cumberland, yoti may, if you deem it advisable,
leave Paine's division and bring only your own. Post Negley at the de-
fensible works and position, and at Ihe capitol and at the bridge, and di-
rect him to leave twenty days' rations at each point for its garrison. He
must defend his position to the last extremity. Bring only wagons enough
to carry your ammunition and four days' rations, and cooking-utensils,
not exceeding five loaded wagons to each regiment, exclusive of ammu-
nition. You may, however, act at your own discretion, and unknown to
the troops, bring fifty wagons to each division, to carry men who give
out on the march. You must, however, start with none but able-bodied
men. You will find the best watering-places at Tyree Springs, and at a
creek five miles north of Mitchellsville, and a cave spring three miles
south of Bowling Green, and it is expected you will be able to make these
marches. Explain the urgency of the matter to Governor Johnson. If
Bragg's army is defeated, Nashville is safe; if not, it is lost. At any rate,
bring forage for vour command on the march for three davs.

FRY.

Headquarters, Dripping Springs, September 18, 1862.
Oeneral Thomas :

Push your division forward at the earliest i:)ossible hour. I shall expect
you at Green river by day after to-morrow morning ; bring the reserved
artillery ammunition with you ; put your trains across the river to-night
if possible, and guard it well on the march Forrest is said to be about
Brownsville with a large cavalry force. The garrison of Munfordsville
surrendered yesterday morning, and I learn that Bragg, hearing that I
was close upon him, immediately threw his whole force across the river.
I expect to be there early to morrow. Bring no train, except enough to
carry reserve ammunition, provisions, and cooking-utensils, and leave
that, excepting ammunition, at whatever point on the road you may find
the other trains picketed. Tell Colonel Bruce to be industrious in col-
lecting supplies; to keep himself and me fully informed of the move-
ments of the enemy about him, and protect his supplies and defend his
post to the last extremety.

D. C. BUELL,

Major- General Com7iianding.

174 RETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY.

Headquarters First Division Army of the Ohio,

September 14, 1862—7 A. m.
General Buell :

Received your order of Tuesday, 8 o'clock p. m. It is certain that a
large force of the enemy is near Nashville, awaiting an opportunity ta
attack it. I shall therefore leave Paine's division here. Will march
with my division at the time ordered, and reach Bowling Green as soon
possible.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Major-Genetal U. S. V.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL BRAGG'S INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJOR-
GENERAL E. VAN DORN, OF AUGUST 11, 1862, FROM CHAT-
TANOOGA.

In view of the operations from here it is very desirable to press the
enemy closely in West Tennessee. We learn their forces there are
, being rapidly reduced, and when our movements become known, it is
certain they must throw forces into Middle Tennessee and Kentucky or
lose those regions. If you hold them in check, we are sure of success
here; but should they reinforce here so as to defy us, then you may re-
deem West Tennessee, and probably aid us by crossing the enemy's rear.

Headquarters Department No. 2,
Chattanooga, Tenn., August 27, 1862.
3Iajor- General Earl Van Dorn, Commanding District of the Mississip^n, Jack-
son, Miss.
General: — We move from here immediately — later by some days than
expected ; but in time, we hope, for a successful campaign. Buell has cer-
tainly fallen back from the Memphis and Clharleston railroad, and will
probably not make a stand this side of Nashville, if there. He is now
fortifying that place.

General E. K. Smith, reinforced by two brigades from this army has
turned Cumberland Gap, and is now marching on Lexington, Kentucky.
General Morgan (Yankee) is thus cut off from all supplies. General
Humphrey Marshall is to enter Eastern Kentucky from Western Vir-
ginia. We shall thus have Buell pretty well disposed of.

Sherman and Rosecrans we leave to you and Price, satisfied you can
dispose of them, and we confidently hope to meet you upon the Ohio.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,

BRAXTON BRAGG,
M. M. KiMMEL. General Commanding.

EETREAT TO LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY. 175

Sequatchie Valley, August 29.
To General Sterling Price:

Buell's force is in full retreat upon Nashville, destroying their stores.
Watch Rosecrans and prevent a junction, or if he escapes, you foUow
him closely.

BRAXTON BRAGG.

Headquarters Department No. 2,
Bardstown, Kt., September 25, 1862.
Major-General Van Dorn.

General : — We have driven and drawn the enemy back to the Ohio.
Push your columns to our support, and arouse the people to reinforce us.
We have thousands of arms without men to handle them.

Nashville is defended by only a weak brigade; Bowling Green by only
a w'eak regiment. Sweep them off and push up to the Ohio. Secure the
heavy guns at these places, and we will secure the Tennessee and Cum-
berland rivers. All depends on rapid movements.

Trusting to your energy and zeal we shall confidently expect a diversion
in our favor against the overwhelming force now concentrating in our
front.

BRAXTON BRAGG,

M. M. Kimmel, General Commanding.

Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.

CHAPTER XIV.

OPERATIONS OF GENERALS G. W. MORGAN AND WM. NELSON, IN

KENTUCKY.

Soon after the occupation of Cumberland Gap by General
Morgan, First Lieutenant W. P. Craigbill of the engineers,
under the general instructions of the President and Secretary
of War, commenced the construction of such defensive works
as would assure the safety of the position with the least pos-
sible number of men, making them formidable only against
attacks from the south, while they should be so situated that
should they again fall into the hands of the enemy, they might
present no barrier to an attack from the north to regain them.
The great obstacles to the retention of this important position
were its distance from supplies and the character of the roads
leading to it from Kentucky, and to overcome them, General
Morgan proposed the construction of a military road to Crab
Orchard, and Lieutenant Craighill was sent to Washington to
lay the proposition before the Secretary of War. The project
was approved, but the movements of the enemy rendered its
execution impracticable.

In the general effort to drive the national armies from
Southern soil and invade the j^orth, the plan of the enemy
compassed the invasion of Kentucky and the pillage of Cincin-
nati, by an army from East Tennessee, and indications of the
movement soon became apparent. General Smith did not
withdraw his forces from the vicinity of Cumberland Gap
after its loss. General Stevenson's division remained in prox-
imity, and other detachments were stationed at various points
more or less remote. The enemy, for some time, made demon-

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OPERATIONS OF GENS. MORGAN AND NELSON. 177

strations against General Morgan, but lie was prompt to resist
all aggressions.

On tlie 5tli of August, General Morgan sent Colonel De
Courcy, with liis brigade and a battery of artillery, to capture
supplies collected by the enemy at Tazewell. Colonel De
Courcy succeeded in seizing a large amount of forage, and
some mules, horses, and tobacco, but was soon after attacked
by Stevenson's division. A sharp conflict ensued, resulting in
victory to De Courcy, with a reputed loss to the enemy of
about two hundred in killed and wounded, but only a slight
loss to himself, mostly in prisoners, who were captured on
picket duty.

About the middle of August, the enemy began to reveal
his purpose of invasion. On the 16th, General Stevenson pre-
sented himself before Cumberland Gap. Presuming that
there would be co-operate movements. General Morgan sent
Captain Martin's company of cavalry, with orders to move
with the greatest speed possible, and observe the enemy at
Rogers' and Big Creek Gaps. When within eighteen miles
of the former. Captain Martin met the vanguard of General
Smith's army advancing toward Kentucky. General Smith
at once established himself at Barboursville, and sent General
McCown, with a strong force, to Cumberland Ford. These
dispositions of the enemy nearly enveloped Morgan's position,
and positively cut him off from supplies. Anticipating the
total exhaustion of his supplies on hand, before his com-
munications could be restored, he put his troops on half rations
at once, and made preparations to hold out to the last ex-
tremity. Although circumstances forbade hope of success, he
nevertheless made effort to open the way for relief. He
mounted about four hundred men of the Third Kentucky In-
fantry, under Colonel Garrard, on artillery, wagon, and extra
cavalry horses, and sent them into Kentucky with Colonel
Mundy's cavalry, to join a column organizing for the relief
of his command. He afterward sent Colonel Childs with a
battalion of the Third Tennessee Cavalry for the same pur-
pose. Another battalion of this regiment, dispatched to the
12

178 OPEEATIONS OF GENS. MOEGAN AND NELSON.

rear, was attacked by a superior force at London, and forced
to return.

General Smith did not wait for the reduction of Morgan's
position, as his strength enabled him to turn it with ease. He
therefore left Stevenson's division to threaten from the south,
and calling together his other forces, advanced into Central
Kentucky. lie thus advanced toward his objective, and at
the same time barred the passage of reinforcements and sup-
plies to Cumberland Gap, After the departure of the main
army, General Morgan endeavored to provoke General Steven-
son to give battle, but without success. He advanced to his
position, repeatedly surprised and captured his outposts,
watched the gaps, but could not bring on an engagement.
These maneuvers resulted in a loss to the enemy, in the aggre-
gate, of about one hundred men killed and wounded, but in
no respect changed the situation. All the while, despite the
issue of half rations and all efforts to draw supplies from the
country, their diminution was rapid. The grain soon gave
out, and it was apparent that the retention of the place could
not last beyond the consumption of a few days' rations. It
was not probable that the enemy would attack, and to hold
out much longer, he would have no mules or horses to haul
off his munitions. To wait for starvation to force surrender,
would give the enemy ten thousand prisoners, twenty-two
cannon, fourteen thousand small arms, and a large amount of
ammunition. Influenced by these facts, it was decided, at a
council of war held on the 14th, that the evacuation of the
position was advisable. Accordingly, the next day, prepara-
tions were made for a safe retreat. The roads and mountain
cliffs were mined to prevent pursuit, and the siege guns were
disabled and hurled over the cliff. In the evening a large
wagon-train, under escort of infantry and artillery, was started
on the Manchester road, and on the following day and even-
ing, the whole force was quietly withdrawn on the same road.
AVhat property could not be transported was destroyed, and
the usual conflagration and explosions which herald an accom-
plished evacuation of a fortress, made known to the enemy
that Cumberland Gap had again been vacated without an en-
gagement or surrender. The enemy's pickets advanced, but

OPERATIONS OF GEXS. MORGAN AND NELSON. 179

having been repulsed, the army made the descent of the moun-
tain in safety and even without molestation.

To avoid the enemy, known to be in force on the direct
line to the Ohio river. General Morgan deflected to the north
and cast through Manchester, Booneville, Hazel Green, West
Liberty, Grayson, and Grcenupsburg. En route, he encoun-
tered General ]\Iorgan's cavalry, and was annoyed by them
for several days, but suffered no check or serious loss. From
Grcenupsburg General Morgan moved through Gallipolis,
Ohio, to the mouth of the Kanawha river, then up that river
to Charleston, and after a short stay in Western Virginia, his
command embarked for Vicksburg.

Two days after General Buell had ordered General l^elson
from McMinnville, to take charge of affairs in Kentucky, the
Department of the Ohio was reconstituted by general orders
ISTo. 112, war department, so as to embrace the States of Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, and a portion of Kentucky,
and placed under the command of Major-General H. G. Wright.
On reaching Kentucky, General ISTelson was ordered by Gen-
eral Wright to proceed to Lexington and assume command
of all the troops at that place and Leljanon, and all in the
vicinity of those places. These troops mostly comprised new
regiments, which had been hastily thrown into Kentucky from
the adjoining states, principally from Ohio and Indiana.
Many of the regiments had never been drilled as such, and
officers and men were in a great measure without military
training and experience. They were concentrated at Lexing-
ton, and formed into a division, with Brigadier-Generals M.
D. Manson, Charles Cruft, and J. F. Jackson as commanders
of brigades. Soon after assuming command at Lexington,
General I^elson, knowing that the enemy was approaching in
force from East Tennessee, sent forward Colonel Metcalfe, of
the Seventh Kentucky Cavalry, with about four hundred men
from his own regiment, and Colonel Childs' battalion, recently
from Cumberland Gap, to take post at Big Hill and oppose
the advance of the enemy. On the 23d of August, Colonel
Metcalfe engaged a superior force, and at the beginning of the
conflict the troops of liis regiment became confused, and three-
fourths of them fled. The other fourth, and the Tennessee

180 OPERATIONS OF GENS. MORGAN AND NELSON.

battalion, however, fought bravely, and after repulsing the
enemy, retired to the foot of the hill. Here Colonel Metcalfe
rallied a large portion of his men, but upon the approach of the
enemy they again fled, and the Tennesseeans, as before, stood
firm, and so far restrained the enemy as to efi'ect a safe retire-
ment to Richmond. The enemy followed, and demanded the
surrender of the town, but upon learning that Colonel Linck,
from General Cruft's brigade, had arrived with reinforcements,
withdrew. Soon after this occurrence General iTelson ordered
General Manson, with his own brigade and General Cruft's,
to march to Richmond, who, on arriving, established his camps
two miles south of the town, and sent a portion of his cavalry
forward to observe the enemy.

On the 29th, Lieutenant-Colonel Mundy, while scouting
with a detachment of cavalry in the vicinity of Kingston,
learned that the enemy was advancing in considerable force,
and immediately informed General Manson of the fact, and
the latter in turn forwarded the information to General iSTelson
at Lexington. General Manson then directed Colonel Mun-
dy to make effort to hold the enemy in check, and ascertain
his position and strength. He at the same time reinforced
his pickets and prepared his brigade to advance at a moment's
warning. At 2 p. m. he received information that his cavalry
and infantry pickets were receding before a force estimated at
five thousand men. General Manson then advanced with his
brigade, leaving General Cruft's at Richmond. Having
moved forward about a mile and a half, and dispersed the
enemy's cavalry and artillery with his own artillery, he took
possession of a high ridge, and formed his troops in line of
battle on each side of the road, placing his artillery on the
flanks, so as to command the road and the open country as far
south as Rogersville. The enemy soon appeared with infantry,
cavalry, and artillery, but after a sharp skirmish of an hour's
duration, with a loss of one cannon and several men captured,
he withdrew. General Manson then advanced to Rogersville,
placed his command in bivouac, and sent Colonel Metcalfe in
pursuit of the enemy, under instructions to ascertain his
strength. He also directed General Cruft to post strong
guards on the Lancaster turnpike, and on the road entering

OPERATIOXS OF GENS. MORGAN AND NELSON. 181

the town from the east, and hold the remainder of his brigade
in readiness to move at notice. Colonel Metcalfe encountered
the enemy six miles out, and after a slight skirmish fell l)ack
to Rogersville.

At 6 A. M. the next day. General Manson ordered General
Cruft to his support, having learned that the enemy was again
advancing. lie then moved forward and met the enemy's
vanguard about a half mile south of Rogersville, and taking
position on a wooded elevation formed a line of battle, with
the Fifty -fifth Indiana on the left of the road behind a fence,
the Sixty-ninth Indiana on the right, the artillery on high
ground to the left, and the Seventy -first Indiana in reserve.
The skirmishers on the left opened the battle, and simultane-
A:)usly the Sixteenth Indiana coming up took position in the
woods on the left of the Fifty -fifth. After the fighting had
^jontinued for an hour, the enemy made a fierce assault upon
the left, and the Seventy-first Indiana was ordered to its sup-
])ort. While executing this movement, the regiment was sub-
jected to a galling fire, and Lieutenant-Colonel Topping and
Major Conkling fell, the former mortally wounded and the
latter killed. This reinforcement of the left did not relieve it
from severe pressure, and seven companies of the Sixty-ninth
Indiana from the right were also directed to its support. At
this juncture. General Cruft reached the field with the advance
of his brigade — the ITinety -fifth Ohio and a section of artil-
lery. The Mnety-fifth was placed on the right behind the
three companies of the Sixty-ninth, then warmly engaged,
and were ordered to charge a battery which was posted on an
eminence a short distance to the front. In making this
charge, the regiment was thrown into disorder by the severe
fire to which it was exposed, and then the enemy pressed the
right from position. The left also was turned by a flank
movement under cover of the woods, and driven back in dis-
order. Just as the rout became general, the remainder of
General Cruft's brigade appeared. The Eighteenth Kentucky
at once formed in line, and in a few minutes was compelled to
fall back with heavy loss. The other two regiments of the
Ijrigade, the Twelfth and Sixty-sixth, were formed in line on a
high position near Rogersville, a mile to the rear of the first line,

182 OPERATIOXS OF GENS. MORGAX AXD NELSOX.

and upon tliem the fragments of the routed troops were rallied.
The ground here, however, not being considered favorable for
defense. General Manson posted his cavalry and one gun on
an eminence to check the enemy and withdrew to his position
of the previous evening, and then formed again as in the
morning, with his troops as much as possible under cover and
his artillery on the flanks. As the enemy was advancing
upon this new position, General Manson received an order
from General Nelson, of August 30th, directing him to retire
l)y the Lancaster road should the enemy approach in force.
It was then too late for obedience, as a few minutes later the
enemy attacked his whole line with great energy, and though
his right was at first pressed back l)y artillery fire, he finally,
though checked repeatedly, pressed General Cruft's troops
back in great disorder. The left was then withdrawn and the
whole force fell back to its camps in front of Richmond, the
enemy pursuing closely. Here General ]\Ianson endeavored
again to reform his command, and had partially succeeded,
when General ITelson appeared and directed that a line should
be formed near the town and cemetery. The troops had
barely reached the position designated and formed in line be-
fore the enemy assaulted in overwhelming force. Resisting-
for a few minutes, the whole line crumbled, and its fragments
drifted through Richmond and on to Louisville.

General Nelson's command consisted almost entirely of new
regiments, and did not exceed six thousand five hundred.
He lost two hundred killed, seven hundred wounded, and two
thousand captured, and nine guns. The enemy's strength
was twelve thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and
fifteen guns. He lost two hundred and fifty killed and about
five hundred wounded.

There was now no well-organized force to meet General
Smith's arm}^, and the excitement in Louisville and Cincin-
nati was intense. General ISTelson took command at Louis-
ville, and attempted to organize the new troops and the citi-
zens who volunteered for the defense of the city. IMultitudes
from the adjacent populous regions hastened to Cincinnati to
save the city from pillage.

After the battle of Richmond, General E. K. Smith moved

OPERATIONS OF GENS. MORGAN AND NELSON. 183

northward, with General Heath's division in advance, in
boldest menace to Covington and Cincinnati. To defend
these cities, new troops and citizens gathered in great numbers
at Cincinnati, and an army had been formed of such propor-
tions under Generals A. J. Smith, L. Wallace, and Gordon
Granger, and though having approached very near to Cov-
ington, the Confederate general refrained from attack, and
contented himself with distributing his forces in the eastern
portion of Central Kentucky, to gather supplies and recruits,
and there await the results of the movement of the armies of
Generals Bragg and Buell toward Louisville.

CHAPTER XV.

CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY.

General Buell found at Louisville a large force of new
troops, comprising the remnant of General Nelson's division,
and regiments that had been hurriedly thrown into the city
for its defense against the two Confederate armies in the state.
He at once commenced the reorganization and re-equipment of
his army. The new troops were mingled with his veterans,
clothing was issued to all, and full preparations made for an
active campaign against General Bragg. Three corps, each
comprising three divisions, designated as First, Second, and
Third, were formed, and Major-Generals A. McB. McCook
and T. L. Crittenden and Brigadier-General C. C. Gilbert were
announced as corps commanders.

On the 29th of September, Major-General Thomas received
an order at the hands of Colonel McGibbon, aid-de-camp to
Major-General Halleck, commander-in-chief, assigning him to
the command of the Army of the Ohio, but at his request
General Buell was retained. The day following, General
Thomas was announced as second in command.

General Buell, having completed his preparations for his
movement against General Bragg, commenced his advance on
the 1st day of October. General Sill's division, of General
McCook's or the left corps, and General Dumont's, which had
not been assigned to a corps, moved on the left toward Frank-
fort, to hold in check the army of General Kirby Smith. The
remainder of the army moved directly on General Bragg's
position at Bardstown. General McCook's corps advanced
through Taylorsville, General Gilbert's through Shepherdsville,
and General Crittenden's through Mount Washington, upon

(184)

CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY. 185

roads converging upon Bardstown from those places. Soon
after leaving Louisville tlie head of each column engaged in
skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry and artillery, the resist-
ance constantly increasing as the army approached Bardstown.
This was done to give time for General Bragg to w^ithdraw
his army, and this he accomplished a few hours hefore the
heads of column approached tlie town. He retreated toward
Springlield, and so close a pursuit was maintained that skir-
mishing with his rear-guard was not unfrequent. Inferring
from information received, that the two Confederate armies
would unite at Danville, General Buell directed General
McCook, whose corps had -arrived at Bloomiield, to march on
Harrodshurg ; he instructed General Thomas to move with
Crittenden's corps on the Lebanon and Danville road, which
passes four miles east of Perry ville, with a branch road leading
to that place, and in person proceeded with Gilbert's corps on
the direct road to Perryville. Having learned soon afterward,
that Smith's army had crossed to the west side of the Ken-
tucky river near Salvisa, and was marching to form a junction
with General Bragg at Harrodshurg or Perryville, he ordered
General McCook to bear to the right and march on the latter
place.

General Buell, with the central corps, arrived at a point
within three and one-half miles of Perryville on the evening
of the 7th, and having ascertained that the enemy held the
place in force, directed that the corps should be disposed in
order of battle. In compliance. General Mitchell's division
was formed across the road, General Sheridan's on an elevation
to the left, and General Schoepf s was held in reserve. In the
meantime, the vanguard, under Captain Gay, consisting of cav-
alry and artillery, reinforced by two regiments, had, after heavy
skirmishing, pressed the enemy's rear-guard a mile farther
toward the town, and it was discovered that the enemy was
concentrating for battle. General Buell at once dispatched
orders for the other two corps to march at 3 o'clock the next
morning and form on the right and left of the corps already
in position. His orders required that each corps commander,
upon the attainment of position on the field, should report to

186 CAMPAIGN OF PERRY^'ILLE, KENTUCKY.

him in person, and expressed tlie expectation of attacking and
carrying the enemy's position at Perryville the next day.

General McCook received his orders at 2| o'clock the next
morning, and had his column on the march at 5 o'clock. He
reached his designated position at lOJ a. m., and formed his
two divisions. Generals Rousseau's and Jackson's, on the left
of General Gilbert's corps, connecting Rousseau's division with
Gilbert's left. The order requiring an early movement of the
troops and prescribing the preliminary arrangements for bat-
tle, did not reach General Thomas as soon as anticipated, in
consequence of the fact that he had been compelled the night
before to diverge from his direct line of march to obtain water
for his command ; his cavahy, nevertheless, was in front of
the position to which he had been assigned, at daylight, and
pushed back the pickets of the enemy. General Crittenden'&
corps came up later even than General McCook's, but two
divisions were in position l:)efore noon. Upon being informed,
early in the morning, that the enemy was in front of his po-
sition. General Thomas went forward to arrange for the for-
mation of Crittenden's corps, and at noon sent an officer of his
staff, Captain Mack, to inform General Buell of his arrival
and position, and requesting instructions through him, assign-
ing the presence of the enemy in his front as an excuse for not
reporting in person. As soon as General Crittenden reached
his assigned position, he seat a staff' officer to General Gilbert
to make inquiries with regard to his formation, and General
Gilbert states in his official report that he went to General Crit-
tenden's position to give the information in person.

The roads over which the army had advanced the preceding
day were very dusty, and owing to this and the hot dry
weather and scarcity of water, the troops had suffered exceed-
ingly. During the night. Colonel Daniel JVIcCook's brigade
of Sheridan's division had been thrown forward from the cen-
ter, to occupy the heights in front of Doctor's creek, a tribu-
tary of Chaplin creek, and about two and a half miles from
Perryville. After a sharp skirmish. Colonel McCook suc-
ceeded at daylight in gaining the heights, and secured some
pools of water in the bed of the stream, which afforded poor
water for the thirsty troops. About two hours after the

CAMPAIGN OF PEERYVILLE, KENTUCKY. 187

heiglits had lieen occupied, the enemy in considerable force
advanced through the woods on the eastern slope and endeav-
ored to regain the position. General Sheridan then ordered
forward Laiboldt's brigade and Ilescock's battery, instructing
Colonel Laiboldt to advance two regiments and drive back tlie
enemy. Stubborn resistance was offered, but after a severe
conflict, in which both sides lost quite heavily, the enemy was
forced across Chaplin river. In this action, Captain Barnett,
with a section of his battery, and Lieutenant Taliaferro, with
a section of Hescock's, forced the guns of the enemy from
position.

The noise of this action incited McCook's corps to haste in
gaining position, and near its close it arrived on the field, and
General McCook at once directed General Rousseau to throw
forward a line of skirmishers to examine the woods on the
left and in front. He ordered Captain Wickliffc's company of
cavalry to reconnoiter the ground to the left of tlie skirmishers,
as acting Brigadier-General Gay was at the time making a
reconnoissance in front and toward Perry ville ; directed Gen-
eral Jackson to post his two brigades on commanding ground,
immediately to the right of the Maxville and Perry ville road,
and to hold them in column ready to move in whatever direc-
tion occasion might require ; and ordered that Captain Loomis'
battery should be posted on high ground, near Russell's house,
to the left. He then indicated his line of battle, and directed
General Rousseau to form it. Following these dispositions
and the conflict in the center, there was a period of quietness,
during which General McCook reported in person to General
Buell, some distance in the rear, and General Gilbert went to
General Crittenden's position. The force which had engaged
General Gilbert's left had retired, and there were no other
troops in view.

General McCook was instructed by General Buell to make
a reconnoissance to Chaplin river, upon his return to his
command ; but during his absence, the troops were suffering
so severely for water that General Rousseau ordered the right
of his line forward a half mile to obtain a supply. Soon after,
the enemy appeared in force, and having placed three batteries
in position, opened fire. General Rousseau then moved his

188 CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY.

other two brigades abreast of his right, and responded to the
enemy's artillery with Loomis' and Simonson's batteries. At
this juncture, General McCook returned, and seeing no infan-
try, he directed that the batteries should cease firing and econ-
omize their ammunition. Learning that commanding ground
for a portion of his line could be obtained a short distance to
the left of the Perryville road (the one leading from Maxville),
he ordered a portion of the Thirty-third Ohio into the woods
in front to ascertain if the enemy was present in that* vicinity,
within a distance of six hundred yards from Chaplin river.
Having gone forward himself, he called to him Generals Jack-
son and Terrell, " showed them the water, marked their line
of battle," and ordered a battery to be posted on the line with
strong supports. He further directed General Terrell " to ad-
vance a line of skirmishers cautiously down the slopes of the
hill to the water, as soon as his line was formed," that the so
much needed water might be obtained. The execution of this
movement developed no enemy, except a body of cavalry,
which appeared on the hills across the river, and fled upon
receiving the fire of Stone's battery, posted to the left and rear
of the position.

At half-past 1 o'clock, General McCook, not anticipating an
attack, as no strong force of the enemy had been in view in
his front, rode to the right of the line. But at 2 p. m. the
enemy attacked the skirmishers of the Thirty-third Ohio, and
then he ordered the remainder of the regiment, Lieutenant-
Colonel Moore commanding, and the Second Ohio to their sup-
port. At this juncture, his line was formed, with Rousseau's
right, near a barn on the right of the Maxville and Perryville
road, and extending to the left on a ridge through a corn-
field (the corn being cut and shocked), to the skirt of woods
occupied by the Second and Thirty-third Ohio regiments ; while
the right of Terrell's brigade of Jackson's division held a
wooded elevation running along to the left, overlooking a por-
tion of Chaplin river, and his left formed a crotchet to the
rear, in order to occupy the hi^h ground to the left and rear.
Starkweather's brigade and Stone's and Bush's batteries of
Rousseau's division were posted to the left and rear of Jack-
son's left, on high ground, and "Webster's brigade of Jackson's

CAMPAIGN OF PEERYVILLE, KENTUCKY. 189

division was placed to the left of RusscH's house and in the
rear of the center of Rousseau's line.

Very soon after, the enemy fell upon the skirmishers of the
Thirty-second Ohio. McCook's whole line became hotly en-
gaged, while the chief force of the enemy was directed against
his left. General Jackson was killed by the first fire, and by
2 J p. M. General Terrell's brigade, composed of new troops,
under an exceedingly heavy pressure by superior numbers,
w^as forced back in confusion. General Terrell showed great
bravery, and exerted himself to the utmost to hold his troops
fii'm, but in vain. It was the traditional method of the
enemy — an attack by a massed force on the end of a line — and
an inferior force of raw troops soon gave way before it. Per.
ceiving that his left had been turned, General McCook sent
Lieutenant Hosea, of his staff, to request General Sheridan to
secure his right. A half hour later, 2i P. M., he dispatched
Captain Fisher to the nearest commander of troops for as-
sistance. This officer met General Schoepf, who was ad-
vancing to the front with his division, who referred him to
General Gilbert, who was with the column. He reported to
General Gilbert that " McCook's whole command was engaged,
his reserves being all in line, and that the safety of his corps
was compromised." General Gilbert referred Captain Fisher
to General Buell, but afford'ed no assistance. General McCook
sent a third staff officer. Captain Hoblitzell, at 3 p. m., to
General Schoepf, or the commander of the nearest troops, to
ask for help. Having thus made effort to obtain reinforce-
ments, he remained w^tli his left until the enemy had been re-
pulsed by Starkweather's brigade and the cross fire of Stone's
and Bush's batteries, all suitably posted to secure this result,
after Terrell's brigade had been driven back and the enemy
had swung' round in pursuit. The batteries alone held the
enemy in check for some time. When having received rein-
forcements, he assaulted with great fury. The Twenty-first
Wisconsin, lying in front of the batteries, then opened a de-
structive fire, but were forced back. The batteries and the
remainder of the brigade were then assaulted, but here the
enemy was repulsed again. He repeated his assaults with
fresh troops, but was driven back each time with heavy loss,

190 CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY.

until the brigade and batteries having exhausted their ammu-
nition, quietly retired to the line first selected, where, having
obtained ammunition, they renewed the conflict.

Having witnessed the repulse of the enemy on his left. Gen-
eral McCook proceeded to his right, concerning which he had
hitherto felt no uneasiness, to witness the issue of a terrible
conflict there. "\Yliile the battle had been raging on the left,
General Rousseau's right and center brigades, commanded re-
spectively by Colonels Lytle and Harris, had been hotly en-
gaged, and had repeatedly repulsed the enemy, although his
attacks had been made by superior numbers. Colonel Harris'
brigade held its position against every assault, inflicting se-
vere punishment upon the enemy, and presenting an unbroken
front, even after its ammunition had been exhausted. It was
finally withdrawn to the original line simultaneously with
Starkweather's brigade. There was now an opening between
Lytle's right and the central corps, while his left flank w^as
exposed. General McCook ordered Colonel "Webster to op-
pose the enemy, and in the vain effort he fell, mortally
wounded. The enemy, in the meantime, having posted a bat-
tery in a favorable position, opened a destructive fire upon
Lytle's right flank, and he too fell back. Even then the right,
near Russell's house, could not be held, owing to the de-
structive fire of artillery and -the- heat of a burning barn in
proximity. Tlie enemy, with its recession, swung round in
Lytle's rear. Fortunately, Loomis' battery, which, having pre-
viously exhausted its long-range ammunition, had been re-
tired to a commanding ridge, about one hundred and fifty
yards in the rear of Russelhs house, under instructions to re-
serve its canister for close work, was now in readiness for such
a fire as checked the enemy's advance. Soon after. Colonel
Gooding's brigade, with Finney's battery (Fifth Wisconsin),
from MitchelFs division of the central corps, was near, and by
the spirited action of infantry and artillery, the enemy was
driven back and the position at Russell's was regained. This
brigade lost four hundred and ninety men — nearly one-fourth
of its effective strength. General Steedman's brigade, from-
Schoepf 's division, followed Gooding's closely, and these rein-
forcements and night arrested the battle at this point. When

CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY. 191

General Terrell's brigade gave way in the first onset, a portion
of it fell back to the position of Stone's and Bush's batteries ;
and there, in the effort to rally his troops, this gallant com-
mander fell, mortally wounded, and died a few hours later.

In the recession of the left, seven pieces of Parsons' eight-
gun battery fell into the hands of the enemy, and at G i\ m.
four guns of Harris' Indiana battery were also lost.

About the time that General McCook was first attacked,
General Sheridan advanced Captain Ilescock's battery to a
good position in front of a belt of woods, where he had. an
enfilading fire on the enemy's batteries on the opposite side
of the valley of Chaplin river, and advanced six regiments to
support it. The fire of this battery was severe, and the enemy
attempted to dislodge it by establishing a battery at short
range. But Ilescock's shots were so well directed and efiective,
that the enemy abandoned this advanced position in a few
minutes. The enemy then posted two batteries on Sheridan's
right flank with infxntry behind them, when General Sheri-
dan, in obedience to orders, occupied the hill from which he
had previously driven the enemy. The enemy again assaulted
the position and advanced close to Sheridan's line, although
suffering fearful losses from canister. Being now greatly
pressed. General Sheridan called upon General Gilbert for
reinforcements, and the latter ordered Schoepf s and Mitchell's
divisions to close to the left and support him. Arriving at
the scene of conflict. General Mitchell threw forward Colonel
Carlin's brigade to relieve Sheridan's right from pressure. As
Colonel Carlin ascended to the brow of the hill, he observed
the enemy advancing in strong force, and he immediately
charged, broke his line, and drove him beyond Perryvillc,
ISTear the town, the Thirty-eighth Illinois, in the advance, cap-
tured three officers, one hundred and thirty men, some wagons,
and two caissons with horses attached. Seeing that he was not
supported on either flank, Carlin took advantage 6f the con-
fusion of the enemy and safely withdrew. General Sheridan
also drove the enemy for some distance, but having per-
ceived that General McCook's right, having been left without
support, had been turned, deemed it unsafe to advance far, and

192 CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KEXTUCKY.

therefore turned his artillery upon the enemy across the val-
ley, and thus relieved the pressure upon the left wing.

Though General Thomas had found the enemy in his front
early in the morning, and had reported his presence as his
excuse for not reporting to the commanding general in per-
son, and although General Gilbert's corps had been engaged
more or less from the earlier hours of the morning, and Gen-
eral McCook's corps had been struggling against overwhelm-
ing nimibers, Gen. Thomas received no orders from Gen. Buell
until 4 p. M., upon the return of Captain Mack. The verbal
instructions through this officer were, that he should hold a
division in readiness to reinforce the center if necessary, to
reconnoiter his front to ascertain if the enemy had reinforced
his left or was withdrawing, and report all information ob-
tained. In compliance, the reconnoissance was made immedi-
ately, and developed the enemy ; but though the fact was
reported, no further orders respecting operations for that day
were received. Owing to the absence of instructions requiring
the advance of the right corps, it was not engaged during the
day, excepting the cavalry in the morning, in the front, and
Wagner's brigade of Wood's division, which became involved
with General Mitchell's right, late in the evening.

In compliance with orders from General Buell, Generals
Thomas, McCook, and Gilbert reported at his headquarters at
night, to receive instructions for the next day. General
McCook was directed to move his corps during the night and
close up on General Gilbert's left, to hold this position
and take advantage of any opportunity that the events of the
day might present. Generals Thomas and Gilbert were ordered
to make preparations to advance on Perryville at daylight the
next morning, and attack the enemy's front and left flank,
keeping their adjacent flanks well connected. The move-
ments, as ordered, were made during the night and morning ;
but the advance troops in the morning discovered that the
enemy had retired during the night, and was falling back to
Ilarrodsburg, but had left no evidence of haste or disorder,
save that his dead and wounded remained on the field.

General Buell reported his loss in this battle at nine hundred
and sixteen killed, two thousand nine hundred and forty-three

CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY. 193

■wounded, and four hundred and eighty-nine missing ; total,
four thousand three hundred and forty-eight. An exceed-
ingly large number for the troops severely engaged, but one
that attests their valor. iSTearly all the losses were from
McCook's two divisions, and the l)rigade sent from the center
to his support.

The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded is not known.
General Buell claims that from first to last, he captured from
four to five thousand men, including the sick and wounded.

This battle, in some of its features at least, was the result
of the mutual misconception of the situation by the command-
ing generals, and its initiation was palpably owing to the
ignorance of General Bragg with regard to the actual concen-
tration of eight divisions of the Army of the Ohio before him.
General Bragg did not know this when he made an attack
upon its left and center with three divisions. He had not,
previous to the 7th, intended to give battle at Perryville, but
owing to the pressure upon his rear, which arrested two of his
divisions, Buckner's and Anderson's,'-^ under General Hardee,
he at that time determined to concentrate three divisions,
Cheatham's and the two others mentioned of General Polk's
conunand, and give battle before that town. On the 7th,
Cheatham moved from Harrodsburg, General Bragg having
Bent Withers' division the day before to support Smith against
the column formed of Sill's and Bumont's divisions advancing
against him. Having learned subsequently that this force was
retreating, he then proceeded to Perryville, and was present
at the battle, though disclaiming the conduct of it beyond
suggesting some changes in General Polk's dispositions.
These facts, mentioned officially by General Bragg, indicate
clearly that he expected to fight at Perryville only the more
advanced portions of General Buell's army. He states ex-
plicitly in his report, that he declined battle on the 9th, be-
cause General Buell had received reinforcements during the
previous day and night. With regard to the opening of the

*This was probably Hardee's division, in temporary command of An-
derson; at least, the division which General Hardee had previously com-
manded.

13

194 CAMPAIGN OF PEERYVILLE, KENTUCKY.

battle, he made the following statements : " The action opened
at half-past 12 p. m., between skirmishers and artillery on
both sides. Finding the enemy indisposed to advance against
us, and knowing that he was receiving heavy reinforcements,
I deemed it best to assail him vigorously, and so directed."

On the other hand, General Buell did not seem to know that
before General McCook became seriously engaged. General
Crittenden's corps was in line of battle on General Gilbert's
right. General Gilbert had been with General Crittenden
while aligning his corps, and returned to his own before the
action commenced, as he states in his official report. General
Thomas' statement does not give the exact time when his line
of battle was formed, but the fact of his own early presence
on the field, and his early report of this fact to General Buell,
through a staff officer, which report by order was contingent
upon the assumption of position by Crittenden's corps, leaves
no room to doubt that this corps was in readiness to partici-
pate in the action soon after 12 m. At this hour two of Crit-
tenden's divisions, Smith's and Van Cleve's, were in position,
and "Wood's was two miles in the rear marching to the front.
About 4 p. M. General Buell first learned that McCook's corps
was seriously engaged and heavily pressed. He then ordered
General Gilbert to send a division to its support, and directed
General Thomas to hold one division in readiness to support
the left. The execution of the order to General Gilbert gave
two additional brigades to the support of General McCook
near the close of the action. It does not appear, from any of
the official reports from which this narrative has been drawn,
that the order, announcing the intention to give battle on the
8th, and enforcing preparations for it, had been revoked, and
from this fact, and the noise of musketry as well as artillery,
which had announced the beginning and progress of a battle
involving the center and left, there was a general expectation
throughout Crittenden's corps that it too would participate in
the action.

The testimony is very explicit from General Gilbert that
General McCook called upon him for help (as his corps was
upon the point of being compromised), when he was return-
ing from General Crittenden's position, and that upon his

CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY. 195

second call he sent h.im one brigade and a battery, befoi-e he
received an order from General Buell, through Major Wright,
to send two brigades to his support. Thus the suddenness
and impetuosity of the attack upon McCook did not permit
him to delay for a moment in asking aid from the nearest
troops, and it was General Gill)ort who sent one of McCook's
staft" officers to General Buell, as he could not at first give him
reinforcements. Thus, these two corps commanders conducted
the engagement from their respective positions, to meet the
attacks of the enemy, without orders from General Buell, and
«dthout any recognized plan of battle, or any apparent object,
except to maintain their ground by repulsing the enemy.

Though General Bragg had withdrawn his army. General
Buell still believed that he would deliver battle, and that
Smith's army had joined him for that purpose. He therefore
determined, that as the two Confederate columns had formed
a junction, to await the arrival of General Sill's division,
which he had ordered forward from Frankfort. In the mean-
time, he placed his army in position, his right four miles from
Danville, his center on the Perryville and Harrodsburg turn-
pike, and his left near Duckville, on the roads converging
to Harrodsburg. On the nuxrch from Frankfort, General Sill
was attacked near Lawrenceburg by a portion of General
Smith's army, but he repulsed the attack, and arrived at Perry-
ville on the 11th. General Dumont's division remained at
Frankfort.

On the morning of the 11th, a reconnoissance was made by
three brigades of infantry from Crittenden's and Gilbert's
corps, and by McCook's and Gay's cavalry, and discovered the
enemy in force about three miles south of Harrodsburg, but
he retired during the day, and his rear-guard was driven
out of the town in the evening, with the loss of some stores,
and about twelve hundred prisoners, mostly sick and wounded.
The next day. General Buell ordered General McCook's corps
to Harrodsburg, General Crittenden's to the left and rear of
Danville, and General Gilbert's to a point midway between
these towns, on the road connecting them, while a strong re-
connoitering force advanced to the crossing of Dick's river,
and ascertained that the enemy had crossed his entire army.

196 CAMPAIGJf OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY.

Two clays later, it was known that the enemy was retreating
south, and pursuit was at once ordered. General "Wood's di-
vision marched at 12 o'clock that night, and engaged the
enemy's artillery and cavalry at Stanford the next morning
at daylight. The remainder of General Crittenden's corps,
and all of General McCook's, followed General Wood through
Danville and Stanford to Crab Orchard, and General Gilbert's
corps reached the same point through Lancaster. The en-
emy resisted the head of each column with cavalry and artil-
lery whenever he could find favorable positions, but he was
steadily followed, and often attacked, as he moved on toward
Cumberland Gap.

From Crab Orchard southward, the country is barren and
rough, affording only meager supplies, and as there was now
no prospects of forcing General Bragg to an engagement,
McCook's and Gilbert's corps were halted at Crab Orchard,
while Crittenden's, with W. S. Smith's division leading, fol-
lowed on to London, on the direct road, and to Manchester,
on the branch road. But nothing was effected l^eyond suc-
cessful skirmishing with the enemy's rear-guard, and the cap-
ture of some prisoners and cattle. There being no promise
of further advantage, the pursuit was not continued beyond
London, and the Army of the Ohio turned toward Bowling
Green and Glasgow, preparatory to a movement to JSTashville.
General Buell retired to Louisville, leaving General Thomas in
chief command.

On the 26th of October, General Buell directed General
Thomas by telegraph to concentrate the corps of Generals
McCook and Gilbert at Bowling Green, and that of General
Crittenden at Glasgow. In compliance, Generals McCook
and Gilbert moved from Crab Orchard to Bowling Green — the
former through Stanford, Lebanon, Somerville, and Cave City,
and the latter on the same route, excepting through Camp-
bellsville instead of Somerville. General Crittenden marched
from London to Glasgow through Somerset, Columbia, and
Edmonton. The cavalry remained at Lebanon to refit and
otherwise prepare for active service.

It was not certainly known at this time what General
Bragg's next movement would be. His successful retreat

CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY. 197

from Pcrryvillo proved the easy mobility of his army, and the
direction of it warranted the fear that he woukl endeavor to
attack ISTashville before its feeble garrison could be reinforced.
This was the expectation of General Bnell when he turned
his columns toward Bowling Green, but the authorities at
Washington not only suggested, but ordered that his army
should enter East Tennessee. This cliiFerence of opinion elic-
ited a lengthy discussion, which terminated in the removal of
General Buell from the command of the Army of the Ohio on
the 30th of October.

The operations of Generals Johnston and Lee in Virginia
and Maryland, and of General Bragg in Mississippi, Ten-
nessee, and Kentucky, during the summer and autumn of
1862, compassed the broadest, if not the boldest, aggression of
the Confederate armies during the war, and perhaps were
expressive of their greatest actual strength, and freighted
with the strongest hopes which the Southern people ever en-
tertained subsequent to their first great defeats. In the fore-
cast of these campaigns, it was assumed that General Bragg
would unite the standards of four victorious columns at Louis-
ville or Cincinnati, and that the commander of the eastern
Confederate army should raise the symbol of their declared
nationality on the dome of the national capitol. Then,
should the fugitive or captive representatives of the national
government refuse to recognize the independence of the
Southern Confederacy, the two victorious armies were to co-
operate in the invasion of the ISTorthern States to compel an
unwilling people to acknowledge its independence. While
the murmurs of the people and the official complaints of the
authorities at AVashington were often repeated as General
Buell advanced slowly toward Chattanooga and General
McClellan halted before Richmond, the resources of the South
were strained in preparation for the accomplishment of
these grand objects. At this time, the national armies were
holding the peninsula of Virginia in the East, and on the
West, Cumberland Gap — a position of great strategic im-
portance in both IS'orthern and Southern regard — all Middle
and West Tennessee, portions of Northern Mississippi and
Alabama, commanding the resources, the rivers, and railroads

198 CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY.

of tlie vast region which had been wrested from the enemy,,
and their attitude was still one of absolute asriyression. Sud-
denly they were thrown upon the defensive. The Army of
the Potomac was defeated and withdrawn to Washington, the
second battle was lost at Bull Run, and General Lee crossed
the Potomac with his victorious legions. Then Kirby Smith
turned Cumberland Gap, and soon after defeated at Rich-
mond, Kentucky, the troops that had been improvised for the
defense of Cincinnati and Louisville. Soon General Bragg,
after sending hortatory orders to his lieutenants in IN'orthern
Mississippi to brush General Grant from their front and join
him on the Ohio, scaled Waldron's ridge with his central
column, and, finding an open way, hurried into Kentucky
proclaiming his advent as the redemption of the state from the
despotism of the national government. These successes gave
the brightest hour of the war to the South and the gloomiest
one to the JSTorth — intensifying the opposition to it in the
latter section, and imposing upon the government the most
perplexing embarrassments. The conditions of the struggle
seemed to have been changed entirely.

But promising as was the beginning of these campaigns to
the South, like all others of similar character throughout the
war, they resulted in failure, at least in respect to their domi-
nant objects. Wlien it was that General Bragg lost heart com-
pletely is not revealed, but he certainly gave evidence of some
miscalculation, miscarriage, or waning hope, when he declined
battle at Prewitt's Knob. He had previously moved in ap-
parent disregard of the greater army which he had thrown to
his rear, by leaping upon its communications, and yet his op-
erations at the very moment of their seeming culmination lost
their bold aspect, and thereafter the boastful commander of the-
western Confederate armies drifted about in Kentucky, neither
in spirit or maneuver justifying the assumptions of his proc-
lamations. His offensive campaign, a failure in its ruling ob-
jects,'!^ was nevertheless successful in many subordinate ones..

* One of these objects, doubtless, was tlie permanent occupancy of Ken-
tucky, and to give public expression to it, he went through the pretense
of inaugurating a Confederate provisional governor in room of Mr. John-
son, killed at the battle of Shiloh. The representation of the state in

CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KEXTUCKY. 199

He gained territory of vast extent with its ungarnered corn,
and military advantages which were only overcome by a cam-
paign of nearly a year's duration, a great battle, and a vast
expenditure of war material. He also made a heavy draft
upon the resources of Kentuck3^ Her granaries supplied his
armies while in the state, and doubtless for a time after they
left it. Kentucky stores and looms provided clothing for his
needy soldiers ; the farms and stables of rich Kentuckians fur-
nished his troopers with the best horses in the land. Tlicse
were no inconsiderable results, and some were paraded as com-
pensative, but after all they did not give cheer and hope to the
Southern people as the only consequences of a campaign which,
in its inception and primal progress, promised the recognition
of the Southern Confederacy by foreign nations and even by
the United States. Actual accomplishment fell far below
Southern expectation, east and west. And when General Lee
retreated from the battle-field of Antietam, General Bragg
from Perryville, and General Van Dorn from Corinth, the
Southern people saw plainly that the war was still to bring
desolation to their section, and that the boldest strategy and
the exertion of their full strength could only press back, tem-
porarily, the national armies.

The general offensive attitude of the insurgents, their unex-
pected revelation of great strength, and the defeats of the sum-
mer, forced upon the government and the loyal people the
alternative of the abandonment of the conflict or the enlarge-
ment of the national armies, first to repel invasion and then
reassume the offensive with augmented vigor. There was too
much at stake to yield to the claims of the insurgents, and the
government and the people, under the pressure of a necessity
which involved the life of the nation, made a draft for men and
means proportionate to the compass of the emergency. Dur-
ing September and Octoljer, as the narrative has disclosed, the
invading armies were all repelled and new offensive cam-
paigns were projected. The main one in the "West, looking to
the reoccupancy of Middle Tennessee and Northern Alabama,

the Confederate congress required that there should at least be the sem-
blance of a state government in alliance with the government at Rich-
mond, and this object was attained by the same measure

200 CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY.

and an advance into East Tennessee and Georgia, found official
expression in the order of the war department, recreating the
Department of the Cumberland.

Louisville, Ky., September 29, 1862—2.30 p. m.
Major-General Hallcck, General-in-Chief :

I have received your orders of the 24th inst., requiring me to turn over
my command to Major-General G. H. Thomas. I have accordingly turned
over the command to him, and in further obedience to your instructions,
I shall repair to Indianapolis and await further orders.

D. C. BUELL,

Major- General.
Received, Washington, September 30th.

Louisville, Ky., September 30, 1862 — I p. m.
General Hallech :

I received last evening your dispatch, suspending my removal from
command. Out of a sense of public duty, I shall continue to discharge
the duties of my command to the best of my ability, until otherwise or-
dered.

D. C. BUELL,

Major- General.

October 7 — 7 p. m.

General: — The Third Corps (Gilbert's) is within three and one-half
miles of Perry ville, the cavalry being nearer, perhaps two and a half
miles. From all information received to-day, it is thought the enemy
will resist our advance into Perryville. They are said to have a strong
force in and around the place. We expect to attack and carry the place
to-morrow. March at 3 o'clock precisely to-morrow morning without
fail, and if possible, get all the canteens filled, and have the men cau-
tioned to use water in the most sparing manner. Every otBcer must cau-
tion his men on this point. Send back every team and animal that is
not absolutely necessary with the troops, as they will suffer for water.
All the wagons that can must move in the rear of your troops.

The right of Gilbert's rests opposite to Gordon's place, which is on the
Lebanon pike, and from Gordon's to Gilbert's right is about two to two
and a quarter miles. Wlien the two corps get up to that vicinity — that
is to say, three or three and a half miles from town — let the front be
halted and put in order of battle, and the whole column closed up, and
the men allowed to rest in position, and made as comfortable as possible,
but not allowed to scatter. The commander of the corps n\ust then im-
mediately have the front reconnoitered, and gain all the information he

CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY. 201

can of the position of the enemy, and also of the nature of the country
in his front. This must be done by inquiry of the inhabitants, and by
personal examination of officers, and by reconnoisance.

When the column has got into position, you will please report at these
headquarters with all the information you may have been able to obtain,
and instructions for further movements will be given. Send orderlies
back with bearer to learn where our headquarters are. All the usual
precautions must be taken, and preparations made for action. There is
no water near us, and we expect but little, if any, until we get it at Perry-
ville. Nothing has been heard of you since we parted this morning.

Respectfully, etc.,

JAMES B. FRY,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
General Thoma.s, Second in Command.

An order nearly similar was sent to General McCook.

GENERAL BUELL'S FIRST BRIEF REPORT.

Pi RRYViLLE, Ky. , VIA Barpstown, October 10*, 1862.
To Major- Gc?ieral II. W. Halleck, Commander-in-Chief :

I have already advised you of the movement of the army under my
command, from Louisville. More or less skirmishing occurred daily with
the enemy's cavalry since then, and it was supposed that the enemy would
give battle at Bardstown.

My troops reached that point on the 4th, driving the enemy's rear-
guard of cavalry and artilery of the main body to Springfield, whither
pursuit was continued. The center corps, under General Gilbert, moved
in the direct road from Springfield to Perryville, and arrived on the
7th one mile from town, where the enemy was found to be in force.
'I'he left column, under Cleneral McCook, came upon the IMaxville road
yesterday about 10 o'clock (the 8th). It was ordered into jjosition
to attack, and a strong reconnoissance directed.

At 4 o'clock I received a request from General McCook for reinforce-
ments, and learned that the left liad been seriously engaged for several
hours, and that the right and left of that corps were being turned and
.severely pressed. Reinforcements were immediately sent forward from
the center. Orders were issued to the right column under General Crit-
tenden, which was advancing by the Lebanon road, to push forward and
attack the enemy's left, but it was impossible for it to get into position
in time to produce any decisive results.

'i"he action continued till dark. Some sharp fighting also occurred in
the center. The enemy was everywhere repulsed, but not without some
momentary advantage on the left. The several corps were put in posi-
tion during the night, and moved to the attack.

*Shonldbe9.

202 CAMPAIGN OF PEERYVILLE, KENTUCKY.

At 6 o'clock this morning, Thursday, some sharp skirmishing occurred
with the enemy's rear-guard. The m;iin body has fallen back in the di-
rection of Harrodsburg. I have no accurate report of our loss yet. It
is probably heavy, including several valuable officers. Generals Jackson
and Terrell, I regret to say, are among the killed.

D. C. BUELL,
Major-General Commanding.

EXTRACT FROM MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS' REPORT
TO THE "COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS ON THE CONDUCT OF
THE WAR."

At daylight on the morning of the 8th of October, the cavalry, under the
command of Colonel Ed. McCook, in advance of the right wing, had reached
the point indicated in the foregoing communication (reference is made
to General Buell's order of October 7th, 7 p. m. ), on the Lebanon and Perry-
ville road. Upon his arrival. Colonel McCook sent me a message that
he had encountered the enemy's pickets, and had driven them a mile be-
yond in the direction of Perryville. I immediately rode to the front,
and gave directions for tlie formation of Crittenden's corps, sending my
aid, Captain 0. A. Mack, Fourth United States Artillery, to General
Buell, reporting my position and requesting him to send orders by Cap-
tain Mack, the enemy being reported immediately in my front, for which
reason I did not like to leave my troops. About 4 p. m. Captain Mack
returned with verbal orders from General Buell, to hold one division in
readiness to reinforce the center, if necessary, and also to reconnoiter my
front to see if the enemy had reinforced his left, or was withdrawing,
which information was to be reported to him immediately. Notwith-
standing my reconnoissance developed the enemy still in my front, I had
no orders to advance. After sundown, I received the following commu-
nication :

October 8 — 6.30 p. m.

General: — The First Corps (McCook's) on our left, has been very heav-
ily engaged. The left and center of this corps gained ground, but the
right yielded a little. Press your lines forward as far as possible to-night,
and get in position to make a vigorous attack in the morning at daylight.
If you have got your troops into a position which you deem advantage-
ous, it will not be advisable to make a change for the purpose of comply-
ing with the general's instructions for you, sent by Captain Mack. It
may be as well to have the division ordered to the center, and let it wait
where it is for further orders. The general desires to see you in person
as soon to-night as your duties will permit you to come over.

J. B. FRY,
Colonel and Cluef of Staff.

General Thomas, Second in Command.

CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KET^TUCKY. 203

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL GILBERT'S REPORT.

Pending these movements, the arrival of the Fii'st Corps (Major-Gen-
eral McCook's) was announced on my left, and the sound of artillery in-
dicated that its appearance had attracted the serious attention of the
enemy. I also received an officer from Major-General Crittenden, who
had been dispatched to seek out my lines, that he might make a junction
with me. I gave him the position, and being near the general's head-
quartei's, I repaired to them, and made a report in person of the disposi-
tion of my forces and of the operations of the day, and then returned to
my headquarters, near the crossing of Doctor's creek. On my way hither
I was met by a messenger from Major-General McCook, to the effect that
his corps was upon the point of being compromised, the enemy having
attacked him in overwhelming numbers. About the same time, I re-
ceived from General Sheridan warning that he could not hold his posi-
tion if not supjjorted with reinforcements, and confirming the unfavor-
able intelligence respecting the First Corps. I at once ordered Schoepf 's
division to close more to the left to support Sheridan, and also to cover
the movement of the First Corps, which was gradually swinging around
to our rear, under strong pressure brought to bear upon it. To support
Sheridan's right, I ordered Mitchell to close to the left and co-operate
closely with him. These orders being given, 1 continued on toward the
left, and was shortly met by Captain Iloblitzell, with an urgent demand
for support for the First Corps. He was furnished with ^a brigade
and battery from Mitchell's division, though at the time my own lines
were assailed in the most lively and vigorous manner. Shortly after,
Major "Wright brought an order to send two brigades from Schoepf 's di-
vision to support the First Corps ; but as one brigade had already gone,
and my own lines were undergoing a dangerous assault, I dispatched only
one of Schoepf 's brigades.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL McCOOK'S REPORT.

At this juncture — half-past 2 p. m. — seeing that I was assailed by at
least three times my number, I despatched my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant
L. M. Hosea, Sixteenth United States Infantry, to General Sheridan, com-
manding General Gilbert's left division, to request him to look to my
right, to see that it was not turned. At 3 p. m. I dispatched Captain
Horace M. Fisher, of my staff, to the nearest commander of troop.s, for
assistance. Ee first met General Schoepf, marching at the head of his
division, and reported my condition to him. General Schoepf expressed
a desire to come vip, and stated that he was moving to the front for some
purpose, and requested Captain Fisher to see General Gilbert, who was
riding with the column. Captain Fisher then reported to General Gil-
bert that my entire command was engaged, that the reserves were all in,
and the safety of my corps was compromised. General Gilbert referred
him to General Buell, to whom this officer reported.

204 CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY.

At 3 p. M. I also dispatched another aid, Captain W. F. Hoblitzell,
to General Schoepf, commanding the First division and reserve in Gil-
bert's corps, or the commander of the nearest troops in rear, to inform
him of my condition, and ask for troops.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL BRAGG'S REPORT.

Headquarters Department No. 2,
Bryansville, Kt., October 12.

Sir : — Finding the enemy pressing heavily in his rear near Perryville,
Major-General Hardee, of Polk's command, was obliged to halt and check
him at that point. Having arrived at Harrodsburgh from Frankfort, I
determined to give him battle there, and accordingly concentrated three
divisions of my old command — the Army of the Mississippi, now under
command of Major-General Polk — Cheatham's, Buckner's, and Anderson's
and directed General Polk to take command on the 7th and attack
the enemy the next morning. Withers' division had gone the day before
to support Smith. PI earing, on the night of the 7th, that the force in
front of Smith had rapidly retreated, I moved early next morning to be
present at the operations of Polk's command.

The two armies were formed confronting each other, on opposite sides
of the town of Perryville. After consulting the General and reconnoit-
ering the ground, and examining his dispositions, I declined to assume
command, but suggested some change and modifications of his arrange-
ments, which he promptly adopted.

[BY TELEGRAPH FROM LOUISVILLE, OCTOBER 26TH.]

To General Thomas :

Crittenden's corps will proceed to Glasgow as fast as it reaches Colum-
bia. If its baggage should not arrive, it will follow. It must be at Glas-
gow entire, by the 31st.

Put McCook's division in motion by way of Somerville, Horse Hill, and
Bowling Green. It must reach Bowling Green by the 31st. Rations will
meet it at Bell's.

Crittenden's division will draw rations from Cave City or Munfords-
ville.

Direct the First and Third divisions (Schoepf 's and Rousseau's) to march

for Bowling Green, by Campbellsville, Greensburg, and Glasgow. They

must reach Bowling Green by the 1st proximo, and Glasgow by the 29th.

Rations for them will be at Cave City.

J. B. FRY,

Colonel and Chief of Staff.

CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY. 205

Washington, Orinhcr 19, ]Sf)2— 1.30 i-. m.
General Bvell, Mount Vcrnnn :

Your telegram of the 17th received this morning, and has been laid
before the President who concurs in my telegram to you yesterday. The
capture of East Tennessee should be the main object of your campaign. You
say it is the heart of the enemy's resources. Make it the heart of yours.
Your army can live there if the enemy can. You must in a great meas-
ure live upon the country, paying for your supplies when proper, and levy-
ing contributions when necessary. 1 am directed by the President to
say to you that your army must enter East Tenne.ssee this fall, and that
it ought to move there while the roads are passable. Once between the
enemy and Nashville, there will be no serious difficulty in re-opening
your communications with that place. Pie does not understand why we
can not march as the enemy marches, live as he lives, and fight as he
fights, unless we admit the inferiority of our troops and our generals.
Once hold the valley of the Upper Tennessee, and the operations in that

state and in Kentucky will soon cease.

H. W. HALLECK.

\_Ex1ract from General Buelts Reply.']

If the enemy puts himself on the defensive in East Tennessee, it will
require an available force of eighty thousand men to take and hold it.
If our army can subsist on the country, so much the better; but it will
not do to rely solely on that source. If we can obtain even one-half our
breadstuffs, that, for the present, is as much as we can do. Everything
else must be hauled. Nashville is essential as a depot, afterward Mc-
Minnville. Gainesboro may be an important point for us as soon as the
navigation of the Cumberland opens, which may not be for two months.
We can procure all of our forage and breadstuffs and some meat from
Middle Tennessee, but Nashville and the vicinity must be rid of the
enemy, in any considerable force — we can not otherwise collect supplies.
The enemy has repaired, and is now using the Chattanooga railroad to
Murfreesboro, and is threatening Nashville somewhat seriously, as ap-
pears from a dispatch received to-day from General Negley, which I send
you. This danger has no reference to Bragg's movements. If the enemy
should not be thei'e in full force, it would not be necessary to go there in
full force, we could cross the Cumberland at various points above, and go
in by Jamestown, Montgomery, Clinton, or Kingston, and there is no
shorter way ; that by Cumberland Gap being out of the question.

The railroad to Nashville must be opened and rendered secure, because,
until navigation opens, that is the only channel of supplies.

206 CAMPAIGX OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY.

Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C,

October 24, 1862.
Major-General D. C. Buell, Commanding, etc.

General : — The President directs, that on the presentation of this
order, you will turn over your command to Major-General W. S. Rose-
crans, and repair to Indianapolis, Indiana, reporting from that place to
the adjutant-general of the army, for further orders.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

Qeneral-in- Chief.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND AT NASH-
VILLE, TENNESSEE, AND SUBORDINATE CONTINGENT OPERATIONS.

While General Buell's army was concentrating at Bowling
Green and Glasgow, he was relieved of command by Major-
General W. S. Rosecrans. This change occnrred October
30th, in compliance with general orders No. 168, war de-
partment, dated October 24, 1862. This order gave General
Kosecrans the command of the " Department of the Cumber-
land," which embraced that portion of Tennessee lying east of
the Tennessee river, with a prospective enlargement from such
portions of Alabama and Georgia as his army might gain. By
the same order the troops of the. department were designated
as the " Fourteenth Army Corps." This designation soon
gave place to the more appropriate and popular one, " Army
of the Cumberland," — the name which the original portions
bore under Generals Anderson and Sherman.

In a day or two after General Rosecrans assumed command,
the concentration ordered by his predecessor was effected. The
commands of Generals McCook and Gilbert, each consisting
of three divisions, were at Bowling Green. The three divis-
ions under General Crittenden, with the exception of Hazcn's
brigade, which had not returned from the pursuit of the enemy,
reached Glasgow on the 3d of November. The cavalry had
also arrived at Bowling Green.

The question of an objective, unsettled by previous discus-
sions, was inherited by General Rosecrans. For a time, he was
urged* to advance directly into East Tennessee; but the clan-

*See his testimony before the "Committee of Congress on the Conduct

of the War."

(207)

208 CONCENTRATIOX AT XASHVILLE, ETC.

ger to IS'asliville, whicli, having been held against Breckin-
ridge's command by ISTegley's and Pahner's divisions, was now
the objective of a new combination, and tlie imijortance of
this city as a secondary base of supplies, induced him to make
preparations to concentrate his forces there. The veteran por-
tion of his army needed rest and re-equipment, and the new
regiments needed discipline ; but the activity of the enemy
gave no time for the recuperation of the one portion or the
training of the other. The purposes of General Bragg were
not at once revealed, but the conjectured advance of his army
toward Nashville was almost immediately indicated with cer-
tainty by the appearance of his forces at Murfreesboro. As,
therefore, IlTashville was in danger from the advance of the
army withdrawn from Kentucky, conjoined with Breckin-
ridge's force, there was reason to fear that General JSTcgley
would be compelled to surrender, unless speedily reinforced.
To prevent this. General Eosecrans ordered an advance to
that city on the 4th of N'ovember. General McCook then
moved from Bowling Green through Franklin, Mitchellsville,
and Tyree Springs, and having posted Carlin's brigade at
Edgefield Junction, to keep the communications open and pro-
tect supply trains, reached Kashville with the remainder of his
command on the morning of the 9th, thus accomplishing a
march of seventy-two miles in about three days. General
Crittenden, leaving Smith's division temporarily at Glasgow,
proceeded, with "Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions, through
Seottsville to Gallatin, Here he was joined by Colonel Ken-
nett, in command of the cavalry, who had advanced from
Bowling Green through Franklin, Mitchellsville, and Foun-
, tain Head. Colonel Zahm's brigade leading, the cavalry
entered Gallatin simultaneously with Ilarker's brigade of
Wood's division. These two brigades, acting in conjunction,
drove out of the town the rear-guard of Morgan's cavalry, cap-
turing twenty men with their horses. Morgan had just re-
turned from the vicinity of E'ashville, having unsuccessfully
assaulted Colonel Smith at Edgefield on the 5th, losing five
killed and nineteen w^ounded.

Early in the morning of the 5th, Forrest had also provoked
an engagement on the other side of Nashville, having attacked

COXCEXTRATIOX AT XASHVILLE, ETC. 209

General l^egley's pickets, who were witlidrawn under tlie guns
of Fort aSTegley. Immediately after their withdrawal, Gen-
eral ISTegley advanced against Forrest and drove him seven
miles, and returning, foiled an attempt of the enemy to cut liim
off.

The advance of McCook and Crittenden relieved iSTashvillc
from siege, to the great disappointment of the enemy, who
had several times, during September and October, arrogantly
demanded its surrender.

General Breckinridge did not have a sufficient force to
reduce the city, and General Thomas had left a second division
to defend it. With two divisions as a garrison, it was no easy
matter to hold the place and gather supplies from the country ;
but this was successfully accomplished. Supplies could not
be sent from the ISTorth after the army entered Kentucky in
pursuit of General Bragg, as his cavalry held the road in Gen-
eral Buell's rear ; but the garrison was maintained through a
general system of foraging,* with large trains and strong
detachments. Had General Breckinridge had a sufficient force
to invest the town, he might have accomplished its reduction
by starving the garrison. As it was, he could not get near,
as the fortifications commenced by General ISTelson, during
the summer, and enlarged by General ISTcgley, enabled the
troops to keep him at a distance ; and he had to content him-
self with feints, demands for surrender, and watching for op-
portunities to cut off' foraging parties. General Bragg could
not really spare Breckinridge's command from his main col-
umn, and had he not hoped that his Mississippi forces would
be able to join him, bringing Breckinridge's troops with them,
he would not perhaps have detached them to demonstrate
against a place which would inevitably fall into his hands if^
he should succeed in defeating General Buell and establishing
himself in Kentucky. When he began to despair of his
ability to meet General Buell, he had changed the tone of his
orders to his Mississippi generals, and presented the absolute
necessity of their support, and urged them to free West Ten-

*The garrison was partly supplied by farmers living in the vicinity,
who willingly fed their enemies at good prices and prompt payment.

14

210 COXCENTBATIOX AT NASHVILLE, ETC.

nessee and hasten to him, putting their hands upon IN'ashville
as they came. This was impracticable, without them, as Gen-
eral Breckinridge had no reinforcements, and the active gar-
rison was ever ready for defense and almost ubiquitous in its
foraging 0[)perations.

General ISTegley did not confine himself altogether to the
defensive, but made at least one offensive dash, with very
favorable results. Learning, early in October, that the enemy
was concentrating at La Vergne, fifteen miles south, he sent
out General Palmer, with eight hundred men — infantry and
cavalry in equal strength, and four guns — on the direct road,
and Colonel Miller, with eighteen hundred infantry, by a cir-
cuitous route, to the south of La Vergne. General Palmer
skirmished with the enemy as he advanced, and having pro-
voked him to make a stand, after a fight of thirty minutes
he was routed, with a loss of eighty killed and wounded, one
hundred and seventy-five captured, with three guns and the
colors of a regiment.

The system of pickets adopted by Lieutenant-Colonel Yon
Schradcr was so complete, that during a nominal siege of two
months, there wero no surprises.

"With IsTashville gained, General Rosecraus turned his atten-
tion to the equipment and discipline of his army, and the es-
tablishment of railroad communications with Louisville, and
demanded the earnest co-operation of his officers of every
grade, in the accomplishment of these objects.

On the 7th of ISTovember, General Rosecrans announced, in
general order No. 8, the reorganization of his army, assigning
Major-General Thomas to the command of the " Center," com-
prising the divisions of Rousseau, Negley, Dumont, Fry, and
Palmer; Major-General McCookto the command of the " Right
"Wing," and Major-General Crittenden to that of the " Left
Wing." Soon after he gave the divisions of Sheridan, Sill,
and Woodruff''' to General McCook, and those of Wood,
Smith, and Van Cleve to General Crittenden.

The Louisville and Nashville railroad having been opened

* Generals 11. W. Johnson and J. C. Davis subsequently commanded in
room of General Sill and Colonel Woodruff, and General J. M. Palmer in
room of General Smith.

CONCENTRATION AT NASHVILLE, ETC. 211

to Mitcliellsville, a point a few miles north of the south tun-
nel, which Morgan had greatly injured, a temporary depot of
supplies was there estahlished. The enemy had so damaged
the road at the tunnel and between it and Nashville, that it
required a period of several weeks to put it in running order.
Until its completion, supplies for all the troops south of Mitch-
ellsville were transported in wagons.

The completion and protection of the railroad, and the
transportation of supplies, were intrusted to General Thomas,
whose headquarters were established at Gallatin. Pursuant
to orders. General Thomas relieved General Smith's division,
at Glasgow, with Colonel Scott's brigade of General Dumont's
division ; sent Dumont with his other two brigades to Scotts-
ville ; occupied Gallatin with General Fry's division, for the
protection of the railroad, and employed General Rousseau's
division to forward supplies and assist in the maintenance of
communications with iTashville. The divisions of Generals
ISTegley and Palmer remained at Nashville.

While the command of General Thomas was thus located
and employed, General Crittenden crossed the Cumberland
river and disposed his troops at Silver Springs, and was there
joined by General Smith, who had moved his division from
Glasgow by way of Gallatin.

On the 9th, General Rosecrans established his headquarters
at Nashville, an event which indicated the concentration of
his army, and preparations for an advance. The enemy was
active near his army, in efforts to intercept supply trains, an-
noy and capture outposts, and overwhelm feeljle detachments,
but as yet it was not known where General Bragg would con-
centrate his forces. Being superior in cavalry, his sporadic
operations were often successful, and he succeeded, too, until
late in the month, in veiling his grander objects. But igno-
rance of the ulterior designs of his antagonist did not prevent
General Rosecrans from accomplishing his own, and gradually
his forces were moved toward Nashville, even before railroad
communications were established between that city and Louis-
ville. General Crittenden moved on the IStli from Silver
Springs, and leisurely concentrated his force at Nashville.
General Dumont, with two brigades, advanced to Gallatin.

212 COXCEXTRATIOX AT XASHVILLE, ETC.

Scott's brigade moved first from Glasgow to Tompkinsvillo,
and subsequently to Hartsville. Harlan's brigade was posted
at Castalian Springs, and Colonel Hall was ordered forward
from Munfordsville to Glasgow. General Paine reported to
General Thomas, to take command of the troops guarding the
railroad, and established his headquarters at Gallatin.

During the month of ]Srovember the enemy had no marked
success, even in his chosen mode of warfare. In most cases
he was foiled in attempting to capture supply trains and out-
posts, and in several aggressive enterprises the national troops
gained decided advantages. Several of these minor actions
deserve mention.

November 12th, Colonel S. D. Bruce, with seventeen com-
panies of infantry and about nine hundred cavalry, was or-
dered from Bowling Green to Russellville to clear that section
of guerrillas. He marched from Ilussellville on the 29th, and
routed about eight hundred of the enemy's irregular troops,
and drove them beyond Clarksville, toward Charlotte.

About the 16th, Colonel Carlin sent a detachment, undei
Colonel McKee, from Edgefield, across the Cumberland river,
into Cheatham county, to give attention to guerrillas. Colonel
McKee captured forty-six men and thirty horses and mules,
and returned to Edgefield on the 20th.

Two days later, General Morgan attacked Lieutenant-
Colonel Lister, commanding the Thirty-first Ohio, at Cage's
ford of the Cumberland river, and was handsomely repulsed.
Colonel Lister had been posted there several days before by
direction of General Thomas. Just before the attack, Morgan,
in person, as it was afterward ascertained, and several of his
stafii", all in disguise, approached under a flag of truce. As
they revealed no purpose which justified the use of this flag,
Colonel Lister inferred that their real object was a reconnois-
sance with a view to capture his command. As the river was
between him and support, he crossed over soon after JSIorgan
left, and from the safer side awaited his coming. Morgan
soon appeared again, and anticipating an easy capture, rushed
upon Lister's vacant. position, and was severely punished by
the volleys of his intended captives from the opposite bank
of the stream.

CONCENTKATIOX AT NASHVILLE, ETC. 213

Colonel Kennett, acting chief of cavalry, left Ilartsville on
the 17tli, and joined General Crittenden at Silver Springs.
He snbsequently took position in liis front sontli of ISTasli-
ville. On the 27th, he routed a large body of the enemy on
the Franklin turnpike, and drove them fifteen miles.

The same day. General Kirk, with a portioii of his brigade,
drove Wlieeler from La Vergne, capturing a small number of
prisoners. From them, definite information concerning Gen-
eral Bragg's position, strength, and purposes was obtained.
From this time General Eosecrans' plans had reference to a
probable battle near Murfreesboro.

In the evening of the 27th, Colonel Roberts, of the Forty-
second Illinois, captured a captain and squad of Morgan's
men, with their equipments aiul horses; and about the same
time. Major Hill, with a squadron of the Second Indiana Cav-
alry, recaptured a forage train, releasing the prisoners taken
with it, and killing twenty of the force that had made the
capture, by suddenly crossing the Cumberland river near
Hartsville.

A few days later, Hartsville was made memorable by a
eerious disaster to the national arms. December 2d, Colonel
Scott, of the I^incteenth Illinois, had been relieved of the
command of the Thirty-ninth brigade by Colonel A. B. Moore,
of the One Hundred and Fourth Illinois. This brigade had
been stationed at Hartsville, by General Thomas, to guard a
ford and observe the enemy on the Lebanon road. The posi-
tion was elevated, and regarded as susceptible of easy defense.
The brigade comprised the Ojie Hundred and Sixth and One
Hundred and Eighth Ohio Infantry, the One Hundred and
Fourth Illinois, aljout two hundred and fifty men of the Sec-
ond Indiana Cavalry, and one company of Iventuck}^ cavalry,
in all, about eighteen hundred men. The efl'ective force, how-
ever, was twelve hundred, as two hundred had been sent to
Gallatin, and four hundred were unfit for duty.

On the 6th, General Morgan, with a strong force of ca\alry,
infantry, and artillery, left Prairie Mills, eight miles south of
Lebanon and twenty-five from Hartsville, and encamped the
following night within five miles of the latter place. ISIor-
gan's strength has been variously estimated, Colonel Moore

214 CONCENTRATION AT NASHVILLE, ETC.

placed it at four tliousand cavalry and two regiments of in-
fantry. In "Morgan and his Captors," his strength is esti-
mated at fifteen hundred men. General Bragg, in his con-
gratulatory order after the engagement, states that he had
twelve hundred men in action.

Morgan planned a complete surprise. He crossed the Cum-
berland and encamped so quietly the night of the 6th, and
approached and formed his lines so adroitly the next morning,,
that he was almost in Moore's camps before it was known
that he was near. The reports of his advance are so con-
flicting that it can not be ascertained with certainty how Mor-
gan's proximity became known. Colonel Moore's videttes
and pickets, from his fault in posting them, or their own in
the performance of their duty, did not give warning of his
approach. Still the surprise was not absolute. The "pickets"
or " camp guard," or some frightened " negro," certainly made
known tliat he was coming, but not in time for the formation
of suitable plans to resist him. At the time he was discovered^
he was marching toward a ravine at the Ijase of the hill upon
which Moore's command was posted. A frail skirmish line
opposed his advance, and gave time for the hasty formation
of a line of battle on the top of the hill, jNIorgan formed a
compact line with his intautry and a portion of his cavalry
dismounted, and moved steadily to the ravine, there securing
a somewhat sheltered position, from which his fire was so
eftective that Colonel Moore deemed his position untenable,^
and approved of a movement to the rear. In etfecting this,
the command was thrown into confusion. Colonel Tafel, of
the One Hundred and Sixth (3hio, assumed a position of his ov/n
selection, without orders. The One Hundred and Fourth Illi-
nois, a portion of the One Hundred and Eighth Ohio, and the
cavalry, resisted the enemy for a short time, and then Colonel
Moore surrendered. Colonel Tafel and the commanders of iso-
lated companies surrendered subsequently. The contest lasted
an hour and a half. Colonel Moore lost fifty killed and one hun-
dred wounded — the remaining fourteen hundred and fifty, two
pieces of artillery, and arms, camp equipage and trains, cor-
responding to the strength of his command. General Bragg
himself reported Morgan's loss at one hundred and twenty-

COXCENTEATIOX AT NASHVILLE, ETC. 215

five killed and wounded. A careful comparison of the con-
flicting reports of this action warrants the following conclu-
sions : That Colonel jSIoore's outlook was at fault ; that nothing
had been done to strengthen his position ; that there was con-
fusion and absence of plan in the effort to resist the enemy,,
and that a portion of the troops failed to exhibit that subor-
dination and bravery which characterized theni in subsequent
battles.

Another engagement occurred on the 9th, with different con-
duct on the part of officers and men, and consequently with
different issue. On that day, Colonel Stanley Matthews, of
the Fifty-seventh Ohio, with his brigade, composed of his own
regiment, the Thirty-lifth Indiana, the Eighth and Twenty-
ffrst Kentuck}", and a section of Swallow's battery, moved out
upon the Murfreesboro road, with a large train, in quest of
forage. Leaving the road, he passed to Stone river, and filled
his wagons in a bend of the river, and just as the full train was
ready to move toward Nashville, the sharp report of musketry
was heard in his rear. This was the first intimation to Colonel
Matthews that General Wheeler, with a force of cavalry^
mounted infantry, and artillery, was between him and JsTash-
ville, and advancing to cut him ofiE". The warning volley came
from a few"" men of the Twenty -first Kentucky, who were
guarding the wagons. lie at once threw forward the Fifty-
seventh Ohio and Thirty-fifth Indiana, and after a severe
encounter with the foe, drove him so far as to admit the
movement of his train toward jSTashville, with his command
so formed as to protect it ; the Ohio and Indiana regiments
were in front, aud the Kentuckians on the flanks and in the
rear. lie ordered a brisk homeward movement, and as it
progressed, Wheeler twice attacked the Kentuckians, but re-
coiled from their fire. lie then advanced more cautiously
upon the flanks of the command — a movement that involved
the whole command in action, but resulted in the failure of
the fourth attack. Wheeler then withdrew. Colonel Mat-
thews lost five men killed, over thirty wounded, and six mis-
sing. Wheeler's loss was probably greater.

On the 11th, Brigadier-General D. S. Stanley, recently
transferred from the Army of the Tennessee, and assigned

216 COJs^CENTRATIOX AT NASHVILLE, ETC.

as chief of cavalry in the Army of the Cmnberlancl, moved
upon the Franklin road with a strong force, encamping at
night within four miles of Franklin. The next morning he
engaged the enemy vigorously, and drove him from the place,
killing five men, including a lieutenant, capturing twelve, and
a large number of horses and valuable property, and losing
but one man. He also destroyc^l mills and other property
valuable to the enemy, and returned to his camp on the 13th.
His men had in this operation their first experience with
revolving rifles.

Late in December, General Morgan moved into Kentucky
with a strong force, to destroy General Rosecraus' communi-
cations. On the 25th, Colonel Ilobson, conunanding at Mun-
fordsville, attacked him six miles' from that place and inflicted
a loss of over fifty men, • Moving north, Morgan captured the
stockade at Bacon creek. At ]SIuldraugh's Hill, he attacked
and captured the Seventy -first Indiana. The fight here lasted
ten hours, though the parties to it were unequal. At Eliza-
bethtown, he captured the Ninety-first Illinois, surrounding
the town and firing upon it, without giving warning or an op-
portunity to escape. He destroyed a large amount of property,
in part belonging to his friends, and appropriated bountifully
for his command. On the 26th, General J. J. Reynolds, com-
manding in room of General Dumont, moved in pursuit from
Gallatin, by Scottsville and Glasgow, while Colonel Harlan
proceeded Avith his brigade by rail. The latter overtook Mor-
gan at the Rolling fork of Salt river, and defeating him, drove
him toward Bardstown. Colonel Iloskins fell upon him as ho
was passing near Lebanon, capturing from his force one hun-
dred and fifty men.

Morgan wrought great damage and sufiered heavy losses.
The most serious injury to the railroad was the destruction of
the bridges at Bacon creek and JSTolin, and the trestles at Eliza-
bethtown and Muldraugh's Hill.

Meanwhile a counter raid was in progress. On the 21st,
General Carter, with the iSTinth Pennsylvania, Second Michi-
gan, and part of the Eighth Ohio Cavalry, moved from Leb-
anon, Kentucky, toward East Tennessee, to injure the Ten-
nessee and Virginia railroad. He advanced through Nicholas-

CONCENTRATION AT NASHVILLE, ETC. 217

ville, Big Hill, and Pine Mountain; crossed the Cumberland
Mountain, forty miles northeast of Cumberland Gap, and
moved thence through Southwestern Virginia and Jonesboro,
Tennessee, to Carter's Station. He destroyed the bridges over
the Watauga and Holston rivers and the railroad for several
miles, on the 28th, and then returned to Kentucky, mainly on
the route of his advance. Wliile these subordinate operations
were in progress, preparations for an offensive campaign were
completed. The Louisville and JSTashville railroad having been
opened, and sutficient supplies having been accumulated to
warrant an advance against General Bragg, at Murfreesboro,
General Thomas moved to JSTashville on the 22d of December,
and concentrated there Rousseau's and ISTegley's divisions, and
"Walker's brigade of Fry's division, leaving the remaining two
brigades of the latter and Reynolds' division on the line of
the Louisville and Nashville railroad. General liosecraus had
previously placed the post of JSTashville under Brigadier-Gen-
eral R. B. Mitchell, with Morgan's and McCook's brigades as
garrison.

During the tirst two months of his command. General Rose-
crans had been untiring in his efforts to assimilate with his
army the fresh troops that had been attached, and had obtained
from Washington power to make summary disposition of all
officers who failed in duty from incompetency or other causes.
And to simplify the designation of divisions and brigades, he
changed the consecutive numbering throughout his army, and
numbered the divisions as First, Second, and Third, in each
grand unit, and the brigades in the same way in each division.
He required that brigades in divisions, and divisions in the
larger organizations, should be numbered from right to left,
but that in reports they should be designated by the names of
their respective commanders.

The department commander also instituted new measures in
dealing with the non-military enemies within his lines — meas-
ures which impressed this troublesome class of persons with
the power of the national government, and restricted them in
aiding the enemy in arms with information or supplies.

It is probable that General Bragg did not anticipate an ad-
vance against his position at Murfreesboro, as he sent, at the

218 CONCENTRATION AT NASHVILLE, ETC.

same time, General Morgan into Kentucky, and General
Wheeler into West Tennessee, thus depriving himself of the
greater portions of his cavalry. Their absence and the fact in-
dicated by their absence, induced General Rosecrans to make
an early movement. On the evening of the 25th of December,
he gave orders for his army to march the next morning.

CHAPTER XVII.

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

"When General Rosecrans ordered the advance of his army,
the dispositions of his antagonist were well known. Generals
Polk's and Kirby Smith's corps were at Murfreesboro, with
an advance at Stewart's creek and La Vergne ; and General
Hardee's corps was on the turnpike road between Triune and
Eagleville, Avith detachments thrown forward to Knob's Gap
and ISToleusville. As it was the prerogative of the enemy on
the defensive to choose his battle-field, General Rosccrans
gave positive and contingent orders to the commanders of
his " Right Wing," " Cenuer," and " Left Wing." lie directed
General McCook to move with his three divisions — Johnson's,
Davis', and Sheridan's — by the ISTolensville turnpike to Triune ;
General Thomas, with Rousseau's and l^cgley's divisions, and
Walker's brigade, to march on the Frauklin and Wilson turn-
pikes to threaten Hardee's left, and then to cross by county
roads to i^olensville ; and General Crittenden to advance on
the direct road to Murfreesboro. At jSTolensville, General
Thomas would be in position to support either wing, and Gen-
eral McCook was ordered to attack Hardee at Triune, as soon
as the commander of the " Center " should reach I^olensville.
Should General Bragg reinforce Hardee against McCook, then
Thomas was to move to his support. If Hardee should re-
treat, and the enemy meet Crittenden in force, then Thomas
was to reinforce the " Left Wing," and move upon the enemy's
left flank, and McCook, after detaching a division to pursue
Hardee or observe him, should then move to the rear of
Thomas and Crittenden.

The movements ordered were begun on the morning of the

(219)

220 STOXE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

26tli of December, 1862. The advance of the right wing was
given to General Davis, who moved from camp at 6 a. m. to-
ward ISTolensville, on the Edmonson turnpike, to Prim's
"blacksmith-shop, where he diverged on a common road lead-
ing through a broken country, rendered unfriendly to the
comfort and celerity of his command by the rain which fell in
torrents during the forenoon. General Davis' cavalry escort,
Captain Sheerer's company of the Thirty-sixth Illinois, de-
veloped the enemy's pickets a few miles from camp — a fact
which showed plainly that though General Bragg may not
have anticipated the advance of the Army of the Cumberland,
he had made provision to gain early knowledge of all move-
ments in his front. Only slight resistance, however, was
offered until the head of the column reached the vicinity of
I^olensville, where it became necessary to form the division to
dislodge the enemy. Post's brigade was deployed in line of
battle, and Pinney's battery so posted as to command the
town and the approaches from the southwest. At this junc-
ture, the enemy's cavalry was observed to be assuming posi-
tion, and a Ijattery opened fire, which Pinney's response soon
silenced. Woodruffs brigade then formed on the right to pre-
vent a flank attack, and Carlin advanced and dislodged the
enemy.

General Davis here learned that he would be more strongly
opposed at Knob's Gap, and he at once disposed his weary
troops to carry that point also. The enemy's lines were soon
discerned, extending upon a range of high rocky hills through
which the Nolensville and Triune turnpike passes in a depres-
sion known as " Knob's Gap." The position was fiivorable
for defense and well guarded by artillery, which opened upon
Davis at long range, who put Ilotchkiss' and Pinney's batteries
in action as speedily as possible. Carlin's brigade then charged
the enemy's battery, captured two guns, and carried the heights
on the right. Post's brigade carried the hills on the left, and
Woodruff's drove the enemy's pickets on the extreme right.
Nisrht came with the termination of the conflict, Johnson's
and Sheridan's divisions, having followed in supporting dis-
tance all day, came up, and the whole command bivouacked
for the night.

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 221

The " Left "Wing " advanced on the Mnrfreesboro road, Pal-
mer's division leading, and encountered the enemy a short dis-
tance beyond the former outposts. Spirited skirmishing was
maintained all day, the obstinacy of the enemy increasing as
the head of the column steadil}* advanced. At night, this
v/ing bivouacked four miles north of La Vergne.

General Thomas' command advanced, with ISTegley's division
in front. At Owen's store, ITegley moved hurriedly to the
left to support General Davis at Nolensville. At night, the
troops were scattered from Brentwood to ISTolensville.

The cavalry moved in three columns. Colonel Minty's bri-
gade, under Colonel Kennett, the division commander, accom-
panied the left wing. Colonel Zahm's brigade proceeded on
the Franklin road, as a protection to General McCook's right
flank, and General Stanle}', with the reserve brigade, also ac-
companied the right wing.

A dense fog, on the morning of the 27th, prevented the
right wing from advancing to Triune as early as had been ex-
pected. A forward movement was attempted early in the
morning, but the enemy having been encountered in apparent
strength by General Johnson, General McCook deemed it
hazardous to press an engagement on unknown ground, in
fog so thick as to forbid the distinction of friend from foe, at
the ordinary interval between opposing lines of battle. Heavy
skirmishing and artillery action were maintained during the
forenoon. At 1 p. m. the fog lifted, and Johnson, with Sher-
idan in immediate support, advanced to the town, where Har-
dee's corps had been in line of battle during the preceding
night and morning. Later he had burned the bridge over
"Wilson's creek, and leaving some cavalry and a battery to
contest the crossing, retired his main force. Upon Johnson's
approach, his rear-guard fled, after the feeblest resistance to a
line of skirmishers. Johnson then moved south a mile, and
stopped for the night ; the other two divisions were close in
his rear.

As it was proposed that the wings of the army should ad-
vance without otfering either to the enemy, in the absence of
the support of the other and the center, General McCook's
delay prevented the early movement of General Crittenden.

222 STOXE RIVER CAMPAIGX.

At 11 A. M., however, lie moved forward — Wood's division in
the advance, Pahner and Van Cleve following. General Has-
call's brigade of the leading division drove the enemy from La
Vergne, and the adjacent hills, and, supported by the other
brigades of the division, forced the enemy over Stuart's creek,
live miles beyond. Colonel McKee, of the Third Kentucky In-
fantry, saved the bridge, which had been fired by the retreating
foe. Hascall also repulsed an attack of cavalry on his left
flank, capturing twenty-five prisoners. From La Yergne,
Colonel Hazen's brigade of Palmer's division moved on the
Jefferson turnpike, and seized the bridge over Stuart's creek,
and drove the enemy beyond. Van Cleve's division, after
countermarching on the main road, followed, and encamped
north of the creek. Wood's and Palmer's divisions passed
the night at Stewartsboro, on the direct road.

Dui'ing the day. General Thomas advanced Xegley's division
from lN"olensville to Crittenden's right at Stewartsboro, and
moved Rousseau's division to ^STolensville, leaving Walker's
brigade at Brentwood. The marching on the turnpikes was
greatly retarded by the rain which fell on the 2Gth and 27th,
but on the common cross-roads it was exceedingly laborious.
Therefore the troops and trains of this command changed po-
sitions slowly.

The 28th being the Sabbath, there was no general advance.
General McCook sent forward General Willich's brigade on a
reconnoissance, to ascertain the direction of General Hardee's
retreat. General Willich advanced seven miles on the Shelby-
ville road, and learned that he had retired to Murfreesboro.
General Crittenden only de[>loyed a few troops to guard
against the onsets of cavalry, which were threatened during
the day. General Thomas advanced Rousseau's division to
Stewartsboro, and Walker's brigade to the JSTolensville turn-
pike. General Stanley made a reconnoissance to College Hill,
and confirmed the retreat of General Hardee to Murfreesboro.

General Stanley moved in advance of the right wing, on the
29th. The Anderson cavalry, the Fifteenth Pennsylvania,
pushed the enemy, at full charge, for six miles. A heavy loss
was suffered, however, late in the evening, in an unfortunate
attack upon two regiments of infantry lying in concealment.

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 223

Major Rosengarten and six men were killed, and Major Ward
and five men wounded. Colonel Zahm's brigade advanced on
the Franklin road, and joined the reserve brigade at tlie cross-
ing of Stewart's creek. The enemy's cavalry were met during
the day in strong force, at Wilkinson's Cross-roads, and were
driven across Overall's creek to the immediate front of Gen-
eral Bragg's line of battle before JSIurfreesboro. General
Davis followed the cavalry, and bivouacked at Overall's creek ;
Johnson and Sheridan at Wilkinson's Cross-roads.

General Crittenden advanced with Wood's division on the
left of the Murfreesboro road, and Palmer's on the right of it.
Wagner's brigade of the former, and Grose's of the latter,
were deployed in front, and drove the enemy's skirmishers
before them upon their main line of battle. Late in the after-
noon, these divisions halted about two and a half miles from
Murfreesboro, their commanders having observed indications
of an army in position in their immediate front. They at
once deployed their troops in line of battle, and informed
General Crittenden of their action and the probable situation.
Up to this time the opinion had obtained in the national army
that General Bragg would not accept battle at Murfreesboro.
Acting upon this supposition, General Rosecrans ordered
General Crittenden to occupy the town that night with one
of his divisions, and encamp the other two miles outside.
This order reached General Crittenden at dark, just as he
reached the front. He at once made dispositions for its
prompt execution, designating Wood's division for the ad-
vance. General Wood, believing that as this movement was
to be made at night over unknown ground and against an
army in position, it would result in total failure and heavy
loss, earnestly protested against it. At first, General Critten-
den refused to suspend his order to General Wood, and re-
quired his immediate adv^ance, as he considered the order of
his superior too positive to admit discretion. Subsequently,
however, General Palmer having supported General Wood in
a second protest, he suspended his order for an hour, and dis-
patched to General Rosecrans for instructions in the premises.
Before the hour had passed, General Rosecrans came up and
countermanded bis own order, and recalled the troops to their

224 STONE RIVER CAMrAIGX.

former position. Even this movement was critical, as Colonel
Ilarker's brigade had crossed Stone river, and had driven
Breckinridge's advance upon his main line, and Hascall's bri-
gade and Bradley's battery were in the river, advancing in
rear. However, Colonel Harker's adroitness and the veil of
darkness secured their withdrawal with only slight loss.

In the meantime General Van Cleve's division, which had
moved from the Jefierson turnpike to the Murfrecsboro road,
came up and was posted in rear of General Wood's position.
Colonel Hazcn also came up from Stewart's creek, and was
placed in line with his division. General ISTegley, who had
marched from Stewartsboro on the right of Crittenden's com-
mand, went into position on General Palmer's right. Thus
four divisions were in line of battle before the enemy.

General Rousseau remained at Stewartsboro, but detached
Colonel Starkweather's brigade to the Jefferson turnpike
bridofe over Stone river. At ni2:ht Colonel Walker reached
Stewartsboro.

Yory early in the morning of the 30th, General McCook
was ordered to move forward and take position in line of
battle on the right of General Negley. In compliance, Sher-
idan's division, preceded by General Stanley, with a regiment
of cavahy, moved on the Wilkinson turnpike, closel}^ followed
by Johnson and Davis. As General Sheridan approached the
enemy's position he was more and more obstinately opposed,
and when his head of column had reached a point within two
and a quarter miles of Murfreesboro, it became necessary that
he and General Davis should deploy their divisions in line of
battle. The left of Sheridan's division, when in line, rested
on the Wilkinson turnpike. General Davis formed his divis-
ion on Sheridan's right, and General Johnson held his in
reserve. The direction of the line was such as to refuse Sher-
idan's right and Davis' whole front, and yet the latter was
stubbornl}^ resisted — a fact that revealed General Bragg's care
of his left flank at this early stage of the conflict. As the
line wheeled into position, Carlin's l)rigade of Davis' division
had a severe conflict with the enemy, in which the eagerness
of Colonel J. W. S. Alexander, commanding the Twenty-first
Illinois, led him to charge a battery, which, when abandoned

STOIS^E EIVER CAMPAIGN. 225

l)j its cannoneers, was successfully defended by supporting
infantry. This attack served to fix definitely the troops in
opposition at this point. In the attainment of position, Gen-
eral Sheridan lost seventy-five men, and General Davis nearly
two hundred.

The left wing during the day maintained essentially the
position assumed the previous evening. There was a slight
change in Palmer's division, which was advanced a short dis-
tance, against spirited opposition. The pioneer brigade,
under Captain Morton, was posted on Stone river to prepare
fords.

In the center. General Thomas brought up three brigades
of Rousseau's division, and stationed them in rear of ISTegley's
line. Colonel Starkweather was left to guard a bridge on the
Jefierson turnpike, and repulsed an attack by cavalry. Colonel
"Walker moved from Stewart's creek to La Vergne, and routed
a portion of General Wheeler's cavalry, that had captured
General McCook's train. He recaptured about eight hundred
men, and all the train animals, the wagons having been burned
by the enemy.

In the afternoon. General Stanley, with a portion of his cav-
alry, returned to La Vergne. The remaining portions of his
command were posted on the flanks of the army.

It was now evident that the two armies were in close prox-
imity, in readiness for battle. During the day there had been
heavy skirmishing in front of the troops in position, and the
right wing had met strong resistance in advancing to its as-
signed place, abreast the center. At intervals, from flank to
flank, batteries had responded to batteries, and where the
main lines were parallel, or nearly so, they had reciprocally
felt the fire of musketry.

On the general battle front of the national army, "Wood's
division was next Stone river, Hascall's brigade forming the
extreme left, Harker's the center, and "Wagner's connecting
with Palmer's left at the Nashville turnpike. Palmer's di-
vision was formed with Grose's brigade on the left, Cruft's on
the right connecting with Negley, and Hazen's in reserve.
Miller's brigade of Negley's division connected with Cruft,
15

226 STONE EIYER CAMPAIGN.

and Stanley's with Sheridan's left on the "Wilkinson turnpike.
Roberts' brigade of the latter division was on the left, Sill's
on the right, and Schaefer's in reserve. Sill's brigade touched
Woodruff''s brigade on the left of Davis' line. Carliu's formed
liis center, and Post's his right. The formation of these two
divisions of the right wing conformed to the general type, and
had at least average strength. At first Johnson's division
"svas wholly in reserve.

During the afternoon of the 30th, General McCook was
informed by a citizen that the right of Davis' division, rest-
ing near the Franklin turnpike, was opposite the center of
General Bragg's brittle front, which fact he communicated to
General Rosecrans ; and to provide as far as possible against
the palpable danger, he threw Johnson's division in position
on the right of Davis. Kirk's brigade was formed on the right
of Post, but thrown forward so as to hold the front edge of
the woods, which gave strength to the position, and also to
command the open ground between the opposing lines of bat-
tle. Willich's brigade was refused to the right and rear of
Xirk, with a line facing south, and Baldwin's was entirely in
reserve, near division headquarters, a mile or more distant.

General McCook's corps was now formed in a line broken
at several points. General Davis' line formed a right angle
with General Sheridan's, and faced the south very nearly.
The trend of Kirk's line was more toward the east, and then
Willich's stretched westward, facing south; and although
Kirk was thrown forward to secure all the advantages of the
position, the two divisions on the right, as a whole, formed a
refused flank. General Rosecrans' report indicates his belief
that his right did not trend in a proper direction, in facing
" strongly toward the east, and that his own disadvantages of
position and maneuver were fatally enchanced by the ' faulty
position ' " of his right wing. The general trend of this wing,
however, conformed to that of the enemy's line in its front,
the latter leaning forward from the point opposite Sheridan's
right, and the former bending back in correspondence. The
enemy's line, from the river to the Franklin road, had been
located for defense, and rested as far as practicable in woods,
with open ground in front; and as the right wing of the

STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN. 227

national army, according to the plan of battle, was to await
attack, its division commanders observed similar prudence in
establishing their lines.

As General Bragg believed that his army was inferior in
numbers to that of General Roseerans, his first policy was to
await an attack. lie therefore formed his army Avith his left
wing, composed of ^Withers' and Cheatham's divisions, under
General Polk, in front of Stone river, covering the direct roads
leading from Murfreesboro to iTashville and Franklin, and his
right wing embracing Breckinridge's and Cleburne's divisions?
across the river on Polk's right. He posted McCown's divis-
ion, as the main reserve, in rear of his center, and a free bri-
gade, under General Jackson, on his extreme right flank. In
this formation,Withers' division occupied the space from Stone
river to the Franklin turnpike, or the whole front of the na-
tional army. Cheatham's division formed a line of the same
length, directly in the rear. The right wing was similarly
formed, with Breckinridge's division in front and Cleburne's
in rear.

With his forces thus disposed. General Bragg awaited Gen-
eral Rosecrans' approach, until the evening of the 29th, tlien,
apprehending from General McCook's advance on the Yv'ilkin-
son turnpike that he would be flanked on his left, he ti'ans-
ferred McCown's division from reserve across the river, to
General Polk's left, with its right resting on the Franklin
road. In not receiving an attack on the 30th, the Confed-
erate general was disappointed, and in the evening resolved to
assail from his left the next day, and for this purpose moved
Cleburne's division from the rear of Breckinridge to the rear
of McCown, and gave the command of these two divisions to
General Hardee. He had then four divisions in double for-
mation, in front of Stone river, their right resting on the river
bank and their center on the Franklin turnpike, near which
rested the right of McCook's corps. He had no reserve but
Breckinridge's command on the east side of the river, but con-
sidered this force available for support at any point in hi;^ line,
as there were no indications of an attack upon his right.

General Polk was evidently in error in his official report,
respecting the exact positions of the three divisions of the

228 STOXE RIVER CAMPAIGTs^

right wing of the national army, though correct as to the
order of their alignment. He supposed, and so stated, that
the left of Withers' division, resting on the Franklin turnpike,
was opposite the right of Sheridan, whom he located " on a
ridge of rocks, with chasms intervening, and covered with a
dense growth of rough cedars " — the exact description of
Davis' position — while Sheridan only touched the cedars with
his right. As further proof of this misapprehension. General
Polk stated that Alexander's assault in the evening of the 30th,
was an attempt to capture a battery on the left of Withers'
line, and hence opposite Davis, not Sheridan.

The battle front of each army was now continuous, save
the separation of Breckinridge by the river. But such was
the topography of the field, that the trend of the main lines
was curved and broken' in turn. Between the two armies
there was open ground almost continuously. Some portions
of the national line rested in strong defensive positions, as in
the case of Davis' division and Kirk's brigade ; but much of
the line was on open ground. Sheridan's division was on open
ground, except where its right touched Davis. ISTegley's divis-
ion was uncovered, but had woods in rear. Palmer's was
somewhat embowered by an oak grove.

General Rosecrans' plan of battle, as revealed in his official
report and by his orders on the field, was as follows : General
McCook was instructed to take an advantageous position on
the right, and hold the enemy in check, if attacked ; but if over-
powered, to fall back slowly, refusing his right. If not attacked,
he was to engage the enemy sufficiently to hold him in his
front. Generals Thomas and Palmer weretoopen with skirmish-
ing, and gain the enemy's center and left as far as the river.
General Crittenden was to throw Yan Cleve's division across
the river, at the lower ford, to advance against Breckinridge
and to cross Wood's division by brigades at the upper fords,
and support Yan Cleve's right. If successful in driving
back the enemy's right, General Wood was to place his bat-
teries on the heights east of the river, and open on his
center and left in reverse. Then General Palmer should press
the enemy in his front, and General Thomas should sustain
the movement in the center.

STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN. 229

Eacli army commander, on the uiglit of the 30th, was there-
fore equally intent upon executing an essentially identical
plan of battle, with an initiative by each from his left flank.
General Bragg proposed that Hardee should attack at day-
light the left of the national army, and then he would bring
his whole army into action from this initiative by a I'ight
wheel on Polk's right flank, at Stone river, as a pivot. To
mask his movement from his left, General Rosecrans ordered
that fires should be built for two miles beyond McCook's right
flank. This expedient was adopted to make the impression
that the national forces were massing on that flank, to throw
General Bragg ofi" his guard at the opposite extremity of his
line, and thus assure the success of the movement against it,
proposed for Crittenden the next morning. General McCook
had previously felt uneasy in regard to his right flank, believ-
ing that it was greatly overlapped by the enemy, and had
given stringent orders to his subordinate commanders to watch
against surprise ; and any invitation to increase the strength
of General Bragg's left, magnified his fear for his right.

Early in the morning of the last day of the year 1862, the
commanders of the confronting armies, of nearly equal pro-
portions, put upon trial a common plan of battle, Avith the
contingency to each of miscarriage in the event of being too
late in initial ofiense. The advantage of this dominant con-
tingency was gained by General Bragg, and General Rose-
crans was thrown upon the defensive at the opening of the
battle.

Soon after dawn. General Hardee, with two-fifths of Gen-
eral Bragg's infantry, wheeled in long circuit upon the right
of the national army. When he first moved from position,
McCown's division deflected to the left, opening an interval to
the left of Withers' flank, which was quickly filled by Cle-
burne's line; then the two divisions wheeled upon McCook's
right flank. Kirk's brigade flrst felt the shock of battle, as it
was in proximity to the pivot of the column in motion. His
line had been attenuated to secure a good position for a bat-
tery, and one of his regiments was in the rear. The enemy's
onset was furious, expressing alike the importance of the
movement and the initial courage and spirit of the Southern

230 STOXE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

armies. Unfortunately for tlie national army, this flank of
three brigades, when receiving an attack from two divisions of
four brigades each, was not in ordinary condition for battle.
The division commander was not on the line, nor near enough
to give orders, and General Wilhch, commanding the brigade
which had been posted for lateral defense, was absent from his
command. This position of affairs forbade unity of action ;
in fact, these brave troops were thrown into confusion by cir-
cumstances over which the}' had no control. Generals Bragg
and Polk claimed pretentiously, in their official reports,
that these troops were surprised ; and to some of them, no
doubt, the blow was unexpected, at least from the quarter
whence it came. Still the usual provision against surprise
had been made. Skirmish lines were well offered to the
enemy, and when General Kirk perceived the advancing col-
umn, he threw forward the Thirty-fourth Illinois to check it.
This commander, who was mortally wounded, but lived to
make a report, claimed that when he saw the strength of the
column hurrying upon him, he called for help from Willich's
brigade, which at that time was without a recognized com-
mander. This brigade had been on the lookout for the enemy
from an early hour, but had been ordered to breakfast by Gen-
eral Willich at the time of his starting to visit division head-
quarters. It does not appear from the reports that all the
guns near the salient angle of this flank were in battery. In
some cases the horses were detached. These circumstances,
and the manifestly overwhelming strength of the enemj^'s
lines, rendered the conflict exceedingly unequal. The reports
of the commanders who battled upon these unequal condi-
tions are so inharmonious that it is impossible to determine
the order of the recession of these two brigades. It is, how-
ever, demonstrable that neither held position long, and that
lioth in the sharp conflict sufi'ered such losses as prove severe
fighting or the maintenance of position, until withdrawal was
impossible without great waste of life. Kirk lost five hundred
men killed and wounded, and three hundred and fifty l)y cap-
ture. Willich lost a few less in killed and wounded, and
more than double as many men by capture. General Willich
was captured in an effort to join his brigade. Captain Edgar-

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 231

ton was captured with liis battery located near the salient
angle of the line, and three guns were lost from Goodspeed's
battery, posted to the right of TVillich's brigade. So quickly
were these two brigades dislodged, that Colonel Baldwin was
informed of the fact by stragglers from their ranks, and had
barely time, in conjunction with General Johnson, to form his
troops and make a slight advance before the enemy wafe upon
him.

The recession of Kirk's and Willich's brigades exposed
General Davis' right flank to the enveloping lines of the en-
em}^, and he at once ordered Colonel Post to change the front
of his brigade nearly perpendicularly to the rear, and to dis-
pose his regiments and battery to repel a flank attack. Fin-
ney's battery was moved one-fourth of a mile to the right, and
the Fifty-ninth Illinois sent with it for support ; the Seventy-
fourth and Seventy -fifth Illinois were posted in the edge of the
woods behind a fence, and when the enemy revealed his over-
lapping lines far to the right, the Twenty-second Indiana was
deployed bc3'ond the l^attory.

Colonel Baldwin's xjosition was at least one-fourth of a mile
to the right of Post. His brigade was posted behind a fence
on the margin of wooded ground lying in front, and presented
four regiments and a battery in line, with one regiment in re-
serve.

These dispositions had hardly been made, before the enemy
advanced against Baldwin and Post on the flank, and against
Carlin, Woodruff, and Sill on the main battle front. The con-
secpTcnt action Avas the second distinct stage of the battle and
was one of the fiercest of the day. The forces which had driven
Kirk's and Willich's brigades from position, attacked Baldwin
and Post ; while the brigades of Loomis and Manigualt, of
"Withers' division of General Polk's front line, fell upon Car-
lin, Woodruff, and Sill. Baldwin maintained his ground for
a short time, but he was soon flanked on his right and com-
pelled to withdraw; but Post repulsed the enemy, and Carlin,
Woodruff, and Sill hurled back the columns assaulting them.
This repulse was so emphatic tli at General Polk threw forward
the reserve brigades on his left to renew the attack, his first
line having been so broken as to need radical readjustment.

232 STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

In repelling the attack upon Sheridan's right, General* Sill
had the support of a portion of Schaefer's brigade, but with
this additional strength he was barely able to drive back the

foe.

General Sheridan's line compassed four regimental intervals
and was consequently a strong one, or this first attack would
have pressed back his light brigade, at least that portion which
was on open ground. The lines of the two divisions being
perpendicular to each other, the right angle formed by Sill's
and WoodruiFs brigades and prominently ofiered to the enemy,
made that point exceedingly critical, as a direct attack upon
either would enfilade the line of the other, and the withdrawal
of either of the connecting flanks would greatly expose the
other. In the subsequent attacks, therefore, the enemy made
special eflbrts to break these lines at the point of connection.

Having formed Vaughn's and Maney's brigades in room of
Loomis' and Manigualt's, General Polk soon made a second
attempt to carry this position, but the issue was the same as
before — a complete repulse. In conjunction with this assault
in front, Cleburne's division fell again upon Post's line and
was also repulsed. Some previous success of this division had
been regar-ded by General Polk as the dislodgment of Davis'
division, and he now referred the fire of Pinney's battery to
one of Sheridan's, wheeled to the right, but this division was
still before him. Its left flank was now slightly bent back in
consequence of the turning of Sill's brigade on its left. In
the first attack upon General Sill, the enemy had made effort
to capture Bush's battery, which had been posted considerably
in advance of Hiscock's and Houghtaling's, and in the second
assault this object was manifest. General Sill was killed be-
tween the guns of this battery, and soon after his fall, the right
of the brigade having been turned, it was retired to the posi-
tion of the other batteries, and Colonel Grensel, commanding
in room of General Sill, sent the Twenty -first Michigan to sup-
port Hiscock's, now in the front.

As soon as practicable after the repulse of Vaughn's and
Maney's brigades, General Cheatham reorganized his shattered
troops, and with four brigades made a third attack upon Davis
and Sheridan. In the formation of Polk's corps in two lines,

STOXE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 233

by divisions, the four brigades forming the left half of liis corps,
were under the command of General Cheatham, and the other
four on the right were under General "Withers. In this third
attack Post's brigade was enveloped by General Hardee's vic-
torious forces and was compelled to withdraw with the loss of
one gun. His retirement exposed Carlin's right flank and rear,
while resisting the enemy in his front. The flanks of both
Woodruffs and Carlin's brigades were so bent that each com-
mander thought himself isolated and entirely without support
on either flank. The reports are not concurrent as to the or-
der of the withdrawal of Carlin's and "Woodrufl^'s brigades,
and Davis' and Sheridan's divisions, from the original battle
line. The w^eight of testimony supports the hypothesis that
Sheridan's right brigade was shattered and divided, while
"Woodrufi'was unmoved by the assaults upon him, except that
his left was bent back for lateral defense, and that his brigade
was the last of Davis' division to leave position. The condi-
tions of the battle and the circumstances of withdrawal were
such as to give different views to the several commanders, and
their conflicting reports embarrass him wdio attempts to deter-
mine the exact order of events.

The regimental commanders of General Sill's brigade men-
tion that they gave ground repeatedly on the right of the bri-
gade, and assign as a reason that they were unsupported on their
right. The reports from Woodrufl's brigade claim that this
brigade was unsupported on its left. The only fact which can
explain this contradiction, and others occurring under similar
circumstances, without impeaching the veracity of commanders,
is, that under the pressure of attack covering the connecting
points of regiments, brigades, or even larger organizations, the
flanks naturally bend backward and inward toward their re-
xspective centers, and there is partial isolation at least, without
an absolute loss of position.

There is the most positive testimony from the enemy, that
the troops of Davis' division held their position in the cedar
woods with great persistency. General Polk mentioned in his
report that Vaughn lost one-third of his troops and every horse
in the brigade but three, and that other brigades lost heavily.
He claimed the capture of two guns from Sheridan, but these

234 STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

were from Carpenter's battery of Davis' division, and this fact
is decisive of General Polk's mistake in reference to the posi-
tion of General Davis. General Sheridan lost no gnns from
his first position.

Whatever may have been the exact order of the recession
of Davis and Sheridan, it is certain that neither held position
long after the third assault of the enemy. The conditions
of their retreat, however, were dififerent, though the cause of
it was common — the battle line on the left of Sheridan
was intact, while the brigades of Davis' division were exposed
on all sides. Colonel Post, under the pressure of Cleburne's
division, moved directly to the Nashville turnpike, in rear
of the army. Colonel Carlin held his ground until the de-
struction of his brigade was imminent, when his regiments
broke to the rear from his left flank. Hotchkiss' battery
moved across open fields to wooded ground, where General
Davis attempted to form a new line. As Carlin's broken
regiments reached this position, they were disposed to support
this battery. Woodruff retreated through the woods in his
rear, and then turned and charged the pursuing enemy with
such force that he regained his original position, but being en-
tirely unsupported, could not hold it. Through false infor-
mation as to the purpose of General Davis, and danger from
the overlapping lines of the enemy, Carlin abandoned the
new line before Woodrufi" reached it, and both brigades
crossed the Wilkinson turnpike and joined a portion of John-
son's division, which, having made repeated efiforts to with-
stand the enemy, had fallen back to the right of General
Rousseau's division.

Yflien General Sill's brigade yielded its position, General
Sheridan changed the front of Roberts' to the right, to cover
its retreat, and ordered its commander to charge the enemy.
In obedience. Colonel Roberts advanced, but the enemy did
not await his approach. This movement was doubtless coin-
cident with Woodruff's charge, when he regained his position,
and the action of these brigades expressed such positive
offense, that the advance of the enemy was greatly retarded.

Having recalled Colonel Roberts to a new line trending
across his first line of battle, General Sheridan soon found

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGX. 235

that this new position was untenable, and then be fell back to
the Wilkinson tnrnpike, where he re-establif^becl his con-
nection with JSTegley's right, and bending back his Une twice
at right angles, formed a new flank and covered I^egley's rear.
General McCook's corps was driven from position after
hard fighting against three-fifths of the Confederate army,
eager to give complete success to the ruling movement of Gen-
eral Bragg's aggressive plan. General Hardee overlapped
every flank oflbred to him, and yet his losses were so heavy
that early in the day he asked for reinforcements, and did not
press rapidly nor with remarkable power upon any of the
improvised lines, and never so far gained the rear of a single
brigade as to prevent an easy escape, and at last felt his way
with great caution across the Wilkinson turnpike. General
McCook gave personal attention to the maneuvers of Sheri-
dan's division, and had his horse shot under him in proximity
to bis lines. As his other troops reached the right of Gen-
eral Housseau, he made dispositions for their reorganization
and alignment, so as to cover the communications of the army.
The third distinct stage of the battle involved a new dispo-
sition of all troops not on the battle front, and the fiercest
fighting of Rousseau's, Sheridan's, Negley's, and Palmer's di-
visions— such fighting as palpably involved a crisis of the
battle. The Confederate army continued to wheel, even to its
pivot on the bank of Stone river, and the wave of battle was
rapidly transmitted to that point.

ISTegley's and Palmer's divisions had made a slight advance
early in the morning to feel the enemy, and to be in readiness
to rush through his lines to the river, should General Critten-
den's movement against Breckinridge across the stream prove
successful. At 8 a. m., Crittenden's advance — Van Clove's
division — was in motion, and its leading brigades had crossed
tlKT river, while General Wood had Avithdrawn two brigades
from position in preparation to follow. The noise of battle
on the right had been heard all the morning, but as yet there
had been no such indications of disaster to McCook as pre-
cluded the possibility of oftense from the left flank, although
it was probable that the right wing Avas severely engaged.
When positive intelligence that the right had been turned was

236 STOXE RIVER CAMPAIGJf.

received, Beatty's and Price's brigade of Van Cleve's division
were in line before Breckinridge, and Fyffe's brigade was in
the act of fording. Immediately, General Rosecrans recalled
this offensive movement, that he might reinforce his right.
He moved Fyffe's brigade rapidly to the rear on the ISTashville
road to repel the enemy's cavalry that had fallen upon the
trains and captured men and wagons. He sent Beatty's
brigade to the right of Rousseau, and soon ordered to the
same point Harker's, from Wood's division, which had been
withdrawn from position in conjunction with Hascall's,in prep-
aration to follow Van Cleve. Price's brigade, of Van Cleve's
division, was left to hold the ford, and General Wood was
allowed to hold Hascall's brigade as a mobile column. These
dispositions were ordered about the time that the enemy
moved against l!^egley.

When General Thomas perceived that General Sheridan
had changed position, and knew that this change was the
prophecy of unexpected conditions of battle for his command,
he ordered General Rousseau to move two brigades to the
right and rear of Sheridan, whose right flank was then ex-
posed, though bent far back toward Negley's rear. Hardee's
corps was now entirely upon the broken flank, which had
been bereft of two divisions, and was moving with his divis-
ions in eschelon to overlap Sheridan and take Thomas in
reverse. Cheatham was wheeling upon his front with his
four brigades, and Withers, with an equal force, was advancing
against IvTegley and Palmer in front. This combination in-
volved the action of the entire Confederate army, save the
force under Breckinridge across the river. The object of
Thomas in moving Rousseau to Sheridan's right was to sup-
port him should he be able to hold his ground, and cover his
retreat should he be compelled to fall back. For a time, these
dispositions checked the advance and success of the enemy,
but they provoked a conflict which palpably brought on an-
other crisis of the battle.

Three of the five divisions of the national army forming the
battle front had been displaced, and the attack upon ]Sregley
was intended to dislodge another, and was consequently made
with a fury and persistence born of such a purpose. Had

STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN. Z6 i

there been immediate success, tlie center of the national army
would iiave been broken at a time when the new dispositions
of troops to restore the right were incomplete, and in all
probability, total defeat would have ensued.

The first attacks upon Koglcy and Sheridan, involving
ivoasseau also, were repulsed. N"egley had three batteries (Mar-
shall's, Ellsworth's, and Schultz's), which were well posted,
contributing largely to the defensive strength of this division.
The brigades of Anderson and Stewart, under General Withers,
assaulted ITegley ; while General Cheatham, with the left half
of Polk's corps, moved repeatedly upon Sheridan, pressing his
left especially, as its displacement would be fatal to ISTegley.
Roberts' brigade, supported by Houghtaling's battery and a
section from each of the other batteries, Bush's and Hiscock's,
occupied a position south of the Wilkinson road. At the
termination of this attack. General Sheridan having nearly
exhausted his supply of ammunition, and Colonel Eoberts hav-
ing been killed, ordered his division to fall back, leaving
Houghtaling's battery and two guns from Bush's in the hands
of the enemy. This withdrawal opened a gap between
Negley's and Rousseau's divisions, exposing the right flank of
the former and the left flank of the latter. Into this space the
enemy rushed, closely following Sheridan's retiring troops,
and reaching the rear of these divisions. The condition of
Negley and Rousseau was now exceedingly critical, exposed
on flank and rear, and subjected to a cross fire of musketry
and artillery at short range. While it was utterly imjiossible
for them to maintain their positions, it verged closely upon,
an impossibility for them to secure new ones with safety to
themselves and the army. In the emergency, General Thomas
ordered both Negley and Rousseau to withdraw to form a new
line. Each was covered at first by cedars. But the enemy
was in their rear as well as front, and it was impracticable to
give mutual support, as their insulation was too positive and
the necessity of rapid movement too imperative. It was
necessary also to form a temporary line to save the artillery,
before a permanent one could be established. General Thomas,
therefore, first directed that a new line should be taken run-
ning along a depression in the open ground in rear of the

238 STONE RIVER CAMPAIGX.

cedar woods, to be held until the artillery could be retired to
the high ground near the j^ashville turnpike, where the per-
manent line was to be established, Rousseau's division, leav-
ing its position under a heavy fire, drew back to this depres-
sion, having first posted its batteries on the high ground far-
ther to the rear. The exultant enemy soon emerged from the
cedar woods, but then fell under the musketry of Rousseau's
division at short range. Colonel Shepherd's brigade of regu-
lars quivered under the onset of the enemy, now fully hopeful
of an immediate and decisive victory; but this brigade, by
the efficient support and co-operation of Scribner's and Colonel
John Beatty's brigades, Loomis' and Guenther's batteries, and
the pioneer brigade with Stokes' battery, withstood the attack.
This short and decisive conflict saved the center and the army,
but it cost Shepherd's brigade alone twenty-two officers and
five hundred and eighteen men killed and wounded. "When
the enemy was here repulsed and driven back to the woods,
the formation of a new line on higher ground was practicable.
General ITegley was so completely unsupported on his right
when Sheridan had withdrawn, that the safety of his division
was compromised. The massed forces that had assaulted
Sheridan were in his rear, and his division having been well
oflered to the enemy in the original formation, was now
almost completely enveloped. To prevent capture he ordered
his troops to cut their way through the enemy's lines to the
ground designated for the realignment of the center. In
passing Rousseau's division, he was partially relieved from
pressure by the prompt action of Colonel Scribner, who
wheeled the Thirty-eighth Indiana and Tenth Wisconsin so as
to receive and repulse the force that was pressing ISTegley, and
then covered his formation in the rear. In this dash to the
rear through the enemy's enveloping lines. General ]^egley
lost six guns. This hazardous change of position by General
Thomas' command also received support from Colonel Samuel
Reatty's brigade of Van Cleve's division, which, with the di-
vision commander, reached the right of Rousseau at the mo-
ment the latter was forming his temporary line. This brigade
engaged the enemy at the time of his severest attack upon
Rousseau's division, and clung to its right during the day.

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 239

The withdrawal of ISTegley's division from the front line
involved Palmer's division in a conflict, whose conditions were
identical Avith those of the divisions to its right. Ilazen's
brigade, which had exchanged places, from reserve, with
Grose's, as the last brigade on the left of the continnous line
of battle, was now in air, with almost a division interval
between it and Wagner's brigade of Wood's division, which
still held position on the river bank, which having been
designated to form the rear of Crittenden's oiiensive column,
was the only one that maintained original position. This flank
had been hj^pothetically secured, in the plan of aggressive bat-
tle, by the anticipated enfilading fire of Wood's and Van
Cleve's musketry and artillery from the east side of the river,
but in actual defense it was vulnerable to an attack from
Breckinridge, who could have crossed the river at any time,
and the space between Hazen's left and the river gave an in-
vitation to General Polk to wheel his right upon it. Perceiv-
ing this exposure of Palmer's left in defensive battle, General
Wood had left Wagner's brigade on the river bank, and had
held Hascall's, though once in motion to the right, in reserve
opposite the space between Wagner's right and Hazen's left.
The safety of this flank during the first half of the day was
doubtless owing to the fact that General Bragg's plan re-
strained his right until the issue of his continuous attack from
his left should be fully developed.

The attack upon Palmer was made with great fury, espe-
cially upon Cruft's brigade, which was in advance of Hazen.
General Cruft was unable to withstand the enemy, in the open
space to which he had advanced, and was pressed back to the
woods. Here he fought desperately and successfully, until
ISTegley dashed to the rear, in the emergency at the center.
Then Cruft's right was in air, and though he repulsed Chal-
mers in front, he was soon enveloped by that brigade and
Donelson's, and the forces which following Negley reached
his rear. So complete was the insulation of Palmer at this
juncture, that Colonel Grose, in reserve, changed front to the
rear, and forcing back the enemy, made it possible for Cruft
to draw back toward the ncAV position assumed by General
Thomas' corps. The fighting here, as along the whole line,

240 STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

was exceedingly severe. Hazen alone now held position, and
even he was forced to change slightly to conform to the
changes on his right. He moved a short distance to the left,
until his left flank rested on the left of the railroad, and his
■whole brigade was in a strong position in woods, on high
ground. As Cruft moved to the rear, he became hotly en-
gaged, and Grose, who had fought facing the rear, again
changed front, and supported Cruft and Hazen. Cruft's bri-
gade lost heavily in maintaining position in great exposure,
and in gaining connection with the center. The batteries of
the division— Standardt's, "H" and "M" Fourth United
States Artillery, under Lieutenant Parsons, and Cockerell's —
rendered efficient service during this conflict.

Every brigade of General Bragg's foul' divisions on the west
side of the river had been severely engaged, many of them in
repeated assaults, and his losses had been very heavy. He
had yet five brigades of infantry across the river, under Gen-
eral Breckinridge, and with these as his resource for farther
aggression, he made a fourth and final combination, the object
of which was to turn General Rosecrans' left as he had turned
his right, and upon this contingency the success of his plan
manifestly hinged, though he had not yet abandoned all ag-
gression with his left.

General Breckinridge had hitherto been comparatively in-
active, although he had been under orders for action. As early
as 10 o'clock A. M., General Bragg had ordered him to send
one brigade, and soon after a second, to reinforce or act as a
reserve to General Hardee. Instead of prompt obedience,
General Breckinridge informed his chief, first, that the na-
tional troops, in heavy force, were in the act of crossing the
river, and then that they had crossed and were advancing
against him. Simultaneously, General Bragg received intel-
ligence of the advance of another strong force of infantry on
the Lebanon road. To provide against this seeming aggres-
sion, the army commander directed General Breckinridge not
to await an attack, but to advance, and ordered General Pe-
gram, in command of cavalry, to develop the movement on
the Lebanon road. When the report was received that there
were no national troops on that side of the river, it was too

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN^. 241

late to reinforce Hardee from his extreme right, and besides
hy this time his left was too much exhausted to promise much
by further aggression. Tims, the incipient oftenso from Gen-
eral Rosecrans' left flank, though seemingly a total failure,
Avas not without very important results, as thereby Breckin-
ridge was kept on the east side at a time when his help on the
left might have enabled Hardee to reach the center and left
of the national army. And this attempted transfer of troops
from the right to the left of the Confederate army may be ac-
cepted as evidence that General Hardee had met stronger
opposition from Generals McCook and Thomas than had been
anticipated, and that at 10 o'clock the success of the ruling
moA'ement was doubtful.

The repulse of the enemy by General Thomas, and his suc-
cessful establishment of a new line, had greatly changed the
conditions of the conflict on the right. Recoiling from
Thomas, Hardee could not safely overlap the new right flank
of the army, now held by Beatty's brigade of Van Clove's
division. This gave time for the reformation of McCook's
forces and the alignment of Crittenden's reinforcing troops.
Fyfiie's brigade of Van Cleve's division formed on the right of
Beatty's, and then Harker's, of "Wood's division, and beyond
were portions of the three divisions of the right wing.

While General Breckinridge was transferring his first two
brigades across the river, commanded respectively by Generals
Adams and Jackson, there was a lull in the action on the left.
During this quiet the enemy made his second combination to
turn General Rosecrans' left, and counter preparation was
made to hold it. General Wood now threw Hascall's brigade
on the right of Wagner's and placed Cox's battery in Wag-
ner's rear, to respond to the enemy's batteries across the river,
and to repel attacks from that quarter, and posted Estop's
battery in rear of Hascall. The high wooded ground at the
railroad was regarded l)y the enemy as the key-point, and des-
ignated by him as the " Round Forest." Upon this spot he
converged his lines, and made repeated assaults to carry it,
resistance to which not only involved Hazen's brigade, which
rested upon it, but those on Hazen's right and left. Colonel
16

242 STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

Hazen had at that point the Forty -first Ohio, ISTiiith Indiana, and
One Hundred and Tenth Illinois; his remaining regiment, the
Sixth Kentucky, was engaged farther to the right. This was
a small force to hold the key-point, when converging columns
were directed upon it, even though well supported. While,
however, this position was the main objective of the enemy,
the adjacent forces were also heavily pressed. And General
Palmer's first call for help from General Wood was to give
support to troops to the right of Hazen. In response, the
Third Kentucky was sent, and was soon terribly mangled,
losing its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel McKee. General
Polk repeated his assaults with great fury, and even desper-
ation, as success at this point was now plainly the condition
of victory. General Rosecrans, in his frequent rapid passage
along his lines, Avas an observer of this confiict, and gave
directions concerning it, and General Crittenden, with his
division commanders. Generals Wood and Palmer, gave it the
closest attention, throwing together all the available troops
and batteries of the left wing to maintain this vital point.

The new dispositions in the center and on the right had
now fully arrested Hardee's turning movement, and he had
been forced to take the defensive by Rousseau and Van Cleve.
The troops of the latter, pressing forward too eagerly under
the emphatic order of General Rosecrans, had exposed a flank,
and severe loss and a repulse had resulted. In this, Fyife's
brigade had been the greatest sufierer, but saved its battery
(Swallow's), and was soon reformed for action. About the
same time Harker's brigade was hotly engaged, and also some
portions of the right wing on the right of Crittenden's troops.

By this time. General Bragg had abandoned all purpose of
aggression, except from his right flank ; and here the brigades
of Jackson and Adams had been repulsed and shattered, and
now two more, Preston's and Palmer's, were moved across the
river and directed against the " Round Forest."

When the pressure of the first new combination fell upon
Hazen, at his call, General Wood sent the Twenty-fourth Ohio,
of Ilascall's brigade. Ilazen used the railroad cut for a ram-
part, and with the aid aftbrded maintained his position. To
repel the later assaults, additional troops were concentrated.

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 243

In response to a second request for help from General Palmer,
General Wood sent the Fifty-eighth Indiana, which relieved
the Third Kentucky on the right of the railroad, its left rest-
ing on that road. The One Hundredth Illinois, from the same
hrigade, was sent to Hazen, and formed the right of his line,
its right resting on the railroad. Colonel Hazen had called
the Sixth Kentucky to the left of this road, and the Second
Missouri, from Schaefer's hrigade of Sheridan's, which, with
the brigade, was in the rear of the " Round Forest," was asso-
ciated with the One Hundredth Illinois in holding Ilazen's
right. The Fortieth and ISTinety-seventh Ohio, of Wagner's
hrigade, were in position also, on the right of the railroad, in
conjunction with the Sixth and Twenty-sixth Ohio, of Grose's
brigade. In connection with these regiments, Estep's battery
rendered efRcient service, and afterward joined Cox's battery
on the extreme left, where these batteries were supported by
Wagner and the Twenty-sixth Ohio regiment, of Hascall's
brigade. Having been bereft of half his brigade, Wagner
became severely engaged in the extreme left, on the bank of
the river. IS'ot waiting for an assault, which was palpably
foreshadowed, Wagner charged the enemy with great energy.
The Fifteenth and Fifty-seventh Indiana regiments dashed
against the enemy far in advance of our main line, but though
successful against the enemy's infantry, they could not main-
tain the position under a heavy iirc of artillery, and were com-
pelled to fall back. In this charge the Fifteenth Indiana cap-
tured nearly all the men of a regiment that were not killed or
wounded. The retirement of these troops from their perilous
insulation was doubtless covered b}^ the Fifteenth Missouri
regiment, of Schaefer's brigade of Sheridan's division. The
report of his successor in command. Colonel Laiboldt, declares
that Colonel Schaefer was killed when about giving orders to
this regiment, which, after deployment in a corn-field, was
retreating to the position of the brigade at the raih'oad ; and
General Sheridan avers that he lost his last brigade com-
mander when in the act of relieving from the pressure of the
enemy Wood's division, which had given way. These were
the only troops on the extreme left that gave ground to the

244 STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

enemy, and these only left an advanced position to resume
tlieir original place.

Of the entire battle line of the army in the morning, only
"Wagner's position at the river and the ground at the railroad
were now held; the left of the continuous battle line was now
resting much nearer the river than at the opening of the bat-
tle. Between the Xashville turnpike and the river were two
brigades of Wood's division, Wagner's and nascall's, and two
of Palmer's, the regiments of which had been thrown to-
gether as emergencies were developed at different points by the
assaults of the enemy, by the exhaustion of troops, or failure
of ammunition. Hazen still held the left of the continuous
line, but his brigade had been pushed to the left more than its
length ; its right in the morning rested between the Nashville
turn]^^)ike and railroad, and at the end of the engagement the
One Hundredth Illinois was between its right and the railroad.
On the right of the Nashville turnpike, the battle line, bent
back with a curve until its trend was nearly perpendicular to
its original direction.

The assaults on our left cost the enemy immense losses.
Some of the assaulting regiments lost more than half their
strength ; and none of these attacks were even temporarily suc-
cessful. General Bragg admitted, in his official report, that Gen-
eral Polk made repeated attempts to turn General Rosecrans'
left flank, with utter failure. He attributed his failures to the
concentration of artillery of superior range, which seemed to
bid him defiance, and which enabled his enemy to maintain the
strong position on Stone river. This is strong testimony for
the efficiency of the artillery posted on this flank of the na-
tional army." The infantry of Wood's and Palmer's divisions,
as such, were not less efficient in repelling the enemy.

During the day, the enemy's cavalry passed entirely round
General Rosecrans' army, and consequently provoked several
conflicts and greatly disturbed the trains in the rear. A portion
of Colonel Zahm's brigade rendered good service on the right of
the army, in covering the infantry in retreat. In a hand-to-
hand conflict. Colonel Minor Milliken, commanding the First
Ohio Cavalry, was killed by a pistol shot while using his saber.
Colonel Keunett's command first engaged the enemy in the im-

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 245

mediate rear of the army, repulsing liim and recapturing a train.
Finally, there was a concentration of cavahy, under General
D. S. Stanley, behind Overall's creek, where successful resist-
ance was offered to a superior force. Here Colonel Walker's
brigade, of General Fry's division, approaching from Stewarts-
boro, supported Stanley. The roar of Church's battery, in
this engagement, excited grave apprehension at the front that
General Bragg had throAvn a strong force upon the communi-
cations of the army. Squadrons of troopers were active on
the !N"ashville road, several miles to the rear, but beyond the
capture of some stragglers, no injury was done.

After the enemy had been fully checked at all points, Gen-
eral Rosecrans readjusted his line of battle, extending his cen-
ter and right in a northwesterly direction, nearly at right
angles to their original trend, and refusing his extreme right
on the left of the Nashville turnpike. In consecutive order,
from right to left, were Davis', Sheridan's and Johnson's di-
visions, "Walker's and Harker's brigades, Van Cleve's division,
Pioneer brigade, and Rousseau's, Palmer's, and Wood's di-
visions. ISTegley's division constituted the reserve of the cen-
ter, and Starkweather's brigade having reached the battle-
field, was placed in reserve, in rear of Sheridan's left. The
cavalry remained beyond Overall's creek. The enemy felt
this line until late in the evening, when the two armies, after
the long, exhaustive conflict, rested on their arms in close
proximity.

ITeither army commander had fully executed his plan of
battle, although General Bragg had approached very nearly
the completion of his. He had tui-ned a flank of the national
army, bent l)ack the right to the rear of the center, but had
failed to turn its left or reach its rear, and hence had not gained
the extreme advantages which he had inticipated in assuming
the offensive and had seemingly attained at the grand crisis of
the battle. He had assaulted boldly and persistently from first
to last, but had completely exhausted his army without gain-
ing a decisive victory. General Rosecrans had fought a bat-
tle radically different from the one he had proposed for him-
self. Instead of turning the right of the Confederate army
and taking its center in reverse, according to his plan, he had

246 STONE EIVER CAMPAIGX.

been forced into the most emphatic straits in maintaining the
defensive from flank to flank. Both commanders had lost
heavily; General Bragg by continuous assaults with massed
forces, and General Bosecrans by resistance at each point to
superior numbers, and by frequent recessions under the guns
of the enemy. Their respective losses on this day are not
given even approximately in oflicial reports, but it may be as-
sumed that the aggregates mentioned for the four days of bat-
tle were drawn mainly from the first. A battle whose emer-
gencies of offense and defense involves the use of all reserves,
must necessarily be a bloody one.

It is seldom that an engagement of such dimensions has
left two commanding generals so much in doubt as to the
course that either would adopt, and hence each determined to
await developments, and each was ignorant of the purpose of
the other. Of the two. General Bragg was the more hopeful ;
not because he had strength for further offense, but from his
belief that such was the condition of the opposing army that
its retreat was a necessity. And the question of retreat was
doubtless at first an open one with General Rosecrans and his
subordinate commanders.

General Rosecrans' report indicates that he was at first in
doubt as to the propriety of attempting to remain on the field.
He did not certainly know that the opposing army had been
so reduced in strength and spirit as to have abandoned the
offensive, and being aware of his own heavy losses in men
and material — such material, too, as the defensive demands —
and having his right flank bent back upon his line of commu-
nications after a battle which he had provoked by positive
oftense, he could hardly avoid hesitation in maintaining the
defensive in that position. He thus mentioned his action and
decision in his oflicial report : "After a careful examination
and free consultation with corps commanders, followed by a
personal examination of the ground in rear as far as Overall's
creek, it was determined to await the enemy's attack in that
position, to send for the provision train, and order up fresh
supplies of ammunition, on the arrival of which, should the
enemy not attack, offensive operations were to be resumed."

During the night, Van Cleve's division, under command of

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 247

Colonel Samuel Beatty, General Van Cleve having been
woimded early in the day, resumed its connection with the
left wing; and a little before daylight, on January 1st, Gen-
eral Crittenden, with permission of General Rosecrans, retired
his line a few hundred yards to higher ground. General
Palmer then took the left, with Wood's division on his right.
At this time the latter division was commanded by General
Hascall, General Wood having been wounded on the 31st.

At noon on the 1st, Negley's division was moved to General
McCook's support, in expectation of a second efFoft of the
enemy to turn his right. General Bragg demonstrated heavily
against the center, and right at several points with artillery
and a show of infantry. This action, however, was only ten-
tative, as he was still in doubt as to General Rosecrans' inten-
tions, though expecting his retreat. In the afternoon. Gen-
eral Crittenden moved Beatty's division, supported by Grose's
brigade, across the river, and formed a line of battle in front
of Breckinridge, who had resumed his position on that side.

During the day the enemy's cavalry, under Generals
Wheeler and Wharton, were busy in the rear to embarrass
the passage of trains to and from Nashville, and to watch care-
fully for indications of the retreat of the army. A heavy force
appeared at 2 p. m., in the vicinity of La Vergne, captured
a portion of a train, dispersing the remainder, and then
attacked Colonel Innis, commanding the First Regiment
Michigan engineers and mechanics, holding a stockade on the
hill south of the town. Colonel Innis twice refused to sur-
render upon formal demand, and successfully repelled every
attack, although his little stockade was bombarded. At his
call, Lieutenant-Colonel Burke of the Tenth Ohio first sent a
detachment of cavalry to his support from Stewart's creek, and
upon the failure of this force to give aid, he made a rapid
march to La Yergne, arriving, however, after the withdrawal
of the enemy. This conflict, the presence of the enemy's cav-
alry in heavy force on the communications of the army, at-
tacking train guards and destroying wagons, and a multi-
tude of frightened teamsters and demoralized soldiers strag-
gling to the rear, produced the wildest confusion from Stewart's
creek to the vicinity of Nashville. This excitement in the

248 STONE RIYEE CAMPAIGN.

rear was in striking contrast with tlie comparative quietness
reio;ning over the field, where each army was awaiting the
action of the other, harmonizing in purpose now as fully as
when opening battle upon the same plan.

During the forenoon of the 2d, there were indications that
General Bragg would renew the offensive this time from his
right. The movement of infantry and artillery was plainly
visible from Beatty's position. Skirmishing was maintained
between the two lines across the river, with occasional cannon
shots. Colonel Beatty's line in front of General Breckinridge
was formed with Price's brigade on the right, next the river ;
Fyffe's on the left ; Grider's, formerly Beatty's, supporting
Price, and Grose's supporting Fyifc. Drury's battery. Lieu-
tenant Livingston commanding, was posted in the rear. At
3 o'clock p. M., the advance of strong columns following skir-
mish lines, revealed fully the purpose of the enemy.

This aggression had really a defensive object, as General
Bragg had concluded that he must dislodge the force in front
of his right, or he would be compelled to withdraw Polk's
right across the river, since it was exposed to an enfilading
fire from Beatty's position.

Ills hope of the retreat of General Posecrans had been
sti-engthened by the return of Wheeler and Wharton from the
rear, with information indicating this movement. The former
of these commanders was again in the rear of the national
army, under instructions to ascertain definitely "whether a
retrograde movement was being made." While there was any
doubt respecting this expected and greatly desired withdrawal,
it was imperative that General Polk's position should be
maintained, and the condition of its accomplishment was the
dislodgment of Beatty. He therefore formed as strong a com-
bination as practicable, giving Breckinridge two thousand
cavalry under Wharton and Pegram for his right, and added
ten ISTapoleon guns to his artillery. This movement then was
the expression of a vital object, involving even the stability of
his main lines on the left side of the river. To veil his pur-
pose as much as possible. General Bragg had opened his ar-
tillery upon General Posecrans' center and right at noon,
which had become quiet after a vigorous response in semblance

STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN. 249

of a tentative demonstration. His real object, doubtless, was
to draw attention to his own center and left, that he might
throw Breckinridge suddenly against Beatty, and gain the
heights he deemed necessary for the defense of General Polk's
right flank.

Impressed with the importance of his movement, General
Breckinridge advanced with his forces massed and with great
vigor. Artillery, in active contests on the other side of the
river, had heralded an engagement considered by the enemy
as decisive of the general conflict, and Breckinridge's onset
was in correspondence with the magnitude of the interests
compassed by his adventure. lie received and disregarded
the fire of Beatty's skirmishers, his first and second lines and
artillery, and wheeling upon Price's and Grider's brigades,
broke their lines and followed the retreating fragments to the
river.

In the quiet that prevailed on the other side of the river,
this contest drew upon it the attention of both armies. On
the high ground on the opposite bank, were massed two bri-
gades, Hazen's and Graft's, of Palmer's division, and IlTegley's
division, with their batteries. And when General Crittenden
perceived that his left, across the river, was under great pres-
sure, he asked Major John Mendenhall, his chief of artillery,
what he could do with his guns to relieve Beatty, and the
latter hurriedly massed all the guns of the left wing, except
Drury's, and with them Negley's guns and Stokes' battery.
This battery had been sent with the pioneer brigade to the left
by General Eosecrans, when he first heard the noise of battle-
from that direction. As the engagement across the river pro-
gressed, Major Mendenhall, in the presence of Generals Eose-
crans and Crittenden, posted battery after battery, until fifty-
eight guns were ready to bear upon the enemy. At the
culmination of the conflict, on the dislodgment of Price and
Grider, these guns were opened upon the enemy, who in his
eagerness of pursuit followed to the river, losing heavily under
such a fire at every step, and finally receiving, in addition,
volleys from the supporting infantry. At the river, Breckin-
ridge recoiled and drew Ixiek his rapidly diminishing forces.
At this juncture. Colonel John F. Miller, followed by a por-

250 STOXE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

tioii of Stanley's brigade, cliarged with his brigade across the
river. Disregarding an order from a general officer, not his
immediate commander, to desist from so hazardous an adven-
ture, he dashed over and fell furiously upon the foe, already
in rapid retreat. The right of Miller's line was supported by
the Eighteenth Ohio, and portions of the Thirty-seventh In-
diana and Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania, of Stanley's brigade.
Moving on the opposite bank his left, by Grose's brigade,
which had changed front and resisted the enemy, when Price
and Grider gave ground, and in his rear were Hazen's brigade
and portions of Beatty's division. Miller reached a battery
in position, and charging with the Seventy-eighth Pennsyl-
vania, Sixty-ninth and Seventy-f )arth Ohio, and Nineteenth
Illinois, the Twenty-first Ohio striking opportunely on the
left, captured four guns, and the colors of the Twenty-sixth
Tennessee regiment. The Twenty-first Ohio siezed the guns
and drew them off, and the Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania
gained the colors. Miller's hurried movement having dis-
ordered his lines, he here halted to readjust them, and was
almost immediately relieved from position by Hazen's and
Grose's brigades, and Davis' division. General Davis had first
thrown one brigade from his position on the extreme right of
the army, across the river, and afterward, having obtained
perndssion from General Posecrans, had followed with two
brigades. General Davis, being the ranking officer on that side
of the river, assumed command of all the forces nearly equal
to a full corps in number. He assumed command just after
Colonel Miller, under orders, passed to the rear with his bri-
gade, and recrossed the river. General Davis at once threw
forward skirmish lines. These soon encountered the enemy,
who had somewhat recovered from his panic, and a sharp en-
gagement ensued, in which artillery was freely used. During
the night General Davis fortified his line and intrenched a
battery.

Colonel Miller's movement had great prominence, in utterly
defeating General Bragg's object in this engagement, which
was to secure the heights commanding his lines across the
river. General Rosecrans, being as yet on the defensive, had
no thought of aggression from any point of his line, and

STOXE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 251

hence il is not improbable that, had not Miller moved promptly
to charge Breckinridge's forces, and had he not followed them
in rapid pursuit, they might have reformed upon their object-
ive, and held it. As it was. Miller drew after him such a
combination as prevented Breckinridge from holding the cov-
eted heights, who having been carried beyond the hills, by
his success at first, lost them altogether, his failure costing, in
the various forms of casualty, an aggregate of two thousand
men.

The weather on the 3d was unfavorable to active opera-
tions against the enemy, and as General Bragg declined the
offensive altogether, after the repulse of the preceding even-
ing, there was quietness throughout the day. At 6 p. m.. Gen-
eral Thomas interrupted the reigning stillness, by throwing
forward Colonels Beatty's and Spear's brigades — the latter
having come up during the battle — and driving the enemy
from the woods in his front and his intrenchments beyond,
severed his line in the center. During the night. General
Bragg retreated, as he stated in his official report, in conse-
quence of his knowledge of reinforcements to General Rose-
crans. His information was incorrect, or else the coming of
Spear's brigade was considered as giving a dangerous prepon-
derance to the national army, or became an excuse for an act
that other circumstances made imperative. The 4th was spent
in burying the dead, and on the 5th the army occupied jNIur-
freesboro.

General Bosecrans moved from ISTashville with about forty-
seven thousand men. He fought the battle with an aggregate
of forty-three thousand four hundred — thirty-seven thousand
nine hundred and seventy-seven infantry, three thousand two
hundred cavahy, and two thousand two hundred and twenty-
three artillery. He lost ninety-two officers killed, and three
hundred and eighty-four wounded ; one thousand four hun-
dred and forty-one enlisted men killed, and six thousand eight
hundred and sixty wounded, and about two thousand eight
hundred missing. Lieutenant-Colonel Gareschc, his chief of
staff, was killed by his side. In addition to the field officers
already mentioned as killed, eight colonels, five lieutenant-
colonels, and five majors fell in immediate death, or died from

252 STONE RIVP]R CAMPAIGN".

wounds. The aggregate loss was over twenty per cent. The
enemy gained about thirty guns, and lost three."^

General Bragg reported his strength at less than thirty-five
thousand men, of whom thirty thousand were infantry and
artillery. His losses, in the aggregate, including four general
oiScers, two of whom were killed, were nine thousand killed
and wounded, and one thousand missing.

General Rosecrans estimated the opposing army at over
sixty thousand men, and General Bragg, in reciprocal error,
conjectured that he fought an army of seventy thousand. The
latter was superior in cavalry, while the former had five more
brigades of infantry in action from first to last, but only two
more seriously engaged on the 31st, and only three more on
the field until late in the day.

A victory had been gained by the Army of the Cumberland,
and in view of the primal success of the enemy, a great vic-
tory, but in respect to the broadest possibilities of battle, it
was not emphatically decisive. The national army held
the field, and had made an advance of thirty miles toward
Chattanooga, with good ground for encamping, and a good
depot for supplies at Murfreesboro ; but General Bragg, though
compelled to abandon the field after an initiative of battle
which promised complete victory, had withdrawn his army in
good order and fair condition, with freedom to retire at leisure
to Ills next defensive line, that of Duck river, as the last of
the advantages which he had gained b}^ his advance from Chat-
tanooga, in August, 1862. The victory, then, was simply the

*The colonels were Frederick C. Schaefei', commanding a brigade un-
der General Sheridan, who fell near the railroad, in rear of the left;
James Forman, Fifteenth Kentucky; Leander Stern, One Hundred and
First Ohio ; T. D. Williams, Twenty-fifth Illinois ; S. P. Reed, Seventy-
ninth Illinois ; F. C. Jones. Twenty-fourth Ohio ; J. G. Hawkins, Thir-
teenth Ohio, and F. A. Harrington, Twenty-seventh Illinois. Lieutenants
Colonels : John Kell, Second Ohio ; M. F. Wooster, One Hundred and First
Ohio ; David McKee, Fifteenth Wisconsin ; L. Drake, Forty-ninth Ohio,
and P. B. Houssem, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania. The Majors : S. D.
Carpenter, Nineteenth United States Infantry; Henry Terry, Twenty-
fourth Ohio; Adolph G. Rosengarten, and F. B. Ward, Fifteenth Penn-
sylvania Cavalry ; and D. A. B. Moore, First Ohio Cavalry.

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGX. 253

expression of a long stride toward the restoration of the status
of tlie preceding summer, in Middle Tennessee.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Stewart's Creek, Murfreesboro Pike, December 29 — p. m.
To General Mc Cook.

General: — Your dispatch, 12.30 p. m., just received. Palmer's division
is within three miles of Murfreesboro. No firing since early this morn-
ing. Crittenden's corps has crossed Stewart's creek. His trains are fol-
lowing. Your conjectures are probablj^ correct. There is no necessity of
your going into Murfreesboro to-night, if that is the case. Come on until
you reach the Wilkinson pike, wherever you can find forage. Should it
prove, as we now believe, that the enemy have made a precipitate retreat
from Murfreesboro, you had better move on Salem, where you will proba-
bly find forage, and where you can receive your supplies by Murfreesboro
pike. If you can find forage, push a reconnoitering force of two brigades
-down the road toward Shelbyville to Middleton. If you see General
Stanley, tell him to direct his cavaliy to look out particularly for forage
west of Salem, and push on down to Shelbyville. Negley is moving on
Wilkinson's Cross-roads.

By order of Major-General Rosecrans.

C. GODDARD,
Major and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Stewartsboro, December 29 — p. m.
Major- General A. McD. 3IcCoolc, Commanding Right Wing:

Report from Crittenden's advance, 3.45 p. m., says the enemy is in line
of battle on the east side of Stone river — infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
Crittenden has been ordered to form in order of battle out of cannon range,
covering his tlaiik down Stone river to Jefferson pike; two divisions in
front across Murfreesboro road, one in reserve; Negley to come in on his
right. Place your left facing a little more to the south, I should judge,
from what I know of the country, and then reconnoiter in force south
toward Franklin road. Send cavalry to the west down toward Salem, the
main point being to cover your right against a possibility of an enterprise,
and to ascertain if the enemy intend to fight altogetlier behind Stone
river. Establish signal stations, if you can, to communicate. I expect to
be down at the front.

By order Major-General Rosecrans.

C. GODDARD,
Major and Acting Assistant Adjutant- General.

254 STONE RIVER CAMrAIGN.

Headquaeters,*1862— ?).35 r. m.
Major-General McCook, Commanding Right Wing:

Have received Mr. Fisher's report. Take a strong position, and pre-
pare to fight a heavy battle to-morrow ; or, if you are ready, commence it
now, and the left wing will simultaneously go into Murfreesboro.

Since writing above, received your dispatch by courier. If you need
help, will send you Eousseau, but would rather reserve him to take Mur-
freesboro. And if they retreat, you can let them drive you, inch by inch,
making them fight, as they have made you fight.
By command of Major-General W. S. Rosecrans.

J. P. GAEESCHE,

Chief of Staff.

Headquarters,* 1862 — i p. m.
Major-General McCoolc, Commanaing Right Wing :

If you are too hard pressed, fall back slowlj^ ; draw them in. Pass the
word along your line to that effect.

By command of Major-General W. S. Eosecrans.

J. P. GAEESCHE,

aiief of Staff.

Headquarters, December 30, 1862 — 5.35 p. m.
Mojor-General McCook, Commanding Right Wing :

Take up strong position. Let the men refresh themselves well. Extend
a line of fires to your right, so as to deceive the enemy with the belief
that we are massing troops there. In the morning refuse your right, so
as to draw them on in that direction. Crittenden will cross, and, with
God's help, take Murfreesboro. His movement will be so timed and
managed, however, as to give it the appearance of a feint. Meantime, do
you hold them in check if they attack you; or, if they don't, do you at-
tack them not vigorously, bat warily. Eousseau is almost within support-
ing distance of you. All the troops will be moved up to-morrow.
By command of Major-General W. S. Eosecrans.

J. P. GAEESCHE,

Chief of Staff.

Headquarters Fourteenth Army Corps,
Department of the Cumberland, December 31, 1862 — 7.45 a. m.
General McCook, Commanding Right :

A report from General Crittenden this morning is that the enemy has
been moving some of his forces toward his left — that is, toward you. Ee-
port is too vague to determine what it amounts to. Eousseau has been
moved to the front; will be held in reserve. Thomas has gone there.
Rousseau, Negley, and Palmer will operate in the center, and try to break
their center and force the passage of the ford, giving six divisions on this
*30th.

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 2-55

side. I have been waiting to hear the report from your lines, which I

should never fail to receive, and render to me. Let me hear from you soon.

By order of Major-General Rosecrans.

C. GODDAED,

Major and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL ROSECRANS' REPORT.

At 9 p. M. the corps commanders met at the headquarters of the general
commanding, who explained to them the following plan of battle :

McCook was to occupy the most advantageous position, refusing his
right as much as practicable and necessary to secure it, to receive the at-
tack of the enemy, or if that did not come, to attack himself sufficient to
hold all the force on his front.

Thomas and Palmer to open with skirmishing, and gain the enemy's
center and left as far as the river.

Crittenden to cross Van Cleve's division at the lower ford, covered and
supported by the sappers and miners, and to advance on Breckinridge.

Wood's division to follow by brigades, crossing at the upper ford and
moving on Van Cleve's right; to carry everything before them into Mur-
freesboro. This would have given us two divisions against one ; and as
soon as Breckinridge had been dislodged from position, the batteries of
Wood's division taking position on the heights east of Stone river, in
advance, would see the enemy's works in reverse; would dislodge them,
and enable Palmer's division to press them back, and drive them west-
ward across the river or through the woods; while Thoiuas, sustaining the
movement on the center, wouldadvance on the right of Palmer, crushing
their right; and Crittenden's corps advancing, would take Murfreesboro,
and then moving westward on the Franklin road, get in their flank and
rear, and drive them into the country toward Salem, with the prospect of
cutting off their retreat, and probably destroying their army.

* * « * -K- * -x- •;■:- -X-

On the whole, it is evident that we fought superior numbers, on un-
known ground, inflicting more injury than we suffered; were always su-
perior on equal ground with equal numbers, and failed of a most crushing
victory on Wednesday by the extension and direction of our rigJit wing.

EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL BRAGG'S REPORT.

Late on Monday, December 29th, it became apparent that the enemy wns
extending to the right, to flank us on the left. McCown's division in re-
serve was promptly thrown to that flank, and added to the command of
Lieutenant-General Polk. The enemy not meeting our expectations of
making an attack on Tuesday — which was consumed in artillery firing
and heavy skirmishing — with the exception of a dash late in the evening
on the left of Wither,?' division, which was repulsed and severely pun-

256 ' STONE KIVER CAMPAIGN.

ished, it was determined to assail him on Wednesday morning, the
31st.

For this purpose, Cleburne's division was removed from the second line
on the right to the corresponding position on the left, and Lieutenant-
General Hardee was ordered to that point, and assigned to the command
of that and McCown's division.

This disposition — the result of necessity — left me no reserve ; but Breck-
inridge's command on the right, not now thre?„tened, was regarded as a
source of supply for any reinforcements absolutely necessaiy to other
parts of the field. Stone river, at its low stage, was fordable at almost
every point for infantry, and at short intervals perfectly practicable for
artillery.

This disposition completed, Lieutenant-General Hardee was ordered to
assail the enemy at daylight, on Wednesday, the 31st, the attack to be
taken up by General Polk's command in succession to the right flank —
the move to be made by a constant wheel to the I'ight, on Polk's right
flank as a pivot — the object being to force the enemy back on Stone river,
and, if practicable, by the aid of cavalry, cut him off from his base of op-
erations and supplies by the Nashville pike.

* -Tf * * -X * « » «•

The failure of General McCown to execute during the night, an order
for a slight change in the line of his division, and which had to be done
the next morning, caused some delay in the general and vigorous as-
sault by Lieutenant-General Hardee. But about 7 o'clock, the rattle of
musketry and the roar of artillery announced the beginning of the con-
flict. The enemy was taken completely by surprise — artillery horses not
hitched, and infantry not formed. A hot and inviting breakfast of coffee,
and other luxuries to which our gallant and hardy men had long been,
strangers, was found upon the fire, unserved, and was left, whilst we
pushed on to the enjoyment of a more inviting feast, that of captured ar-
tillery, flying battalions, and hosts of craven prisoners, begging for the
lives they had forfeited by their acts of brutality and atrocity.

Whilst thus routing and pushing the enemy on his front, Lieutenant-
General Hardee announced to me by a messenger that the movement
was not being as promptly executed by Major-General Cheatham's
command on his right, the left of General Polk's coi-ps, as he expected,
and that his line was completely exposed to an enfilade fire from the en-
emy's artillery in that point. The necessary instructions for prompt
movement at that point were immediately dispatched, and in a short
time our whole line, except Breckinridge's command, was warmly en-
gaged. From this time, we continued to drive the enemy more or less
rapidly, until his line was thrown entirely back at right angles to his
first position, and occupied the railroad, along which he had massed his
reserves and posted very strong batteries. , .

We succeeded in driving him from every position except the strong
one held by his extreme left flank, resting on Stone river, and carried

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 257

(covered ?) by a concentration of artillery of superior range and caliber^
which seemed to bid us defiance. . . .

As early as ten o'clock a. m., Major-General Breckinridge was called on
for one brigade, and soon after, a second, to reinforce or act as a reserve
to Lieutenant-General Hardee. His reply to the first call represented
the enemy crossing Stone river in heavy force, in his immediate front,
and on receiving the second order, he informed me that he had already
crossed in heavy force, and was advancing to attack his lines. He was
immediately ordered not to wait attack, but to advance and meet him.
About the same time, a report reached me that a heavy force of the en-
emy's infantry was advancing on the Lebanon road, about five miles from
Breckinridge's front. Brigadier-General Pegram, who had been sent to
that road to cover the flank of the infantry with his cavalry brigade, two
regiments detached, with Wheeler and Wharton, was ordered forward
immediately to develop any such movement.

* * s * -x- * * * *

By the time this could be accomplished, it was too late to send this
force to Lieutenant-General Hardee's support, who was unable to make
further progress, and he was directed to maintain his position. Lieu-
tenant-General Polk was directed with these reinforcements to throw all
the force he could collect upon the enemy's extreme left and thereby
either carry that strong position which had so far resisted us so success-
fully, or, failing in that, at least to draw off from Hardee's front the for-
midable opposition there concentrated. . . .

Upon this flank, their strongest defensive position, resting on the river
bank, the enemy had concentrated not less than twenty pieces of artil-
lery, masked almost from view, bvit covering an open space in front of
several hundred yards, supported right, left, and rear by heavy masses
of infantry. This position proved impracticable, and after two unsuc-
cessful efforts, the attempt to carry it by infantry was abandoned. Our
heaviest batteries of artillery and rifled guns of long range were now
concentrated in front, and their fires opened upon this position. .

The dislodgment of this force (Beatty's), or the withdrawal of Polk's
line, was an evident necessity. The latter involved consequences not
to be entertained. . . . Major-General Breckinridge was sent for
and advised of the movement and its objects — the securing and hold-
ing the position which protected Polk's flank and gave us command of
the enemy's, by which to enfilade him. He was informed of the forces
placed at his disposal, and instructed with them to drive back the enemy,
cover the hill, intrench his artillery, and hold the position.

To distract their attention from our real object, a heavy artillery fire
was ordered from Polk's front at the exact hour at which the movement
was to begin. At other points throughout both lines all was quiet.

Late on Friday night I had received the captured papers of Major-
General McCook, commanding one corps d'armee of the enemy, showing
their effective strength to have been nearly, if not quite, twenty thousand

17

258 STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

men. Befoi'e noon, reports from Brigadier-General Wheeler satisfied me
that the enemy, instead of retiring, was receiving reinforcements.

Common prudence and the safety of my army, upon which even the
safety of our cause depended, left no doubt in my mind as to the neces-
sity of my withdrawal from so unequal a contest. My orders were ac-
cordingly given about noon for the movement of the train, and for the
necessary preparations of troops.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL POLK'S REPORT.

As the brigades composing the division of Major-General Withers had
not been engaged in any heavy battle since Shiloh, I placed them in the
first line. They extended from the river near the intersection of the
Nashville turnpike and railroad, southward across the Wilkinson pike to
Triune or Franklin road, in a line irregular, but adapted to the topog-
rajjhy.

The division of Major-General Cheatham was posted in the rear of that
of Major-General Withers, as a supporting force. The division of Major-
General McCown, of Lieutenant-General Kirby Smith's army corps, was
in prolongation of that of Major-General Cleburne, of Lieutenant-General
Hardee's corps, as its supporting force. Major-General Breckinridge's
division, of Lieutenant-General Hardee's corps, occupied the ground on
the east side of the river, in the line of Major-General Withers, on the
right.

The enemy moved forward, and our outposts went back slowly, and
took their place in the line of battle on the 29th.

On the 30th, in order to discover the situation at which we pro-
posed to offer battle, he moved up cautiously, shelling his front heavily
as he advanced.

The cannonading was responded to along our line, and the theater of
the impending conflict was speedily determined.

On the left of my line, the skirmishing became very active, and my
left brigade's front and rear became hotly engaged with the line which
was being formed immediately before them. The enemy pressed forward
very heavily with both artillery and infantry, and a sharp contest ensued
in which he attempted, with several regiments, to take one of my bat'
teries by assault, but was repulsed in the most decisive manner,

In this preliminary onset, many lives were lost on both sides. It was,
from its severity, an introduction to the great battle of the ensuing day,
and prepared our troops for the work before them. Twilight following
soon after, the enemy settled around his bivouac-fires for the night.

Orders were issued by the general commanding to attack in the morn-
ing at daybreak. The attack was to be made by the extreme left, and
the whole was ordered to swing around from left to right upon my right
brigade as a pivot. Major-General Breckinridge, on the extreme right
across the river, was to hold the enemy in observation on that flank.

At the appointed time, opened to the surprise evidently of the ojapos-

STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN. 259

lag anny, Major-General McCown, wlio wasa cting under the orders of
Lieutenant-General Hardee, was upon them before they were prepared to
TBceive him. He captured several batteries and one brigadier-general,
and wounded another, and drove three brigades — those composing the
division of Brigadier-General Johnson — in confusion before him.

He was followed quickly by Major-General Cleburne, as a supporting
force, who occupied the space left vacant by the forward movement of
McCown, between the left of my line and McCown's right. Opposing
him in that space was the second division of Major-General McCook's
corps, under command of Brigadier-General Jeff. C. Davis, as the right
of General McCook's corps, was slightly advanced. Cleburne's attack
following soon on that of McCown, caught the force in his front, also not
altogether prepared, and the vigor of the assault was so intense, that
they too yielded and were driven.

Major-General Withers' left was opposed to the right of Slieridan, com-
manding the third and remaining division of General McCook's corps.
The enemy's right was strongly posted on a ridge of rocks, with chasms
intervening, and covered with a dense growth of rough cedars. Being
advised of the attack he was to expect by the fierce contest which was
being waged on his right, he was fully prepared for the onset, and this
notice and the strength of his position enabled him to offer a strong re-
sistance to Withers, whose duty it was to move next.

Colonel Loomis, who commanded the left brigade, moved up witli en-
ergy and spirit to the attack. Ue was wounded, and was succeeded by
Colonel Coltart. The enemy met the advance with firmness, but was
forced to yield. An accession of force aided him to recover his posi-
tion, and its great strength enabled him to hold it. Coltart, after a
gallant charge and a sharp contest, fell back, and was replaced by
Colonel Vaughn, of Major-General Cheatham's command of the rear line.
Vaughn, notwithstanding the difficulties of the ground, charged the po-
sition with great energy, but tlie enemy intrenched behind stones and
thick woods, could not be moved, and Vaughn also was repulsed.

This caused a loss of time, and T'leburne's division, pressing Davis,
reached a point \vhere Sheridan's batteries still unmoved, by wheeling to
the left, enfiladed it. Colonel Vaughn was speedily reorganized, and re
turned to the assaults, and in conjunction with (Jolonel Coltart, drove at
the position with resistless courage and energy ; and although their losses
Avere heavy, the enemy could not bear up against the onset. He was dis-
lodged and driven with the rest of the flying battalions to McCook's
corps.

In this charge, the horse of every officer on the field and staff of
Vaughn's brigade, except one, and the horses of all the officers of the
field and staff of every regiment, except two were killed. The brigade
loss also one-third of all its forces. It captured two of the enemy's field
guns.

The brigade of Colonel Maingault, which was immediately on the right
of Colonel Coltart, followed the movement of the latter, according to in-

260 STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN.

structions. But as Coltart failed in the onset to drive Sheridan's right,
Maingault, after dashing forward and pressing the enemy's line in his
front, back upon his second line, was brought under a heavy fire of artil-
lery from two batteries on his right, supported by a heavy force of infantry.
He was therefore comi^elled to fall back.

In this charge, the brigade suffered severely, sustaining a very heavy
loss in officers and men; but the gallant South Carolinians returned to
the charge a second time and a third time, and being aided by the bri-
gade of Major-General Maney of the second line, which came to his re-
lief with his heavy Napoleon guns and a deadly fire of musketry, the
enemy gave way, and joined his comrades on the right in their precip-
itate retreat across the Wilkinson pike. This movement dislodged and
drove the residue of Sheridan's division, and completed the forcing of
the whole of McCook's corps out of its line of battle, and placed it in
full retreat. The enemy left one of his batteries of four guns on the
field, which fell into the hands of Maney's brigade. The front of Main-
gault and Maney being free, they swung round with our lines on the left,
and joined in pressing the enemy and his reinforcements into the cedar
brake.

At 9 A. M., Brigadier-General Patton Anderson, on Maingault's right,
moved in conjunction with its left brigade formed upon the line in its
front. The line rested with its right near the Wilkinson pike, and is
understood to have been General Negley's division, of General Thomas'
corps, which constituted the center of the enemy's line of battle. . . .

The supporting brigade of Anderson, commanded by Brigadier-General
A. P. Stewart, moved with that of Anderson. It was ordered by the di-
vision commander, Major-General Withers, who was in command of
Major-General Cheatham's two right brigades, as Major-General Cheatham
was of his two left — to move to the support of the left regiments of An-
derson, which were pressed.

■>f ^ ****** *

Brigadier-General Chalmers' brigade, the remaining one of those con-
stituting my front line whose right flank rested on the river, was the last
to move. This brigade, owing to its position in the line, was called on to
encounter a measure of personal suffering from exposure beyond that of
any other in my corps. . . .

In its front, lay the right of Brigadier-General Palmer's division, of
Major-General Crittenden's corps, which constituted the left wing of the
enemy's line of battle. The general movement from the left having
reached Chalmers' brigade, it was ordered to attack, and its reserve, under
Brigadier-General Donelson, was directed to move forward to its sup-
port. . . .

All the line in their front was carried, except the extreme right. This
point, which was the key to the enemy's position, and which was known
as the Bound Forrest, was attacked by the right of the brigade. It was
met by a fire from artillery and musketry, which mowed down more than
one-half its number.

STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN. 261

The enemy was now driven from the field at all points occujjied by him
in the morning, along his whole line from his right to the extreme left,
and was pressed back until our line occupied a position at right angles to
that which we held at the opening of the battle. After passing the
Nashville and Murfreesboro turnpike, his flight was covered by large
bodies of fresh troops and numerous batteries of artillery, and the ad-
vance of our exhausted columns was checked.

His extreme left alone held its position. This occupied a piece of
ground well chosen and defended, the river being on the one hand and
a deep railroad cut on the other. It was held by a strong force of artil-
lery and infantry, well su})ported by a reserve, composed of Brigadier-
Oeneral Wood's division.

My last reserve having been exhausted, the brigades of Major-General
Breckinridge's division, and a small brigade of General J. K. Jackson's
posted to guard our right flank, were the only troops left that had not
been engaged. Four of these were ordered to report to me. They came
in detachments of two brigades each, the first arriving near two hours
after Donelson's attack, the other about an hour after the first. The
commanders of these detachments, the first composed of the brigades of
Generals Adams and Jackson, the second under General Breckinridge in
person, consisting of the brigades of General Preston and Colonel Pal-
mer, had pointed out to them the particular object to be accomplished,
to wit, to drive in the enemy's left, and especially to dislodge him from
his position in the Eound Forest. Unfortunately the opportune moment
for putting in these detachments had passed.

Could they have been thrown upon the enemy's left immediately after
Chalmers' and Donelson's assaults, in quick succession, the extraordinary
strength of his position would have availed him nothing. That point
would have been carried, and his left been driven back on his panic-
stricken right, would have completed his confusion and insured
an utter rout. It was, however, otherwise,^ and the time lost between
Donelson's attack and the coming up of these detachments in suc-
cession, enabled the enemy to recover his self-possession, to mass a num-
ber of heavy batteries, and concentrate a strong infantry force on the
position, and thus make a successful attack very diflficult. Nevertheless
the brigades of Adams and Jackson assailed the enemy's line with en-
ergy, and after a severe contest were compelled to fall back. They were
promptly rallied by General Breckinridge, who, having pressed his other
brigades, reached the ground at the moment, but as they were much cut
up they were not required to renew the attack.

The brigades of Preston and Palmer, on arriving, renewed the assault
with the same undaunted determination; but as another battery had been
added since the previous attack, to a position already strong and diflficult
of access, this assault was alike ineffectual. The enemy, though not
■driven from his position, was severely punished, and as the day was far
spent, it was not deemed anvisable to renew the attack that evening, and
the troops held the line they occupied for the night.

262 STOXE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL McCOOK'S REPORT.

At 2 o'clock p. M., December 30th, a citizen residing on the Franklin road,
and about half a mile in fx'ont of the enemy's line of battle, was put un-
der guai-d by General Stanley. He reported as follou-s :

" 1 was up to the enemy's line of battle twice yesterday, and once this
morning, to get some stock taken from me. The enemy's troojis ai'e
posted in the following manner: The right of Cheatham's division rests on
the Wilkinson pike ; Withers is on Cheatham's left, with his left on the
Franklin road; Hardee's corps is entirely beyond that road, his right rest-
ing on that road, and his left extending toward the Salem pike." . . .

I also sent a report to the general commanding, by my aid-de-camp,
Horace N. Fisher, that the right of my line rested directly in front of the
enemy's center. This made me anxious for my right. All my division
commanders were immediately informed of this fact, and two brigades
of the reserve division, commanded respectively by Generals Willich and
Kirk, two of the best and most experienced brigadiers in the ai-my, were
ordered to the right of the line to protect the I'ight flank, and guard
against surprise there.

At 6 o'clock p. M. I received an order from the general commanding
to have large and extended camp-fires built on my right to deceive the
enemy, making them believe we were massing troops there. This order
was communicated to General Stanley commanding cavahy, and carried
into execution by Major R. H. Nodine, Twenty-fiftli Illinois, engineer
officer on my staff.

< !)n the morning of the 30th, the order of battle was nearly parallel
with that of the enemy, my right slightly refused, and the line of battle
in two lines.

On the evening of the 30th, Sheridan's left rested on the Wilkinson
road, and on the right of Negley's division, and the line ran in a south-
easterly direction, through a cedar thicket, until General Davis' right
rested near the Franklin road. Kirk's brigade was on Davis' right. Wil-
lich's brigade flanked on a line nearly perpendicular to the main line,
forming a crotchet to the rear, to avoid the possibilities of my right
being turned by anything like an equal force. My line was a strong one,
open ground in front for a short distance. My instructions for the fol-
lowing day were received at about 6j o'clock, p. m. on the 30th, and were
as follows :

"Take strong position; if the enemy attack you, fall back slowly, re-
fusing your right, contesting the ground inch by inch. If the enemy do
not attack you, you will attack them, not vigorously, but warily — the
time of attack by you to be designated by the general commanding."

I was also informed that Crittenden's corps would move simultaneously
with my attack, into Murfreesboro.

Written instructions were sent to each division commander, on the
night of the 30th, explaining to each what would be required of them
on the 31st.

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 265

In a strict compliance with my orders, and the knowledge I possessed
of the position of the enemy, which was communicated to my superior,
and the generals under my command, I could not have made a better
disposition of my troops.

EXTPvACT FROM GENERAL R. W. JOHNSON'S REPORT.

About 2 o'clock p. m. I received an order from Major-General McCook
to look well to my right, as General Uardee (rebel) with his corps was on
the right flank of our column. I ordered the Second brigade, Brigadiei'-
General Kirk commanding, to take position with his brigade, his left rest-
ing against the right of General Davis, his right refused so as to cover our
right flank. About dark, 1 placed (General Willich's brigade on the right
of Kirk's, refusing his right, and directing a heavy line of skirmishers to
be thrown forward, connecting on the left with those of General Davis,
and extending to the right and rear, near the Wilkinson pike. This line
of skirmishers was thrown forward about six hundred j'ards, and near
those of the enemy. My third brigade. Colonel Baldwin commanding,
was held in reserve.

In consultation with General McCook late in the afternoon of December
30th, he informed me that he had reliable information to the eftect that the
center of the rebel line of bittle was opposite to our extreme right, and
that we would probably be attacked by the entire rebel army early on the
Ibllowing morning. His prediction proved true. He also informed me
that he had communicated this information to the commanding general.
1 exjoected a change in the programme for the following day, but none
was made. My brigade commanders were called together, and the oper-
ations of the following day fully explained to them. Every arrangement
was made for an attack. Two gallant and experienced officers commanded
my advanced brigades, and every precaution taken against surprise. At
6:22 on the morning of the 31st, the outposts in front of my division were
driven in by an overwhelming force of infantry, outnumbering my forces
greatly, and known to contain about thirty Ave thousand men. At the
same time my extreme right was attacked by the enemy's cavahy.

The gallant Willich and Kirk soon opened a heavy fire of musketry and
artillery uj^on the advancing columns, causing wavering of the ranks, but
fresh columns would soon replace them, and it was apparent that to fall
back was "a military necessity." Edgarton's battery, after firing three
rounds, had so many of his horses killed as to render it unmanageable. He,
however, remained with it, and continued to fire until he fell by a severe
wound, and he and his battery fell into the hands of the enemy. . . .

Seeing the pressure upon my lines, I ordered up my reserve brigade,
under the gallant Baldwin. The troops of this brigade advanced promptly
and delivered their fire, holding their ground for some time, but they,
too, were compelled to fall back.

264 STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

EXTRACT FROM COLONEL W. H. GIBSON, COMMANDING WIL-
LICH'S BRIGADE.

These dispositions had been made and these precautions adopted by
General Willich. At dawn of day, orders were received to build fires and
make coffee. In a few moments after, I met General Willich, who re-
marked that he would be absent a few moments at the headquarters of
General Johnson, and in case anything occurred in front of our pickets,
he directed me to rally the Thirty-ninth and Thirty-second (Indiana) to
their support. At twenty -five minutes past six, and soon after meeting the
general, firing was heard on General Kirk's right. The brigade was in-
stantly ordered to take arms, and Lieutenant Miles of the staff was dis-
patched for General Willich. He was found, and started for his command,
but his horse was shot under him, and he was made a prisoner before
giving an order. The enemy advanced upon our position with four heavy
lines of battle, witli a strong reserve held in mass. All these were in
full view before the lines of General Kirk gave wa}^ His left extended
a great distance beyond our extreme right, and was thrown forward so
that his lines were to some extent oblique to ours. To the right of our
position, and near the Franklin road, he took position with an immense
force of cavalry. In fact, the center of Hardee's corps attacked our right.
His lines were advanced with great rapidity, and his force could not have
been less than thirty-five thousand, besides cavalry. Portions of Polk's
and Smith's corps were engaged. The lines of General Kirk soon yielded
to an assault which no troops in the world could have withstood. The
Thirty-second and Thirty-ninth moved promptly, but were embarrassed
b}'^ the retiring forces, and their safety endangered by an assault in over-
whelming numbers upon front and flanks. . . . The Forty-ninth re-
mained in position until ordered to retire, and fought despara.ely at every
rod. The Fifteenth Ohio, Colonel Wallace, delivered six rounds before
falling back, whilst the Thirty-second and Thirty-ninth Indiana bravely
contested the ground on the right. . . . The Fifteenth Ohio, Colonel
Wallace, had got into position, and under cover of its fire the Forty-ninth
Ohio and Eighty-ninth Illinois were directed to retire by the flank. The
Thirty-second and Thirty-ninth were now retiring in good order. At this
juncture, learning nothing of General Willich, I felt it my duty to exert
myself as far as possible to save the command.

« EXTRACT FROM COLONEL BALDWIN'S REPORT.

The brigade returned to the woods, near the headquarters of the division,
after dark, and bivouacked there.

At daybreak the next morning, I was informed by stragglers who were
running across the field in my front, of the attack on General Willich's
and Kirk's brigades.

I immediately ordered the brigade under arms, and proceeded to form

STONE RIVEK CAMPAIGN. 265

a line of battle in the edge of timber, facing the large open fields, over
which I knew the enemy must come to attack me.

I deployed the Louisville legion on the right, and was proceeding to
post the First Ohio in the center, and the Sixth Ohio, holding the Ninety-
third Ohio in reserve to protect either flank, when you (General Johnson)
ordered me to move the First Ohio across the open field, and jDost it at the
fence. The Sixth Indiana was moved forward and posted on the edge of
a skirt of timber to the left of the First Ohio, the Thirtieth Indiana and
Seventy-ninth Illinois being posted on the right, and a section of the
Fifth Indiana battery was posted between the First Ohio and Sixth In-
diana. . . .

These dispositions were scarcely made when the enemy in immense
masses appeared in my front at short range, their left extending far beyond
the extreme right of my line. My infantry and artillery poured a de-
structive fire into their dense masses, checking them in front; but their
left continued to advance against my right. . . . Had my line stood
a moment longer, it would have been entirely suri-ounded and captured.

EXTKACT FEOM GENERAL KIRK'S REPORT.

At 5 A. M. I had the entire brigade under arms ready for action, in
which state of readiness they continued until something over an hour
later, when the engagement commenced. The enemy attacked our lines
at daylight. We could see them advancing over the open country for
about a half a mile in front of our lines. They moved in heavy masses,
apparently six lines deep. Their left extended far beyond our right, so
as to completely flank us. They moved up steadily and in good order,
without music or noise of any kind. They had no artillery in sight.
Having early notice of the enemy's advance, I sent a staff officer to
General Johnson to advise him of it, and then I passed to the extreme
right of my line, where the attack would commence, and where my
artillery was posted. Seeing the exposed condition from the enemy's
fire, I ordered the Thirty-fourth Illinois to advance to meet the enemy,
at the same time ordering the battery to commence firing, which it did
with excellent effect. With my line extended as it was, I should think
the enemy outnumbered me here at least five to one, i^crhaps double that
proportion, but this solitary regiment never wavered, but steadily advanced
until they closed with the enemy, and it became almost a hand-to-hand
fight. The balance of my line now became engaged, and fought most
bravely against this fearful odds. No other proof is needed of the fierce-
ness of the conflict at this point, and the stubborn tenacity vvitli which
our men fought, than the fact that considerably more than one-half of
some of these regiments were shot down before they yielded an inch of
ground, and the effectiveness of their fire is evidenced by the piles of the
rebel dead along their lines. Seeing the contest was so unequal, and that
I could not long sustain it, I sought General Willich, with a view of asking

266 STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

his immediate active support. He had gone to division headquarters.
He was expected back every moment. His brigade had not yet learned
that he was captured. No other officer had assumed command. I ap-
pealed personally to two of the regiments to come to mj' support, but
they declined moving without orders from their commander. This
brigade and the Third are mostly old troops, and among the bravest
veterans in the service; and I do not censure them or question their
bravery, when I say that bewildered and confused, without a division or
brigade commander, outflanked and nearly surrounded by a force vastly
outnumbering us all, they fell back without at that time coming into the
action, and left me alone with my four small regiments, already badly cut
to pieces, and without a solitary support. There is a limit to human
endurance. No troops on earth could sustain themselves circumstanced
as mine were.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL DAVIS' REPORT.

The night (the 30th) passed off quietly until about daylight, when the
enemy's forces were observed by our pickets to be in motion. Their ob-
ject could not, however, with certainty be determined until near sunrise,
when a vigorous attack was made upon Willich's and Kii'k's brigades.
'I hese troops seemed not to have been fully prepared for the assault, and
with little or no resistance retreated from their position, leaving their ar-
tillery in the hands of the enemy. This left my right brigade exposed to
a flank movement, which the enemy was now rapidly executing, and com-
pelled me to order Post's brigade to fall back and partly change its front.
Simultaneous with this movement, the enemy commenced a heavy and
very determined attack on both Carlin's and Woodrufi"s brigades.

These brigades were fully prepared for the attack, and received it with
veteran courage. The conflict was fierce in the extreme on both sides.
Our loss was heavy, and that of the enemy no less. It was, according to
my observations, the best contested point of the day, and would have
been held, but for the overwhelming force moving so persistently against
my right. Carlin, finding his right flank being so severely pressed and
threatened with being turned, ordered his troops to retire.

Woodruffs brigade succeeded in repulsing the enemy and holding its
position, until the withdrawal of the troops on both its flanks compelled*
it to retire.

EXTRACT FROM COLONEL POST'S REPORT.

The right of the brigade extended into a dense and almost impene-
trable thicket of cedars, connecting there with the left of General Kirk's
brigade, and in that direction nothing could be seen on account of the
thicket. For more than half an hour the enemy's dark columns flowed
toward our right, where the volleys of musketry and their advancing
cheers from that direction assured me that they had driven the brigades

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 267

of the right from their position, and were already in our rear, and T accord-
ingly changed front nearly perpendicularly to the rear to meet them. . .

Captain Pinney opened upon the advancing line with all his guns and
when they came within range of his canister, and the fire of the support-
ing regiment, the execution was so great that the entire line recoiled be-
fore it, but after temporary confusion they were rallied and lay down.
The enemy oisened a battery upon the hill and advanced a second line.

. . . For about thirty minutes tliis tierce contest continued, while
the enemy on our right advanced so as again to endanger our rear.

As those in front rallied and charged upon the battery on the double-
quick, the Fifty-ninth Illinois regiment fixed bayonets to receive them,
but with the large force unopposed on our right, the position was already
untenable, even though that in front were repulsed, and I ordered the
battei-y withdrawn.

EXTRACT FROM COLONEL CARLIN'S REPORT.

My men were falling rapidly on the front line, and to increase the fire
on the enemy, I sent an order to Colonel Alexander to advance and form
on the right of the One Hundred and First Ohio Volunteers, and to Colo-
nel Ileg, Fifteenth Wisconsin Volunteers, to form on the left of the
Thirty-eighth Illinois, and to my battery to retire. To my surprise, I re-
ceived in reply from Colonel Alexander, that he was already so hotly en-
gaged that he could not come forward. The startling intelligence was
also at this moment communicated to me, by one of my orderlies, that
all our forces on our right had left the ground. Immediately afterward
a heavy fire of musketry and artillery from the enemy from my right
flank and rear, unmistakably announced that I was also attacked from
that direction.

On my left Woodruffs brigade had left the ground. My command was
thus exposed to fire from all points, excepting the left of my rear. When
too late to retii'e in good order, I found that I was overpowered, and but a
moment was wanting to place my brigade in the hands of the foe.

EXTRACT FROM COLONEL WOODRUFF'S REPORT.

As soon as the battle became general, the Twenty-fourth Wisconsin,*
which joined my left, gave way, leaving my battery and left flank exposed
to an enfilading fire. I finally succeeded in rallying them as a reserve.
At this moment the right of General Sill's brigade commenced to swing to
the rear, and Colonel Carlin's was observed steadily falling back. I then
received orders to take position to the rear some 300 yards, in the belt of
timber.

* From Sill's Brigade.

268 STOXE EIVER CAMPAIGJs^.

EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL SHERIDAN'S REPORT.

At sundown I had taken up my position — my right resting in the tim-
ber, my left on the Wilkinson pike, my reserve brigade of four regiments
to the rear and opposite the center. The killed and wounded during the
day was seventy -five men. General Davis' left closed in on my right,
and his line thrown to the rear so that it formed nearly a right angle
with me. General Negley's division of Thomas' corps was immediately
on my left, his right resting on the left-hand side of the Wilkinson pike.

About fifteen minutes after 7 in the morning, the enemy advanced to
the attack across an open cotton-field in Sill's front. This column was
opened upon by Bush's battery of Sill's brigade, which had a direct fire
on its front; also by Hiscock's and Houghtaling's batteries, which had an
oblique fire on its front, from a commanding position near the center of
my line. The effect of this fire upon the enemy's columns was terrible.
The enemy, however, continued to advance until they had reached
nearly the edge of the timber, when they were opened upon by Sill's in
fantry, at a range of not over fifty yards. The destruction to the enemy's
columns which was closed in mass, being several regiments in depth, was
terrible. For a short time they withstood this fire, maneuvered, then
broke and ran, Sill directing his troops to charge, which was gallantly
responded to, and the enemy driven back across the valley and behind
their intrenchments. In this charge I had the misfortune to lose General
Sill, who was killed. The brigade then fell back in good order and re-
sumed its original lines. Here, unfortunatelv, the brigade of Colonel
AVoodrufif gave way, also one regiment of Sill's brigade which was in the
second line. This regiment fell back some distance into an open field
and then rallied, its place being supplied by a third regiment of reserve.
At this time, the enemy, who had attacked on the extreme right of our
wing against Johnson, and also on Davis' front, had been successful, and
two divisions on my right were reth-ing in great confusion, closely followed
by the enemy, completely turning my position and exposing my line to a
fire from the rear. I hastily withdrew the whole of Sill's brigade, and
the three regiments sent to support it, at the same time directing Colonel
Roberts of the left brigade, who had changed front and formed in column
of regiments, to charge the enemy in the timber from which I had with-
drawn those regiments. This was very gallantly done by Colonel Rob-
erts, who captured one piece of the enemy's artillery, which had to be
abandoned.

In the meantime I had formed Sill's brigade and Schaefer's on a line at
right angles to my first line and behind the three batteries of artillery,
which were placed in a fine position, directing Colonel Roberts to return
and form on this new line.

I then made an unavailing attempt to form the troops on my right on
this front line, in front of which were open fields, through which the

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 269

enemy was approaching, under a lieavj' fire from Hiscock's, Honghta-
ling's, and Bush's batteries.

After the attempt had proved entirely unsuccessful, and my right was
again turned, General McCook directed me to advance to tlie front and
form on the right of Negley. This movement was successfully accom-
plished under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, every regiment of
mine remaining unbroken. I took position on Negley's right, Iioberts'
brigade having been placed in position at right angles to Negley's line
facing to the south, the other two brigades being placed to the rear and
at right angles with Roberts', and facing the west, covering the rear of
Negley's lines.

*********

General Cheatham's division advanced on Roberts' brigade, and heavy
masses of the enemy, with three batteries of artillery, advanced over the
open ground which I had occupied in the previous part of the engage-
ment, at the same time the enemy opening from their intrenchments in
the direction of Murfreesboro.

The contest then became terrible; the enemy made three attacks, and
were three times repulsed, the artillery range of the respective batteries
being not over two hundred yards. In these attacks Roberts' brigade lost
its gallant commander, who was killed.

*********

Schaefer's brigade being entirely out of ammunition, I directed them to
fix bayonets and await the enemy. Roberts' brigade, which was nearly
out of ammunition, I directed to fall back, resisting the enemy.

******** *

The difficulty of withdrawing the artillery here became very great, the
ground being rocky and covered with a dense growth of cedar. Hough-
taling's battery had to be abandoned, also two pieces of Bush's battery.

*********

These regiments of Schaefer's brigade, having supplied themselves with
ammunition, 1 put into action, by direction of General Rosecrans, directly
to the front and right of General Wood's division, on the left-hand side
of the railroad.

The brigade advanced through a clump of timber, and took position on
the edge of a cotton-field, close upon the enemy's lines, relieving the di-
vision of General Wood, which was falling back under heavy pressure of
the enemy. At this point I lost my third and last brigade commander,
who was killed.

EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF COLONEL GRENSEL, WHO AS-
SUMED COMMAND OF THE BRIGADE AFTER THE DEATH
OF GENERAL SILL.

About this time, 7 o'clock a. m., while directing the movements of
the brigade, our brave general. Sill, was struck in the face by a musket-
ball, and instantly killed. I then received your order to take command
of the brigade. The enemy having turned our right, and again advancing

270 STOXE RIVKR CAMPAIGN.

in force, I moved to the rear, with the Twenty-fourth Wisconsin and
Eighty-eighth Illinois, and across the road, where I formed on the left of
the Eighty-eiglith Indiana, of Woodruff's brigade, leaving the Twenty-
first Michigan to support Hiscock's battery, where they were assailed by
great numbers of the enemy, but held their ground until the battery was
moved, when they retired in good order, losing heavily in killed and
wounded. Having exjaended all the ammunition of the two regiments
with me, I retired to, and got a supply from the train of General Rous-
seau, ours having been cut oflf.

EXTRACT FROM COLONEL LAIBOLDT'S REPORT, COMMANDING
IN ROOM OF COLONEL SCHAEFER.

After the lai)se of an hour, the brigade was enabled to receive ammu-
nition, and had a new position assigned to them on the Chattanooga
railroad. Colonel Schaefer ordered the Fifteenth Missouri Volunteers to
deploy in a cornfield, whilst the balance of the brigade held the railroad,
and kept up such a galling and well-aimed fire that the enemy, though of
a strength to which our force was hardly comparable, and fighting with
the utmost desperation, was again and again repulsed. The Fifteenth
Missouri Volunteers being in danger of being outflanked, retreated
toward the position of the brigade, and it was at that moment, when
about giving orders to said regiment, that the true soldier and brave man,
my lamented predecessor. Colonel Fred. Schaefer fell. By order of Gen-
eral Sheridan, I assumed forthwith the command of the biigade, the
Thirty-sixth Illinois Volunteers, commanded by Captain Olsen, having
been detached to it; and after taking up another favorable position on
the line of the railroad, I was enabled to hold the enemy in check, in
spite of his desperate endeavors, until night broke in, and the bloody
drama of that day was ended.

EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF COLONEL L. P. BRADLEY,
COM^IANDING IN ROOM OF COLONEL ROBERTS.

About 8 J A. M., Colonel Roberts commanded the Twenty-second, Forty-
second, and Fifty-first Illinois to charge the enemy's columns, and
gallantly led them in person. The Forty-second and Fifty-first charged
in line, with the Twenty-second in rear of the Forty-second, at battalion
distance. These regiments went forward at the double-quick, and cleared
the wood in front of our lines, the enemy giving way before we reached
him. The line was halted, and opened fire in the timber. After some
ten minutes, the line on right giving way, we were ordered to retire to
the lane leading at nearly right angles with the pike, and take a new po-
sition. Very soon the whole brigade was moved to the left and rear, and
formed in the cedar woods, on the pike, and east of the hospital.
Houghtaling'a battery was posted so as to sweep the open ground and
timber the brigade had lately occupied. The Forty-second and 'I'weuty-

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 271

second were thrown to the left and rear of the batter^v, and the Twenty-
seventh and Fifty-first formed on the pike fronting south. The whole
command was soon hotly engaged with the enemy advancing on the east
and south.

There the brigade met its chief loss — lour hundred killed or wounded
in two hours. Colonels Roberts and Harrington fell about quarter before
11 o'clock. At this time the ammunition of the battery and of the in-
fantry was nearly exhausted. Being hard pressed by a superior force,
and nearly surrounded, it was thought necessary to retire. At about II
o'clock, 1 withdrew the Fifty-first in concert with the Twenty-seventh,
under Major Smith, both regiments moving by the right flank in good
order, lloughtaling's battery was left upon the field after firing the last
round of ammunition and losing more than half the horses; being out-
flanked on both sides, it was impossible to bring it off, in its crippled
condition. I was not informed of the fall of Colonels Roberts and Har-
rington until after the Forty-second and Twenty-second had moved.
These regiments, after suffering a loss of half their numbers, retired
toward the Nashville pike, striking it near the grounds held by General
Palmer's division, and being separated from the brigade, rej^orted to him.

The Twenty-seventh and Fifty-first were the last regiments to leave
the ground, the regiments under General Negley's command having al-
ready retired. As soon as I was informed that the command of the bri-
gade devolved on me, I sent Captain Rose, of Colonel Roberts' staff, to
report to General Sheridan for orders, and fell back through the timber
toward the pike.

Xot being able to find General Sheridan, I reported to General I^avis,
who ordered me to reinforce Colonel Harker's brigade, then engaged with
the enemy, who was endeavoring to turn our extreme right and get pos-
session of the road. I took in the Twenty-seventh and Fifty-first, in line
of battle, just as our troops were falling back in some disorder, and after
firing a volley or two, charged a rebel brigade of five regiments, routing
them completely, and taking some two hundred prisoners.

EXTRACT FROM CAPTAIN IIISCOCK'S PEPORT, CHIEF OF AR-
TILLERY, OF SHERIDAN'S DIVISION.

The events of the 31st relative to the batteries of this division are diffi-
cult to detail, but inay be made intelligible to any one conversant with the
ground or taking any part in the action. The battle opened in the divis-
ion by an attempt to carry Bush's battery. It was gallantly defended by
General Sill until his brigade was completely turned. The brave gen-
eral fell dead between the guns. The battery then fell back to the posi
tion occupied by the other batteries of the division. In the meantime,
lloughtaling's and the Missouri, firing into the enemy's ranks and bat-
teries that were engaging General Sill and General Davis, continued to
<lo fearful execution among them until the enemy, who were pui-suing

272 STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN.

General Johnson's surprised and defeated division, gained the rear of the
division, when all the batteries moved to the front, to the position just
held by the enemy, and from which the division had driven him.

EXTRACT FROM MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS' REPORT.

Between 6 and 7 a. m., the enemy having massed a heavy force on
McCook's right during the night of the 30th, attacked and drove it back,
pushing his division in pursuit in echelon and in supporting distance, until
he had gained sufficient ground to our rear to wheel his masses to the
right, and tiirow them upon the right flank of the center, at the same
moment attacking Negley and Palmer in front, with a greatly superior
force. To counteract the movements, I had ordered Rousseau to place
two brigades with a battery to the right and rear of Sheridan's division,
facing toward the west, so as to support Sheridan should he be able to
hold his ground, or to cover him should he be compelled to fall back.
About 11 o'clock, General Sheridan reported to me that his ammunition
was entirely out, and he would be compelled to fall back to get more.
As it became necessary for General Sheridan to fall, the enemy pressed
on still further to our rear, and soon took up a position which gave them
a concentrated cross-Hre of musketry and cannon on Negley's and Rous-
seau's troops at short range. This compelled me to fall back out of the
cedar woods, and take up a line along a depression in the open ground,
within good musket range of the edge of the woods, whilst the artillery
was retired to the high ground to the right of the turnpike. From this
last position we were enabled to drive back the enemy, cover the for-
mation of our troops, and secure the center on high gi'ound.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL ROUSSEAU'S REPORT.

Our lines were hardly formed before a dropping fire from the enemy
announced his approach. General McCook's troops, in a good deal of
confusion, retired through our lines and around our right, under a most
terrific fire. The enemy in pursuit furiously assailed our front, and
greatly outflanking us, passed around to our right and rear. By General
Thomas' direction, I had already ordered the artillery — Loomis' and
Guenther's batteries — to the open field in the rear. Seeing that my com-
mand was outflanked on the right, I sent orders to the brigade com-
manders to retire at once also to this field, and riding back myself, I
posted the batteries on a ridge, with open ground parallel with our line
of battle ; and as my men emerged from the woods, they were ordered
to take position on the right, in support of these batteries, which was
promptly done. We had perhaps four or five hundred yards of open
ground in our front. While the batteries were unlimbering, seeing Gen-
eral Van Cleve close by, I rode up and asked him if he would move his
command to the right, and aid in checking up the enemy by forming on

STOT^E EIVER CAMPAIG^T. 273

my right. . . . As the enemy emerged from the woods in great force,
shouting and cheering, the batteries of Guenther and Loomis, double
shotted with canister, opened upon them. They moved straight ahead
for a while, but were finally driven back with immense loss. .
Four deliberate and fiercely sustained assaults were made upon our posi-
tion, and repulsed.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL NEGLEY'S REPORT.

By 11 o'clock, Sheridan's men, with their ammunition exhausted, were
falling back. General Rousseau's reserve and General Palmer's division
had retired in rear of the cedars to form a new line. The artillery am-
munition was expended; that of the infantry reduced to a few rounds;
the artillery horses were nearly all killed or wounded. My ammunition
train had been sent back to avoid capture. A heavy column of the enemy
was marching directly to our rear through the cedars. Communication
with General Rosecrans and Thomas was entirely cut off, and it was man-
ifestly impossible for my command to hold position without eventually
making a hopeless, fruitless sacrifice of the whole division. To retire
was but to cut our way through the ranks of the enemy.

EXTRACT FROM COLONEL T. R. STANLEY'S REPORT.

At night we lay on our arms, and early on the morning of the 31st
December, our skirmishers advanced and drove the enemy's skirmishers
partly through the wo'ods on our front, and General McCook engaged
them on our right, but eventually fell back ; and then a very heavy force
was precipitated on our front and right, and on the Seventh brigade
(Miller's) to my left. This infantry force was supported by a battery on
our front, and one in intrenchments on our left, and the fire was very se-
vere; but the brigade (as also did the Seventh brigade on my left) sus-
tained the fire without falling back, and poured such a well-directed fire
upon the enemy, that they faltered, and their ranks were thinned and
stayed ; but the troops on our right and left had fallen back so far as to
bring the enemy on three sides of us, and fast closing on our rear. At
this time. General Negley directed the division to cut its way through to
join our other troops in the rear. This we did in good order, halting
at two points, and checking the enemy by a well-directed fire, which, by
this time, they had learned to fear.

EXTRACT FROM COLONEL JNO. F. MILLER'S REPORT.

The batteries were worked with admirable skill, and the firing along
our whole line was executed with creditable precision. The enemy
halted, but did not abate his fire. The roar of musketry and artillery

18

274 STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN.

now became almost deafening, and as the unequal contest progressed, it
became more terrible. Once the strong force in the open field in front
of my left wing, attempted a bayonet charge on the Twenty-first Ohio,
hut were gallantly met and repulsed with great slaughter. On one of the
flags was inscribed, " Rock City Guards." The battle continued with un-
abating fierceness on both sides, until the sixty rounds of ammunition
with which my men were supplied, was nearly exhausted. . . .

Soon after this, a heavy force was observed to advance on General
Palmer's right brigade. General Palmer's right brigade held their
ground for a short time, and then began to retire. Just at this time I re-
ceived orders from General Xegley to retire slowly with my command
into the woods. My troops were nearly out of ammunition. The enemy
was advancing on my right flank and on my left. The fire in front was
no less destructive than it had been during the engagement. . . .

While in the woods, being closely pressed in the rear, the enemy in
strong force was encountered on the line of retreat, when a destructive
fire was opened upon my column, which caused them to break to the
right. My men did not run, but marched to the pike, carrying many of
our wounded.

About 4 o'clock v. m. (Jan^^ary 2d), a furious attack was made by the
enemy upon General Beatty's (or Van Cleve's) division, then across the
river. The fire of the enemy was returned with spirit for a time, when
that division retired across the river, and retieated through my lines,
which were then formed near the bank of the river, my men laying down
partly concealed behind the crest of a small hill in the open field. . . .

My troops opened fire from the crest of the hill, the enemy halted and
began to waver. I then ordered the men forward to a rail-fence on the
bank of the river. Here a heavy fire was directed upon the enemy with
fierce effect, and although in strong force, and supported by the fire of two
batteries in the rear, he began to retreat. Believing this an opportune
moment for crossing the river, 1 ordered the troops to cross rapidlj^,
which tliey did with great gallantry, under fire from front and right flank-
, . . The enemy's batteries were posted on an eminence in the woods
near a corn-field in our front, and all this time kept up a brisk fire, but
without much eflect. His infantry retreated in great disorder, leaving
the ground covered with his dead and wounded.

When within one hundred and fifty yards of the first battery, I ordered
the Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers to charge the battery, which
was immediately done by the men of that regiment, and the Nineteenth
Illinois, Sixty-ninth Ohio, and perhaps others. The Twenty-first Ohio
coming opportunely on the left, the battery consisting of four guns was
taken and hauled off by the men.

STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN. 275

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL CRITTENDEN'S REPORT.

It was about dusk, and just at the moment when Generals Wood and
Palmer had halted to gather up their troops, that I reached the head of
my command. These two generals had their divisions in line of battle,
General Wood on the left and General Palmer on the right ; the enemjr
in sight and evidently in heavier force than we had yet encountered
them. It was evident they intended to dispute the passage of the river,
and to fight a battle at or near Murfreesboro.

At this moment I received an order to occupy Murfreesboro with one
division, camping the other two outside.

I immediately gave the order to advance, and the movement was com-
menced. General Wood was ordered to occupy the place — General Palmer
being ordered, at General Wood's suggestion, to keep in line with W ood's
division, and advance with him, until he had forced the passage of the
river. At this time it was dark. General Wood had declared, when he
received the order, that it was hazarding a great deal for very little, to
move over unknown ground in the night instead of awaiting for day-
light, and that I ought to take the responsibility of disobeying the order.
I thought the movement hazardous, but as the success of the whole army
might depend upon the prompt execution of orders by every officer, it
was my duty to advance. After General Wood had issued the order to
advance, and General Palmer had received his also, they both came to
see me, and insisted that the ordor should not be carried out. I refused
to rescind the order, but consented to suspend it for an hour, as General
Rosecrans could be heard from in that time. During the interval, the
General himself came to the front, and approved of what I had done.

In the meantime, Colonel Harker, after a sharp skirmish, gallantly
crossed the river with his brigade and Bradley's battery, and Hascall was
already in the river advancing, when the order to suspend the movement
was received. As soon as possible, I recalled Harker, and to my great
satisfaction, this able officer, with consummate address, withdrew from the
actual presence of a vastly superior force his artillery and troops, and
recrossed the river without any serious loss.

When the troops composing the center and right wing of our army
had been driven by the enemy from our original line of battle to a lino
almost perpendicular to it, the First and Second divisions of the left
wing still nobly maintained their position. Though several times as-
saulted by the enemy with great force, it was evident that it was vital to
us that this position should be held, at least until our troops, who had
been driven back, could establish themselves on their new line. The
country is deeply indebted to Generals Wood and Palmer for the sound
judgment, skill, and courage with which they managed their commands
at this important crisis of the battle.

276 STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL WOOD'S REPORT.

Again the enemy were seen concentrating large masses of troops in the
fields to the front and right, and soon these masses moved to the attack.
Estep's battery was now moved to the front to join Hascall's brigade.
The artillery in the front lines, as well as those placed in the rear of the
center and left, poured a destructive fire on the advancing foe, but on
he came until within small-arm range, when he was repulsed and driven
back. . . .

During this attack the Fifteenth Indiana, commanded by Lieutenant-
Colonel Wood, countercharged on one of the enemy's regiments and
captured one hundred and seventy-five prisoners. The capture was from
the Twentieth Louisiana. While this attack was in progress, I received
a message from General Palmer, commanding the second division of the
left wing, that he was sorely pressed, and desired that I would send him
a regiment if I could possibly spare one. I sent an order to General
Hascall to send a regiment to General Palmer's assistance, if his situation
would warrant it. He dispatched the Fifty-eighth Indiana, Colonel G. P.
Buell's regiment, to report to General Palmer. The regiment got into
position, reserved its fire iintil the enemy was in close range, and then
poured in a withering discharge, from which the foe recoiled in disorder.
Our extreme left next became the object of the enemy's attention.
Skirmishers were soon descending the slope on the opposite side of the
river, as also working their way down the stream, for the purpose, ap-
parently, of gaining our left flank and rear, A few well-directed charges
of grape and canister from Cox's battery drove them back.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL PALMER'S REPORT.

In the meantime. General Negley's command had, to some extent,
become compromised by the confusion on the right, and my first brigade
was exposed in front and flank to a severe attack which also now ex-
tended along my whole front. Orders were sent to Colonel Hazen to fall
back from the open cotton-field into which he had moved. He fell
back a short distance, and a regiment from Wood's division, which had
occupied the crest of a low wooded hill, between the pike and the rail-
road, having been removed, he took possession of that and there resisted
the enemy. Hazen, on the railroad, one or two regiments to the right,
some troops in the point of woods south of the cotton-field, and a short
distance in advance of the general line, among whom I was only able to
distinguish the gallant Colonel Whittaker and his Sixth Kentucky ; still
further to the right, Cruft was fighting, aided by Standart's guns, and to
the rear, Grose was fighting with apparently great odds against him. All
were acquitting themselves nobly, and all were hard pressed. I could
see that Grose was losing a great many men, but the importance of Ha-
zen's position determined me, if necessary, to expend the last man in
holding it. I gave my attention from that time chiefly to that point.

STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN. 277

The One Hundredth Illinois came up on the left of the railroad and
fought steadilJ^ As soon as Colonel C4rose was relieved of the enemy in
his rear, he again changed front, moved to the left, and co-operated with
Colonel Ilazen. One regiment was sent to my support from General
Wood's command, and which behaved splendidly. I regret my inability
either to name the regiment or its officers. Again and again the attack
was renewed by the enemy and each time repulsed, and the gallant men
who had so gallantly struggled to hold the position, occupied it during the
night.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL GRUFT'S REPORT.

The rear line (now^ front) was soon actively engaged. I attempted with
it to assail the enemy, and ordered an advance. The First Kentucky,
Colonel Engart on the right of the line, made a gallant charge and drove
the enemy before it, rushing to the crest of the hill, clear beyond and
to the right of the burnt house. The fire was so severe from the enemy's
force at the burnt house on the left, that the order to move uj) the Nine-
tieth Ohio was countermanded, not, however, until many of the officers
and men of this gallant regiment had pressed forward over the fence in line
with the "Old" First Kentucky. The sad list of the killed and wounded
of the Ninetieth and First regiments speaks loudly of the courage and
manhood they evinced in this charge. Standart, with his gallant gun-
ners, was throwing in grape and canister from the flanks as my men ran
forward to the charge, and thinning the enemy's ranks. He was too
strong for us, however, and soon my gallant advance was beaten back to
the point of woods. This point was still held. The brigade on the left
(Hazen's) was never pressed up to my front and left me exijosed from
this quarter. General Negley's brigade on the right first advanced
with me, but yielding to the impulsive charge of the enemy, broke u]d
and a portion of it drifted in disorder immediately to my rear, and left
me exposed to the cross-fire of the enemy from the woods on the right.
We were soon completely flanked ; our own troops impeded my retreat.
. . . The enemy's fire was ui:)on three sides of my position, and appar-
ently exactly to the rear in the woods. It was impossible to get ammu-
nition up, to communicate with the general commanding the division,
or to obtain reinforcements. In this condition the ground was still held
for some forty (40) minutes longer than seemed right or proper.

EXTRACT FROM COLONEL HAZEN'S REPORT.

The enemy now took cover in the wood, keeping up so destructive a
fire as to make it necessary to retire behind the embankments of the
railroad, which only necessitated the swinging to the rear of my right,
the left having been posted on it when the action commenced in the
morning. A sharp fight was kept up from this position till 2 p. m., when
.another assault in regular lines, supported by artillery, was made upon

278 STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN.

this .position in force. Tliis assault was resisted much more easily than
the previous ones, there being now a large force of our artillery bearing
upon this point. The enemy also extended his lines much farther to
the left, causing something of a diversion of our troops in that direction.
The One Hundredth Illinois, Colonel Bartleson, was sent to me by the Gen-
eral commanding the army, which was posted with the One Hundred and
Tenth Illinois and Ninth Indiana, in line to the front with the right
resting on the railroad. Here, with a German regiment (I think the
Second Missouri),"'^ these regiments fought the remainder of the day, the
troops previously occupying this position retiring on the last approach
of the enemy. A period of about an hour ensued, with but little infan-
try firing, but a murderous shower of shot and shell was rained from
several directions upon this position, which was covered by a thick growth
of timber. A portion of Wood's division, now commanded by General
Hascall, was also posted in these woods, in rear of my troops.

At about 4 p. M. the enemy again advanced upon my front in two lines.
The battle had hushed, and the dreadful splendor of this advance can only
be conceived, as all description must fall vastly short. His right was even
with my left, and his left was lost in the distance. He advanced steadily,
and as it seemed, certainly to victory. I sent back all of my remaining stafi
successively, to ask for support, and braced my own lines as perfectly as
possible. The Sixth Kentucky had joined me from the other side some
time previously, and was posted just over the embankment of the railroad.
They were strengthened by such fragments of troops as I could pick up
until a good line was formed along the track. A portion of Sheridan's di-
vision was also but a few hundred yards in the rear, replenishing their
boxes. A portion of General Hascall's troops was also on the right of
the railroad.

The fire of the troops was held until the enemy's right flank came in
close range, when a single fire from my men was sufficient to disperse
this portion of his lines, his left passing far round to our right. This vir-
tually ended the fight of the day. My brigade rested where it had
fought, not a stone's throw from where it was posted in the morning, till
withdrawn at dawn of next dav.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL HASCALL'S REPORT.

I now took a survey of the situation, and found that along the entire
line to the right and left of the railroad, which had not yet been carried
by the enemy, I was the only general officer present, and was therefore in
command, and responsible for the conduct of affairs. Colonel Hazen,
commanding a brigade in General Palmer's division, was present Avith
his brigade to the left of the railroad, and Colonel Grose, commanding
another brigade in the same division, was also present with what there
was left of his brigade, and most nobly did he co-operate with me. with

*This regiment belonged to Schaefer's brigade of Sheridan's division.

STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN.

279

the vSixth and Twenty-fourth Ohio, to the right of the railroad ; while
Colonel Wagner, commanding the Second brigade in the First divison
("Wood's), left wing, nobly sustained his front, assisted by Colonel Ilazen,
to the left of the railroad. I now relieved the Third Kentucky regiment,
who were nearly annihilated and out of ammunition, with the Fifty-
eighth Indiana regiment of my brigade, commanded by CoJonel George
P. Buell ; and this being a much larger regiment than the Third Ken-
tucky, filled up the entire space from where the right of the Third Ken-
tucky rested to the railroad. I then threw forward the right of the Sixth
Ohio regiment, of Colonel Grose's brigade, which was on the right of
Twenty-sixth Ohio, so that its line of battle was more nearly perpendic-
ular to the railroad, and so its fire would sweep the front of the Twenty-
sixth Ohio and Fifty-eighth Indiana, and supported the Sixth Ohio with
Estep's battery on a little eminence to its right, and brought up the
Ninety-seventh Ohio (Colonel Lane) fromWagner's brigade, tostill further
strengthen the right. This disposition being made, I galloped a little to
the rear, and found General Eosecrans, and called his attention to the
importance of the position I was holding, and the necessity of keeping
it supported. He rode to the front with me, approved the disposition I
"had made, spoke a few words pf encouragement to the men, cautioning
them to hold their fire till the enemy got well up, and had no sooner re-
tired than the enemy emerged from the woods and over the hill, and were
moving upon us again in splendid style and in immense force.

EXTRACT FROM COLONEL WAGNER'S REPORT.

Learning that General Hascall, on the right of the road, was hard
pressed, I sent the Ninety-seventh Ohio to reinforce him, which did good
service, as they took position on the flank, and were sheltered by the na-
ture of the ground from the fire of the enemy, and which prevented the
enemy from raking our lines from the woods on the right. Colonel
Lane maintained this position throughout the clay. The enemy, at this
time, had gained the woods on this side of the river, and I ordered the
Fifteenth Indiana, supported by the Fifty-seventh Indiana, to advance to
meet them. ... I preferred making the attack myself rather than
waiting an assault from them. I ordered forward the Fifteenth Indiana,
supported by the Fifty-seventh Indiana, being all the troops I had on
hand, the Fortieth Indiana being engaged on the right of the railroad,
with the left resting on the river, so as to completely enfilade the enemy's
line. At this time. Colonel Ilines and Lieutenant-Colonel Leonard, of
the Fifty-seventh Indiana, were severely wounded, and had to leave the
field. From this position, I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, command-
ing Fifteenth Indiana Volunteers, to charge the enemy at a double-quick,
and nobly did his men execute the order, killing, wounding, and captur-
ing nearly one entire regiment, and driving two others in utter rout from
the field, and nobly was the movement seconded by the Fifty-seventh
Indiana. Although they had lost all their field officers, they poured vol-

280 STONE RIVEE CAMPAIGN.

ley after volley into the enemy, thereby aiding greatly to the success of
the movement. Captain Cox's battery gave them the last shot in the
locker, thereby making the rout complete. The Fifteenth Indiana lost
in this charge about thirty killed and near one hundred wounded ; but
the rebels were not j'et whipped, as they returned again in force, my in-
fantry slowly retiring, and fighting their way back. By this time, we were
prepared for their reception, as Captain Cox had procured some ammuni-
tion, and I had ordered Lieutenant Estep's battery into position with four
guns. When the enemy came within canister range, they were literally
swept away, and driven back in confusion .

EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT OF CAPTAIN JNO. MENDEN
HALL, CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, TO GENERAL CRITTENDEN.

About 4 p. M.. whilst riding along the pike with General Crittenden, we
heard heavy firing of artillery and musketry on the left. We at once
rode briskly over, and arriving upon the hill near the ford, saw our in-
fantry retiring before the enemy. The general asked me if I could not
do something to relieve Colonel Beatty with my guns. Captain Swallow
had already opened with his battery. I ordered Lieutenant Parsons to
move a little forward, and open with his guns, then rode back to Lieuten-
ant Estep, with his Eighth Indiana battery. Meeting Captain Morton
with his brigade of pioneers, he asked for advioe, and I told him to move
briskly forward with his brigade, »nd send his battery to the crest of the
hill near the batteries already engaged. The Eighth Indiana battery took
position to the right of Lieutenant Parsons. Seeing that Lieutenant
Osborn was in position (between Lieutenants Parsons and Estep), I rode
to Lieutenant Stevens (Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania battery), and directed
him to change front, to file to the left with his pieces. He took position
covering the ford. I found that Captain Bradley had anticipated my
wishes, and had changed front to fire to the left, and opened upon the
enemy. This battery was near the railroad. Lieutenant Livingston's
Third Wisconsin battery, which was across the river, opened upon the
advancing enemy, and continued to fire till he thought he could no
longer maintain his position, when he crossed over, one section at a time,
and opened fire again. The firing ceased about dark.

During this terrible encounter of little more than an hour in duration,
forty-three pieces of artilleiy belonging to the left wing, the Board of
Trade battery of six guns, and the batteries of General Negley's divis-
ion, about nine guns, making a total of about fifty-eight pieces, opened
fire upon the enemy. The enemy soon retired, our troops following.
Three batteries of the left wing, besides those of General Davis, crossed
the river in pursuit.

STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN. 281

Eoster of the Fourteenth Array CoriDS, or Army of the Cumberland,
Major-General W. S. Eosecrans commanding, at the Battle
of Stone Eiver.

lOth Ohio Kegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Burke commanding, Headquarters
Guard.

Right Winy.
MAJOE-GENEKAL A. McD. McCOOK commanding.

First Division.
Brigadier-General Jeff. C. Davis commanding.
First Brigade-
Colonel S. PobT commanding.
59tli Illinois Kegiment, Captain H. E. Paine commanding.
22d Indiana Eegiment, Colonel Gooding, Commanding.
74th Illinois Kegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Marsh commanding.
75th Illinois Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Bennett commanding.
5th Wisconsin Battery, Captain 0. E. Pinney commanding.

Second Brigade.
Colonel W. P. Carlin com,7nanding.
21st Illinois Kegiment, Colonel W. S. Alexander commanding.
38th Illinois Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel D. H. Gilmer commanding.
15th Wisconsin Kegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel David McKee commanding.
101st Ohio Kegiment, Colonel L. Stern commanding.
2d Minnesota Battery, Captain W. A. Hotchkiss commanding.

Third Brigade.
Colonel W. E. Woodruff commanding
25th Illinois Eegiment, Colonel T. D. Williams commanding.
35th Illinois Kegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel W. P» Chandler commanding.
81st Indiana Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel .lohn Timberlake commanding.
8th Wisconsin Battery, Captain S. .1. Carpenter commanding.

Second Division.
Brigadier-General K. W. Johnson commanding.
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General A. Willich commanding.
49th Ohio Regiment, Colonel W. H. Gibson commanding.
15th Ohio Regiment, Colonel Wm. Wallace commanding.
39th Indiana Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel E. W. Jones commanding.
32d Indiana Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel E. Erdelmeyer commanding.
89th Illinois Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Hotchkiss commanding.
"A" 1st Ohio Battery, Captain W. F. Goodspeed commanding.

282 STONE RIVER CAMPAIGN-.

Second Brigade.
Brtgadiek-General E. N. Kirk commanding.
77th Pennsylvania Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel P. B. Houssum commanding.
29tli Indiana Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel D. M. Dunn commanding.
Both Indiana Eegiment, Colonel J. B. Dodge commanding.
79th Illinois Eegiment, Major Allen Buckner commanding.
Sith Illinois Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel H. W. Bristol commanding.
20th Ohio Battery Captain W. P. Edgarton commanding.

Third Brigade.
CoLONKL P. P. Baldwin commanding.
6th Indiana Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Tripp coramanding.
1st Ohio Eegiment, 3Iajor J. A. Stafford commanding.
93d Ohio Eegiment, Colonel Charles Anderson commanding.
5th Kentucky Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel "SYm. W. Berry commanding,
6th Indiana Battery, Captain P. Simonson commanding.

Tliird Division.
Brigadier-General P. H. Sheridan comm,anding
First Brigade.
Brigadier-General J. W. Sill co^nmandfng.
o6th Illinois Eegiment, Colonel IST. Grensel commanding.
88th Illinois Eegiment, Colonel P. T. Sherman commanding.
24th Wisconsin Eegiment, Major E. C. Hibhard commanding.
21st Michigan Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel W. B. McCreary commanding.
''G" Battery, 1st Missouri, Captain H. Hescock commanding.

Second Brigade.
Colonel P. Schaefer commanding.
2d Missouri Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel B. Laiboldt commanding,
loth Missouri Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel John Weter commanding.
44th Illinois Eegiment, Captain Yv". W. Barrett commanding.
73d Illinois Eegiment, Major W. A. Pressen commanding.
" C " Battery, 1st Illinois, Captain C. Houghtaling commanding.

Third Brigade.
Colonel G. W. Egberts commanding.
22d Illinois Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Swanvick commanding.
27th Illinois Eegiment, Colonel F. A. Harrington commanding.
42d Illinois Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel N. H. Walworth commanding.
51st Illinois Eegiment, Colonel L. P. Bradley commanding.
4th Indiana Battery, Captain A. K. Cush commanding.

Center.
MAJOE-GENEEAL GEOEGE H. THOMAS commanding.
9th Michigan Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel T. G. Parkhurst commanding. Head-
quarters and Provost Guard.

STONE EIYEE CAMPAIGN. 283

First Division.
Brigadier-General L. H. Eousseau commanding.

First Brigade.
Colonel B. F. Scribner commanding.
38tli Indiana Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel D. F. Griffin commanding.
94th Ohio Eegiment, Colonel J. W. Frizell commanding.
2d Ohio Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel John Kell commanding.
33d Ohio Eegiment, Captain E. J. Ellis commanding.
10th "Wisconsin, Colonel A. E. Chapin commanding.

Second Brigade.
Colonel John. Beattt commanding.
15th Kentucky Eegiment, Colonel J. B. Foreman commanding.
3d Ohio Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel O. A. Lawson commanding.
10th Ohio Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Burke commanding.
42d Indiana Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Shanklin commanding.
88th Indiana Eegiment, Colonel George Humphrey commanding.
1st Michigan Battery, Lieutenant G. W. Van Pelt commanding.

Third Brigade.
Colonel J. C. Starkweather commanding.
79th Pennsylvania Eegiment, Colonel H. A. Hambright commanding.
1st Wisconsin Eegiment, Colonel G. B. Bingham commanding.
21st Wisconsin Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel H. C Hobart commanding.
24th Illinois Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Mihalotzy commanding.

Fourth Brigade.
Lieutenant-Colonel O. L. Shepherd commanding,
1st Bat., 15th U. S. Infantry, Major J. F. King commanding.
1st Bat., ICth U. S. Infantry, Major A. J. Slemmer commanding.
1st Bat., 18th U. S. Infantry, 3Iajor Fred. Townsend commanding.
2d Bat., 18th U. S. Infantry, Major J. N. Caldwell commanding.
1st. Bat., 19th U. S. Infantry, Major D. D. Carpenter commanding.
Co. "H" Battery, 5th U. S. Artillery, Lieutenant F. L. Guenther commanding.

Second Division.
Brigadier-General J. S. Negley commanding.

First Brigade.
Brigadier-General J. G. Spears cominanding.
1st East Tennessee Eegiment, Colonel E. K. Byrd commanding.
2d East Tennessee Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Melton commanding.
85th Illinois Eegiment, Colonel E. S. Moore commanding.
14th Michigan Eegiment, Colonel H. K. Mizner commanding.
10th Wisconsin Battery (two sections), Captain Y. V. Beebe commanding.

284 STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN.

Second Brigade.
Colonel T. E. Stanley commanding.
18th Ohio Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Given commanding.
69th Ohio Eegiment, Colonel W. B. ('assilly commanding.
19th Ohio Eegiment, Colonel J. E. Scott commanding.
11th Michigan Eegiment, Colonel W. L. Stoughton commanding.
Battery " M," 1st Ohio, Captain F. Schultz commanding.

Third Brigade.
Colonel J. F. Miller commanding.
78th Pennsylvania Eegiment, Colonel AV. Sirwell commanding.
21st Ohio Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. ISTeibling commanding.
74th Ohio Eegiment, Colonel G. Moody commanding.
87th Indiana Eegiment, Colonel J. S. Hull commanding.
1st Kentucky Battery, Lieutenant A. A. Ellsworth commanding.
Battery " G," 1st Ohio, Lieutenant A. Marshall commanding.

Third Division.
Brigadier-General S. S. Fry commanding.
First Brigade.
Colonel M. B. Walker commanding.
17th Ohio Eegiment, Colonel J. M. Connell commanding.
81st Ohio Eegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Lister commanding.
38th Ohio Eegiment, Colonel E. H. Phelps commanding.
82d Indiana Eegiment, Colonel M. C. Hunter commanding.
4th Michigan Battery, Captain J. W. Church commanding.

STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN. 285

Third Brigade.
Colonel C. G. Harker commanding.
51st Indiana Kegiment, Colonel A. D. Streight commanding.
13th Michigan Kegiment, Colonel M. Shoemaker commanding.
73d Indiana Kegiment, Colonel G. Hathaway commanding.
64th Ohio Kegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Mcllvaine commanding.
65th Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel A,Cassil commanding.
6th Ohio Battery, Captain C. Bradley commanding.

Second Division.
Brigadier-Gen eral J. M. Palmer commanding.

First Brigade.
Brigadier-General Charles Cruft commanding.
1st Kentucky Kegiment, Colonel D. A. Enyart commanding.
2d Kentucky Kegiment, Colonel T. G. Sedgwick commanding.
31st Indiana Kegiment, Colonel J. Osborne commanding.
90th Ohio Regiment, Colonel I. N. Ross commanding.
Battery " B," 1st Ohio, Captain W. E. Standart commanding.

Second Brigade.
Colonel W. B. Hazen commanding.
41st Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wiley commanding.
6th Kentucky Regiment, Colonel W. C. Whitaker commanding.
9th Indiana Regiment, Colonel W. H. Lake commanding.
110th Illinois Regiment, Colonel T. S. Casey commanding.
Battery "F," 1st Ohio, Captain G. J. Cockerill commanding.

Third Brigade.
Colonel W. Grose commanding.

80th Indiana Regiment, Major Kinley commanding.

6th Ohio Regiment, Colonel N. L. Anderson commanding.

24th Oliio Regiment, Colonel P. C. Jones commanding.

84th Illinois Regiment, Colonel L. H. "Waters commanding.

23d Kentucky Regiment, Major T. H. Hamrick commanding.

Batteries "H" and "M," 4th U. S. Artillery, forming battalion; Lieutenants
H. C. Cashing and H. A. Huntington commanding batteries ; Lieutenant C. C.
Parsons commanding battalion.

Third Division.
Brigadier-General H. P. Van Cleve commanding.
First Brigade.
Colonel Samuel Beatty commanding.
19th Ohio Regiment, Major C. P. Manderson commanding.
9th Kentucky Regiment, Colonel B. C. Gridcr commanding.
11th Kentucky Regiment, Major E. L. Moutley commanding.
79th .Indiana Regiment, Colonel Fred. Knefler commanding.
26th Pennsylvania Battery, Lieutenant A. J. Stevens commanding.

286 STONE EIVER CAMPAIGN.

Second Brigade.
Colonel J. P. PTrrE cornmanding.
44th Indiana Kegiment, Colonel W. C. Williams commanding.
86tli Indiana Kegiment, Colonel A. S. Hamilton commanding.
13th Ohio Eegiment, Colonel J. G. Hawkins commanding.
69th Ohio Kegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. Howard commanding.
7th Indiana Battery, Captain G. K. Swallow commanding.

Third Brigade.
Colonel S. W. Price commanding.
51st Ohio Kegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. McClain commanding.
99th Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Cummins commanding.
35th Indiana Kegiment, Colonel B. F. Mullen commanding.
8th Kentucky Kegiment, Major G. B. Broddus commanding.
21st Kentucky Kegiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Evans commanding.
3d "Wisconsin Battery, Lieutenant C. Livingston commanding.

Cavalry.

BKIGADIEK-GENERAL D. S. STANLEY commanding.

Colonel Jno. Kennett commanding First Division.

First Brigade.

Colonel R. H. G. Mintt commatiding.

3d Kentucky Cavalry, Colonel E. H. Murray commanding.

4th Michigan Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Dickinson commanding.

7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Major Jno. E. Wynkoop commanding.

Second Brigade.
Colonel Lewis Zahm commanding.
1st Ohio Cavalry, Colonel Minor Milliken commanding.
3d Ohio Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel D. A. 3Iurray commanding.
4th Ohio Cavalry, Major J. L. Pugh commanding.

The Reserve.
General Stanley, commanding in person.
15th Pennsylvania, Anderson Troop, Colonel Wm. J. Palmer commanding.
1st Middle Tennessee Cavalry, Colonel W. B. Stokes commanding.
2d East Tennessee Cavalry, Colonel J. P. T. Carter Commanding
Battalion of 3d Indiana Cavalry, Major R. Kline commanding.
Battery "D," 1st Ohio Artillery, Lieutenant N. W. Newell commanding.
4th U. S. Cavalry, Captain Elmer Otis commanding, Body-guard to the Gen-
eral commanding the Army.

CHAPTER XVIIL

OPERATIONS DURING THE ARMY's ENCAMPMENT OF SIX MONTHS
AT MURFREESBORO.

On the 5th of January, the Army of the Cumberland went
into position iu the vicinity of Murfreesboro. General
Thomas, by direction, placed his divisions on the Woodbury,
Bradyville, Manchester, and Shelb3rville turnpikes; General
McCook posted his forces from the Shelbyville road across the
Salem turnpike to Stone river, where his right rested, and
General Crittenden disposed his command from General
Thomas' left so as to cover the Liberty and Lebanon turn-
pikes, resting his left on Stone river.

Thus located, attention was first given to the recuperation
and reinforcement of the arm}^ The slightly wounded were
sent to ]!:^ashville and farther north as fast as possible, while
the severely wounded were placed in the public buildings of
Murfreesboro not occupied by the enemy as hospitals, and in
large field hospitals in the vicinity of the town.

Until the railroad to l!^ashville was put in running order,
wagon trains were the sole dependence for supplies. The con-
tingencies of bad weather and bad roads, and the vastness of
the daily demand, forbade a full commissariat or the rapid re-
clothing of the troops.

By authority of general order No. 9, war department,
January 9, 1863, the troops of the Army of the Cumberland
were organized into three corps d'armee, designated the Four-
teenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first, corresponding in the main
to the former grand divisions of " Center," Right and Left
"Wings, without change of commanders. During the month of
January, General Steedman's division, formerly under com-

(287)

288 SIX MONTHS AT MURFREESBORO.

mand of General Fry, moved from Gallatin and took post at
Antioch Cliurch on Mill creek, near Il^asliville, and at La
Yergne, and General Reynolds' division advanced from the
same place to Murfreesboro.

The objects proposed for attainment, while the army v^as in
camp at Murfreesboro, were the fortification of the place, the
complete re-equipment and reorganization of the troops, gen-
eral preparation for a summer campaign, the greatest possible
restraint to the enemy north of Duck river, and the greatest
possible injury to him south of that stream.

Soon after the occupation of Murfreesboro, the most elab-
orate fortifications were projected, and their construction com-
menced, and were completed during the six months of
comparative inactivity which followed. Earthworks of the
strongest type were thrown up on the high ground between
the town and Stone river, on each side of the railroad and
]!*5"ashville turnpike, and on the elevated ground north of the
river. These heavy works were commanded in turn by a suc-
cession of forts which ofi'ered vulnerable sides to the great
central fortress. And besides the heavy forts and intrench-
ments, there was a circumvallation in front of the extended
camps of the army. These defenses subsequently furnished
refuge for troops stationed for the protection of communi-
cations and the depot of supplies at Murfreesboro, but no
great army ever had an opportunity of repelling a greater
army through their friendly help.

January 25th, by order of the war department, Forts
Henry and Donelson were transferred from General Grant to
General Rosecrans, and subsequently the order was amended
to include Fort Heiman. This change placed the Cumberland
river in the care of General Rosecrans (being one of the two
channels of supply connecting his primary and proximate
depots) and appropriately threw upon him the responsibility
of maintaining the open navigation of this river.

l^o general engagement being imminent, the enemy's cav-
alry was exceedinly active in embarrassing the concentration
of divisions, and in expeditions against the communications of
the army. About the last of January, General "WTieeler
having under his command his own cavalry and the troopers

SIX MONTHS AT MUEFREESBOEO. 289

of Forrest and Wliarton, appeared at Triune, in rear of fhe
army. Having received early intelligence of his movement,
General Rosecrans directed General Davis, with his division
and two brigades of cavalry, under Colonel Minty, to move
by the Versailles turnpike to the rear of Wlieeler. He also
directed General Steedman to keep watch toward Triune.
General Davis, upon arrival at the junction of the Versailles
and Eagleville roads, dispatched Colonel Minty to move round
by way of Unionville and Rover, while he advanced directly
to Eagleville, reaching there on the evening of the 31st. At
Rover, Colonel Minty captured a regiment numbering three
hundred and fifty men. Afterward, the pursuing forces con-
centrated at Franklin to intercept the enemy. General Davis
divided his command and moved upon different routes, and
General Steedman advanced to l^olensville and thence to
Franklin. But Wheeler eluded the infantry and cavalry, and
appeared before Fort Donelson on the 3d of February. This
post was held by seven hundred men under Colonel A. C.
Harding, Eighty-third Illinois. Wheeler made repeated
attacks, but was as often repulsed, with a total loss of two
hundred men killed, six hundred wounded, and one hundred
captured. Colonel Harding had thirteen killed, fifty wounded,
and twenty captured. Shortly after dark, several gunboats
convoying a large fleet of transports laden with troops on their
way to reinforce General Rosecrans, arrived at Fort Donelson,
when Wheeler at once retreated. Before morning, Colonel
Lowe arrived from Fort Henry, and from all quarters efforts
were made to intercept the enemy. Colonel Lowe sent his
cavalry in direct pursuit, and General Davis, at Franklin,
having been reinforced by five hundred cavalry, under General
Morgan, made effort to cut him off in his retreat. He gave
chase with Morgan's and Minty's cavalry, but Wheeler moved
far to the west and avoided him altogether, crosssing Duck
river at Centerville. All the troops that had been directed
against Wlieeler resumed their previous stations, except Gen-
eral Steedman's command, which remained at the front.

The troops that reached Fort Donelson, February 3d, com-
prised eighteen regiments of infantry and four batteries of ar-
19

290 SIX MONTHS AT MURFREESBORO.

tillery, having recently been designated the " Army of Ken-
tucky," under the immediate command of Brigadier- Generals
C. C Gilbert, A. Baird, and George Crook, but under the gen-
eral command of Major-General Gordon Granger, who was still
at Louisville. From Fort Donelson they steamed to Nashville.
These forces, with two regiments of infantry and four of cav-
alry, which soon after joined them by rail and boat at ISTash-
ville, numbered in the aggregate about fourteen thousand men.
The appearance of the fleet approaching Nashville was exceed-
ingly imposing. The river below the city is tortuous, and the
line of gunboats and steamboats, whose decks were covered
with troops with arms and banners, revealing its winding length,
formed a pageant of wonderful grandeur. The unfriendly citi-
zens of Nashville were forced to contrast this revelation of
power and splendor with the confusion and dismay which
reigned when the retreat of Johnston's army through their
streets left them defenseless.

The reinforcements gradually took position in the front.
February 12th, General Gilbert moved with his brigade to
Franklin ; on the 24th, General Crook embarked with his and
proceeded up the Cumberland to Carthage, Tennessee, where
he debarked and took position, and on the 3d of March, Gen-
eral G. C. Smith advanced from Nashville to Brentwood with
the cavalry of General Granger's command.

March 4th, General Rosecrans ordered a general reconnois-
sance to ascertain the strength of the enemy in his front. Gen-
eral Sheridan, with four brigades of infantry and Minty's cav-
alry, moved from Murfreesboro toward Rover. When near
the latter place he turned toward Eagleville with the infantry,
giving the direct road to the cavalry. Colonel Minty found
four hundred of the enemy's cavalry at Rover; drove them
upon another force of six hundred at Unionville, and having
routed the whole, pushed them to Shelbyville, capturing fifty-
two prisoners, some wagons and mules. He then joined Sher-
idan at Eagleville. General Steedman, with his entire com-
mand, moved from Nolensville, through Triune and Harpeth,
toward Chapel Hill, meeting and driving back Roddy's cavalry.

The same day (March 4th), General Gilbert sent an expe-
dition under Colonel John Coburn, of the Thirty-third Indi-

SIX MONTHS AT MUEFREESBORO. 291

ana, south from Franklin. The objects were to form a junction
with a column moving toward Columbia from Murfreesboro,
and the collection of forage to fill a train of eighty wagons.
Colonel Coburn's command embraced his own regiment, the
Thirty-third Indiana; the Eighty -fifth Indiana; the Nineteenth
and Twenty-second Michigan ; six hundred cavalry under Col-
onel Thomas J. Jordan, comprising a detachment from his own
regiment, the IS'inth Pennsylvania Cavalry, one from the Sec-
ond Michigan, and another from the Fourth Kentucky ; and
Aleshire's Eighteenth Ohio battery. The total strength of the
force was two thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven.

Colonel Coburu was directed by General Gilbert to advance
the first day to Spring Hill, and divide his force on the second,
sending one fraction to Rally Hill to meet the column from
Murfreesboro, and the other toward Columbia, each to return
to Spring Hill at night, unless the former should meet the ex-
pected column.

Colonel Jordan moved in advance of the infantry, and met
the enemy about three miles from Franklin, moving north.
Both forces quickly formed lines of battle, but Colonel Jor-
dan was first in readiness for action, and Aleshire opened with
his guns. After a sharp conflict for some hours, the enemy
withdrew and retreated toward Spring Hill. The next morn-
ing the column advanced, but before reaching Thompson's
Station the enemy was again found, and this time in position.
There were rumors of other forces on the left flank, and some
troops were in sight on high ground in proximity, in that
direction. Colonel Jordan charged the enemy on a line of
hills in front of the station, with his men dismounted, when a
new position was taken on another range of hills beyond the
station. Colonel Coburn pursued to the vicinity of the sta-
tion, where the column was arrested by shells from a battery
on a hill to the left, and soon by the flre of another on the
right, which, from the direction of the advance, enfiladed the;
line. Colonel Coburn had, the day before and that morning,
advised Gen. Gilbert of these indications and of direct infor-
mation that he was meeting the enemy in strong force ; yet, as
his orders had not been modified, he determined to advance and
charge the annoying battery on the right. He placed his o\vn

292 SIX MONTHS AT MURFREESBOEO.

battery by sections on opposite sides of the turnpike and rail-
road, whicb are separated by a narrow space ; placed the cav-
alry in immediate support, and disposed three regiments for
the attack — his fourth, the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth
Ohio, being in the rear to guard the train. The line advanced
under the fire of both batteries, when suddenly they ceased
firing, and the enemy's infantry was seen in motion to attack.
The situation was now fully developed. There was infantry
with the two batteries, while cavalry was reported on the left
and rear. Colonel Coburn now resolved to retreat ; but it was
necessary first to repel the enemy. After some sharp fighting
in front, the retrograde movement was commenced from the
midst of large forces of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Colo-
nel Jordan was directed to collect his command and cover the
retreat, who, soon seeing the infantry of the enemy moving to
his rear to cut him oft", ordered the battery to move to the rear,
and dismounted the detachments of Majors Scranton and
Jones to hold the enemy in check to enable Captain Aleshire
to save his battery, and then effect a junction with the infan-
try regiments to the east. But the cavalry and infantry were
here separated. The infantry regiments, by changing front to
resist attacks from various directions, moved backward and to
the east. The cavalry, artillery, and the One Hundred and
Twenty-fourth Ohio, which, upon being threatened by the
enemy, retreated with the train, followed the turnpike road.
Colonel Jordan deemed it vain to attempt to resist the heavy
masses of the enemy, and Colonel Coburn finding himself in a
short time surrounded, surrendered the three regiments with
him. The other forces escaped. His loss was forty killed,
one hundred and fifty wounded, and thirteen hundred surren-
dered, including his wounded. The reported loss of the enemy
was one hundred and fifty killed and four hundred and fifty
wounded.

The enemy's force, under Generals Van Dorn and Wheeler,
was fourteen or fifteen thousand strong, and the surrender,
after Colonel Coburn had gone into the midst of this army
and had been turned to the east of the road, was doubtless a
necessity. He went forward against his own convictions, be-

SIX MONTHS AT MURFREESBORO. 293

cause liis orders were not changed. An earlier retreat miglit
liave saved his command.

The reports of Colonels Coburn and Jordan are conflicting
as to the exact situation when the latter commenced to retreat.
Colonel Jordan asserted that his retreat was necessary to save
himself from being cut off by a force moving to his rear, west
of the road, which was the direct line for the retrograde move-
ment, and that the situation was then hopeless, as it was vain
1o resist an army. Colonel Coburn had hope of saving his
whole force if its unity had not been broken.

In the meanwhile. General Sheridan had taken position at
the junction of the Chapel Hill and Shelbyville turnpikes,
xmd General Steedman had pushed the enemy's cavalry, under
Roddy, south through Chapel Hill and across Duck river, cap-
turing sixty men and eighty horses. General Steedman then
mtrenched himself at Triune.

Upon receiving information of Colonel Coburn's defeat and
surrender. General Granger threw General Baird's brigade into
Franklin from ISTashville by rail, and followed in person.

March 6th, Colonel Jones' brigade, supported by Colonel
ITeg's, drove the enemy out of Middleton, when both brigades
returned to Murfreesboro.

The same day. General Granger brought forward his cavalry,
under General Smith, from Brentwood, to join a co-operative
movement against General Yan Dorn. The next day. General
Sheridan closed up on Franklin, and a brigade arrived from
Nashville. General Steedman was now threatened by some
six thousand cavalry, but upon the arrival of two regiments
from La Yergne, the enemy retired toward College Grove.
Two days later. Colonel Minty moved to Franklin, and the
day following, General Granger, with his own and Sheridan's
and Minty's troops, advanced from Franklin and drove Yan
Dorn from Spring Hill. At the same time. General Davis
was thrown forward from Salem to Eagleville, to relieve Gen-
eral Stcedman's front, and General R. S. Granger was posted
at Yersailles, in his support. On the 10th, General Davis
closed upon General Steedman at Triune, and General Gordon
Granger drove Yan Dorn across Rutherford's creek, near Co-
lumbia. The day following, General Granger's cavalry hav-

294 SIX MONTHS AT MUEFREESBOEO.

ing crossed the stream several miles above, advanced almost
to Columbia, but the high water prevented the passage of the
infantry and artillery. This movement terminated this gen-
eral and complicated reconnoissance, when all the various com-
mands engaged in it returned to their former respective posi-
tions. It was developed that the enemy was in strong resist-
ing force at various points, but no special knowledge of
General Bragg's aggregate strength was gained.

March 5th, General Eosecrans ordered Colonel H. P. Lyon
to abandon Fort Henry and transfer the garrison to Fort
Donelson. A few days later, Fort Heiman was also abandoned,
and its garrison, under Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick, was with-
drawn to Fort Donelson. The latter fort was strengthened to
give greater security to the navigation of the Cumberland river.

During the spring and early summer, the Confederate gen-
erals, Morgan and Forrest, were very active, the former operat-
ing to the east of Murfreesboro and the latter to the west.
Their frequent appearance in the vicinity of outposts of the
army provoked several efforts to punish them for their
audacity.

March 18th, Colonel A. S. Hall was sent from Murfreesboro,
with the second brigade of General Eeynolds' division, to look
after Morgan to the northeast. He advanced beyond States-
ville, and learning that ISIorgan was preparing to attack him
he retreated to Milton, and posting his brigade on a hill in the
vicinity, awaited his assault. Morgan's superior numbers gave
him strong assurance of success, and though meeting a more
stubborn resistance than he antisipated, assaulted Hall's com-
mand first on both flanks, and then in turn on left, right, and
rear, but was repulsed throughout the engagement, which
lasted three and a half hours. Morgan left four hundred men
on the field, of whom over sixty had been killed. Colonel
Hall had six men killed and forty wounded. This was the
most decided failure that ISIorgan had yet made. His policy,
always, was to attack only when he had such advantage as to
assure his success, and he no doubt supposed, as the usual con-
dition was palpable, he would attain the common result.

On the 1st of April, General Morgan was driven from his
stronghold at Snow Hill by General Stanley. He left his dead

SIX MONTHS AT MURFREESBORO. 295

on the field and fled toward McMinnville. General Stanley
returned to Mnrfreesboro with forty prisoners and three hun-
dred horses and mules.

On the 25th of March, General Forrest captured at Brent-
wood, after a short engagement, about four hundred men of
the Twenty-second "Wisconsin regiment, under Lieutenant-
Colonel Bloodgood. He also captured, at a stockade south of
Brentwood, a detachment of the Nineteenth Michigan. Gen-
eral Smith at the time was moving with about six hundred
cavalry to the support of Colonel Bloodgood, and pursued the
enemy. He overtook Colonel Biffle's regiment four miles
from Brentwood, inflicted a severe loss upon it, and recaptured
considerable property, but was compelled to retreat before
Forrest's whole command,

April 7th, General Rosecrans organized a provisional brigade
of seventeen Inindrcd men for independent service, and as-
signed Colonel A. D. Streight to its command, with instructions
to repair to Nashville and prepare to make an expedition into
Alabama and Georgia to interrupt communications and de-
stroy property of all kinds useful to the enemy. Having ob-
tained a partial supply of unserviceable mules. Colonel Streight
proceeded to Palmyra, and thence across to Fort Henry, gather-
ing on the way as many serviceable animals as possible. At
Fort Henry he embarked for Eastport, Mississippi. He left
that point on the 21st, reached Tuscumbia on the 24th, and
moved thence on the 26th for Moulton. Leaving that place at
midnight on the 28th, he pressed forward through Day's Gap
toward Blountsville. "While passing through the Gap, his rear-
guard was attacked by Forrest's cavalry. The enemy fol-
lowed him through Blountsville, Gadsden, and on toward Rome.
He defeated Forrest repeatedly, but his men and his animals
becoming jaded, he lost heavily by capture. "With diminished
ranks and in almost utter destitution of serviceable ammuni-
tion,* he moved on, and crossed the Chattooga river, in hope
of destroying the bridge at Rome. But in this he failed, as
the enemy pressed upon him so closely that his men became
exhausted, and many having been already killed and captured,

*His ammunition had been injured by fording streams.

296 SIX MONTHS AT MUEFREESBORO.

aud there being no hope of accomplishing the object of his ex-
pedition, he surrendered to Forrest on the 3d of May. This
enterprise was boldly conceived, and there was no lack of
bravery and energy in its conduct, but the contingencies were
not clearly apprehended, and the actual results did not com-
pensate for the loss of so many men and so much material.
But failure though it was, it was the type of enterprises which,
undertaken under better conditions, resulted in brilliant suc-
cess. It was a mistake to start with a half supply of poor
animals, depending mainly upon captures to mount half his
command at the start. This plan caused delay in starting,
and the result was that the enemy was encountered in superior
numbers soon after Colonel Streight had passed beyond the
reach of support. The enemy's partisan leaders in their raids
in Tennessee and Kentucky had citizens of these states for
soldiers, could always depend upon the friendship and assist-
ance of a large portion of the inhabitants, and, besides, were
themselves thoroughly acquainted with the country, and con-
sequently were hardly ever ignorant of the strength of the
forces operating against them, or of the short routes to safety.
The conditions of success were very different subsequently,
when the national forces undertook to interrupt the enemy's
communications and make destructive raids. Such enterprises
were given an unheralded start, and were prepared for quick
movement, or else had such strength as to defy ordinary op-
position. These conditions were wanting in Colonel Streight's
adventure.

On the 9th of April, General Stanley moved from Mur-
freesboro, through Triune, to support General Granger at
Franklin, who was threatened by about nine thousand
cavalry and two regiments of infantry under General Yan
Dorn. General Granger's forces numbered about five thou-
sand infantry and two thousand seven hundred cavalry. His
infantry were posted on the south bank of the Harpeth river,
and General Smith's cavalry had been sent to reinforce the
garrison at Brentwood. The enemy suffered severe loss in ap-
proaching Franklin, inflicted by the Fortieth Ohio Infantry,
which resisted very stubbornly as it slowly retreated. General
Stanley crossed tlie river and struck the enemy in flank, but

SIX MONTHS AT MURFREESBORO. 297

was subsequently forced to recross. Having met sucli oppo-
sition before reaching Franklin, General Van Dorn retreated
without making a general attack.

April 20th, General Reynolds, with four thousand infantry,
and two thousand six hundred cavalry, under Colonel Wilder,
made a reconnoissance northeast and southeast from Mur-
freesboro. He destroyed almost entirely the railroad from
Manchester to McMinnville, a cotton-mill and two other mills
at McMinnville, a small mill at Liberty, captured a large
amount of supplies, one hundred and eighty prisoners, over
six hundred animals, and returned to Murfreesboro with tlio
loss of one man wounded.

At 1 A. M., on the 27th, Colonel Watkins moved out of
Franklin, between the Columbia and Carter's Creek turnpikes,
and surprised the Texas legion encamped within a mile of
General Van Dorn's main force. He captured one hundred
and twenty-eight prisoners, three hundred horses and mules,
eight wagons, and all the camp and garrison equipage without
losing a man. Colonel Campbell, with his brigade of cavalry,
went out from Franklin on the 30th, to surprise the enemy on
the Columbia and Jonesboro turnpikes. He killed fourteen
men, wounded twenty-hve, and captured thirteen.

May 21st, General Stanley started from Murfreesboro with a
portion of General Turchin's cavalry division and one regi-
ment of mounted infantry, to attack a force encamped in the
vicinity of Middleton. His advance under Lieutenant O'Con-
nell charged the enemy, and drove him from his camp and from
another position, inflicting heavy loss. General Stanley
brought in three hundred horses and seven hundred stand of
arms, with other less valuable property.

Early in June, there was one of the peculiarly sad occur-
rences of war at Franklin, Tennessee. Two men, claiming to
be officers, and wearing the uniform of a colonel and major,
presented themselves to Colonel Baird, commanding the post,
and stated that they were Colonel Anton and Major Dunlap,
and authorized, by an order from General E. D. Townseud,
assistant adjutant-general, at Washington, and another from
General Rosecrans, to inspect outposts. Their conduct excited
snrprise, and Colonel Watkins soon concluded that they were

298 SIX MONTHS AT MURFREESBORO.

spies. This supposition proved to be true, as upon inquiry at
department headquarters, it was ascertained that there were
no such inspectors in the national service. General Rosecrans
at once ordered a drum-head court-martial, and their imme-
diate execution, upon conviction, as spies. Learning that such
a court had been ordered, they confessed that they were Col-
onel Lawrence A. Williams and Lieutenant Dunlap, of the
Confederate army. The former had been in the army of the
United States. They claimed that they were not spies, and
solicited clemency. But the proof was positive, and General
Hosecrans' order was imperative, and they were consequently
hung June 9th, the day after their arrest.

The conduct of these men was somewhat inexplicable. It
was supposed that it was their object to gain such knowledge
of the post as would enable Forrest to dash on it and capture
it. But Franklin was not an exceedingly important place,
not being on the direct communications of the army, and one
that could not be held by the enemy except with a large army.
AVliy they should make such a venture to gain knowledge of
its strength and defense, is incomprehensible ; and if they had
an ulterior object, it was not apparent.

During the six months of the army's encampment at Mur-
freesboro, which were filled up with numerous reconnoissances
and " affairs of outposts," there was an earnest and protracted
discussion between General Halleck, commander-in-chief, and
General Rosecrans, with regard to an aggressive campaign,
and from the first months of the year the latter was urged to
advance against General Bragg, in position on Duck river.
After General Grant had commenced his campaign against
Yicksburg, General Halleck became more urgent, as he
thought that the inactivity of the Army of the Cumberland
would permit General Bragg to detach forces to Mississippi,
to maintain the enemy's grasp of the Mississippi river. This
was considered the more probable, as General Joseph E. John-
ston was in command of a large department, including General
Bragg's army, as well as the one operating in the State of Mis-
sissippi. General Rosecrans was restrained from active oper-
ations, as he claimed, first, by the character of the roads in
Middle Tennesse in winter, and then by delay in the enlarge-

SIX MONTHS AT MUEFEEESBOEO. 299

ment of his cavalry arnij and the lack of animals for trans-
portation, and the want of forage. He also assnmed the
ground that military considerations forbade his advance while
General Grant's campaign was in progress. That, should he
force General Bragg to retire behind the mountains, he would
give him an opportunity to send reinforcements to General
Johnston in Mississippi, which he would not have should he
be held on the line of Duck river, with the contingency of
battle at any moment, and that, should General Grant fail,
there would be a heavy combination against himself in Middle
Tennessee, and that for this contingency the reserve army
should not be far from its base. General Bragg however,
did detach a portion of his troops, but fortunately they did
not reach Mississippi until General Grant thrust his army
between Generals Johnston and Pemberton, and had shut up
the latter to a siege within his intrenchments at Vicksburg, so
thoroughly established that no outside relief could reach him.
Thus the spring passed away before General Rosecrans
deemed himself prepared to advance. His cavalry horses
multiplied slowly, and his trains and forage attained the
requisite proportions in the same degree. Still, by the 1st of
June, the more special indications of an advance began to
appear. General Ward's brigade was ordered forward from
Gallatin, to take post at La Vergne. General Gordon Granger
moved his command from Franklin to Triune. General
Crook's brigade was transferred from Carthage to Murfrees-
boro, and attached to General Reynolds' division, the Fourth,
of the Fourteenth Corps. The former Fourth division of that
corps was transferred to General G. Granger, whose forces
were constituted as the reserve corps, comprising three divis-
ions, designated as First, Second, and Third, and commanded
respectively by Brigadier-Generals A. Baird, J. D. Morgan,
and R. S. Granger. General Rosecrans, however, still delayed,
and about the 10th of June he invited a formal expression of
opinion with regard to an advance against the enemy from his
corps and division generals. He was sustained in his delay
by his subordinates generally, though General Garfield, his
chief of staff, urged upon him a speedy movement, for reasons
both military and political, and chiefly upon the ground that

300 SIX MOXTHS AT MURFREESBORO.

he could advance with sixty -five thousand one hundred and
thirty-seven bayonets and sabers, against an army of forty-one
thousand six hundred and eighty men, as he estimated the
strength of General Bragg's army.

By the 23d of June, the question of advance was fully
solved, and orders were issued for the movement of the army.
By this time the cavalry had been greatly enlarged, through
accessions of regular cavalry and mounted infantry, and the
grand fortifications at Murfreesboro afibrded in their comple-
tion protection to General Rosecrans' accumulated supplies.

No. 7. — Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,

Murfreesboro, June 9 — 4.40 a. m.
Colonel J. P. Baird, Franklin :

The general commanding directs that the two spies, if found guilty, be
hung at once, thus placing beyond the possibility of Forrest's profiting
by the information they have gained.

FRANK S. BOND,

Major and Aid-de-Camp.

No. 9. — Franklin, June 9 — 10.30. a. m.,
To General Garfield, Chief of Staff:

The men have been tried, found guilty, and executed in compliance
with your order.

I am, ever yours,

J. P. BAIRD,
Colonel Commanding Post.

Murfreesboro, January 14, 1863.
Major-General Hallech, Washington, D. C. :

I must have cavalry or inounted infantry. I could mount infantry had
I horses and saddles. The saddles I had ordered have been delivered so
very slowly, that now, after four months, I have only a few hundred more
than have been required for the use of the cavalry. With mounted in-
fantry, I can drive the rebel cavalry to the wall, and keep the roads open
to my rear. Not so now. I must also have some bullet-proof, light-
draught transports for the Cumberland. Will you authorize the purchase
of saddles and horses for mounting, when requisite, five thousand more
infantry ?

W. S. ROSECRANS.

Major- General.

SIX MONTHS AT MURFREESBOEO. 301

MuRFREKSBORO, February 2, 18G3.
Son. E. M. Stanton, Washington, D. C. :

' I telegraphed the commander-in-chief that two thousand carbines or
rifles were required to arm our cavalry. He replied as if he thought it a
complaint. I telegraph you also, to prevent misunderstanding. I speak
for the country when I say two thousand effective cavalry will cost tho
support of nearly four thousand — say, five thousand dollars per daJ^ But
this is the smallest part of the trouble. One rebel cavalryman takes, on
an average, three of our infantry to watch our communications, while
our progress is made slow and cautious, and we command the forage of
the country only by sending large train-guards. It is a prime necessity,
in every point of view, to master their cavalry. I propose to do this, first,
by so arming our cavaliy as to give it its maximum strength ; second, by
having animals and saddles temporarily to mount infantry brigades for
inarches and enterprises. We have now one thousand cavalry men with-
out horses, and two thousand without arms. We do n't want revolvers
so much as light, revolving rifles. The matter is so clearly, in my mind,
of paramount public interest, that I blush to think it necessary to seem
to apologize for it. I do hope the government will have confidence
enough in me to know I never have asked and never will ask anything
to increase my personal command. Had this been understood when I
vrent with Blenker's division, this nation might have been saved millions
blood and treasure.

W. S. ROSECRANS,

Major- General.

MuRFREE.sBORo, Jum 21, 1863.

General : — In your favor of the 12th inst., you say you do not see how
the maxim of not fighting two great battles at the same time applies to
the case of this army and Grant's. Looking at the matter practically,
we and our opposing forces are so nearly separated, that for Bragg ma-
terially to aid Johnston he must abandon our front substantially, and
then we can move to an ultimate work with more rapidity and less waste
of material or natural obstacles. (?) If General Grant is defeated, both
forces will come here, and then we ought to be near our base. The same
maxim that forbids, as you take it, a single army fighting two great bat-
tles at the same time (by the way, an awkward thing to do), would forbid
this nation engaging all its forces in the great West at the same time, so
as to leave it without a single reserve to stem the current of possible dis-
aster. This is, I think, sustained by military and political considerations.
We ought to fight here, if we have a strong prospect of winning a decisive
victory over the opposing force ; and upon this ground I shall act. I
shall be very careful not to risk our last reserve without a strong ground
to expect success.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. S. ROSECRANS,

Major- General.

Major-General Halleck, Commander-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.

CHAPTER XIX.

TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN.

In June, 1863, General Bragg's army was occupying a strong
position north of Duck river. His infantry front extended
from Shelbyville to "Wartrace, and his cavahy rested at McMinn-
ville, on his right, and Spring Hill and Columbia on his left.
G-eneral Polk's corps was at Shelbyville, having a redan line
covered with abatis in front. A detachment from it was
thrown forward to Guy's Gap. General Hardee's corps held
Hoover's, Liberty, and Bellbuckle Gaps. Chattanooga was the
base, and Tullahoma was the chief depot of supplies.

General Rosecrans determined to concentrate the corps of
Generals Thomas, McCook, and Crittenden on the enemy's
right, covering this movement by a feint upon his left with
General Granger's corps and the main portion of his cavalry.
The execution of this plan was commenced on the 23d, by the
advance of Granger's corps. The enemy's position was well
chosen for either defense or retreat. He had in his front a
range of hills rough and rocky, through whose depressions,
called gaps, the main roads to the south passed. These gaps
were held by strong detachments, with heavy columns within
supporting distance. Such was the strength of the position
at Shelbyville, that General Rosecrans anticipated stubborn
resistance should he attack it, and in the event of success in
assault, the enemy could cover his retreat, having a route to
his rear, easily defended. He therefore proposed to turn Gen-
eral Bragg's right, and avoiding his intrenchments at Shelby-
ville altogether, provoke a battle on ground of his own selec-
tion, or force him to retreat on a disadvantageous line. This
purpose involved the necessity of forcing the advanced forces

(302)

TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN. 303

from the gaps from the left to the right of the main posi-
tion.

The movement of troops, in the first place, to Triune had
been made to create the belief that a direct attack would be
made upon Shelbyville ; and now, in the actual advance of
his army, he endeavored to keep up this impression. For this
object. General R, B. Mitchell, commanding the First cavalry
division, moved forward from Triune and drove back the ene-
my's cavalry upon his infantry line, skirmishing sharply at
Eagleville, Rover, and Unionville. General Rosecrans also
demonstrated with his cavalry from his left, and sent an in-
fantry force to Woodbury, that the enemy might regard these
movements as a feint to divert attention from the direct attack
upon Shelbyville. The same day, June 23d, General Granger,
with his own corps and General Brannan's division of General
Thomas' corps, moved from Triune to Salem.

The next day the whole army was in motion. General
McCook advanced toward Liberty Gap. His corps started
on the Shelbyville turnpike, but the divisions at different points
deflected to Millersburg, where Sheridan's and Davis' divisions
bivouacked at night, while Johnston's advanced to the Gap.
On approaching the position. Colonel Harrison, with five com-
panies of his mounted infantry, the Thirty-ninth Indiana, was
thrown forward to skirmish. Colonel Harrison having pro-
voked resistance in front of the gap, General Willich's brigade
was deployed, and advancing pushed the enemy's skirmishers
upon their reserves, posted upon the crest of the hills on the
opposite sides of the entrance to the gap. A demonstration
in front developed the impracticability of carrying the position
by a direct attack. Colonel Miller, with a portion of his bri-
gade, was then brought up, and a line having been formed of
such length as to envelop both flanks of the enemy, he was
driven through the depression a distance of two miles. The
whole division bivouacked between the hills to hold one of the
gateways through the enemy's natural defenses.

During the day. General Thomas advanced on the Man-
chester turnpike, Reynolds' division leading, followed by Rous-
seau's and ISTegley's divisions. Colonel Wilder's brigade of
mounted infantry, of Reynolds' division, encountered cavalry

304 TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGIN^.

posted seven miles from Murfreesboro, and pressing them upon
tlieir reserves, drove the whole force through Hoover's Gap, a
defile three miles long, and took position at its southern en-
trance. He was soon fiercely attacked by a large body of in-
fantry, but held his ground until General Reynolds' joined
him with his other two brigades, when the enemy withdrew,
and the Fourteenth Corps rested for the night in another of the
passes through the hills in front of the enemy.

General Crittenden, having left General Van Cleve's division
to garrison Murfreesboro, moved, with Generals Wood's and
Palmer's divisions, to Bradyville. General Granger, accom-
panied by Brannan's division, advanced from Salem to Chris-
tiana. General Stanley proceeded from Murfreesboro, on the
Woodbury turnpike, to Cripple creek, with General Turchin's
division of cavalry, and thence through Salem to reinforce
General Mitchell, and formed a junction with him at the in-
tersection of the Salem and Christiana roads. General Mitchell
had advanced during the day from Rover through Yersailles
to Middleton, where he met cavalry, and in an engagement of
considerable sharpness killed thirty men and wounded a large
number.

The next day, General Crittenden advanced to Holly
Springs. General Brannan joined General Thomas, from
Christiana, and was placed in position in Hoover's Gap.
General Reynolds skirmished all day with the enemy. At
night, General Rousseau closed up in his rear, preparatory to
an attack upon the enemy the next day at Beech Grove. Gen-
eral Stanley joined General Granger, with Mitchell's division
and Minty's brigade, at Christiana, for operations on the right
flank, having first driven the enemy's cavalry to Guy's Gap.
Colonel Long, with a portion of his brigade, advanced to
Lumley's Stand, and scouted to Track's Ford and Pocahontas.
The remainder of Turchin's division accompanied General
Crittenden.

Late in the afternoon, the enemy made an attack at Liberty
Gap, -svith the evident intention of dislodging Johnson's di-
vision. General Johnson did not hold the southern entrance,
as did General Thomas at Hoover's Pass, and this fact and the
supposition of General Bragg, that General Rosecrans would

TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN. 305

throw tlie main portion of his army through this gap, induced
the eflbrt to regain it.

The enemy first attacked the center of Johnson's line, and
being repulsed, next attempted to gain the liills, so as to com-
mand Johnson's flanks with infantry and artillery ; but he was
circumvented in his strategy, and repulsed in every attack,
withdrawihg entirely late in the evening, in the direction of
Bellbuckle. The troops engaged were Willich's and Miller's
brigades of Johnson's division, supported by Carlin's brigade
of Davis' division, and all evinced distinguished gallantry.
The losses in this action revealed its character. General
Johnson lost two hundred and thirty-one killed and wounded,
and the enemy one hundred killed, and seven hundred and
fifty wounded.

On the 26th, General Thomas advanced toward Fairfield,
and met the enemy in force on the heights north of Garrison
creek. He drove him steadily. Generals Rousseau and Bran-
nan operating upon his left flank from the hills north of the
road, and General Reynolds against his front and left. Hav-
ing assumed a new position, he made preparations to resist,
and attempted from the hills to enfilade General Thomas' line,
but was driven from position by a charge of "Walker's brigade
and the regular brigade, under Major Coolidge. He then
retired before the rapid advance of the Fourteenth Corps, and
covered his retreat with heavy skirmish lines, supported by
artillery in rear and cavalry on the flanks. After pursuing
some distance. General Thomas disposed his divisions so as
to oflfer a battle front, extending from the Fairfield road to a
point within five miles of Manchester. During the day. Gen-
erals McCook and Granger remained in bivouac, the former
at Liberty Gap and the latter at Christiana. General Critten-
den struggled on toward Manchester, over almost impassable
roads, rendered so by the heavy rains, which had fallen every
day since the army left Murfreesboro.

The position of the Fourteenth Corps, far in advance of

Hoover's Gap, made practicable the concentration of the whole

army on the enemy's left, to force him to fight to resist its

further advance, or abandon his position altogether. Accord-

20

306 TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN.

ingly, on the 27tli, General McCook withdrew from Liberty
Gap, and having passed through Hoover's Gap, marched his
corps, in rear of General Thomas, toward Manchester. Early
in the day, General Thomas put his corps in motion — Rous-
seau's and Brannan's divisions to Fairfield, ]N"egley's on their
left in support, and Reynolds' directly on Manchester, The
latter arrived at Manchester early in the morning, Wilder's
brigade surprising the town and capturing forty prisoners.
The enemy not having been found at Fairfield, the other di-
visions turned toward Manchester, where, about midnight, the
whole corps was concentrated.

The reserve corps, preceded by the cavalry under General
Stanley, advanced from Christiana to Guy's Gap, where the
enemy was encountered. Colonel Minty's brigade, supported
by Mitchell's division, drove him from the gap and pursued
liim to his intrenchments, four miles north of Shelbyville,
v^here he again offered resistance. General Wheeler was in
command, having with him Martin's division and a portion of
"Wliarton's. Colonel Minty attacked him and forced him out
of his intrenchments, and pushed him into Shelbyville. At
this juncture, General Mitchell coming up, turned his right
flank and cut him off from direct retreat, while Minty
charged into the town and completed his total defeat. Gen-
eral Stanley captured Wheeler's artillery and about five hundred
of his men, while nearly two hundred were either killed or
drowned in attempting to swim Duck river. General "Wlieeler
■escaped with the remainder of his command by swimming the
river. The movements of the day revealed the fact that Gen-
eral Bragg had withdrawn his army entirely from his first line
of defense, and confirmed the success of the first grand feature
of General Rosecrans' strategy. It now remained to force him,
by battle or strategy, to fall back to his stronghold on the
Tennessee river.

"Wliile the corps of Generals McCook and Crittenden were
concentrating at Manchester, slowly in fact, but as rapidly as
the rain and bad roads would permit, General Thomas, in
compliance with instruction from General Rosecrans, com-
menced the movements which were- designed to bring the cam-
paign to a decisive issue. Early on the morning of the 28th,

TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN. 307

he sent Colonel Wilder with his brigade to break the railroad
at some point south of Decherd, and Colonel John Beatty's
brigade to Hillsboro, in support of the movement. He also
threw forward toward Tullahoma, Rousseau's and Brannan's
divisions, with some regiments from Reynolds' and Sheridan's,
on their right and left flanks.

Colonel Wilder reached Decherd at 8 p. m., burned the
depot and water-tank, and destroyed about three hundred
yards of railroad, but retired upon the approach of the
enemy's infantry. The next day he moved to the University,
broke up the Tracy City railroad, and then dividing his force
advanced toward Anderson and Tantallon. The enemy was
found at these places in such force as to forbid attack, and the
brigade was soon after united at University. On his return,
he avoided Forrest at Pelham, and reached Manchester in
safety about noon on the 30th.

On the 29th, there was an advance toward Tullahoma
until the front of the army was within two miles of the place.
Generals Thomas', McCook's, and Crittenden's corps closed in
upon it, and General Stanley, with the cavalry, reached Man-
chester, completing the concentration of the army for the
flnal movement against Tullahoma.

Early in the morning of the 30th, General Thomas learned,
through a citizen, that General Bragg had evacuated the posi-
tion. He at once ordered General Steedman, with his brigade
and two additional regiments, to make a cautious recon-
noissance and ascertain the truth or falsity of the report.
The troops entered the town about noon without opposition,
and captured a few pri&oners. The fact having been commu-
nicated to General Rosecrans, he immediately disposed his
troops for pursuit. Rousseau and E'egley overtook the
enemy's rear-guard at Bethpage bridge, and skirmished
sharply. His forces, however, had possession of the heights
across the river, and commanded the bridge by artillery pro-
tected by epaulements. The swollen streams, especially Elk
river, performed a friendly ofllce for General Bragg, as they
formed behind him a barrier to a rapid pursuit. The cav-
alry, in some instances, forced the passage of the bridgeless
river at the moment of engaging the enemy, but in the main,

308 TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN.

the pursuit, either by cavahy or infantry, was entirely fruitless.
It developed the fact, however, that General Bragg had crossed
the Cumberland Mountains, and that Middle Tennessee was
again in the possession of the Army of the Cumberland.

During this campaign of nine days, the rain fell almost in-
cessantl}^, and the ground over which the army moved was of
such nature that the movement of artillery and trains was ex-
ceedingly slow, and the escape of the enemy without battle
was mainly owing to this cause.

General E-osecrans lost in the campaign eighty-five men
killed, four hundred and eighty-two wounded, and thirteen
captured. General Bragg's loss in killed and wounded was
not ascertained ; but he left behind him as prisoners fifty-nine
officers and one thousand five hundred and seventy -five men,
eight field pieces, and three rifled siege-gans, besides the usual
waste of material in a hasty retreat.

At the conclusion of this short but spirited campaign, the
Confederate Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the
Cumberland resumed in the main the attitude of the preced-
ing summer, when each was gathering forces for aggressive
movements. These armies had marched into jSTorthern Ken-
tucky and back again ; had fought two battles and skirmished
over large portions of Kentucky and Tennessee ; and they
gave themselves again to preparation for future conflicts, the
one at Chattanooga, and the other with its camps disposed as
before, from Winchester to McMinnville. In declining battle
at Tullahoma, General Bragg invited the renewal of the old
plan for the invasion of East Tennessee, and General Rose-
crans' acceptance of it brought to his army the old work of
repairing roads and building bridges, and the long waiting for
the accumulation of supplies. This campaign then terminated
with the complete restoration of the status of July, 1862 — the
Army of the Cumberland in possession of the line of the
Tennessee and the railroads in Middle Tennessee, with Chat-
tanooga as its objective. It was then decisive of the complete
failure of General Bragg's aggression. "While the prepara-
tions for another campaign were going on, the remoteness of
the enemy precluded the usual infantry skirmishing and
1 econnoissances, which, in the interval between great battles,

TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN. 309

maintain active belligerency ; but tbe cavalry had opportunity
to revisit most of the places in Tennessee and !N"orthern Ala-
bama, from which the national forces had been withdrawn the
previous summer. And this was done to the intense annoy-
ance of the citizen enemies of the national government, as in
the second coming of the Army of the Cumberland supplies
were to be drawn from the country, in the absence, too, of the
slightest presumption that the government was to be main-
tained and the Union restored through mere kindness to the
people whose property and aid had been freely given to the
Confederate armies.

The return of the Army of the Cumberland to Southern
Tennessee and Northern Alabama was doubtless as unex-
pected as its first appearance the previous jear. Wlien it
moved northward, the farmers of this region had been ex-
horted to repair their fences and plant their fields under the
most positive assurance by the Confederate generals that no
second invasion would ever interrupt their ordinary pursuits.
"But war, with a more dismal front and sterner power, was
again at their doors.

During the early part of July, the cavalry was concentrated
at Salem, Tennessee, preparatory to a general sweep to Hunts-
ville, Alabama. On the 12th, General Stanley put his cavalry
in motion. He sent Colonel Galbraith along the railroad to
Fayetteville, to ascertain the condition of the road. He cap-
tured some prisoners, and learned that General Forrest's com-
mand was north of Elk river, moving south. He moved
across to Pulaski, and then pursued a force of cavalry to Law-
renceburg, killing eight men and capturing ninety. The other
forces of the cavalry, by various routes, concentrated at Hunts-
ville on the 14th, and soon after diverged widely on their re-
turn to the rear of the army, bringing about three hundred
prisoners, one thousand six hundred horses and mules, nearly
one thousand cattle and sheep, and six hundred negroes.
These minor operations were then suspended to enter upon
^mother of the great campaigns of the war.

CHAPTER XX.

THE MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY OVER THE MOUNTAINS AND TEN-
NESSEE RIVER, AND BATTLE OP CHICKAMAUGA.

Upon the conclusion of the Tullahoma campaign, General
Halleck urged General Rosecrans to advance against the en-
emy south of the Tennessee river. But there were difficulties
in the way of an early movement, which General Rosecrans
deemed insurmountable. In his judgment, three conditions
were essential to the successful advance of his army. These
were the repair of the railroad to the Tennessee river, ripe
corn in the fields, and support to his flanks. For the actuality
of the first, he was himself responsible ; the second depended
upon time and favorable weather ; and the third rested with
the military authorities at Washington, and the commanders
of the armies east and west of him, on the line of the Ten-
nessee river.

July 13th, the railroad bridge over Elk river was ready for
trains, and on the 25th they were running to Bridgeport, Ala-
bama. But corn does not ripen in Tennessee and Georgia
in July, and the movement of General Burnside into East
Tennessee was long deferred, and no promises had been given
that the right flank of the Army of the Cumberland should
have protection while advancing against Chattanooga. On
the 5th of August, in disregard of General Rosecrans' assigned
reasons for not moving his army, General Halleck gave per-
emptory orders for its advance. The former, however, deferred
movement until the middle of the month. By this time his
^'reparations were complete, and the fields promised the forage
lor which he had been waiting ; but no further assurance had
been given that he should have supporting forces on right or
(310)

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 311

left. As a partial protection to liis right, he had sent, August
11th, Brigadier-General E,. B. Mitchell's cavalry division,.
Colonel E. M. McCook commanding, from Fayetteville, Ten-
nessee, to Huntsville, Alabama, and thence along the Mem-
phis and Charleston railroad, to protect that road and guard
the line of the Tennessee river from "Whitesburg to Bridge-
port.

At this juncture, the Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-
first Corps, with the cavalry on the flanks, were mainly dis-
posed on a line from "Winchester to McMinnville, in readiness
for the various movements involved in the plan of campaign.
Sheridan's division, since the opening of the raitoad to
Bridgeport, had been on that road, with heavj^ detachments
at Stevenson and Bridgeport. A brigacle had taken post at
Pelham, and a detachment had been sent to Tracy City, on.
the 13th of August, to protect a depot of supplies established
at that point — the terminus of the mountain railroad.

The reserve corps was in the rear, occupying all the coun-
try north of Buck river, with garrisons at Fort Bonelson,.
Clarksville, Gallatin, Carthage, Nashville, Murfreesboro, Shel-
byville, and "Wartrace. The army was dependent for supplies
upon the railroad to Louisville, as during the months of sum-
mer and autumn the navigation of the Cumberland river is
exceedingly precarious. Nashville was a secondary base, and
there were surplus supplies nearer the front to meet the wants
of the army during any temporary interruption of the rail-
road. But the assurance of full rations at the front depended
primarily upon the maintenance of railroad connection with
Louisville. The thorough defense of this road required a
force equal, at least, to one-fourth of the offensive strength of
the army. Looking to the rear, the problem of supplies de-
manded most earnest attention and most positive solution, and
involved difficulties by no means light ; and looking toward
the enemy, who was resting in fancied security in a position
invested l)y mountains, the barriers to advance, successful
strategy, or attack, seemed exceedingly formidable. General
Rosecrans had maneuvered Bragg out of Tullahoma and
across the Tennessee river ; but as the topography ot tlie region
around Chattanooga was very different from the surroundings

312 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

of liis former position, his antagonist did not anticipate that
he should again be compelled to abandon a stronger position
by mere strategy. lie doubtless felt safe from direct attack,
and did not foresee that Rosecrans would throw his army upon
his communications. But this bold venture was proposed for
the Army of the Cumberland — bold under any circumstances,
but especially so, when there were no active campaigns in
progress, east or west, to prevent the enemy from concentrating
heavy forces at Chattanooga or in l^orthern Georgia. Gen-
eral Rosecrans was not indifferent to the possibility of over-
throw, but his orders deprived him of discretion, except as to
the plan of campaign.

Chattanooga had long been the objective of his army, and
yet he was under orders to move against it with inadequate
forces, and under conditions which involved great peril. The
position was too important to the enemy to warrant the hope
that he would fail lo exhaust his resources to hold it. Under
any circumstances, General Bragg could concentrate his own
forces, and with timely warning of a movement against him,
he could draw reinforcements from remote points. It was
impossible for Rosecrans to advance rapidly, and yet the con-
cealment of his ultimate design was a ruling condition of his
success. Apart from the exposure of his flanks in moving
beyond the Tennessee river, the configuration of the country
between him and his objective imposed the alternative of
skillful maneuver or failure. The first barrier was the Cum-
berland range of mountains, which, trending in a southwest-
erly direction, touches the Tennessee river a few miles east of
Bridgeport, and then stretches westward to Athens. "Wal-
dron's ridge, on tliC east, forms the second barrier on the line
of direct approach from McMinnville. This mountain abuts
the Tennessee river, nearly half-way from Bridgeport to Chat-
tanooga, and by its abrupt ascent, bars passage on the bank
of the stream. These mountains, with subordinate hills, were
between Rosecrans and Chattanooga, and were in his way,
should he make a direct advance on that place, or move past
it on the north to reach the enemy's right flank. lie could
reach the river, by moving directly south across the Cumber-
land range, but beyond the river, two other mountain ranges

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 313

interposed — Sand Mountain and Lookout Mountain. The
northern extremities of these mountains confront each other,
from opposite sides of Lookout valley, in the immediate vicin-
ity of Chattanooga. Trending thence to the southwest, they
cross all the lines of advance toward the communications of
the enemy south of Chattanooga.

In view of the strength of Chattanooga against direct at-
tack, General Rosecrans resorted again to maneuver to dislodge
his antagonist. As the route to Bragg's right flank pene-
trated a mountain region almost destitute of forage and water,
and involved a wider separation from his communications, he
selected his lines of advance over the river and mountains
west and south of his ohjective. He, however, so directed
Ms first, movements as to mislead the enemy with regard to
his ultimate design, which was to threaten his communica-
tions, and force him to abandon his position, or give battle on
equal terms. The movement in this direction compassed an-
other great advantage, as it gave him the railroad to Bridge-
port directly in his rear as a channel of supply.

The movement of infantry and artillery across the Cumber-
land Mountains was commenced on the 16th of August.
Two divisions of the Twenty-first Corps — Generals Palmer's
and "Wood's — marched by diflibrent routes over the mountains
into the Sequatchie valley. Two brigades of General Van
Cleve's division, the third having been left at McMinnville,
and Colonel Wilder's brigade of General Reynolds' division
of the Fourteenth Corps, moved on the Harrison Trace road
to rikeville ; while Colonel Minty's brigade of cavalry diverged
to Sparta, to cover the left of the column. This disposition
of General Crittenden's Corps was intended to conceal the
general movement of the army to the south, by making the
impression at Chattanooga that an efiibrt would be made to
turn the position from the north. The four divisions of the
Fourteenth Corps moved upon Stevenson and the mouth of Bat-
tle creek — Generals Baird's and Negley's to the former place,
and Generals Brannan's and Reynolds' to the latter. General
Davis' division of the Twentieth Corps joined General Sheri-
dan at Stevenson, and General Johnson's passed through
Bellefont to Caperton's ferry. General Stanley, with Colonel

314 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Long's brigade of cavalry, advanced to Stevenson. The river
having been reached, the pontoons were kept in conceahnent
at Stevenson until the places for crossing had been selected.

Soon after the left had reached the Sequatchie valley. Gen-
erals Hazen's and Wagner's brigades were thrown ijcross Wal-
dron's ridge into the valley of the Tennessee, and were there
joined by the brigades of Minty and Wilder from Pikeville.
These four brigades, numbering in the aggregate between six
and seven thousand men, under the command of General
Hazen, took position from Williams' island to Kingston, on
the north bank of the river, but in heaviest force opposite
Chattanooo;a and the mouth of North Chickamauira creek.
The extent of front presented, the show of strength near
Chattanooga, the vigorous shelling of the city bj' Wilder's
artillery, the troops at Pikeville and in the Sequatchie valle}^ —
in fine, the bold expression of the whole movement — consti-
tuted a brilliant feint, and contributed largely to General
Bragg's misconception of General Rosecrans' plan of aggres-
sion. A wrong interpretation of the meaning of this move-
ment, or some cause not apparent, induced the enemy to offer
no resistance to the passage of the river at Bridgeport and
other places in the vicinity.

The army commenced crossing the river on the 29th of Au-
gust, and by the 4th of September, all the troops were across,
except those under Hazen, and a few brigades farthest in the
rear. General Johnson's and Davis' divisions, and the cavalry^
crossed at Caperton's ferry, and advanced over Sand Moun-
tain to the base of Lookout Mountain, at Winston's Gap, where
they were joined by Sheridan, who had crossed at Bridgeport.
The divisions of the Fourteenth Corps passed over the river
at four dilferent points — Caperton's ferry, Bridgeport, mouth
of Battle creek, and Shellmound — and crossing Sand Mountain
on converging roads, united in Will's or Lookout valley, in
the vicinity of Trenton. When General Crittenden had con-
centrated his corps, it passed down the Sequatchie valley,
crossed at Bridgeport and the two points above, and moving
up the river to Whitesides, deflected to the right from the
direct road to Chattanooga, through a pass into Lookout
valley. The cavalry preceded the Twentieth Corps to Win-

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 315

ston's Gap, and reconnoitered in various directions, without
finding the enemy in force. As the army of ofiense advanced,
the reserve corps, as far as practicable, moved in rear to hokl
the important positions, and give support in the event of
battle.

The passage of Sand Mountain involved the necessity of
making and repairing roads ; and when this had been done
as far as practicable without too much delay, such was the
steepness of the ascents on the different routes of advance^
that teams were doubled often to move the artillery and
wagons.

By the 6th of the month, these movements in the main had
been completed, and the army lay along the western base of
Lookout Mountain, from Wauhatchie, a point six or seven
miles from Chattanooga, to Valley Head, thirty -five miles dis-
tant.. To dislodge the enemy from Chattanooga, it was now
necessary to carry the point of Lookout Mountain where it
abuts the Tennessee river, or to cross the mountain through
the gaps farther south and endanger his line of communi-
cations. The former scheme being considered impracticable,
the latter was adopted, and orders were issued to scale the
mountain from the center at Trenton, and the right at Valley
Head, while the left should demonstrate directly against Chat-
tanooga, until the action of the enemy was revealed.

On the 30th of August, information had been received
through a loyal citizen who had been forced to leave Chatta-
nooga, that General Burnside had occupied Knoxville, that
the rebel general, S. B. Buckner, and the troops that had held
Knoxville, had retreated to Loudon ; and that fifteen thousand
men were on the way from Mississippi to join General Bragg.
And on the day the army reached Lookout valley there came
a rumor that Buckner had joined Bragg, and that the latter
would abandon Chattanooga. The probability of the truth
of this report induced General Rosecrans to continue the
movements whose object was the accomplishment of this re-
sult. Accordingly, on the 7th, ISTegley's division of the Four-
teenth Corps commenced the ascent of the mountain, and
reached the top at four o'clock in the afternoon. During the
day, Colonel Ilarker, of Wood's division, made a bold recon-

316 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

noissance under the guns of the enemy, on the front of Look-
out Mountain, and found it guarded by a heavy force, which
was then covering the withdrawal of the army from Chatta-
nooga. But this fact came to Hght subsequently. The Twen-
tieth Corps remained in camp on the 7th.

The day following, General McCook, on the right, ordered
two brigades of Davis' division to cross the mountain into
Broomtown valle}^ to support the cavalry in reconnoissance to-
ward Lafaj^ette and Rome. General N"egley seized Cooper's
and Stevens' Gaps, the latter having been heavily obstructed,
and then bivouacked his main column at the junction of the
State road and the one from Cooper's Gap. The operations
of the day elicited no opposition — a fact that plainly indicated
that the enemy was withdrawing from Chattanooga. Captain
Van Buskirk, ISTinety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry, ad-
vanced with fifty uieii to within five miles of Summertown
without opposition, and discovered that the signal stations of
the enemy had been abandoned. Rumors from various sources
concurred in supporting the belief that Bragg had retreated.
To elicit the truth. General Rosecrans directed General
Thomas to send Colonel Atkins, of the Ninety-second Illinois,
to make a reconnoissance toward Chattanooga on the moun-
tain road early on the 9th, and instructed General Crittenden
to send a brigade up an almost impracticable path, called the
Nickajack Trace, to Summertown, a hamlet on the mountain,
to reconnoiter the front of the mountain, and to hold the main
portions of his corps in readiness to support the troops on
reconnoissance, to prevent a sortie of the enemy over the nose
of Lookout, or to enter Chattanooga should the enemy evacu-
ate or make feeble resistance. He ordered the cavalry on the
right flank to push by way of Broomtown valley, and strike
the enemy's railroad communications between the Resaca
bridge and Dalton. But the fact of the evacuation was mani-
fest to the troops on the north bank of the river in the even-
ing of the 8th, and at 3:30 a. m., on the 9th, General Rosecrans
was so informed. Thus, without a battle or heavy skirmish,
the primary objective of the campaign, the ^' Gateway to
Georgia," and the southern entrance to East Tennessee, fell
into his hands, as the result of his strategy.

BA.TTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 317

Tims far, this movement, justly considered perilous in view
of the possibilities to the enemy, was remarkably successful.
During its progrees there had been a lull in active operations
east and west, which allowed the interest of the government
and the loyal people to converge upon the movement in Southern
Tennessee and ISTorthern Georgia. When it became known
at Washington that Bragg was receiving reinforcements, the
necessity of the conjunction of the armies under Generals Rose-
crans and Burnside was clearly perceived. But, unfortunately,
the perception of this necessity was too late for practical ad-
vantage. Burnside's advance was intended to be co-operative
with that of Rosecrans, but the accomplishment of his work
drove his enemy to the army before Rosecrans, while he was
himself too remote and too much engaged with affairs east of
Knoxville, to render aid at Chattanooga. The improbability of
the union of the two armies in time for battle, intensified the
uneasiness that was felt with regard to the advance into
Georgia. The evacuation of Chattanooga, therefore, relieved
the anxiety of the authorities at Washington and General
Rosecrans ; and now, all Lhought of pursuit, rather than of de-
fense, against Bragg's reinforced army.

General Bragg's reasons for the abandonment of Chatta-
nooga, as stated by himself, were these : He estimated the
Army of the Cumberland at seventy thousand men, and the
one under General Burnside, at twenty-five thousand. He.
regarded the movement of troops to Pikeville and Kingston
as a menace to Buckner's rear, while Burnside was in his
front with superior forces. Buckner was therefore first with-
drawn to the Hiawassee river, and subsequently to the vicinity
of Chattanooga. But with this accession, his army was in-
ferior to the one which he was opposing. So when Rosecrans
had crossed the river at Bridgeport, and was as near his main
depot of supplies as he was himself, not being able to divide
his army on account of its weakness to hold his position and
protect his communications and depots, he was compelled to
throw himself before Rosecrans to save his line of supply.
But lie did this with the hope of striking the columns of his
enemy as they should separately debouche from the mountain
gaps.

318 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

To accomplisli this, he placed his army between Lee and
Gordon's Mills and Lafayette, on the road from Chattanooga
to the latter place. He thus faced the eastern slopes of the
mountains, directly on the line of advance from Trenton. He
claimed that his movements partially accomplished his pur-
pose, as he threw Rosecrans oiF his guard by his rapid move-
ment, apparently in retreat, but in reality for concentration
opposite the center of his army, and that being deceived by
the information of deserters and persons sent within his line,
he exposed himself in detail.

General Rosecrans states, in his official report, that the
receipt of evidence, gathered from all sources, led him to be-
lieve that General Bragg was moving on Rome. Accepting
his retreat far southward as a fact, he continued the move-
ments of his right and center across Lookout Mountain, as
previously ordered, and directed General Crittenden to occupy
Chattanooga with a division, and subsequently with a brigade ;
to call his troops from the north bank of the Tennessee river,
and follow the enemy vigorously on the road to Ringgold and
Dalton. When over the mountain, General McCook was
required to advance rapidly on Alpine, interrupt the retreat
of the enemy, and strike him in flank ; and General Thomas
was instructed to move upon Lafayette.

In obedience to orders, General Crittenden occujoied Chat-
tanooga with Wood's division about noon on the 9th, called
to him his troops from the opposite bank of the river, and put
his corps in motion toward Ringgold, his head of column
reaching Rossville, five miles distant, in the evening. The
same day, ISTegley's division, by direction of General Thomas,
moved down the eastern slope of the mountain and debouched
into McLemore's Cove. This nook is formed by Lookout
Mountain and Pigeon Mountain, a spur from Lookout, which
curves round at its origin to the east and then trends northward
on the east side of Chickamauga river, maintaining parallelism
with the stream, ^Missionary Ridge on the west, and Lookout
itself. Negley met the enemy's troopers at the foot of the
mountain and drove them several miles with a heavy line of
skirmishers. On the right, Carlin's brigade of Davis' division
moved upon Alpine, Georgia, and Heg's brigade of the same

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 319

divison into Broonitown valley, in support of the ciivaliy. In
tlie evening, General McCook received information of the
retreat of the enemy and orders to advance in pursuit.

During the 10th, the throe columns moved in pursuance of
orders. Crittenden's corps, with the exception of Wagner's
l)rigade of Wood's division, left to garrison Cliattanooga, ad-
vanced in pursuit of the enemy on the Einggold road. Palmer's
division leading, through deficiency of supplies made a short
march, and encamped at the crossing of the Chickamauga;
hut short as was the advance, the enemy's cavalry annoyed the
head of the column, and in a bold dash rode over the front of
the First Kentucky regiment and captured two ofiicers and
fifty men. The movement on the Einggold road partially
uncovered Chattanooga, l)y giving open ways to the enemy on
the three roads coursing through the valleys between Lookout
ISIountain and the line of march. This fact, taken with an-
other, that Bragg had retired his forces mainly on the road
to Lafayette, induced General Eosecrans to modify his orders
to General Crittenden, restricting his advance to Einggold,*
and requiring him to make a reconnoissance the next day on
the route of the enemy's retreat.

The advance of the central column also discovered the
enemy, contrary to expectations. ISTegley moved forward be •
yond Bailey's Cross-roads and skirmished hotly with the enemy
until he reached the opening of Bug Gap, in Pigeon Moun-
tain, through which the direct road to Lafayette passes — the
designated route of the Fourteenth Corps, He found the gap
obstructed and a line of pickets, indicating the proximity of
the enemy in force. ISTegley was now between the gap in liis
front and Catlett's Gap in the same mountain, fartlier to the
north, and was exposed to attack in front and on both flanks.
His situation, viewed in reference to Bragg's purpose of crusli-
ing his enemy in detail, was exceedingly critical. As he had
progressed he had received conflicting rumors, but at night he
was assured that heavy forces were in proximity to him in the
three directions of his exposure. Baird's division had passed
the mountain during the day, and was encamped at the

* Statement in General Eosecrans' report.

320 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

dcboiiclie from Stevens' Gap, a few miles in his rear, assuring*
liim support in the morning. The advance of the central col-
umn had not been as rapid as General Rosecrans had antici-
pated, and he expressed his disappointment to General Thomas
in terms of implied censure. His impression was that the tar-
diness of General Thomas in moving toward Lafayette imper-
iled both flanks; but in the full revelation of the facts, it
appeared as saving Kegley's and other divisions of the center,
and at the same relieving one or the other of the corps on
the flanks from exposure to an overwhelming concentration
of forces.

In the efiibrt to defeat Rosecrans in detail, Bragg's first com-
bination was directed against Thomas; and this fact doubtless
saved Crittenden's corps, which was in air and in no state of
preparation to resist the attack of an equal force, much less a
great army. McCook's corps was at the same time in com-
plete insulation at Alpine, and not far from Bragg's army.
Thus far the movements of the three columns met the expecta-
tions and wishes of the rebel commander. Crittenden had
diverged to the east on the Ringgold road ; McCook had ad-
vanced far from support, and Thomas had moved directly
toward his army. His army now^ comprised about fifty thou-
sand men. He had been joined by two divisions from Missis-
sippi, and his own estimate placed his infantry at thirty-five
thousand men ; and almost into the midst of this vast army
Negley had penetrated. As soon as his head of column had
appeared at McLemore's Cove, General Bragg had given
orders for a movement in great force against him. At mid-
night on the 9th, he gave orders to General Hindman to ad-
vance with his division to Davis' Cross-roads, in ISTegley's front,
to co-operate with Cleburne's division and a force of cavalry
from Hill's corps. Cleburne being sick and Dug and Catlett's
Gaps being heavily obstructed. General Hill failed in his part
of the combination ; but Hindman advanced and was at Mor-
gan, three or four miles from Is^egley, early in the afternoon
of the 10th. To prevent a miscarriage of the movement alto-
gether, at 8 A. M. General Bragg ordered Buckner with his
corps to join Hindman at Morgan's, three miles from Davis'
Cross-roads, and very near to Negley, Bragg was very urgent

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 321

in regard to the movement, as he had inferred that the three
advancing columns were moving for concentration near his
position. To assure success hy giving strong support to the
forces ah^eady in Negley's front, he directed General Polk to
send a division of his corps to Anderson's, to cover Hindman
during his operations. Fortunately for Negley and the army
there was delay. Hindman proposed a change of plan, and in
waiting for instructions the day passed away. General Bragg
refused to modify his orders, and at midnight repeated them
with emphasis. Kegley, as has been seen, was still unsup-
ported and in ignorance of the elaborate combination which
had been formed to overwhelm and capture him, for in addi-
tion to the four divisions at Morgan's and Anderson's, Walker's
corps was ordered to support Cleburne at Dug Gap.

The experience of the Twentieth Corps on the 10th was not
different from that of the two to its left. Johnson's division
crossed the mountain and reached the vicinity of Davis' posi-
tion, and Sheridan's encamped on the western slope. On reach-
ing Alpine, General McCook ascertained that the enemy had
not retreated, as had been anticipated, and that he could not
communicate with General Thomas, on the east side of the
mountain. lie had been ordered to communicate with that
commander, on that day, at Lafayette. He had also been di-
rected to advance on Summerville. In this unexpected state
of things he abandoned the advance to Summerville to await
developments, and sent messengers to General Thomas, by way
of Valley Head.

In view of the developments of the day, General Rosecrans
made dispositions for the morrow. He ordered General Crit-
tenden to the front, with instructions to advance with his main
force to Ringgold, and detach a brigade to reconnoitcr toward
Lee and Gordon's Mills. Pursuant to these orders, General
Crittenden directed Harker's brigade of Wood's division to
retire to Hossville, and then move on the line of the enemy's
retreat. With Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions he advanced
toward Ringgold. Soon after Harker reached the Lafayette
road, he became engaged with the outlying guards of the en-
emy, and upon report of the fact, General Wood, with Buell's
21

322 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

brigade, went to liis support. During the afternoon, these
brigades advanced to the mills, and at nightfall the camp-fires
of the enemy were in view toward Lafayette. Palmer and
Van Cleve reached Ringgold early in the day, and there met
the brigades of Wilder and Minty, which had driven out the
garrison of the place. Hazen, with his brigade, joined the
infantry column at Graysville, earlier in the day. These bri-
gades had crossed the Tennessee river at the mouth of the
JSTorth Chickamauga. In the afternoon, Wilder, supported by
infantry, advanced toward Dalton. He drove the rebel cavalry
before him to Tunnel Hill, and encamped in front of a heavy
force. The enemy gave many indications of concentration, as
his outlying forct s were formed on all the roads. In fact, Crit-
tenden had passed the right flank of a large army intent upon
operations in an opposite direction, or something more than a
skirmish might have occurred.

The fact of concentration was revealed with greater emphasis
before the Fourteenth Corps. At 8 a. m., Baird reached Keg-
ley, and formed his division on his left. Soon after, it was as-
certained that the obstructions had been removed from the
gaps, and that the enemy was advancing through them in heavy
force, while another column was approaching farther to the
left. It was then apparent that the trains and even the com-
mand would be endangered should battle be accepted without
change of position, and General ISTegley decided to withdraw
as speedily as possible. He sent the trains toward the moun-
tain, and followed with his own division, leaving Baird's to
check the enemy, until he could assume a new position north
of the Chickamauga, and in turn cover the withdrawal of
Baird's line, and prevent a flank movement on the left. When
l^egley's division had gained position and formed in line of
battle, Baird withdrew, step by step, first his skirmishers, then
his main line, until he too had crossed the stream. The enemy
pressed him as he retired, and he was compelled to fight,
sufiering and inflicting loss. He had hardly crossed the stream
before the enemy appeared with heavy lines on the opposite
side, and opened with his artillery, while a heavy force formed
in line of battle on his left. Negley's artillery responded fi-om
£i hill to the rear, and Starkweather's and Stanley's brigades

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 323

became warmly engaged, and so far checked the enemy, that
Baird was able to form a new line behind Negley. When this
was done, Stanley retired, and Starkweather, having covered
his withdrawal, with quickness and safety moved his troops to
the rear of the third covering line. Previously, ITegley had
pent Beatty's and Scribner's brigades to the rear to protect the
trains against the enemy's cavalry. These timely, cautious,
and dextrous movements saved these insulated divisions, and
their safe retirement from the presence of an army may be
regarded as one of the pivotal events of the campaign. Having
■completely foiled the enemy by their skillful withdrawal, "Neg-
ley and Baird took a strong position in front of Stevens' Gap,
and were soon joined by the divisions of Brannan and Rey-
jiolds. These four divisions were disposed for defense by Gen-
eral Thomas : ISTegley on the right ; then, in turn, to the left,
Baird, Brannan, and Reynolds — the whole line covering Ste-
vens' and Coopers' Gaps. But these preparations for defense
were not necessary, as General Bragg had abandoned his effort
against the central column. He had joined Cleburne at Bug
Gap, at daylight, to await the noise of Hindman's guns, as the
signal for Cleburne's movement upon Negley's flank and rear.
During the early hours of the day, in his impatience at Hind-
man's delay, he had repeated his orders to hasten his move-
ments. But when the signal gnns were heard, Cleburne's ad-
vance was too late to reach the flank or rear of the force
devoted, in orders, to destruction. Chagrined that this com-
bination had failed. General Bragg turned his attention to a
movement against Crittenden.

During the 11th, General McCook remained at Alpine, but
the cavalry in his front were active in the endeavor to ascer-
tain the movements and purposes of the enemy. Believing
that co-operation with General Thomas through Broomtown
valley was impracticable. General McCook ordered all his
trains and material not necessary for his troops to be retired
to the summit of the mountain to await the result of the
reconnoissance sent by General Stanle}'' toward Lafayette.

The events of the day made evident the fact that General
Bragg had concentrated his army to give battle. Before Gen-
oral Rosecrans had learned the nature and issue of ITegley'a

324 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

engagement he liad received information which rendered it
probable that a heavy force had been concentrated at
Lafayette, and suggested to General Thomas to call General
McCook to his support. When the report of the engagement
in McLemore's Cove reached him, he emphasized his sug-
gestion that McCook should be called to the center.

Looking to the concentration of his whole army. General
Rosecrans directed General Crittenden to move the divisions
with him at Ringgold to the Lafayette road, either to join
"Wood at Lee and Gordon's Mills, or to call Wood's troops to
himself at some good defensive position farther north. The
orders under which General Crittenden had conducted his
movements during the day had not been interpreted as re-
stricting his advance to Ringgold, but as giving him freedom
to advance indefinitely, if it was apparent that the enemy had
retreated to some remote point. As the head of his column
was beyond Ringgold when he received the order requiring the
movement of his corps to the Lafayette road, he had to recall
Wilder from Tunnel Hill, and the supporting infantry, not far
in his rear, before he could withdraw from Ringgold with his
remaining forces, and delay was unavoidable. The order in
question did not reach him until after night, and this, too, re-
tarded his movement to the northwest.

General McCook remained at Alpine, ignorant of events at
McLemore's Cove, but in constant receipt of information
making certain the fact of Bragg's concentration at Lafayette.
He was consequently uneasy with regard to his own corps,
and anxious with regard to the other columns. The concen-
tration of the enemy so near him was suggestive of the fact
that his position was a false one, as he could not reach Gen-
eral Thomas should the enemy attack him immediately;
neither could he get support from any source should Bragg
fall upon him with his whole army. But in the absence of
orders he did not deem it legitimate to either advance or
retreat.

When General Bragg withdrew his forces from McLemore's
Cove, he directed Polk's and Walker's corps to Lee and Gor-
don's Mills. He made this movement in hope that he could
easily defeat Crittenden, whose corps he had learned was di-

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 325

vided on the roads to Ringgold and Lafayette. His orders to
his corps commanders, and those sent against Crittenden at
Ringgold, on the night of the llth, required that they should
move to a common destination. But though brought face to
face, two corps against one, no battle resulted. And Crit-
tenden's escape from another combination, seemingly well
formed, brings to view another pivot on which the army's
safety turned.

Early in the morning of the 12th, Wilder's brigade and the
supporting infantry returned to Ringgold, and the whole force
was put in motion toward AYood's position. Wilder's brigade
was directed to follow on the line of march and cover the left
flank of the column. Palmer skirmished with the enemy
during the day, and "Wilder had a severe engagement at Leet's
lanyard, in which the enemy lost fifty men killed and
wounded, his own loss being thirty men. His superior guns
made the diiference, for he had no other advantage. Wilder
joined the corps at Lee and Gordon's Mills after dark, where
the union of the three divisions had been effected during the
afternoon.

Keither General Thomas nor General McCook changed po-
sition on the 12th, but each gained additional evidence that
the Confederate army was concentrated at Lafayette. The
cavalry forces on the right, reconnoitering toward that place,
were assured that an army was before them.

On the morning of the 13th, General Crittenden made dis-
positions for defense. He threw Cruft's brigade and Wilder's
on his left to reconnoiter, and the Fourth cavalry, which had
that morning reported to him, on his right, toward Mc-
Lemorc's Cove. Ignorant of the fact that two corps were in
readiness to attack him, he sent Van Cleve, with one brigade,
on a reconnoissance toward Lafayette. Van Clcve met the
enemy, with cavalry and artillery, soon after leaving the mills,
and skirmishing heavily, drove him three miles. This agres-
sive attitude disconcerted General Polk, and instead of attack-
ing, as he had been repeatedly ordered, he halted in defense
and called for reinforcements. Polk had received three dis-
tinct orders to attack at daylight. Three exceedingly im-
portant considerations induced General Bragg to press his sub-

326 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

ordinate to prompt action. There was opportunity, as lie
thouglat, to strike Crittenden " in detail/' and he proposed to
attack the troops in motion from Ringgold, and then those at
the mills. Having crushed Crittenden, he could then give at-
tention a second time to those in the cove. Besides this in-
viting prospect north and west of his position, the approach
of McCook from the south made it important to attack
promptly. He promised his lieutenant-general the support
of Buckner's corps, and gave personal attention to the move-
ment, accompanying Buckner as he advanced in support.
But he was again disappointed. Polk did not attack, as he
had ordered ; and though there were three corps against one,
he abandoned the policy of striking his enemy " exposed in
detail," and gave orders for the concenti-ation of his army on
the right bank of the Chickamauga, to deliver battle from his
right flank.

The proximity of the enemy to the mills excited the gravest
apprehensions, although his strength in Crittenden's front was
not known. It was known, however, that it was possible for
Bragg to throw his whole army against Crittenden, or throw
it between him and Thomas. Each possibility was portentious
of overthrow. In the emergency. General Crittenden was or-
dered to move two divisions to the right to cover the Chatta-
nooga road in the valley, immediately east of Lookout, leav-
ing Wood's division at the mills. Wood was instructed to
hold his position if possible. At this juncture the advance of
the reserve corps — Whittaker's and Mitchell's brigades of
Steedman's division, and Daniel McCook's of Morgan's — were
expected at Rossville, and "Wood was directed to look to these
forces for support should the enemy attack him. His division
was in great peril in its isolation before the whole rebel army —
two brigades opposite the center of an army of nearly sixty
thousand men, without direct support on the right, left, or
rear, and on the direct road to Chattanooga from Bragg's po-
sition. In the event of yielding his position. General Wood
was directed to defend the road to Chattanooga, and the one
over the " nose " of Lookout Mountain, at all haza-rds. Into
the chasm between Crittenden and Thomas, Wilder was
throv^n, with instructions to reconnoiter along Chickamauga

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 327

and Chattanooga creeks, and join General Thomas with such
rapidity as the safety of his brigade would permit.

There was no movement in the center on the 13th, except a
slight advance of Reynolds toward Catlett's Gap. General
Thomas was now awaiting the approach of McCook before
leaving the protection of the mountain.

At midnight of the 12th, General McCook received the first
intimation that he was to join General Thomas. During the
early part of the day he received other communications, which
more fully revealed the necessity of this movement. He at
first prepared to send his trains under the protection of three
brigades. General Lytle commanding, back on the route of ad-
vance, and with the remainder of his corps, to move along the
eastern base of Lookout to Dougherty's Gap, the route that
had been suggested. Subsequently, this route was abandoned
as impracticable, and another was sought on the mountain to
Stevens' Gap. But as citizens concurred in denying the ex-
istence of such a road, and having no guide. General AlcCook
determined to move by way of Yalley Head. He therefore
ascended the mountain, through Henderson's Gaj), on the
night of the 13th. He was now safe from attack; but the
problem of his conjunction with General Thomas in time for
battle was one involving the fate of the army. The issue was
in the balance while he crossed and recrossed the mountain
during the next four days.

General Rosecrans now made effort to hold all the roads to
Chattanooga east of the mountain, and concentrate his army
upon them before the enemy. From the 13th to the 17th,
General Thomas advanced his corps slightly from day to day.
General Crittenden, with Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions,
moved to the Chattanooga valley on the 14th, and counter-
marched on the day following, when Van Cleve took position
at Crawfish Springs, and Palmer on his right, at Gowen's
ford. During the 15th, Minty reconnoitered the front, and
reported that the enemy was in force at Dalton, Ringgold,
Leet's tan-yard, and Rock Spring Church.

After ascending the mountain at "Winston's Gap, General
McCook, with Johnson's and Davis' divisions, followed a
mountain road to Stevens' Gap, and there descended to Gen-

328 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

eral Thomas. Sheridan marched down Lookout valley to
Johnson's creek, and crossed over the mountain on the line
of the advance of the Fourteenth Corps. The cavalry, under
command of Brigadier-General K. B. Mitchell, General Stan-
ley having been relieved on account of sickness, followed the
infantry on the mountain road. General Mitchell stationed
Crook's division at Dougherty's Gap, and sent McCook's di-
vision to McLemore's Cove.

Thus, on the 17th, the three corps were again in supporting
distance of each other. When McCook reached the cove,
General Thomas closed up on Crittenden, whose right division
moved to the left to give room. It had been a matter of life
and death to effect the concentration of the army.* On the
11th, the heads of column had met Bragg's outlying detach-
ments, and from all came the startling announcement that his
army was concentrated preparatory to battle. Subsequently,
it was ascertained that reinforcements had been drawn from
Mississippi, Georgia, and Virginia. General Rosecrans then
abandoned the offensive — an attitude which his army had sus-
tained with marked success for nearly a year. The change to
the defensive was a sad revelation to the troops that had
crossed the lofty Lookout in fancied repetition of their former
pursuits of Bragg's army. Happily, however, the compact
union of the three corps of the Army of the Cumberland, so
long and so perilously insulated, was effected before the enemy
was ready to deliver battle. When the necessity of concen-
tration was perceived, the interval between Crittenden and
Thomas, and between the latter and McCook, was greater
than that between each and Bragg's army. Why, with knowl-
edge of this fact, the Confederate general did not strike either,
in its insulation, is not fully explained by the assertion that
his subordinate corps and division commanders were slow to
do his bidding. Bragg's effort to strike Crittenden was made
on the 13th, and yet for four days thereafter, his corps was
between him and Chattanooga, in closest proximity and with-
out support. No general perhaps, during the war, had such
opportunities, and none so completely failed to avail himself

* Statement in General Rosecrans' Report.

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 329

of them. In the merest glance at his possibilities, in com-
parison with his achievements, the utter absence of general-
ship in the management of his army comes into boldest relief.
ISTo excuse or apology can be made for such blunders. There
was not so much defect of plan, as unprecedented feebleness
of execution. Indeed, his plans were in many respects ad-
mirable. They compassed a magnitude of means out of all
proportion to the objects proposed, and yet the results were
too meager to give praise to the advance of a line of skir-
mishers. If his corps and division generals would not obey
him, he should have drawn their successors from the generals
of lu'igades, rather than have allowed his policy of defeating
his enemy " exposed in detail " to fail. But all his blunders
liad not occurred. When Rosecrans' united army was in de-
fiant attitude across the Chickamauga, on the night of the
17th, having failed to crush either of the three corps of that
enemy in their isolation, his plan compassing the leading
features of a great battle was yet to fail, through the delay of
its initial ruling movement.

The 17th did not close -with General Rosecrans in igno-
rance of the movement of Bragg's army toward his left. The
approach of heavy columns from the direction of Dalton had
been observed by General Steedman, who had advanced to
Rino-o-old in reconnoissance. The clouds of dust which Steed-
man saw south of Ringgold, had their counterpart within the
range of vision from the signal stations of the national army,
and the trending of these clouds told plainly the object of
the enemy. General Bragg had been massing his forces on
his right, with effort to conceal his purpose by apparent
activity and strength on his left. But the coming of his rein-
forcements from Virginia, through Dalton, revealed his
strategy, by the direction of their march.

The night of the 17th, General Bragg announced his plan
and prescribed the movements of his army for execution on
the following morning. His army comprised five corps, some
of them improvised for the occasion. Their order from right
to left was : Hood's, Walker's, Buckner's, Polk's, and Hill's.
Hood was ordered to cross the Chickamauga at Reed's bridge,
and sweep up toward Lee and Gordon's Mills, to reach Rose-

330 BATTLE OF CfllCKAMAUGA.

crans' flank and rear ; Walker was directed to cross at Alex-
ander's bridge and join Hood, and Buckner was required to
cross at Ledford's ford, and press upon "Wood's position in
front of Polk's corps ; while the latter was to demonstrate on
tlie line of direct approach, and if not met by too much resist-
ance, to cross and attack any force he might meet. IliU's duty
was to cover the left flank of the army, and in the event of
the movement of the Union army to Wood's position, he was
directed to attack its left flank. The cavalry was stationed at
the gaps in Pigeon Mountain, to cover the left and rear of the
army.* Had these movements been executed promptly as
ordered, the larger portion of Bragg's army would have been
on Rosecrans' left, and in the rear of his left, with a fair pros-
pect of grasping all the roads east of the Chattanooga valley,
as at the time fixed for the execution of the movement. Gen-
eral Posecrans was not prepared to defeat it. It was a repe-
tition of the initiative of the same commander at Perryville and
Murfreesboro, only on a grander scale. The conditions here
were different, and though he was nearer the rear of his enemy,
and had designated heavier columns for his favorite move-
ment, there were obstacles which gave more embarrassment
than in his other battles. In preparing for battle on the 18th,
he had overlooked causes of detention, and this mistake gave
General Rosecrans time to throw his army to the left, between
him and Chattanooga, upon the shortest roads thither. The
roads designated for his columns were narrow and unsuited
for the movement of artillery ; a stream with few bridges and
few fords was in his way, and the movement of a large army
by the flank on transverse roads involves embarrassments
which almost always cause detentions not anticipated. So
that, at nightfall on the 18th, Bragg was by no means ready
for battle on the 19th, having entirely failed to deliver it on
the 18th, as he had planned. But his preparations were in ad-
vance of those of General Rosecrans, as he had the initiative
and moved on shorter lines. Night marches alone could give
partial finish to Rosecrans' provisions for the engagement now
plainly imminent.

* His plan as given in his official report.

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 331

Early in the day, the clouds of dust trending to the north-
east had made evident the character and purpose of the move-
ment of the Confederate army by the right flank. At an early
hour, there was a demonstration in Palmer's front, to the right
of Crawfish Springs, and at noon, Polk slightly threatened
"Wood. This activity was intended to conceal the heavy
movements down the stream. Minty and Wilder were on the
watch at Reed's and Alexander's bridges, and it was not until
late in the afternoon that the heads of column appeared be-
fore them. These two brigades resisted so persistently, that
General Bragg mentioned their action as one cause of delay.
Wilder inflicted a loss of one hundred and five men to Lid-
dell's division, at Alexander's bridge. But he and Minty were
finally forced back, and the enemy secured the crossings. The
lower one, at Reed's bridge, was wrested from the enemy late
in the evening, and burned by Colonel McCook, of the reserve
corps. Wilder was driven across the Lafayette road, and
neither Minty nor McCook were able to learn what forces
crossed the stream late at night. General Bragg held the river
from Wood's position to Reed's bridge, and under cover of
the night and the forests, his movements were perfectly con-
cealed.

As two corps of the enemy remained in position across the
Chickamauga, and his cavalry was on the right bank, far up
the stream, it was very critical to move the Army of the Cum-
berland by the left flank. Crittenden's corps was compelled
to maintain position, both from policy and absolute necessity.
And the movement of the infantry, from the right toward
Crittenden, was accomplished with great caution and conse-
quent slowness during the day, so that at 4 p. M. no troops
had reached the rear of Crittenden, though it was well known
that the enemy had forces far bej'ond Wood's position. At
this- hour, General Thomas was directed to relieve Palmer's
and Van Cleve's divisions with Negley's, that Crittenden
might place Palmer and Van Cleve on Wood's left, and with
Baird's, Brannan's, and Reynolds' divisions, to take position
at Kelley's, on the Lafayette road. These changes in the
main were effected during the night, and at early dawn there
were five divisions in front of the enemy, and others were in

332 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

motion. McCook's corps bivouacked at Pond Spring, and at
daylight resumed motion toward the left. This corps was yet
far from the battle-field, but its presence there was practicable,
and some of its brigades were to be deployed in line of battle,
while subject to the historic fierceness of the primal attacks
of Southern armies. McCook was placed in command of all the
troops, including the cavalry on the right of Crittenden's corps.

The unexpected slowness of General Bragg's columns on
the 18th did not change his plan of attack ; and at daylight
on the 19th, Buckner's corps and Cheatham's division of
Polk's corps crossed the Chickamauga, and joined Hood and
Walker, who had crossed during the evening and night pre-
vious. General Bragg's line . of battle was formed with
Walker on the right, Buckner on the left. Hood in the center,
and Cheatham, with five brigades, in reserve. Buckner's left
rested on the Chickamauga, a mile below Lee and Gordon's
Mills, and Walker's right on the road leading west from Alex-
ander's bridge.

At daylight. General Thomas, with Baird's division, reached
Kelley's house, Brannan's following closely. The two divis-
ions were immediately formed so as to cover the roads to
Reed's and Alexander's bridges. Wilder's brigade had taken
position the night before, on the west of the Lafayette road,
some distance south from Kelley's, and General Thomas pro-
posed to place the two remaining brigades of Reynolds' division,
Turchin's and King's, between Baird, who was on the right
of Brannan and Wilder, when they should reach the field.
While these dispositions were being made on the left. General
McCook reached Crawfish Springs with his head of column,
and received orders from the general commanding to mass
his corps at that point, and await further directions. The
enemy was not demonstrative in any direction at the time,
and the Twentieth Corps was held for direction to any part
of the field, as emergencies should arise. Crittenden had been
charged by General Rosecrans to hold his position with per-
sistent firmness in the event of attack, as upon his retention
of position, the success of the movement of the other two
corps to the left depended. The quietness in his front was
to him prophetic of danger. His fear of attack had also
been induced by information which Minty had given him

BATTLE OF CHICK AM AUGA. 333

as lie passed his front with his brigade early in tlie morning,
that the enemy was in front of the left of his line. It was
not yet known that General Bragg's army was west of the
Chickamauga, forming for battle, and to relieve the doubtful-
ness of the situation, General Crittenden directed General
Palmer on his left to send a brigade to reconnoiter the road
to the north. Colonel Grose was sent on this reconnoissance,
but, before he could return and report, the suspense was re-
lieved by the noise of battle on the left.

Soon after General Thomas had taken position before
Kelley's house, he was informed by Colonel McCook, who had
bivouacked on the road to Reed's bridge, that he had suc-
ceeded, the night before, in burning the bridge after a brigade
had crossed. Believing this brigade to be isolated, Colonel
McCook suggested that an effort should be made to capture it.
Deeming the suggestion worthy of experiment, and wishing
to explore his front. General Thomas directed General
Brannan to leave one brigade within supporting distance of
General Baird, and with the other two reconnoiter the road
to the burnt bridge, and, if practicable, capture the isolated
brigade. General Thomas, sharing the prevailing ignorance
of the exact movements of the enemy, had been forming his
line in nearness to a heavy force. Although the armies had
been maneuvering in closest proximity for twelve days, each
army commander was ignorant of the special dispositions of
the other, and a merely tentative advance became the ini-
tiative of one of the bloodiest battles of the war. General
Bragg had hoped to conceal his effort to throw his army
between General Rosecrans and Chattanooga. The latter had
discerned the movement of troops to his left, but neither he
nor any of his officers were aware that seven-tenths of General
Bragg's army were on the west bank of the Chickamauga early
in the morning of the 19th. Brannan's reconnoissance, how-
ever, developed the enemy, and brought on the battle, dis-
turbing General Bragg's combinations and preventing the
suddenness of his blow.

In compliance with instructions. General Brannan posted
Croxton's brigade on the left of Baird, and with Vander-
veer's and Connell's moved forward, diverging to the left

334 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Croxtou also advanced and soon enconntered the enemy —
three brigades of cavalry under Forrest, that were covering
Oeneral Bragg's right flank. In moving forward, Baird met
hostile forces, and captured two hundred prisoners. In the
meantime, Croxton had become hotly engaged, as Forrest
had called infantry to his aid. Wlien General Thomas first
heard the noise of battle in the direction of Croxton's advance,
he rode forward to learn the nature of the conflict. He found
Croxton very heavily engaged, but holding his ground against
superior numbers, and returned to direct General Baird to his
support. General Brannan also sent the Thirty-first Ohio,
Lieutenant-Colonel Lister commanding, to Croxton's left.
When these dispositions had been made, the two divisions ad-
vanced and pressed back the enemy some distance. This
done, the line was halted for readjustment, when General
Baird learned that there was a large force on his right. He
prepared for resistance by ordering King's brigade, on his
right, to change front to the south. But before the change
could be made, Liddell's division was upon him, and hurled
King's and Scribner's brigades from position in disorder and
with the loss of ten pieces of artillery. Starkweather's
brigade was thrown before the enemy, but it too gave way.
Fortunately, reinforcements were near to press back the
enemy to the front and right of Baird's position, while Gen-
eral Brannan had been so far relieved from pressure that he
could charge the pursuing forces, with portions of Yander-
veer's and Connell's brigades. The charge was exceedingly
gallant and brilliant — the Mnth Ohio, Colonel Cammerling,
recapturing, with the bayonet, Gunther's battery of the Fifth
artillery, which King had lost. The capture of these and
other guns by the enemy was mainly due to the fact that the
conflict occurred on ground thickly covered with forest trees
and undergrowth, and consequently unfavorable for the rapid
movement of artillery, as also for its eflective use. This
opening passage of arms was the type of the fighting, in its
first stages, from left to right. Excepting a few insignificant
fields, the whole region between the Lafayette road and the
Chickamauga was thickly wooded, and divisions and brigades
from each army were often hotly engaged, while in complete

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 335

isolation in the densest woods; for when armies meet unex-
pectedly on such a field, methodical movements are imprac-
ticable, as also coiitinnons lines, until there has been an
immense waste of strength.

The reinforcements at hand, to retrieve disaster on the left,
had come at the call of General Thomas, and through antici-
pation of their need by General Rosecrans, When General
Thomas was first assured that he had developed the Confed-
erate army in his front, he requested General Crittenden,
whose corps was nearest him, and not engaged, to send him
support. General Crittenden sent Palmer's division, which
reached him almost simultaneously with Johnson's division of
General McCook's corps, acting under orders from General
Rosecrans. Reynolds' division of the Fourteenth Corps ar-
rived soon after. As yet. General Bragg had not advanced
his divisions to the chasm between Thomas and Crittenden.
His object had been to swing round his compact lines and
envelop Crittenden, supposing that Rosecrans' extreme left
rested at Lee and Gordon's Mills. When his cavalry met
infantry overlapping his right flank, General Bragg threw
Walker's corps against Brannan and Baird, and was com-
pelled subsequently to direct his reserves, and one division
from his extreme left, to his right, where Walker's corps had
been broken and routed. The time spent in the execution of
these movements, and surprise from the unexpected conditions
of the engagement, permitted three divisions to secure align-
ment on the right of Baird. The first movement of Brannai:^
and Baird had been regarded by General Bragg as intended
to turn his right flank, and until its security had been attained,
other dispositions were suspended. This prevented the ad-
vance of his central columns upon the unoccupied ground
between Thomas and Crittenden, and robbed him of his great-
est advantage.

General Johnson, on arrival at Kelley's, was directed by
General Thomas to form his division in line of battle and
move forward. The division was formed with Willich's bri-
gade on the right, Baldwin's on the left, and Dodge's in
reserve. When the division was in readiness for motion.
Palmer's was in proximity on the right. By direction of Gen-

336 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

eral Rosecrans, General Palmer had formed his dhdsion by
brigades in echelon, on the march from the right — Hazen's
on the left, then Crnft's and Grose's, the latter well refused.
In moving forward, these two divisions met Cheatham's
division of five brigades, called from reserve to restore the
enemy's right. After an hour of severe fighting, Cheatham
yielded ground and fell back some distance. In the meantime,
Reynolds had formed to the right and rear of Palmer. Tur-
chin's brigade was posted southeast of Kelley's, and King's bri-
gade, destined for his right, was thrown to his left on Palmer's
right, in response to a call for help from Palmer, whose troops
had nearly exhausted their ammunition. Reynolds planted
his batteries, Harris' and Swallow's, near the road, with the
Seventy-fifth Indiana and the IlTinety-second Illinois in sup-
poi't.

The line not being continuous between Generals Thomas
and Crittenden, there was danger that General Bragg would
still interpose a heavy force before reinforcements could arrive.
Troops were in motion from the Twentieth Corps, who were
to bridge this chasm, but none were yet near. At this junc-
ture, through anxiety for the safety of Palmer's division. Gen-
eral Crittenden sought and obtained permission to send other
troops to the left. He at once put Beatty's and Dick's brigades
in motion, leaving the third brigade of Van Cleve's division
with General Wood, at Lee and Gordon's Mills. General Van
Cleve soon found position on the right of Reynolds, and al-
most simultaneously General Davis arrived with Carlin's and
Heg's brigades of his division, and formed them on the right
of Van Cleve, extending the line well toward General Wood.

General Davis had been instructed by General Rosecrans to
turn the enemy's left flank, and the former, in compliance,
formed his brigades, by regiments in echelon, to wheel to the
left from General Van Cleve's right. Having first planted his
batteries on high ground, in an open field east of the Lafayette
road, and posted the Eighty-first Illinois to the right in their
support, he commenced his movement to flank the enemy. He,
however, advanced only a short distance before he met the foe,
and became heavily engaged. At first he drove back the
enemy, but soon, little by little, his two brigades gave ground,

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 337

specially on the flanks of the line, until his right and loft rested
upon the road. In this position, supported by Wilder's bri-
gade of mounted infantry, he resisted successfully the superior
forces of the enemy through several hours of severest fighting.
Generals Van Cleve and Davis were opportunely thrown he-
fore an immense concentration of forces formed to separate the
two wings of the national army, and upon the latter especially
the enemy's blows fell heavily. After a protracted conflict,
Dick's brigade of Van Cleve's division, on his left, gave way,
and then he was in isolation, except as supported by "Wilder,
and for a time severely engaged. His left brigade, with great
loss, its commander. Colonel Heg, falling, held position, but
the Eighty-first Illinois, on the right of the batteries, was driven
back. At this juncture, the enemy was pressing front and
flanks, and the unequal contest could not have been maintained,
had not reinforcements arrived. Colonel Harker first reported
with his brigade, and was placed by General Davis in rear of
Heg's brigade, with orders to pass through it and engage the
enemy. Soon after, Colonel Bradley's brigade of General
Sheridan's division reached the field, and was similarly formed
in the rear of Carlin's brigade, to relieve it by passing to its
front. Soon after. General Wood, having been relieved by
Lytle's brigade, moved, with Buell's brigade of his own divis-
ion, and Barnes' of Van Cleve's, from Lee and Gordon's Mills
to Davis' right, and nearly simultaneously, Laiboldt's brigade
of Sheridan's division came also to the relief of Davis. These
commanders and troops were in time to defeat an efifort of the
enemy to pass around Davis' right. Colonel Buell felt the
shock of battle as the enemy was pressing back the Eighty-
first Illinois, and his brigade was somewhat shattered and
driven back, but soon rallied, and with Laiboldt's and Barnes'
brigades, forced back the flanking column and maintained the
position, the enemy desisting soon after entirely.

The scene of this conflict was Vineyard's farm, extending
east and west from the Lafayette road, and skirted on all sides
by thick woods. The troops of each army, in the alternations
of advance and retreat, found friendly cover in the woods,
while the open fields gave such exposure that they were thickly
22

338 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

strewn with the commingled dead and wounded of the two
armies. This farm and the surrounding woods was a distinct
battle-field. The struggle upon it, though an important ele-
ment of a great battle upon a vast field, was, during the later
hours of its continuance, a separate battle, mapped upon open
field and forest, in glaring insulation, by the bodies of the slain.

On the other side of the chasm, on the left of this position,
there was the counterpart. The left arm of General Bragg's
combination against General Rosecrans' center and right, was
laid heavily on Davis' and Van Cleve's divisions ; the right
arm fell with crushing force upon Reynolds' and Palmer's di-
visions. The recession of Dick's brigade exposed General
Samuel Beatty's right flank, and after a severe conflict, this
brigade was overwhelmed and driven from position. There
was then a wide breach in the right center of the national
army, and General Bragg called troops from the other side of
the Chickamauga, to double back the broken line toward each
flank.

The previous repulse of the enemy's right wing had been
•so decisive that a complete lull had succeeded. This quietness
permitted the retirement of Brannan's and Baird's divisions
on the left of General Thomas' line to a commanding position
on the road to Reid's bridge. General Thomas made this
change to make his left stronger in anticipation of another
assault upon it. On his right, Turchin's brigade of Reynolds'
division had relieved Hazen's on Palmer's left, that he might
replenish his ammunition. General Palmer had also called
away from the support of Reynolds' batteries the Seventy-
fifth Indiana. These latter changes left King without imme-
diate support ; and when under great pressure he called for
help, General Reynolds was compelled to send him the Ninety-
second Illinois — the last regiment defending his artillery.
Wlien Hazen had secured ammunition he moved his brigade
to the left of King's position, holding his left refused upon the
Lafayette road. By this time. Van Cleve had been driven
from line, and King and Hazen engaged the enemy as he
wheeled to double up the flank. As Palmer's division was
not heavily engaged at this juncture, Grose's brigade was sent
to their support. Scarcely had Grose moved to the right

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 339

before the enemy in heavy force fell upon Cruft and Turchin.
The five brigades stood for a few minutes under a destructive
fire, and were then borne back with broken lines. In this
threatening emergency, General Thomas moved Brannan's
division from his left to his disordered right. This timely
reinforcement, the quick reformation of portions of Palmer's
and Reynolds' divisions, and the most effective use of several
batteries of artillery arrested the disaster. The action of the
artillery was especially conspicuous in the repulse of the enemy.
Portions of Standart's, Cockerill's, Cushing's, Russell's, Harris',
and Swallow's batteries opened upon the enemy with grape
from two groups of guns formed respectively from the artillery
of Palmer's and Reynold's divisions. When the enemy was
repulsed on the main road, his forces moved through the chasm,
and were met and driven back by ISTegley's division, which
had advanced from Widow Glenn's and by Brannan's, which
wheeled upon him from the vicinity of Kelley's house. The
whole right of General Bragg's army had been broken and re-
pulsed, and his central forces, though more successful in main-
taining lines, had suffered equal losses. His left — Polk's and
Hill's corps and cavalry — ^beyond menance to Wood and a
dash at ]!:Tegley, had provoked no conflict. His right had
been so disordered by the early assaults, that Johnson's divis-
ion, though far advanced toward the Chickamauga and
entirely unsupported on the right after Palmer had been
driven back, was not again attacked until a fresh division
could be brought from the right bank of the stream, opposite
Lee and Gordon's Mills. At the time that Brannan had been
moved to the right in the afternoon, Scril)ner's and Stark-
weather's brigades were advanced to Johnson 's left in support,
Avhile King's regular brigade, the third of Baird's division,
was left on the road to Reid's bridge to hold the ground pre-
viously occupied by two divisions. These changes were merely
provisional, and General Thomas, as night approached, selected
ground for a new and more compact line, and designated the
respective positions of the five divisions which he had handled
during the day. But before Johnson's division and Baird's
two brigades could be withdrawn, they were attacked by Cle-
burne's fresh division, supported by Cheatham's, and a severe

340 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

uiglit conflict ensued, lasting for an hour, with heavy losses
on both sides and final repulse of the enemy.

The successful defense turned upon the rapid movement of
the whole army to the left. General Rosecrans' field position
was at "Widow Glenn's house, and as he was advised of actual
or prospective emergencies, he directed troops to meet them.
Early in the day, the enemy made an unsuccessful effort to
cross the Chickamauga in ISTegley's front, when in position west
of Crawfish Springs, and late in the day General Lytle's bri-
gade of Sheridan's division posted at Lee and Gordon's Mills,
by General McCook, when that point was abandoned by
Wood's division, repulsed a similar effort. The movement by
the left flank extended to the cavalry ; and at night all the
fords of the stream above Lee and Gordon's Mills were held
by this arm. The field hospitals had been located in the
vicinity of Crawfish Springs for the center and right of the
army,. and for the extreme left on the road to Eossville. The
hospitals on the right, though beyond the flank of the infantry
line, were covered by the cavalry on the line of the Chicka-
mauga.

Both armies lost heavily during the day. The loss of
officers in the Confederate army was exceedingly large. But
heavy as were the losses, each army knew that the in decisive-
ness of the battle involved a renewal of the conflict on the
morrow and a repetition of carnage. Neither army was will-
ing to yield without further fighting, and yet to neither was
there the assurance of ultimate victory ; and as they lay on
their arms in close proximity, there was to each the oppres-
sion of doul)t with regard to the issue. General Bragg, how-
ever, had more troops in reserve, available for the next day,
than General Rosecrans. Longstreet reached Ringgold in the
evening, with several brigades.. Breckinridge's division had
not been engaged at all, and Hindman's and Preston's only
slightly, while nearly all the brigades of the national army on
the field had been fully engaged. General Rosecrans being
on the defensive, was compelled, moreover, to diffuse his army
more widely, not only to cover the two main roads to Chatta-
nooga from the field, but those also in proximity to his flanks.
Llis cavalry was on his right, upon the roads to Chatta-

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 341

nooga, through the first valley east of Lookout Mountain,
and his reserve corps, represented by three brigades, was be-
fore Rossville, guarding the roads which led thither from the
south and east. It was not only necessary to watch against a
movement toward Chattanooga on the roads converging to
Rossville, but also upon the roads farther north; and Minty
had been sent with his troopers early in the day to Mission
Mills, north of east from Chattanooga.

But notwithstanding General Bragg's reserves, he had cause
to feel uneasiness with regard to the work before him. He
had been completely foiled in his strategy and tactics. He had
expected to find Critteuden's corps on the left of the national
army; but his own enveloping lines had been taken in flank,
and the right half had been fearfully shattered. He had had
marked advantage without marked success. At the opening
of the battle, his army had been well in hand for offense or
defense, while General Rosecrans had been compelled often to
throw forward divisions and brigades without support on right
or left; and the national army was now before him, with con-
tinuous lines, and having the choice of strong positions in the
rear. Besides, this army was yet upon the roads to Chatta-
nooga, which he had expected to grasp after he had doubled
its left upon its center and pressed it back upon the mountain
passes. In all his special expectations and dominant aims,
General Bragg had been disappointed and defeated.

General Rosecrans attained a continuous battle front only
at the close of the engagement. The conditions of this at-
tainment, however, had been such as to produce an involution
of divisions destructive to the unity of his corps. Such had
been the antecedent positions of his three corps, and such the
necessary haste of movement to the points most threatened
by the enemy, that their organization could not be main-
tained. Thus, General Thomas had three divisions from his
own corps, and one from each of the other two; and on the
right center and right of the army, the remaining divisions
of McCook's and Crittenden's corps were in regular alterna-
tion. This mixing of divisions gave an expression of impro-
vision to the battle front strongl}' significant of the emer-
gencies of its formation.

342 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Ill forming a new line in the evening, General Thomas did
not change the order of the divisions, hut modified their re-
lations so as to give greater compactness and strength to the
front that should he oiiered to the enemy. The order from
left to right, Avas Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Eeynolds, and
Brannan. Baird's division was well refused, facing the east;
Brannan's was on the right, in echelon. The battle front
coursed round the northeast corner of Kelley's farm, crossed
the Lafayette road a little south of his house, and extended
thence to the southwest, Baird's, Johnson's, and Palmer's
divisions were east of the road, and Reynolds' and Brannan'a
were west of it. This new line was much shorter than the
one maintained during the day, allowing greater strength and
heavier reserves. The general formation was two brigades-
from each division, in double ranks on the battle front, and
one brigade from each in reserve.

About midnight, after a conference with his corps com-
manders and other general officers. General Rosecrans gave
orders relative to the battle front for the next day. General
Thomas was directed to maintain his line as formed in the
eveniner. General McCook was instructed to leave his grand
guard in position until driven in by the enemy, and withdraw
Sheridan's and Davis' divisions, and form a new line to ex-
tend from the Widow Glenn's to the right of General Thomas'
line; and General Crittenden was ordered to leave out his
grand guards also, and retire Wood's and Van Cleve's divis-
ions to the rear of the junction of Thomas' right and Mc-
Cook's left, to be able to direct support to either. It was
also arranged that the cavalry should connect with McCook,
and receive orders from him, and that Negley's division should
be relieved from position on the right of Brannan and trans-
ferred to the left of Baird. General Thomas requested the
transfer of Negley's division, as he anticipated that the enemy
would renew his effort to turn his left flank.

Before daylight, the divisions designated for new positions,
except Negley's, made the movements required ; while those
in position, as far as practicable, covered their fronts with bar-
ricades of logs and rails. General Rosecrans not having
pointed out the exact localities for the divisions of the Twen-

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 343

tietli aud Twenty-first Corps, Generals McCook and Critten-
den made tlieir own selection of positions within the range
permitted by their instrnctions. General McCook placed
Lytle's brigade of Sheridan's division to the right and i-car
of Widow Glenn's, and Laiboldt's and Bradley's, Colonel Wal-
worth commanding, to the rear and right of Lytle, and the
two brigades of Davis' division, Carlin's and Heg's, in rear of
the line thus formed. Carlin's and Ileg's brigades, in with-
standing the heavy columns of the enemy the day before, lost
two-fifths of their effective strength, and could not now muster
more than fourteen hundred men in the a2:2:reo:ate. Wildcr's
brigade, which reported to General McCook by order of the
general commanding, was divided, two regiments being placed
on the right and tAvo on the left of Sheridan. General Crit-
tenden posted his two divisions on the eastern slope of Mis-
sionary Ridge, in readiness to support to the right or left.
Unfortunately, these dispositions did not subsequently com-
mand the approval of General Rosecrans, who ordered changes
during tlic morning.

General Bragg received reinforcements during the nighty
and with them their commander, Lieutenant-Gcncral Long-
street. He transferred all his infantry to the west bank of
the Chickamauga, divided his army into two wiugs, and
placed General Polk in command on the right and General
Longstreet on the left. He ordered the former to attack from
his right at daylight, aud to bring his divisions into action
consecutively to his left, and the latter to await developments
on the right, and then attack in similar manner. In giving
instructions to General Longstreet, General Bragg conveyed
the impression that he had had heavy skirmishing in getting
his army into line of battle. It was, however, such skirmish-
ing as had shattered the right half of his arni}^, and reduced
the strength of some brigades on his left at least one-fourth.

A heavy fog hung over the battle-field during the early
hours of the day, and General Polk did not attack as ordered.
General Bragg waited near the center of his army until his
patience was exhausted, and then proceeded to his right, to find
that the commander of that wing was not on tlie field, and
that the necessary preparation for battle liad not been made.

344 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

During the progress of preparations, General Bragg ordered
a reconnoissanee beyond General Thomas' left flank, and was
gratified to learn that the Lafayette road was open to his pos-
session. This condition of aft'airs on the left of the national
army was owing to the fact that ITegley's division was still in
position on the right of Brannan. The continued delay of
N'egley, caused General Thomas great uneasiness, as he feared
the issne of an attack on his left flank, and was assured that
it would not he long withheld. Baird's division could not
cover all the ground, whose firm defense was essential to the
security of the line. The troops had Avorked vigorously to
construct barricades, l)ut the flank could not be strong while
the promised division was absent. And yet General Bragg
was forming a combination against it, both in pursuance of a
general plan and with special reference to its weakness.

Although the troops on the right had been moved to posi-
tions in the immediate vicinity of General Rosecrans' head-
quarters at Glenn's, yet, when he made a special examination
of his lines, he decided to change the formation on the right.
He wished to hold the space from "Widow Glenn's house to
Brannan's right with McCook's six brigades, including Wil-
der's, and keep Crittenden's corps wholly in reserve. He
therefore ordered General McCook, early in the morning, to
fill the space to be made vacant by the withdrawal of ITegley's
division, if practicable. But it was not practicable for Gen-
eral McCook to cover the space from "Widow Glenn's house to
Brannan's right, except with an attenuated line,'-' and as his
eifort to do so was not made as soon as anticipated. General
Rosecrans called upon Crittenden to furnish troops to fill the

*General Rosecrans stated, in his official report, that McCook " was to
close up on Thomas, his right refused ,and covering the position at Widow
Glenn's house." In his testimonj' before the court of inquiry, at Louis-
ville, Kentucky, he stated that " the information on which the orders
for the 20th were predicated, was that the position at Widow Glenn's
house would be amply within the limits of our strength to cover, and
keep Crittenden's corps wholly in reserve; but 1 am satisfied that the dis-
tance from that position to the right of Brannan was greater than we at
the time supposed, and that the line was therefore attenuated. It was an
apprehension that this might be the case, which led me to bring down
Pavis' division from the left side of the Dry valley, in the morning."

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 345

division interval wliicli ISTegley was holding. In compliance.
General Crittenden directed General Wood, with his two bri-
gades, and Barnes', of Van Cleve's division, to relieve Negley,
and directed General Van Cleve, with his remaining brigades,
to take position in the rear of Wood, in reserve. General
Rosecrans ordered General Davis to form his two brigades on
the right, some distance to the north, and east of his original
position. As this change exposed his right flank, General
McCook posted Laiboldt's brigade of Sheridan's division to the
right and rear of Davis', and held the remaining brigades in
reserve. Other changes were in reserve for this portion of the
line, which rendered it too weak to withstand the enemy.

In order to hasten General J^egley to his left flank, General
Thomas sent Captain Williard of his staff" for him. Upon
reaching iSTegley's position, this officer ascertained that two
brigades were yet in line, and that the reserve brigade, Gen-
eral John Beatty commanding, alone was free to move. This,
Captain Williard conducted to the left of Baird, and one bri-
gade in thin line was the only support to the left flank, in
room of a division of the previous day, and in the stead of the
whole division promised for the coming battle.

At half-past 8 a. m. the character of the skirmishing in
Baird's front plainl}^ indicated that the enemy was preparing
for an attack, and within an hour from that time, he made a
furious assault upon the left of the general line, which was
rapidly extended to the right. Against the left, the assault
was made by Breckinridge and Cleburne. The left brigade
of the division of the former struck the left of Baird's division,
and the other tAvo brigades soon overpowered Beatty's bri-
gade. When this brigade was displaced. General Thomas'
left flank was greatly overlapped. Upon the firmness of this
flank depended the possession of the road to Rossville, to gain
which was the primal object of General Bragg's combination
on his right ; in fact, it was the dominant object compassed by
his general plan of battle for the day. Had General Negley's
entire division been in line as contemplated by General
Thomas, General Bragg's right could have been turned as on
the previous day ; for, as it was, Breckinridge's left brigade
and Cleburne's division were so shattered, that it was not

346 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

deemed safe to swing the overlapping brigades into Baird's
rear. This for a time saved General Thomas' left, especially
as other divisions on the left of Cleburne were repulsed with
equal emphasis, as Generall Bragg's imposing attack swept
from his right to his left. For an hour he maintained the
conflict with great vigor, in great part with fresh troops, but
his whole right was broken as on the previous day. General
Cleburne reported the loss of five hundred men in a few
minutes, and Breckinridge's left brigade was almost annihi-
lated, having lost its commander. General Helm, and two
colonels killed and two colonels wounded. Generals Cle-
burne and Stewart mentioned in their reports the effect of
the national artillery as the most destructive in their ex-
perience. Thus this second battle opened auspiciously for the
national army. The left in the initial conflict was again tri-
umphantly successful, but disaster on the right, and a second
attempt to overwhelm the left, for several hours threatened
the complete overthrow of the whole army. In the mainte-
nance of the left, Stanley's brigade of Negley's division ren-
dered timely assistance, after Beatty's was shattered. Although
the action on his right had not progressed as General Bragg had
anticipated, and General Longstreet had consequently been de-
layed in movement, yet when the latter did advance to attack,
he found only isolated fragments of a battle line before him.
This state of things resulted from a combination of circum-
stances. As the promised division had not been sent to General
Thomas, he repeated his requests for reinforcements, especially
after the opening of the action. These calls and the quietness
of the enemy on the right, induced General Rosecrans to be-
lieve that General Bragg was moving his army to his right.
So strong was this belief, that he finally decided to withdraw
his own right altogether. At 10.10 a. m. he ordered General
McCook to make dispositions looking to the movement of his
troops to the left, and soon after gave him a specific order to
send two brigades of Sheridan's division to General Thomas
with all possible dispatch, and the third as soon as the line
could be sufiiciently withdrawn to permit it. He also directed
General Crittenden to send the two reserve brigades of Van
Cleve's division to the same destination. These orders put in
motion to the left every brigade in reserve except Wilder's.

BATTLE OF CHICK AM AUGA. 347

Another misapprehension was still more favorable to the
enemy. General Rosecrans having received information that
Brannan's line was refused, on the right of Reynolds, he
ordered General Wood to " close up on Reynolds and sup-
port him."

Regarding this order as too explicit in requirement, and too
imperative in tone to warrant any discretion as to obedience,
General "Wood withdrew his division with promptness. His
left was aligned witli Brannan's right, and he saw no way to
close upon Reynolds l)ut to withdraw from line and pass to the
left, in the rear of Brannan. Having advised General Mc-
Cook that this change Avould be made, General Wood moved
his division rapidl}^ from line. Brannan was not out of line,
Reynolds was not under pressure, and AYood moved from line
at the very moment of the enemy's attack. General Davis
threw his reserve brigade toward the wide vacant space, but
the heavy columns of the enemy were soon upon it, and
Davis' two small brigades were speedily enveloped. His
troops resisted bravely, but assaulted in front, flank, and rear,
they were lifted from position and hurled in fragments toward
Missionary Ridge. The attack and issue were too sudden for Lai-
boldt to move to his assistance, and the latter was quickly routed.
Buell's brigade of Wood's division, the last to leave position,
was severed as it retired, and Brannan was struck in flank.
Lytle's and Bradley's brigades of Sheridan's division, at the
time in quick motion to the left, Avere halted, and aided by
Wilder's brigade, oft'ered gallant but vain resistance, and the
vain effort cost, in addition to other losses, the life of the chiv-
alrous Lytle. These brigades, and Beatty's and portions of
Dick's, of Van Cleve's division, also in motion to the left,
were broken and swept over the ridge to the west. The
rapid movement of Brannan's batteries threw General Samuel
Beatty's brigade into utter disorder, and in this condition it
was involved in the confused retreat of all the troops on the
right of Brannan. The suddenness of the displacement of
the lines of infantry exposed the artillery in their rear to cap-
ture, and many guns fell into the hands of the enemy without
dispute. Brannan's right flank, in swinging back under fire.

348 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

was thrown into temporaiy confusion. But his left heing
secure, order was soon restored, and he was able to maintain
position until a lull in the conflict gave him opportunity to
gain a new position.

For a time after the disaster on the right, there were but
five divisions in line against the whole rebel army. These
divisions were all firm, but the enemy was concentrating on
both flanks of the line, which lay across the Lafayette and
Chattanoooga road. And soon, under the inspiration of par-
tial victory, and the hope of complete triumph, most vigorous
and persistent assaults were made, whose successful resistance
under the circumstance, makes the closing struggle of this
o^reat battle one of the most remarkable which has occurred

o

in modern times — one of tlie grandest which has ever been
made for the existence of army or country. From noon till
night, the five divisions which had previously constituted
" Thomas' line," and such other troops as reached him from
the right, under orders, or drifted to him after the disaster,
and two brigades from the reserve corps, successfully resisted
the whole Confederate army. General Wood, with Barker's
and Barnes' brigades, and the greater portion of Buell's, re-
ported to General Thomas in due time. The three brigades
of Negley's division, Beatty's, Stanley's, and Sirwell's, reported
separately. The Forty -fourth Indiana, from Dick's brigade,
and the Seventeenth Kentucky, from Beatty's biigade of Yan
Cleve's division, were the only regiments that, without orders,
diverged from the line of retreat, and reached General Thomas
in time to participate in the final conflict.

General Rosecrans, believing that the day was lost, went to
Chattanooga " to give orders for the security of the pontoon
bridges at Bridgeport and Battle Creek, and to make prelim-
inary dispositions, either to forward ammunitions and supplies,
should the army hold its position, or to withdraw the army
into good position should it become necessary."

Entertaining the same opinion as to the issue of the battle,
Generals McCook and Crittenden followed the general com-
manding to Chattanooga, to report for instructions. All com-
munication between General Thomas and the generals and
troops in retreat having been cut off for a time, the approach

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 349

of hostile columns in the direction of expected reinforcements
first revealed to General Thomas the condition of affairs on
the right, althongh he did not learn the extent of the disaster
until late in the day.

The issue of the first attack from his right did not deter
General Bragg from a renewal of effort to turn General
Thomas' left, and gain the Rossville road. His second assault
was made with stronger lines and greater impetuosity, and
this time with partial success. General Thomas had not yet
been reinforced, except by Barnes' brigade, which had been
reported by General Wood, and placed in support to General
Baird.

In preparation for this new effort. General Bragg moved
General Breckinridge farther to the right, and placed
"Walker's corps between him and Cleburne. In this com-
bination, Breckinridge was to wheel to the left and envelop
General Thomas' exposed left flank. His division advanced
in co-operation with other divisions on his left, and was
soon able to move southward on the Lafayette road, and
take in reverse the main line near Kelley's. This move-
ment was well devised, except that no support was provided
for Breckinridge in his insulation in the rear of the na-
tional army. He advanced boldly, but was met and ovei'-
whelmed by the reserve brigades of Johnson's, Palmer's, and
Brannan'sdivisions,Willich's, Grose's, and Yanderveer's, which
were in fortunate freedom for this most threatening emer-
gency. His division was driven in route round Baird's left
flank, to join the broken ranks of Walker's corps and Cle-
burne's division, which had been repulsed in every attack
upon Baird, Palmer, and Johnson. These assaults were furi-
ous and persistent, but without impression upon the firm
defensive line. As in the morning a complete cessation of the
deadly strife followed these repulses, and none of the divisions
on the left were again engaged until late in the evening, when
they were withdrawing under orders.

, This lull on the left permitted the return of Stanley's and
Yanderveer's brigades to the right. Barnes' brigade of Yan
Cleve's division was posted by General Thomas on the left of
Baird, in provision against another effort to turn the left flank.

350 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

The transfer of Stanley and Vanderveer to the right was op-
portune, as a conflict was there imminent, which, for the vigor
and frequency of charge and countercharge, and successful re-
sistance to vastly superior numbers, is perhaps without par-
allel in the war.

Soon after the rupture of the main line on the right of
Brannan, which caused him to throw back liis right, he found
it necessary to change his position altogether. His division
had been previously engaged on all parts of the line, having
made frequent charges to restore broken columns and turned
flanks, and in consequence had been greatly reduced, but its
severest fighting was yet to come. In withdrawing from the
right of Reynolds, General Brannan selected a position to the
right and rear of the one which he abandoned — a strong po-
sition of defense, but at the time it was taken was unprotected
by troops on the right or left. The position was admirable
for defense, and time was given by the enemy for the division
to construct barricades. Brannan's withdrawal exposed
Reynolds' right flank, and made a broad chasm between the
two divisions. Upon this intervening space, General "Wood,
with Harker's brigade and a portion of Buell's, took position,
though not at first in connection with Brannan on the right
or Reynolds' on the left. The presence of these troops in
this wide interval, well advanced toward the enemy, retarded
his movements, and thus gave time for some preparation for
the impending conflict.

The position assumed by General Brannan was a high knoll
on the curving ridge, trending eastward from the Dry Valley
road, and then northward on the east of that road. In har-
mony with other ridges of the region, its summit was notched
by depressions, and its slopes indented by projecting spurs.
The position was strong, but easily turned, as on the west
there was a depression which afforded easy passage round it.
This ridge, from the Dry Valley road to Kelley's or the
Lafayette road, was wooded, and every way advantagous for a
defensive line whose flanks were secured by reserves.*

* The ridge held by Generals Wood, Brannan, and Steedman, was called
by the general officers of the enemy "Horse Shoe Eidge," on account of
the circular trend of the crest, and Brannan's rounded summit was called
by them " Battery Hill."

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 351

"While the enemy persisted in his effort to turn the left flank
of the army, General Thomas gave attention to that portion
of his line ; but when Bragg's exhausted right wing was en-
tirely withdrawn from action, he was called to the right by
the noise of musketry in that quarter. He had no knowledge,
at the time, of the displacement and rout of the right wing of
the army, nor of the consequent changes in the positions of
his own troops next to the breach. He knew nothing of
Brannan's change of position or of the movements of N"egley.
Two brigades of the latter had been for a time under his own
eye (Beatty's and Stanley's), and he had sent orders to the di-
vision commander to mass a large number of guns on the
eastern slope of Missionary Eidge, to keep the ground to the
left and rear of Baird, where the enemy was partially suc-
cessful in turning his left flank. General ISTegley had posted
his artillery in the rear of Reynolds and Brannan, but had
finally drifted to the Dry Valley road, and thence toward Ross-
ville, with his guns and supporting infantry. But all this was
unknown to General Thomas, as he rode to the right to as-
certain the cause of the firing in the rear of his own line.

As he emerged from the woods bordering the Rossville
road, he met Captain Kellogg, of his staff, who informed him
that in his eftbrt to reach General Sheridan, to conduct his di-
vision to the left, he had been tired upon in the rear of
Re3'nolds' position by a force advancing cautiously, with skir-
mishers thrown out. This officer reported also that troops
had been in view for some time from Wood's position, and
that they were supposed to be Sheridan's division. To as-
certain the facts in the case. General Thomas proceeded to
Harker's brigade, and gave orders that should these troops
fire after seeing the flag, that their fire should be returned,
and their further advance resisted. Meeting General Wood
near by, he was confirmed in the opinion that they were the
enemy. But as Harker soon became engaged, all doubt was
removed, and it was then evident that the right of the army
had been turned, though the extent of the disaster was not
foreshadowed, as these troops were not recognized as the rep-
resentatives of the whole left wing of the Confederate army,
which, after rest and reformation, was advancing to renew the

352 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAFGA.

conflict. In the emergency, General Thomas directed Gen-
eral "Wood to form his troops on the left of Brannan, of whose
position he had heen informed, and gave notice to Reynolds
that the enemy was in his rear. In compliance, General "Wood
formed his line slightly in advance of Brannan's, for the sake
of a better position, and General Reynolds drew back his right
brigade so as to face the force threatening his rear.

There was scarcely time for the execution of these move-
ments before the left wing of the Confederate army fell upon
Wood and Brannan. It is impossible to compute with accu-
racy the number of troops with these generals. Portions of
their respective divisions had been previousl}^ severed and lost,
and there were troojJS with them representing at least two divis-
ions : General Beatty of ITegley's division was acting with a
fragmentary force, and a large portion of Stanley's brigade,
Colonel Stoughton commanding, Colonel Stanley having
been wounded ; the Twenty -first Ohio regiment from
Sirwell's brigade of the same division ; and the Seven-
teenth Kentucky, Colonel Stout, and the Forty-fourth
Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Aldrich, from Yan Cleve's
division. But this isolated line, composed of the frag-
ments of brigades and regiments, about four thousand men
in all, repeatedly repulsed the most furious attacks of Long-
street's massive lines. But its insulation invited the enemy to
other than direct assaults; and soon a strong force was seen
passing around Brannan's right flank to his rear, to take in
reverse the line which had resisted unbroken, every direct at-
tack. The advance of this column evolved the dominant
crisis of the battle. Having been repulsed by the left of the
national army, even after his success against its right, General
Bragg now moved heavy columns to the rear of a slender
line of heroes, many of whom had already, in destitution of
ammunition, clutched their muskets for the desperate use of
the bayonet.

In giving personal direction to the movements on the right,
General Thomas took position in the rear of Wood's line.
With no line of troops intervening, he now saw the foe ad-
vancing in a direction to strike him before he could reach his
troops. Fortunately there were reinforcements equally near.
The noise of the conflict had penetrated the murky clouds

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 353

wMcli overhung the Lloody field, and reaching General Granger
far to the left and rear, suggested the need of his troops where
the hattle was so hotly raging. Accordingly he had moved
forward rapidly, in disregard of the enemy's effort to arrest
liis progress, and at the moment of greatest need reported to
General Thomas with two brigades. As the enemy moved
down the northern slope of the ridge toward the rear of Bran-
nan and Wood, Wliittaker's and Mitchell's brigades of Steed-
man's division, with a fury born of the impending peril, charged
the foe and drove him over the ridge, and then formed line of
hattle from Brannan's right to the hill above Villetoe's, in front
of Long-street's left flank. In gaining this position there was
heavy loss; but if the issue of battle has ever given compen-
sation for the loss of valuable lives, it was in this action, for
the opportune aid of these two brigades saved the army from
defeat and rout.

At 3 p. M., General Longstreet, despairing of carrying the
position without reinforcements, called upon General Bragg
for assistance from his right. He was informed that the troops
of their right wing " had been so badly beaten back " that
they would be of no service on the left. Ascertaining thus
that the right of his own army was in little better condition
than the original right of the national arni}^, Longstreet hesi-
tated to put into the fight his reserve division, and renewed
the assault with the troops that had been repeatedly repulsed.
In this charge, the rebel General Hindman commanding on
the extreme left, gained a temporary advantage, which induced
Longstreet to put his reserve division into the action in hope
of sweeping the hills before him. But before he could get
Preston's large division into line, Hindman was driven from
the hill above Villetoe's, upon which he had planted his ban-
ners, by Steedman's brigades. The reserve division, however,
was not withheld, and Longstreet renewed the action with his
whole force. Brannan had with him about twenty-five hun-
dred men, and on his right were the two brigades of Whittaker
and Mitchell. And yet from his center to Steedman's right,
there were ten brigades of the enemy in line, and Grade's bri-
gade of Preston's division, on the right, went into action with
23

354 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

two thousand and three effective men. With this immense-
preponderance of strength, Longstreet assaulted with frequency
and vigor, but was continually repulsed. The forces before
Wood were relatively as strong as before Brannan and Steed-
man, and were repulsed in every attack. His position was fa-
vorable for defense, as the configuration of the ground was
equivalent to a parapet. The troops could advance and deliver
a plunging fire from the brow of the hill, and by a slight re-
cession while loading, were entirely covered from the bullets
of the enemy. The conflict involved the use of the musket
solely. Wood had no artillery, and the enemy could not use
his to advantage.

Late in the afternoon there were indications that Longstreet
would throw his troops between Wood and Reynolds, and
Hazen's brigade of Palmer's division was transferred to the
intervening space. Hazen was sent because he had ammuni-
tion, and at the time the general destitution created more alarm
than the previous assaults of the enemy had done. Some un-
authorized person had ordered General Thomas' corps ammu-
nition train to Chattanooga, and many of the division trains
had been separated from the troops they were intended to sup-
ply, and had gone to the rear. On the Avhole line, the average
to the man was not more than three rounds, and in some com-
mands there was less than this. It was common to search the
cartridge-boxes of those who fell. Steedman's train afibrded
a few rounds in addition, but this was soon exhausted, and his
own men were at the last entirely destitute. ^Hienever am-
munition failed entirely, the order was given to fix bayonets
and hold the hill with cold steel. Wlien Hazen attained posi-
tion between Reynolds and Wood, he became engaged in se-
verest conflict, and from Reynolds to Steedman the battle raged
with unabated fury ; but the enemy was gallantly repulsed at
every point until night-fall, and in the final attacks, this was
accomplished in no slight measure with the bayonet and clubbed
muskets.*

* The Confederate commanders not only admitted the defensive valor
of the national troops, but the spirit and rigor of their offensive returns.
General Hindman, who commanded ten brigades on the left of the ene

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 355

About 4 p. M., General GarjS.eld, in company with Captains
Gaw and Barker, whom General Thomas had sent to the rear
for ammunition, reached the field from the direction of Ross-
Ville. Lieutenant-Colonel Thurston, chief of staff to General
McCook, about the same time joined him from the right.
From these officers the first definite information concerning it
was received, and their arrival attested the possibility of com-
munications with General Thomas from the Dry Yalley road.
Soon after. General Thomas received a dispatch from General
Rosecraus, " directing him to assume command of all the forces,
and with Crittenden and McCook to take a strong position
and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville," where rations
and ammunition would be sent, and that from that point he
should send all the unorganized troops to Chattanooga.

Upon the return of the officers sent for the ammunition, the
division commanders were notified through Major Lawrence,
chief of artillery, that a supply would be distributed ; and
when this had been accomplished, orders were issued for the
withdrawal of the army by divisions. General Reynolds was
instructed to commence the movement, and as General Thomas
went to meet him to point out where he wished him to form
a line to cover the retirement of the troops on the Lafayette
read, he met a force that had gained the woods in the rear
of Reynolds. As this general's head of column was near, he
directed him to form his division at right angles to the road,
with his right resting upon it, and charge the enemy in his
immediate front, though the rear of the army. The charge
was made with great vigor, and the enemy was completely
routed. Turchin's brigade drove this daring force entirely
beyond Baird's left, capturing more than two hundred prison-
ers. This brigade, and Colonel E. A. King's, which, after his
fall, was commanded by Colonel Robinson, was posted by
General Thomas on the road leading through the ridge to the
Dry Yalley road, to hold the ground while the troops from the
right and left passed by. Soon after, Willich's brigade, John-
son's reserve, took position on high ground, near the Trans-

my's line, with his right resting opposite " Battery Hill," and his left on
the Dry Valley road, declared that " he had never seen Federal troops
fight as well," while " he had never seen Confederate troops fight better."

356 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Terse road. The three divisions on the left, Palmer's, John-
son's, and Baird's, were attacked as they left position ; but
though the fio-litins: Avas severe, there was little confusion, and
no very serious losses — a result which w^as due in some measure
to the brigades which General Thom.as had posted to cover
the movement. "Wood, Brannan, and Steedman, on the right,
withdrew from line without molestation, except an attack on
the junction of their lines, so emphatically had the left wing
of the Confederate army been repulsed."^

During the night. General Thomas formed a new line at
Eossville, and was joined by Generals McCook and Critten-
den, who resumed command of their respective corps. This
point was important only as commanding the roads leading
from the battle-field, and from Ringgold, to Chattanooga.
There was need to check the advance of the enemy, and dis-
positions were here made to this end. General Thomas placed
one brigade of l^egley's division in the gap, and the other two
on the ridge to the right ; Reynolds' division between ISTeg-
ley's right and the Dry Valley road ; McCook's corps, between
this road and Chattanooga creek; Crittenden's, on the left
of Negley, covering the roads from the east ; and Granger's
troops, Baird's and Brannan's divisions, at various points in
rear of the main line. The position was strong against a di-
rect attack, but could be easily turned by a heavy concentra-
tion against the right in Chattanooga valley, and General
Thomas advised General Rosecrans to withdraw the army to
Chattanooga.

The battle of Chickamauga and the movements which pre-
ceded it, present features of marked distinctness. This fact is evi-
dent from the reports of the generals-in-chief and other gen-

*The heaviest losses in the withdrawal of the army were from captures,
mainly from Baird's division, which left position, under a heavy assault;
from Steedman's division, and the Twenty-first Ohio regiment, the latter
being between Brannan and Steedman. This regiment maintained
ground, in greatest exposure during the afternoon, and by its revolving
rifles and gallant fighting, made the impression upon the enemy that its
position was held by a heavy force. At dark, portions of the Twenty-first,
the Eighty-ninth Ohio, and Twenty-second Michigan, the latter two
from the left of Whitaker's brigade, were captured.

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 357

era! officers of tlie opposing armies ; but, nevertheless, tlie
campaign of wliicli the battle itself was the culumination, and
the conduct of the battle, have elicited much antagonistic
criticism in both sections of the country. Despite, however,
all partisan representations, the pivotal events may be clearly
apprehended.

General Bragg was compelled to withdraw from Chatta-
nooga, but his reinforcements were so near that he deemed it
safe to concentrate his forces at Lafayette. From this point
he had command of his communications and lines of retreat,
and General Rosecrans could not at once concentrate against
him. His plans were elaborate, but he failed in every distinct
object, except in making the impression that he was retreating
to some remote point, to induce his antagonist to " expose him-
self in detail." Admitting his failure directly, or by implica-
tion, in his official report he made prominent his possession of
the battle-field, the number of his prisoners, captured guns
and small arms, and the failure of his subordinates to execute
the details of his plans as his justification as a strategist and
tactician. If I^egley's and Baird's divisions had been over-
whelmed in McLemore's Cove, or had Crittenden's corps been
broken and routed while with attenuated lines it covered Chat-
tanooga, or had Bragg delivered battle from the same position
on the 18th, the results of his strategy might have been the
total defeat of the Army of the Cumberland and the reposses-
sion of Chattanooga. As it was. General Rosecrans "exposed
himself in detail" without injury, and threw his army before
Chattanooga on ground which General Bragg had selected as
an open field for maneuver ; and the latter, instead of hurling
the national army in disordered mass upon the mountain
passes through which it had gained his front, followed that
army to Chattanooga with just such speed as it permitted,
leaving behind him, from the casualties of battle, two-fifths of
his forces. Ko wonder that his generalship was criticised, and
that the Southern people complained that the battle of Cliick-
amauga gave no results commensurate with the resources it
represented or the losses it entailed. His strategy failed, and
his tactical dispositions by no means compassed the possibili-
ties of the battle-field ; but the spirited and persistent assaults

358 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

of liis troops during two days of conflict "have seldom been
surpassed.

At the time that it was ascertained that tlie Confederate
army was concentrated at Lafayette, at least forty miles, and
mountain ranges, separated the extremes of the Army of tlie
Cumberland. The union of the three corps before battle was a
condition of safety. So was the attainment of position for
the action of the 19th in the acceptance of battle on the
Chickamauga. The conditions of the conflict on the 20th
were in no small measure promising to General Rosecrans ;
but the movements on his right in the morning gave the advan-
tage to the enemy, and so imperiled the army that its salva-
tion was almost miraculous. It was unfortunate that 'Neg-
ley's division was left in line on the right during the night,
and until the troops of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps
had taken position, and that he was not sooner relieved in the
morning. General Thomas was thus left without his division,
upon which he depended for the security of his left flank.
The battle having been opened before heavy reinforcements
reached him, his previous and subsequent calls for support lost
their true significance. I*^egley's transfer was finally too late
for the emergency on the left, and the movement of his divis-
ion by brigades was fatal to its subsequent unity and efiiciency.
The motion of the two brigades of Sheridan's division and
the two of Van Cleve's to the left, followed by the withdrawal
of "Wood's division from the line at the very moment of the
enemy's attack, exposed equally the troops in motion and the
few left in position. The latter were not able to resist the
enemy until the former were out of reach of the blow, and
then the right was defeated in detail. The recession of the
line from Reynolds to Sheridan, and its compact formation on
the hills, where General Thomas with a part of the army saved
the whole of it, efl'ected at the proper time would have been
eminently judicious; but the attempt to make this change so
late in the day was perilous in the extreme. The fact that
that position was held against all attacks by a slender force,
reveals the strong probability, if not certainty, of Bragg's
total defeat, had the whole national army stood on the line of
final defense. Again, the stability of the right was afifected

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 359

bj tlie want of co-operation on the part of the cavahy, which
resulted in part at least from the incleiiuiteness of orders,*

After the troops had been displaced on the right and were
in motion toward Chattanooga, it was possible for them to
have joined General Thomas in time for participation in the
final conflict. Generals N"egley, Sheridan, and Davis met on
the Dry Valley road, near the northern opening of McFar-
land's Gap ; and there were sufficient troops with them, in all
probability, to have changed the issue of the battle had they
been thrown against the left flank of the enemy at Villetoe's.
!N^ot far from McFarland's house there was a gap opening
eastward, through which a road passed to the rear of General
Thomas' line, and on this these troops could have passed to
bis assistance, had they been so directed, if the Dry Valley
road, leading directly to General Thomas' right flank, had not
been open to the very front and flank of the enemy. Most
of the divisions, in the withdrawal in the evening, passed
Uirough this lateral gap, which opened the way to the rear
•jf Brannan's position. And yet, after deLay in conference,
and after Colonel Thruston, of General McCook's stafi", had
borne a request from General Thomas, that ihej sliould move to
his right flank, General ISTegley and General Sheridan proceeded
toward Rossville with their troops; while General Davis, accom-
paniedby Colonel Thruston, advanced with a fragmentary force
which had been collected, on the Dry Valley road, toward Vil-
letoe's, but was too late for eflEective service. General Sheri-
dan moved through Rossville, and reached the vicinity of
General Thomas' left flank; but he, too, was too late to attack

* General Rosecrans, in his testimony before the court of inquirer at
Louisville, stated that the cavalry had orders to communicate with Gen-
eral McCook and "close on his right. The senior officer of the cavalry was
told that he must take orders from him, though attend to their own busi-
ness." At General McCook's call, the cavalry did not close on his right.
General Mitchell, commanding the cavalrj^ excused himself for not closing
to the left, upon the order of General McCook, in consequence of the fact
that he had been directed by General Rosecrans to cover Crawfish Springs
with his force. This apparent conflict of orders deprived the infantry
forces on the right of the support of the cavah'y in their efforts to rally
after the line was shattered.

360 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

the enemy, and General Thomas was ignorant of his move-
ment. There was no general officer of high rank on the line
of retreat to compreliend the situation and provide for its pos-
sibilities. The general in command on the extreme left of the
rebel army was in constant dread of an attack in flank and
rear by infantry and cavalry during the later hours of the
day. Fearing this, Longstreet kept troops in reserve as long
as possible ; and when the In-igades of "Wliittaker and
^Mitchell hurled his troops from Brannan's rear and flank, he
supposed that he was meeting again the troops that he had
fought in the morning near Widow Glenn's. These facts
show that the enemy not only knew of no bar to the further-
participation in the Ijattle of those forces that had been dis-
placed on the right, but that their conjunction with those to
the left was expected.

The official reports of the two commanding generals do
not give the strength of their respective armies, and each
claimed that he fought superior numbers. There is, however,
no reason to doubt that General Bragg's army was tlie larger.

General Bragg had on the held eleven divisions of infantry
and four of cavaUy, comprising thirty-flve brigades of in-
fantry and ten or twelve of cavalry. The reported aggregate
strength of five divisions of the former, of three brigades
each, was twenty-four thousand one hundred men, an average
of sixteen hundred and six to each brigade. Giving this strength
to the remaining twenty brigades of infantry, would make an
infantry aggregate of fifty-six thousand two hundred and ten.
The reports of the general officers of the cavalry are too in-
definite to furnish a basis for an approximate estimate of the
strength of that arm. It is highly probable, however, that
the four divisions comprised about fifteen thousand men. And
thus, from actual and inferential data, it may be assumed that
General Bragg had an army of seventy thousand men.

General Eosecrans had in the action thirty brigades of in-
fantry, five of cavalry, one of mounted infantry, and thirty-
three batteries. In all, he had one hundred and thirty-five
regiments of infantry, twenty-one of cavalry, and five of
mounted infantry. The average of fifteen brigades of infantry

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 361

whose strength was reported, representing the four corps, was
fifteen hundred and sixty men. If this should be accepted as
the average strength of brigades throughout the army, its
aggregate was fifty-six thousand one hundred and sixty men.
It may then be assumed that General Bragg's army was
superior by twelve or fifteen thousand men.

During the afternoon of the 20th, General Bragg must have
had more than doul)lc as many men as General Thomas. He
employed all his infantry and five or six brigades of cavalry,
and a large portion of the latter arm was fought as infantry.*^
General Thomas had about eighteen brigades of infantry, ex-
clusive of Colonel Daniel McCook's brigade, which resisted
the rebel cavalry on the right flank of the Confederate army
on the road to Rossville, and formed no part of the battle front.
All but two of his brigades had been greatly reduced by hard
fighting for a day and a half, and could not have averaged
more than one thousand men. His force then did not, on his
final line, probaljly exceed twenty thousand men, allowing-
four thousand to General Steedman's two fresh brigades.

As the statement appears in many histories of the war, and
even in some of recent publication, that General Thomas with
his single corps saved the army at Chickamauga, it is impera-
tive to refute this error, as it does great injustice to the ofiicers
and men of the other corps. The preceding narrative gives
an indirect refutation, but this prevalent mistake should be
explicitly corrected. Generals Crittenden and McCook had
each eight brigades on the field, and General Granger had
three. And of these nineteen brigades, twelve were with
General Thomas in the final conflict. Five brigades of
McCook's corps were cut off" on the right, but not more than
two from Crittenden's, counting fragments. Palmer's division
of Crittenden's corps, and Johnson's from McCook's, were
with General Thomas throughout the l)attle, and General
"Wood of the former corps, with two brigades of his /own di-
vision and one from Van Cleve's, went to him on the second
day. Granger's three large brigades constituted nearly one-

*Even General Longstreet fought five hundred troopers on foot, on his
left, late in the evening, who had come from the cavalry force in rear of
their "left wing."

362 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

fourtli of the entire force on the final line. More men left the
field from General Thomas' own corps, the Fourteenth, than
from General Crittenden's. Four regiments of Wilder's bri-
gade of Reynolds' division were on the right of the breach ;
a large portion, more than a moiety, of Negley's division was
led or driven from the field (Beatty's brigade, through the
emergencies of battle and orders of General l^egley's adjutant-
general, joined the divisions on the right, and at night were
found by General Beatty, at Rossville), and Branuan lost a
portion of one of liis brigades through orders of a general
who left the field before the final crisis of the battle. The
glory of the final conflict is then the common inheritance of
the army, as it was won by the valor of troops representing
the four grand units.

General Bragg's losses were exceedingly heavy. He admit-
ted in his official report a loss of two-fifths of his army. His
left wing comprised, on the morning of the 20th, twenty-two
thousand eight hundred and eighty-five men, exclusive of cav-
alry. General Longstreet reported his losses in the aggre-
gate, exclusive of one brigade not reported, at seven thousand
eight hundred and fifty-six. Of these, one thousand and
eighty were killed, six thousand five hundred and six were
wounded, and two hundred and seventy captured. His loss in
one day of battle, and chiefly in the afternoon, was thirty-six
per cent. This fact justifies General Bragg's admission. A
very large number of Confederate ofiicers fell. Two major-
generals were wounded, three brigadiers were killed and
three were wounded, and one of the latter was captured.

General B. H. Helm's Kentucky brigade went into this
fight one thousand seven hundred and sixty-three strong, and
•came out with four hundred and thirty-two, General Helm
being among the killed. Bate's brigade lost six hundred and
eight out of one thousand and eighty-five. A Mississippi bri-
ofade lost seven hundred and eightv-one, and came out with
but two regimental officers uninjured, and several other bri-
gades lost fully half their number.

The reported aggregate loss of the Army of the Cumber-
land was sixteen thousand three hundred and thirty-six, in-
cluding one hundred and thirty -two officers killed, five bun-

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 363

dred and ninety-two wounded, and two hundred and seventy
missing; fifteen hundred and fifty-five enUsted men killed,
eight thousand eight hundred and twenty wounded, and four
thousand nine hundred and eighty-five missing. As many of
those reported as missing were among the slain, the numher
of the killed exceeded two thousand. The loss from Baird's
division was twenty-two hundred and thirteen ; from Bran-
nan's, twenty-one hundred and forty-four; from Palmer's,
thirteen hundred and forty-nine ; from Johnson's, sixteen
hundred and twenty-nine; from Steedman's two brigades,
seventeen hundred and thirty-two ; * from Wood's two, ten
hundred and thirty -five ; and from Sheridan's and Davis' di-
visions, more than forty per cent. The remaining divisions of
the army lost less heavily, though none suffered lightly.
Among those who fell were Brigadier-General Lytle, Colonels
E. A. King, Heg, and Baldwin commanding brigades, and
Colonels W. G. Jones, Bartleson, Alexander, Gilmer, and
McCreary. Tlie loss in material was immense, fifty-one guns,
fifteen thousand small arms, wagons and ambulances in great
numbers, and ammunition and stores in large quantities.

On the morning of the 21st, there were indications that the
enemy was advancing against the position at Rossville. Col-
onel Minty having reported the advance of a strong force of
infantry and cavalry. General Thomas directed him to with-
draw from the front and take position on the left flank of the
army. Soon after, the enemy approached cautiously on the
direct roads from the battle-field. Ko purpose however, was
revealed, to attack the army, and all the tentative demon-
strations were easily repulsed. It being evident to General
Thomas that the enemy could easily concentrate on his right
flank, and by turning it, could cut him oft' from Chattanooga,
he advised General Rosecrans to concentrate his forces at
Chattanooga. Adopting the suggestion. General Roset-rans
authorized a withdrawal from Rossville, and General Thomas
at once made preparations for its accomplishment. Having
called together the corps commanders, he gave them such in-
structions as would preclude confusion in making the move-

*This loss was forty-four per cent, between 2 p. m. and dark.

3o4 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

ment. He first sent all the wagons, ambulances, and surplus
artillery carriages forward ; then stationed Brannan's division
half-way to Chattanooga, to cover the troops on the direct road^
and having thrown out toward the enemy strong skirmish
lines, supported by Baird's division and Minty's cavalry, he
commenced the movement from the left at 9 p. m. It was
made by divisions, in supporting distance, one after another
from left to right. The withdrawal of the army was eftected
without the loss of a single man, and at 7 a. m. the next day^
the troops were in position around Chattanooga, from the
river on the north to the river on the south. General Bragg
excused himself for allowing this quiet withdrawal of the
national army on the ground that his own army was less
than half as strong, and greatly exhausted. This statement
may be regarded as proof that his victory was only nominal
in his own estimation.

But whatever were the immediate and more local conse-
quences of the battle, in its remoter relations and significance,
it has claims to historic grandeur. The Army of the Cum-
berland, without support on either flank, had leaped across
the Tennessee river and the contiguous mountains, and yet
escaped destruction, though the armies of the enemy east and
Avest were made tributary to a combination of forces to ac-
complish this end. Paroled prisoners from Yickburg, regular
troops from Mississippi and Georgia, a veteran corps from
Lee's army in Virginia, and Buckner's corps from East Ten-
nessee joined Bragg on the bank of the Chickamauga, not
simply to retake Chattanooga, l)ut to annihilate the Army of
the Cumberland. N'early half of Bragg's army consisted of
recent reinforcements, sent to ISTorthern Georgia, while the
authorities at "Washington, perplexed with the military situa-
tion, were resting under the delusion that General Bragg was
reinforcing Lee. But this heavy draft upon the resources of
the Confederacy was burdened with the fatalit}^ which clu/ig
to all the grander efforts of the insurgents in the West. And
General Bragg's broken and exhausted army was a symbol of
the fast coming exhaustion of the Confederacy itself The
issue of the battle was not thus defined to the consciousness
of the Southern people, but was doubtless one of the most

BATTLE OF CHICICAMAUGA. 365

•empliatic disappointments of the struggle, and intensified the
gloom produced bj previous defeats. A vast army, repre-
senting a large fraction of the military strength of the Con-
federacy, had only gained a barren victory, if a victory at all,
in room of anticipated results of widest compass. The utter-
ances of Mr. Davis can not be taken as a just expression of
the hopes of the Southern people. They were usually too ex-
travagant to represent the sober thoughts of the people. Still,
it can not be doubted that he had general sympathy in the
conviction, publicly expressed, that the total overthrow of
General Rosccrans, which was regarded as assured, would
virtually terminate the war.

Instead of the annihilation of the Army of the Cumberland,
the recapture of Chattanooga, and the attainment of far
grander ulterior results, which had been anticipated as the
fruits of the battle of Chickamauga, General Bragg, witli a
shattered army, followed slowly and cautiously his retreating
foe, to invest, at Chattanooga, the army which he had failed
to crush on the field of battle, hoping, through starvation, to
wrest from General Rosecrans the original objective of this
campaign.

Washington, D. C, July 14, 18G3.
Burnside has been frequently urged to move forward and cover your
left in entering East Tennessee. I do not know what he is doing. He
seems tied fast to Cincinnati,

H. W. IIALLECK,

Commander-in-Chief.

Winchester, August 4, 18G3.
Major- General Ilalleck, Washington, D. C. :

Your dispatch ordering me to move forward without further delay, re-
porting the movement of each corps until I cross the Tennessee, is received.
As I liave been determined to cross the river as soon as practicable, and
have been making all preparations, and getting such information as may
enable me to do so without being driven back like Hooker, I wish to
know if your order is intended to take away my discretion, as to the time
and manner of moving my troops.

W. S. ROSECEANS,

Major- General.

Washington, August 5, 1863.
The orders for the advance of your army, and that its progress be re-
ported daily, are peremptory.

H. W. HALLECK.

366 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Washixgtox, August 25, 1863.

Burnside, when la&t heard from, was at Mount Vernon, moving toward

Knoxville. He is directed to move forward as rapidly as possible, and

to keep you posted in regard to his operations. Grant's movements at

present have no connection with you.

H. W. HALLECK,

Major- General.

Washington, September 6, 1863.
You give no information of the position of Bragg and Buckner; if
they have united, it is important that you and Burnside unite as quickly
as possible, so that the enemy may not attack you separately.

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-Oeneral.

Washingtox, September 6, 1863.
I have heard nothing from Burnside since his dispatch of August 31st,
the substance of which was sent to you. His instructions were to ad-
vise you of his movements, and connect as soon as possible with your left.
There is no reason now to suppose that any of Lee's troops have been de-
tached, except perhaps a small force from Charleston.

H. W. HALLECK,

Major- General.

Washington, September 11, 1863.
Burnside telegraphs from Cumberland Gap that he holds all East Ten-
nessee above Loudon, and also the gap of the North Carolina mountains.
A cavalry force is moving toward Athens, to connect with you. After
holding the mountain passes on the west, and Dalton or some other point
on the railroad, to prevent the return of Bragg's army, it will be decided
whether your army shall move further into Georgia and Alabama. It is
reported by deserters that a portion of Bragg's army is reinforcing Lee.
It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained as early as

possible.

H. W. HALLECK,

Commander-ill- Chief.

Washington, September 12, 1863.
Following telegram is sent to you for your information by order of the
Secretary of War, from Memphis, 5 p. m., September 9:

" A gentleman just in from Mobile, reports that all of Johnston's force
has gone to join Bragg at Chattanooga. I think the report true, from
the source I received it, and from the fact that the country south of
Corinth is full of regular cavalry making some movement.

"S. A. HURLBUT,

"■^ Major- General. "

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 367

Washington, Scpiemhcr 13, 1863.
There is no intention of sending Bnrnside into North Carolina. He is
ordered to move down and connect with you.

Should the enemy attempt to turn your right flank through Alabama,
Chattanooga should be turned over to Burnside and given away, or such
part of it as may not be required there should move to prevent Bragg
from re-entering Middle Tennessee. Hurlbut will aid you all he can,
but most of Grant's available force is west of the Mississippi.

HALLECK.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Trenton, September 9, 1863 — 3.30 a. m.
Major-General Thomas, Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps :

A dispatch is just received from General Wagner, dated 8.30 p. m.
yesterday, stating that Chattanooga is evacuated by the rebels, and he will
occupy it in the morning. The general commanding desires you to call
on him at once to consult in regard to arrangements for the pursuit.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.

P. S. — The order sending the Ninety-second Indiana to reconnoiter the
mountain is revoked. The general commanding directs you to order your
vfhole command in readiness to move at once.

J. A. GARFIELD,

Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.

Trenton, Ga., September 9, 1863 — 10 a. m.
Major-General Thomas, Commanding Fourteenth Arm;]/ Corps :

The general commanding has ordered a general pursuit of the enemy
by the whole army. General Crittenden has started to occupy Chatta-
nooga, and pursue the line of Bragg's retreat. Our forces across the river
from Chattanooga have been ordered to cross and join General Crittenden
in the pursuit. General McCook has been ordered to move at once on
Alpine and Summerville. The general commanding directs you to move
your command as rapidly as possible to Lafayette, and make every exer-
tion to strike the enemy in flank, and if possible cut ofi" his escape. Col-
onel Wilder's brigade has been ordered to join you at Lafayette.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier- General and Chief of Staff,

S68 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Headquarters Second Division, Fourteenth Army Corps,

Widow Davis', near Chickamauga Creek, September 10, 1863 — 0.30 p. m.
Brigadier-General Baird, Commanding First Division, Fourteenth Arm]/ Corps.

General: — There are indications of a superior force of the enemy being
in jjosition near Dug Gap ; another column, estimated as a division, with
twelve pieces of artilleiy, near Morgan's Mills, three miles to my left, in
the direction of Catlett's Gap ; also a cavah-y force under Forrest, at Culp's
Mills, near the road from Pond Spring to Cooper's Gap — there with the
intention (as citizens and deserters report) of attacking our rear in the
morning.

My position is somewhat advanced, and exposed to a flank approach by
two roads leading from Catlett's Gap, but it is a favorable one to fight the
enemy, providing your division is within supporting distance, which 1
understood from General Thomas would be the case, and that your divis-
ion would move up to Chickamauga Creek to-night. Please inform me if
this will be the case.

Have the kindness to send this information to General Thomas to-
night. I have the honor to remain, yours, very truly,

JAS. S. NEGLEY,

Major- General.

Headquarters Department op the Cumberland,
Chattanooga, September 10, 1863 — 9.45 p. m.
Major-General Thomas, Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps:

The general commanding directs me to say General Negley's dispatch,
forwarded by you at 10 a. m., is received. He is disai^pointed to learn
from it that his forces move to-morrow morning instead of having moved
this morning, as they should have done, this delay imperiling both ex-
tremes of the army.

Your movement on Lafayette should be made with the utmost prompt-
ness.

You ought not to incumber yourself with your main sujjply train. A
brigade or two will be sufficient to protect it.

Your advance ought to have threatened Lafayette yesterday evening.
I have the honor to be. General, very respectfully.
Your obedient servant,

J. P. DROUILLARD,

Captain A. D. 0

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Chattanooga, September 10, 1863 — 10 v. m.
Major-General Thomas, Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps:

In addition to the accompanying dispatch, the general commanding
further directs that you open direct communication with General McCook,
and take care to hurt the enemy as much as possible.

It is important to know whether he retreats on Rome or Cedar Bluli»

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 369

If the enemy has passed Lafayette, toward Rome, he will threaten
HcCook ; if he has not passed this point, he will endanger Crittenden.
Much depends on the promptitude of your movements.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. P. DROUILLARD.

Chattaxooga, September 11, 1863.
Major-General Thomas^ Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps :

Information from many independent sources makes it evident that the
enemy has concentrated in very considerable force in the neighborhood
of Lafayette. It a^^pears that two brigades of rebel infantry were at
Gordon's mill last evening, and one of our scouts reported that a heavy
column of infantry and artillery crossed the Chattanooga at Gowen's
ford yesterday, moving in the direction o' your position.

Crittenden has been ordered to put his corps on the road from Gordons-
ville to Lafayette, near the northern spur of Pigeon Mountains, with
orders to attack any force that should attack you. He was to have got
into position to-night. The general commanding is waiting anxiously ta
hear from you, and know what are the new developments of the day. In
case you find the enemy concentrated in heavy force, it will be best to
draw General McCook to within supporting distance. It is necessary for
the general commanding to know the situation of affairs near you and
General McCook before he can determine what disposition to make of
General Crittenden's corps. Of course, it is our policy to attack him as
soon as we know his position and force.

Verj' respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.

Headquarters Twextieth Army Corps,
At Foot of Mountain near Alpine, September II — 8.30 p. m.

General : — My corps is concentrated here. I have heard nothing from
you. I sent Colonel Harrison at an early hour this morning to open
communication with you. He met the enemy's cavalry between here
and Lafayette, and drove them to a point within nine miles of that place.
A prisoner from the army and citizens report that none of your troops
are there, but that the place is occupied by the enemy with cavalry and
infantry.

I can scarcely believe this, yet all the cavalry we have driven from this
vicinity runs in that direction. Polk's corps is reported at Trion Factory,
five and a half miles northeast from Summerville, on the road from that
place to Ringgold ; also had a courier line on that road to-day.

Colonel Harrison and Colonel Watkins are ordered to go to Lafayette
at all hazards, and ascertain this fact.

24

370 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

I casually heard to-day that General Rosecrans' headquarters have
been moved to Chattanooga.

I send this by my couriers in Will's valley, with orders that it shall go
to you from Trenton, as that may prove the most expeditious way to reach
you. Rome has lately been fortified, and is occupied by infantry and ar-
tillery. A reconnoissance has been sent to intersect the road between
Rome and Summerville, to ascertain what is going on there. I have no
further news.

Very respectfully,

A. McD. McCOOK,

Major-Gcneral Commanding.
Majob-Geneeal Thomas, Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps.

Chattanooga, Scjytcmhcr 12, 1863 — 11.15 a. m.
General: — Your dispatches of 10.30 last night and of 4 o'clock this
morning have been received. After maturely weighing the notes, the
general commanding is induced to think that General Negley withdrew
more through prudence than compulsion. lie trusts that our loss is not
serious, and that there will be no diflSculty in holding the gsup. He dis-
patched you last night to communicate with General McCook, and call
him up if you thought necessary. He trusts this has been done; if not,
no time should be lost. He should move with two divisions immediately,
carrying three days' rations and sixty rounds of ammunition on the per-
sons of the men, leaving the other division to protect the trains. Crit-
tenden was probably at Gordon's Mills by 10 o'clock to-day, and we shall
make immediate dispositions to reach the enemy's flank by Davis' Cross-
roads. Stanley should send his cavalry on the Bloomtown road, and
seize the gap at Dougherty without a moment's delay, and then enter the
valley with a portion of his command. Atkins' cavalrj^ will be sent for-
ward at once. It will be desirable for you to use them for communica-
tions. It is very important, at this time, for you to communicate promptly,
that the general commanding may know how to nianage General Critten-
den's corps, which will attack the enemy as soon as it can be gotten in
position. When a battle does begin, it is desirable that every command
should do its best, and push hard, using the bayonet wherever possible.
I am, sir.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

C. GODDARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Major-Geneeal Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps.

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 371

Headquarters Department of the CcMBERLANn,
Vv'^iDow Glenn's, September 19 — 11.45 a. m.
Major-General McCook, Commanding Twentieth Army Corps :

The general commanding directs you, as soon as practicable, after the
receipt of this order, to post your command so as to form the right of the
new battle-front, and hold the same. Leave your outposts and grand-
guard where they now are, till they are driven in by the enemy, when
they will fall back upon the main body of your command, contesting the
ground inch by inch.

* Very respectfully,

J. A. GARFIELD,

Chief of Stqf.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Widow Glenn's House, September 19, 1863 — 10.20 p. m.
General: — The general commanding directs me to inform you that
General McCook has been ordered to hold this gap to-morrow, covering
the Dry Valley road, his right resting near this place, his left connecting
with General Thomas' right. The general places your corjDS in resei've
to-morrow, and directs you to post it on the eastern slope of Missionary
Eidge to support McCJook or Thomas. Leave the grand-guard from your
command out, with instructions to hold their ground until driven in, and
then to retire slowly, contesting the ground stubbonrly.

Very respectfully,

J. A. GARFIELD,

Chief of Staff.
Majok-General Crittenden, Commanding Twentyfirst Army Corps.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
September 20 — 0.35 a. m.
Major-General McCook, Commanding Twentieth Army Corps :

General Negley's division has been ordered to General Thomas' left.
The general commanding directs you to fill the space left vacant by his
removal, if practicable. The enemy appears to be moving toward our
left.

Very respectfully,

J. A. GARFIELD,

Chief of Staff.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
In the Field, September 20 — 10.10 a. m.
Major-General McCook, Commanding Twentieth Army Corps:

General Thomas is being heavily pressed on the left. The general com-
manding directs you to make immediate dispositions to withdraw the
right, so as to spare as much force as possible to reinforce Thomas. The

372 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

left must be held at all hazards, even if the right is withdrawn back to
the present left. Select a good position back this way, and be ready to
start reinforcements to Thomas at a moment's warning.

J. A. GARFIELD,

Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
In the Field, Sejitcmher 20 — 10.30 a. m.
Major-General McCook, Commanding Twentieth Army Corps:

The general commanding directs you to send two brigades of General
Sheridan's division at once, and with all possible dispatch, to support
General Thomas, and send the third brigade as soon as the lines can be
drawn sufficiently. March them as rapidly as you can without exhaust-
ing the men. Report in person to these headquarters as soon as your or-
ders are given in regard to Sheridan's movement.

Have you any news from Colonel Post? J. A. GARFIELD.

Brigadier-General and GJdef of Staff.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, September 20 — 10.45 a. m.
Brigadier-General Wood, Commanding Division :

The general commanding directs that you close wp on Reynolds as fast
as possible, and support him. Respectfully, etc.,

FRANK S. BOND,
Major and Aid-de- Camp.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, September 19, 1863 — 8 p. m.
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. :

We have just concluded a terrific day's fighting, and have another in
prospect for to-morrow. The enemy attempted to turn our left, but his
design was anticipated, and sufficient force placed there to render his at-
tempt abortive. The number of our killed is considerable ; that of our
wounded very heavy. The enemy was greatly our superior in numbers.
Among our prisoners are men from some thirty regiments. We have
taken two cannons and lost seven (7). The army is in excellent condi-
tion and spirits, and, by the blessing of Pi-ovidence, the defeat of the
enemy will be total to-morrow. The battle-ground was densely wooded,
and its surface in-egular and difficult. We could make but little use of
our artillery. W. S. ROSECRANS,

Major-General Commanding.

Chickamauga River, September 20; Via Ringgold, September 21.
Major-General Cooper, Adjutant-General :

After two day's hard fighting, we have driven the enemy, after a des-
perate resistance, from several positions, and now hold the field; but he
still confronts us. The losses are heavy on both sides, especially of our offi-
cers. We have taken over twenty pieces of artillery, and some 2,500
prisoners. BRAXTON BRAGG.

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 373

Chattaxooga, Srpf ember 21, 1803.
To the President of the United States :

After two days of the severest fighting I ever witnessed, our right center
was beaten. The left held its position until sunset. Our loss is heavy,
and our troops worn down. The enemy received heavy reinforcements.
Every man of ours was in action on Sunday, and all but one brigade on
Saturday. Number of our wounded large, compared with that of the
killed. We took prisoners of two divisions of Longstreet. We have no
certainty of holding our position. If Burnside could come immediately,
it would be well ; otherwise he may not be able to join us, unless he
comes on the west side of the river.

W. S. ROSECRANS,

Major- General.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL G. P. THRUSTON IN RELATION TO,
THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

At the time Bragg's left struck the right of our army, while the latter
was in motion, on the morning of Sundaj^ September 20, '63, I happened
to be sent by General McCook, commanding Twentieth Army Corps (I
was adjutant of that corps and chief of staff), with orders to General
Mitchell, at Crawfish Springs, to close up toward " Widow Glenn's House,"
and support our infantrj" on the right, which was moving toward our left.
Rosecrans was transferring troops from right to left, and this left a gap
between our right and our cavalry. During my brief absence, our troops
were routed on the right, and on my return to the " Widow Glenn's
House," I found our army gone, and the rebels in long lines extending
across the open field in front of that house, and far to the south of it,
showing that their infantry line extended beyond, or south of our right.
As I knew nothing of the general situation of affairs, excejiting that the
rebel troops were in possession of the whole field occupied by our troops
when I left, say a half hour before, I suggested to Colonel T. J. Harrison,
who came up on the Crawfish Spring road just behind me, and whose
regiment, the Thirty-ninth Indiana, was mounted and armed with Spen-
cer rifles, to attack the enemy, then but three or four hundred j'ards
away, and advancing on us rapidly. His men dismounted, and under his
lead and Major Evans' charged the enemy splendidly, and brought back
to widow Glenn's house, where I waited, some two hundred prisoners,
disarmed them, and left them in charge of about a dozen guards only, and
then the regiment turned upon the enemy again.

This single regiment was too small to stay their progress, however, and
it was with the utmost difficulty we got away with our j^i'isoners. The
latter cheered to the rebels to come on and retake them, and it was only
by forcing the prisoners, at the point of the bayonet, to run, and running
oui'selves, that we got away with them. I took charge of the small guard
in charge of the prisoners, and my orderlies assisted, all with drawn
swords and pistols, and we ran nearly a half mile in this way (with the

374 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

rebels in full sight trj'ing to overtake us), before we got out of their sight,
and finally felt that we had our prisoners safe. The prisoners on the run
kept laughing very heartily at us, but there was no safety but in a high
rate of speed.

I then endeavored to ascertain the situation of affairs. After traveling
apparently two or three miles around what seemed to be the left of the
enemy's lines, I succeeded in finding Generals Sheridan and Davis. Each
had collected about half their divisions in broken and disorganized reg-
iments. The troops were greatly demoralized, and they were slowly
retiring along a pathway through the woods and over the hills, which
led in the direction of Rossville, and probably some six miles from there.

Tlie battle seemed still raging over on General Thomas' front, and a
mile or more east of us. We learned that Generals McCook, Rosecrans,
and Crittenden had gone to Chattanooga, and I was desirous that Sher-
idan and Davis' troops should go to General Thomas' assistance, and
volunteered to go myself and see how they could best assist General
Thomas.

After agreeing with Sheridan and Davis on a point where I was to find
them on my return, I made several attempts to cross to General Thomas,
but was prevented by finding the enemy in my front. I finally met
General Negley. He said he had been trying to find General Thomas,
bnt was driven back by the enemy, and assured me it was impossible to
reach General Thomas; but a short time afterward, I succeeded in reach-
ing him, who was just back of the crest of a hill or rise, in an open field,
the battle still raging in his front. I at once informed him of the situa-
tion on the right, relating as rapidly as j^ossible the disaster to that part
of the army, and the present situation of Sheridan's and Davis' troops,
asking him if he wished to use them in any way. I inferred from his
conversation that he received from me the first information he had from
the right wing of the army after it was routed. I do not know with any
l^recision the time of day when I reached General Thomas. I should say
it was about 4 o'clock r. m., but it maj'^ have been a little later or some
earlier.

The general seemed relieved to know that Sheridan and Davis had
some troops within reach, and directed me to bring them up on his right
at once, and have them ready to be put in position there or support the
right by active operations, if circumstances seemed to demand it. Hav-
ing cbanged horse for the third time, I ran my borse back to Sheridan
and Davis, but found that during my absence they had moved on nearer
to Rossville, and I did not find them for nearly an hour at least. I did
reach them along the narrow valley where they were marching, which was
much crowded.

Being adjutant and chief of staff of the Twentieth Corps, to which
their divisions belonged, I reported to them General Thomas' position and
situation, and requested them to return and take position as directed by
him. Davis ordered his men to " right about" at once, and marched back
under my guidance, some of Negley's and other troops joining us. Gen-

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 375

eral Sheridan said he preferred to go to Rossville, and go out on the
Lafayette road. I told him it was getting late, and he could scarcely get
on the field by that route before night, but he insisted on going that way,
which was several miles round.

By the time we reached Thomas' position with Davis' forces, however,
General Thomas was withdrawing his troops, the enemy having sus-
pended or given up his attack, and our troops were being withdrawn,
so we did not get into the action. By that time our troops had in part
recovered their courage and would have done tolerably good service. It
was then about dark — G o'clock p. m., perhaps later. I reported to General
Thomas, and remained with him till he went back to Rossville for the
right. I followed him there and remained with him all night. I had
about half the cavalry escort with ine belonging to headquarters Twen-
tieth Corps.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL SHERIDAN'S REPORT.

After crossing the road, my division was again formed on the ridge
which overlooked the ground where this sanguinary contest had taken
place, the enemy manifesting no disposition to continue the engagement
further. I here learned positively what I had before partially seen, that
the division still further on the left had been driven, and I was completely
cut off.

1 then determined to connect myself with the troops of General
Thomas by moving on the arc of a circle until I struck the Dry Creek
Valley road, by which I hoped to form the junction.

In the meantime I was joined by a portion of the division of General
Davis, under command of General Carlin, and a number of stragglers
from other divisions.

On reaching the Dry Creek Valley road, I found that the enemy had
moved parallel to me, and had also arrived at the road, thus preventing
me joining General Thomas by that route. I then determined to move
quickly on Rossville, and form a junction with him on his left flank, via
Lafayette road. This was successfully accomplished about S^ o'clock p. m.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL DAVIS' REPORT.

General Negley's division at this time possed to the rear, in the direc-
tion of Rossville, and, I understood, took position at that place. General
Carlin and Colonel Martin had also by this time succeeded in reforming
their troops as far as was possible, and reported. Colonel Ward, com-
manding the Tenth Ohio Infantry, reported to- me with his regiment for
duty, and after allowing the men a few minutes to procure water, I or-
dered them again under arms, and moved for the battle-field with a view
of supporting General Thomas' corps, which was still maintaining its
position. It is proper here to add that several detached battalions and

376 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

commands reported, to me, and accompanied my command to the battle-
field, making in all a force of twenty-five hundred to three thousand men.

While in the act of forming my lines near General Thomas' right, I
received information from General Gai'field that Thomas was falling back,
aud orders to repair to Rossville.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL NEGLEY'S REPORT.

2 p. M. Finding that our right wing and center had given way before
the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, and being hard pressed on my
front and right, I sent Lieutenant Moody of my staff to General Rose-
crans for a brigade. Upon being applied to, General Rosecrans replied
that it was too late; that he could give me no help. At this juncture,
Greneral Brannan applied to me for support, and I ordered the Twenty -first
Ohio Volunteers, of Sirvvell's brigade, to his assistance. I then rode forward
to the crest of the ridge over which the left wing and center was retiring, to
get a position for artillery, when I was met by a strong column of the en-
emy, who pressed»<forward rapidly between me and the troops on my left,
leaving me but one whole regiment, the Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania Vol-
unteers, and a part of another, organized, with the artillery in my charge
with its ammunition nearly exhausted ; at the same time my ammunition
train had been driven off the field. At this moment reliable information
reached me that a force of the enemy's cavalry was moving from our right
to our rear, and a column of infantry on our front and left. Finding
it impossible to organize any of the passing troops, and unable to com-
mvmicate with General Thomas, and being informed by a staff-oflicer that
Generals Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden had left the field, I deemed
it vitally important to secure the safety of the artillery, which appeared
to be threatened with immediate capture by a large force of the enemy,
who was pressing forward on my front and right. I immediately took
the Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, and marched to the mouth
of the gap, two miles from Bossville, the first open ground where troops
■could be collected and reorganized. . . .

As soon as I had cleared the gap of artillerj^ and transportation, which
extended back some distance, and in great confusion, and formed the
scattered troops into battalions, I learned that General Sheridan was
close at hand with some fifteen hundred men. I rode forward and re-
spectfully suggested to General Sheridan to move to the support of
General Thomas, stating that I would join him with all the troops I had
collected. He stated his object was to march to Rossville. I then rode
forward to communicate Avith General Thomas; found the enemy's
cavalry in possession of the road between us, preventing my further
passage. I then returned and held a consultation with Generals Davis
and Sheridan and Colonel Ducat.

It was determined as advisable to proceed to Rossville, to prevent the
-enemy from obtaining possession of the ci'oss-roads, and from there

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 377

•General Sheridan would move to the support of General Thomas, via the
Lafavette road.

EXTEACT FROM GENERAL ROSECRANS' REPORT.

The battle in the meanwhile roared with increasing fury and approach
from the left to the center. Two aids arrived successively within a few
minutes, from General Thomas, asking for reinforcements. The first was
directed to say that General Negley had already gone, and should be
nearly at hand at that time, and that Brannan's reserve brigade was
available. The other was directed to say that General Van Cleve would
at once be sent to his assistance, which was accordingly done.

A message from General Thomas soon followed, that he was heavily
pressed, Captain Kellogg, A.D.C., the bearer, informing me at the same
time that General Brannan was out of line, and General Reynolds' right
was exposed. Orders were dispatched to General Wood to close up on
Reynolds, and word was sent to General Thomas that he should be svip-
ported, even if it took away the whole corps of Crittenden and McCook.

General Davis was ordered to close on General Wood, and General
McCook was advised of the state of affairs, and ordered to close his whole
command to the left with all dispatch.

General Wood, overlooking the direction to close up on Reynolds, sup-
posed he was to support him by withdrawing from the line and passing
to the rear of General Brannan, who, it appears, was not out of line, but
was in echelon, and slightly in rear of Reynolds' right. By this unfor-
tunate mistake a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which the
enemy took instant advantage, and striking Davis in flank and rear, as
well as in front, threw his whole division in confusion.

The same attack shattered the right brigade of Wood before it cleared
the space. The right of Brannan was thrown back, and two of his bat-
teries, then in movement to a new position, were taken in flank, and
thrown back through two brigades of Van Cleve, then on the march
to the left, throwing his division into confusion, from which it never re-
covered until it reached Rossville.

While the enemy poured in through this breach, a long line stretching
beyond Sheridan's right was advancing. Laiboldt's brigade shared in the
rout of Davis. Sheridan's other two brigades, in movement toward the
left, under orders to support Thomas, made a gallant charge against the
enemy's advancing columns, but were thrown into confvLsion by the
enemy's line advancing on their flank, and were likewise comjaelled to
fall back, rallying on the Dry Valley road, and repulsing the enemy ; but
they were again compelled to yield to superior numbers, and retired west-
ward of the Dry Valley road, and by a circuitous route reached Rossville,
from which they advanced by the Lafayette road to support our left.

Thus, Davis' two brigades, one of Van Cleve's, and Sheridan's entire
division were driven from the field, and the remainder, consisting of the
■divisions of Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, and Wood, two

378 BATTLE OF CHICKxlMAUGA.

of Negley's brigades, and one of Yan Cleve's, were left to sustain th&
conflict against the whole power of the rebel army, which, desisting from
pursuit on the right, concentrated their whole eflfort to destroy them.

At the moment of the repulse of Davis' division, I was standing in
rear of his right, waiting the completion of the closing of McCook's
corps to the left. Seeing confusion among Van Cleve's troops, and the
distance Davis' men were falling back, and the tide of battle surging
toward us, the urgency for Sheridan's troops to intervene became immi-
nent, and I hastened in person to the extreme right, to direct Sheridan's
movement on the flank of the advancing rebels. It was too late. The
crowd of returning troops rolled back, and the enemy advanced. Giving
the troops directions to rally behind the ridges west of the Dry Valley
road, I passed down it, accompanied by General Garfield, Major Mc-
Michael, and Major Bond, of my staff, and a few of the escort, under a
shower of grape, canister, and musketry, for two or three hundred yards,
and attempted to join General Thomas and the troops sent to his support,
by passing to the rear of the broken portion of our line, but found the
routed troops far toward the left, and hearing the enemy's advancing
musketry and cheers, I became doubtful whether the left had held its
ground, and started for Eossville. On consultation and further reflection,
I determined to send General Garfield there, while I went to Chattanooga,
to give orders for the security of the pontoon bridges at Battle Creek and
Bridgeport, and to make preliminary disposition either to forward am-
munition and supplies, should we hold our ground, or to withdraw the
troops into good position.

Organization of the Army of the Cumberland before the Battle of
''Chickamauga" Georgia, September 19 and 20, 1863.

Department Headquarters.

15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Colonel W. J. Palmer commanding.

10th Ohio Infantry, Colonel J. "W. Burke commanding.

Battalion 1st, Ohio Sharpshooters, Captain G. M. Barber commanding.

Tiventieth Army Corps.
MAJOR-GENEKAL A. McD. McCOOK commandinq.

First Division.
Brigadier-General Jeff. C. Davis commanding.

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 379"

First Brigade. Second Brigade.

Colonel P. S. Post commanding. General W. P. Carlin commanding.
22d Indiana Infantry. 21st Illinois Infantry.

59tli Illinois " 38th " "

74th " " loth Wisconsin "

76th « « 101st Ohio «

Third Brigade.
Colonel H. 0. Heg commanding.
81st Indiana Infantry.
25th Illinois "
35th " "

8th Kansa? "

Artillery.

5th Wisconsin Battery. 2d Minnesota Battery.

8th Wisconsin Battery.

Second Division.
Erigadier-General E. W. Johnson commanding.

First Brigade. Second Brigade.

General A. Willich commanding. Colonel J. B. Dodge commanding.

49th Ohio Infantry. 77th Pennsylvania Infantry.

39th Indiana Infantry. 29th Indiana "

82d " " 30th " «

16th Ohio " 79th Illinois «

89th Illinois " 34th " "

Third Brigade.
Colonel P. P. Baldwin commanding.
6th Indiana Infantry.
1st Ohio Infantry.
93d " "

5th Kentucky Cavalry.

Artillery.
Battery "A," 1st Ohio Art. 20th Ohio Battery.

5th Indiana Battery.

Third Division. -'
Major-General p. H. Sheridan comynanding

First Brigade. Second Brigade.

General W. H. Lytle commanding. Colonel B. Laiboldt commanding^

88th Illinois Infantry. 2d Missouri Infantry.

36th " " 16th " "

24th Wisconsin " 44th Illinois "

21st Michigan " 73d " "

380 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Third Brigade.
Colonel L. P. Bkadley commanding.
22d Illinois Infantry.
27th " "

42d " '*

51st " "

Artillery.
Battery "11," 2d Indiana. Battery " G," 1st MissourL

Battery " C," 1st Illinois.

Fourteenth Army Corps.
MAJOE-GENEEAL GEOKGE H. THOMAS commanding.
Company " L," 1st Ohio Cavalry, " Escort." 9th Michigan Infantry, " Pro-
vost Guard."

First Division.

Brigadier-General A. Baird commanding.

First Brigade. Second Brigade.

CoL B. P. ScRiBNER commanding. Gen. J. C. Starkweather com,manding.

38th Indiana Infantry. 1st Wisconsin Infantry.

94th Ohio Infantry. 21st "Wisconsin Infantry.

2d Ohio Infantry. 24th Illinois Infantry.

33d " " 79th Pennsylvania Infantry.

10th "Wisconsin Infantry.

Third Brigade.
General J. H. King commanding.
15th TJ. S. Infantry, 1st Battalion.
16th " " " "

18th " " 1st and 2d Battalions.

19th " " 1st Battalion.

Artillery.
1st Michigan Battery. 4th Indiana Battery.

Battery " H," 5th U. S. A.

Second Division.
Major-General J. S. Negley commanding.

First Brigade. Second Brigade.

General Jno. Beatty commanding. Colonel T. R. Stanley commanding,

42d Indiana Infantry. 18th Ohio Infantry.

3d Ohio " 69th " "

15th Kentucky " 19th Illinois "

88th Indiana " 11th Michigan Infantry.
104th Illinois "

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 381

Third Brigade.
CoLOKEL W. SiRWELL Commanding.
78th Pennsylvania Infantry.
21st Ohio Infantry.
74th " "

37th Indiana "

Artillery.

Battery "A," 1st Ohio Art. Battery " M," 1st Ohio Art.

Illinois Light Artillery (Bridge's Battery).

Third Division.
Brigadier-General J. M. Brannax commanding.
First Brigade. Seco7id Brigade.

Colonel John M. Connell. Colonel John P. Croxton commanding,
17th Ohio Infantry. 4th Kentucky Infantry.

3Ist " " 10th " "

88th " " 10th Indiana

82d Indiana " 74th " "

14th Ohio "

Third Brigade.
Colonel F. Yandervekr commanding,
9th Ohio Infantry.
35th " «

2d 3Iinnesota Infantry.
87th Indiana "

Artillery.
4th Michigan Battery. Battery " C," 1st Ohio Art.

Battery " I," 4th U. S. A.

Fourth Division.
Major-General J. J. Eeynolds commanding.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.

CoLOKEL J. T. Wilder commajiding. Colonel E. A. King commanding.
17th Indiana Infantry. 68th Indiana Infantry.

72d " " 75th " "

92d Illinois " 101st " "

98tli " " 80th Illinois ' (Nashvillo).

123d « " 105th Ohio

Third Brigade.
General J. B. Turchin commanding.
11th Ohio Infantry.
36th " «

89th " "

92d " «

382 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Artillery.
18tli Indiana Battery. lOth Indiana Battery.

21st Indiana Battery.

Twenty-First Army Corps.
MAJOE-GENEEAL T. L. CEITTENDElSr commanding.

First Division.
Briqadier-General T. J. Wood commanding.
First Brigade' Second Brigade.

C!oLONEL Geo. P. Buell commanding. Ge^teral. G. D. Wagner commanding.*
26th Ohio Infantry. 15th Indiana Infantry.

58th Indiana " 40th " "

13th Michigan Infantry. 51st " « (Nashville).

100th Illinois " 57th " «

197th Ohio "

Third Brigade.
Colonel C. G. Harker com.manding.
3d Kentucky Infantry.
64th Ohio "

65th " "

125th " "

73d Indiana " (Nashville).

Artillery.

10th Indiana Battery. 8th Indiana Battery.

6th Ohio Battery.

Second Division.
Majoe-General J. M. Palmer commanding.

First Brigade. Second Brigade.

Gen. Charles Crxjft commanding. Gen. W. B. Hazen commanding.

1st Kentucky Infantry. 41st Ohio Infantry.

2d » " 124th « «

81st Indiana " 6th Kentucky Infantry.

90th Ohio " 9th Indiana «

110th Illinois " (Battalion).

Third Brigade.
Colonel W. Grose commanding.
36th Indiana Infantry.
24th Ohio "

6th " "

23d Kentucky "
84th Illinois "

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 383

Artillery.
Eattery '■ B," 1st Ohio Art. Battery " 2," 1st Ohio Art.

Battery " M," 4th U. S. Art. Battery " H," 4(h U. S. Art.

Third Division.
Brigadier-General H. P. Vak Cleve commanding.

First Brigade. Second Brigade.

■General S. Beatty commanding. Colonel Geo. F. Dick commanding.

9th Kentucky Infantry. 44th Indiana Infantry.

17th " " 86th " "

19th Ohio " 13th Ohio "

79th Indiana " 59th " «

Third Brigade.
Colonel S. M. Barnes commanding.
51st Ohio Infantry.
99th " "

35th Indiana Infantry.
8th Kentucky "
21st " "

Artillery.
26th Pennsylvania Battery. 3d Wisconsin Battery.
7th Indiana Battery.

Reserve Corps.
MAJOE-GENEEAL G. GEANGEE commanding.
Company " F," 1st Missouri Cavalry, Escort.

First Division.
Brigadier-General Jas. B. Steedman commanding.

First Brigade. Second Brigade.

Gen. W. C. Whittaker commanding. Col. J. G. Mitchell commanding.

40t,h Ohio Infantry. 98th Ohio Infantry.

84th Indiana " 113th " "

96th Illinois " '■ 121st " "

115th " « 78th Illinois "

Third Brigade.
Colonel Jno. Coburn commanding.
33d Indiana Infantry.
85th " "

22d Wisconsin "
19th Michigan "

Artillery.

18th Ohio Battery. Battery " M," 1st Illinois Art.

9th Ohio Battery.

384 BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

Second Division.
Bkigadier-Genekal J. D. Morgan commanding.

First Brigade. Second Brigade.

Colonel K. F. Smith commanding. Colonel D. M. McCook commanding.

10th Illinois Infantry. 85tli Illinois Infantry,

leth " " 86th " "

60th " " 12.3th " "

10th Michigan " 52d " "
14th " "

Third Brigade.

Colonel C. C. Doolittle commanding.
18th Michigan Infantry.
22d " "

106th Ohio "

108th "
10th Tennessee " (detached).

Artillery.

10th Wisconsin Battery. Battery " I," 2d Illinois Art.

Battery "E," 1st Ohio Art.

Third Division.
Beigadier-Genebal K. S. Granger commandi7ig.

First Brigade. Second Brigade.

Colonel S. D. Bruce commanding. General T. D. Ward commanding.

83d Illinois Infantry. 70th Indiana Infantry,

13th Wisconsin Infantry. 79th Ohio "

71st Ohio '• 102d Illinois "

102d " " 105th " ■ "

28th Kentucky " 129th " "

Third Brigade.
General J. G. Spears commanding.
3d Tennessee Infantry.
5th " "

6th

Artillery.
Battery " H," 2d Illinois Art. 5th Michigan Battery.
1st Tennessee Battery.

Cavalry.
MAJOK-GENERAL D. S. STANLEY— ^Ssew;!.
BEIGADIER-GENEEAL EOBEET B. MITCHELL commanding.

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 385

First Division.
Colonel E. M. McCook commanding.

First Brigade. Second Brigade.

Col. a. p. Campbell com,manding. Col. O. A. La Grange commanding.

2d Michigan Cavalry. 2d Indiana Cavalry.

9th Pennsylvania Cavalry. 4th Indiana "

1st Tennessee " 2d Tennessee "

3d " «

1st Wisconsin "

Third Brigade.
Colonel L. D. W^tkins commanding.
4th Kentucky Cavalry.
5th " "

6th " "

7th " "

Section Battery " D," 1st Ohio Art.

Second Division.
Bbiqadiek-General George Crook commanding.

First Brigade. Second Brigade.

Colonel R. H. G. Minty commanding. Colonel Eli Long commanding,

7th Pennsylvania Cavalry. 1st Ohio Cavalry.

4th Michigan Cavalry. 3d " "

4th U.S. " 4th " "

3d Indiana Cavalry (Battalion). 2d Kentucky Cavalry.

Third Brigade.

Colonel "W. Lowe commanding.

5th Iowa Cavalry.

10th Ohio "

5th Tennessee Cavalry.

Chicago " Board of Trade " Battery,

Unassigned Troops.

Pioneer Brigade, Brigadier-General J. St. C. Morton commanding (three bat-
talions).

1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, Colonel W. S. Inness commanding.

2d Kentucky Battery, with Michigan Engineers and Mechanics.

1st " " " Fortress Ptosecrans," Murfreesboro, Tenn.

12th' Indiana Battery, Nashville, Tenn.

13th " " Gallatin, Tenn.

20th " " Nashville, "

Battery "C," 2d Illinois Artillery, " Fort Donelson," Tenn.

4th Tennessee Cavalry, Nashville, Tenn.

Battalion 8th Kentucky Cavalry, Clarksville, Tenn.

25

CHAPTER XXI.

SIEGE OP CHATTANOOGA.

The incipient fortifications left by General Bragg were
speedily strengthened by General Rosecrans, as portions of a
complete circnmvallation. General Rosecrans, however, made
no effort to hold Lookout Mountain, the railroad, or river be-
low Chattanooga. His aim was to hold his bridges at the
town, and present strong lines to the enemy. For a day or
two, General Bragg threatened to attack, but soon posted his
forces to besiege and starve the army which he had failed to
overwhelm in battle. His lines extended from Lookout
Mountain across Chattanooga valley to Missionary Ridge,
and along its base and summit to the Tennessee river above
the town. General Longstreet insisted upon a flank move-
ment instead of a siege. He suggested to his chief, to cross
the river above Chattanooga, and make himself so felt in the
rear as to force General Rosecrans to evacuate the position
and fall back to l^ashville, and then, if not able to continue
the northward movement from inadequate transportation,
to follow the railroad to Knoxville, destroy Burnside, and
from there threaten Rosecrans' communications in the rear
of l^ashville. General Bragg, however, did not deem this
suggestion feasible. His transportation was not considered
adequate, and, in his view, purely military considerations for-
bade the step. He thought that the interruption of Rose-
crans' communications with Bridgeport, south of the river,
promised better results, and he disposed his army to accom-
plish this object. He confided the holding of this important
route to General Longstreet, and threw his cavalry across the
river to operate against the transportation of supplies by

(386)

SIEGE OF CHATTAT^OOGA. 387

Tvagons over the mountains from Bridgeport. He jnclged
wisely that his superiority in cavahy, and the length and con-
dition of the roads, rendered wagon transportation a preca-
rious means of supply for the army shut up in Chattanooga.
His success was assured, if he could maintain his hold upon
the river and the shorter roads to Bridgeport.*

The situation of the beleaguered army was critical from the
first. General Eosecrans expressed his fears to the President,
the day after the battle, that he should not be able to hold
Chattanooga. Two days later, however, he assured the Pres-
ident tliat his army could not be dislodged, except Ijy very
superior numbers, but requested that his communications
should be covered, and that reinforcements should be sent to
liini. General ITalleck had previously ordered General Burn-
Bide to move to his support. This had been done before it had
been perceived that the enemy was concentrating forces from
all quarters in ITorthern Georgia. The issue of the battle,
and the situation at Chattanooga, induced the detachment of
troops from the Army of the Potomac, and orders to Generals
Hurlbut and Sherman to give assistance. But the movement
of troops from points so remote gave no promise of imme-
diate relief, and as the enemy was on the direct line of ap-
proach, their passage from Bridgeport to Chattanooga was of
itself an intricate problem. It was scarcely less difficult of
solution than that of supplying the army at Chattanooga,
until the coming of reinforcements and the establishment of
adequate means of transportation.

Having attained secure position at Chattanooga, General
Eosecrans disposed his cavalry on the north bank of the Ten-
nessee river, from Washington to Caperton's ferry, to observe
the enemy and protect trains in passage from Bridgeport to
Chattanooga. Crook's division kept watch for fifty miles up
the river, while McCook's stood guard at the crossings above
and below Bridgeport. General Crook could only watch at
the main fords, while the intermediate ones were numerous.
At one of the latter, on the 1st of October, Wheeler crossed

* These different plans are fully presented in the official reports of the
two generals.

388 SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA.

with a large force of cavalry, and moved toward the commu-
nications of the army. As soon as advised of the fact, Gen-
eral Rosecrans directed General Crook to collect his command
and pursue, and ordered Colonel McCook to move from
Bridgeport to Anderson's Cross-roads. "Wheeler, however,
had the start, and intercepted and nearly destroyed a large
train of wagons loaded with supplies, near the place to which
M(rCook had been ordered to move. Colonel McCook, upon
the reception of the order, sent instructions to Colonel Camp-
hell, commanding his second brigade, to join him at Jasper,
and started up the valley, with the troops in hand, the First
Wisconsin, and the Second and Fourth Indiana regiments,
and a section of artillery. An incessant rain delayed the
movement, and as McCook approached Anderson's, on the
2d, he saw the smoke of the burning wagons. He hurried
forward, and encountering a portion of Wheeler's troopers,
charged with the First Wisconsin and Second Indiana, and
drove the force past the burning wagons upon the main body,
which was one mile north of the cross-roads, in line of battle.
These two regiments dislodged the enemy from several posi-
tions, and pursued for two miles, when he was found, in a
strong position across a creek, behind a barricade of rails.
McCook carried the position by assault, and attacking re-
peatedly, the enemy was driven across the Sequatchie valley.
In this action the saber was freely used. The following morn-
ing the pursuit was continued to the top of mountain beyond
Dunlap, where the rear-guard of the enemy was again at-
tacked, with successful result. McCook captured, from first
to last, twelve commissioned ofiicers, including Major Green
of Wheeler's staff, and ninety-three enlisted men, and killed
seven officers and several enlisted men. He recaptured eight
hundred mules, and saved some of the wagons. The enemy
destroyed three hundred wagons and a large number of mules.
The force of the enemy engaged was Martin's division, under
the personal command of Wheeler. General Wheeler had
previously divided his force, and sent Wharton's division to
McMinnville, by a detour to the north.

In the meantime. General Crook, with Minty's and Long's
brigades, and Colonel Miller's mounted infantry, lately Wilder's,

SIEGE OF CHATTAXOOGA. 389

had ascended tlie mountain south of Smith's Cross-roads, and
was in rapid pursuit toward McMinnville. He overtook Whar-
ton's rear-guard in descending the Cumberland Mountains, on
the 3d of October. Pursuing rapidly, he succeeded in sur-
rounding a brigade, but through the coming of reinforcements
and darkness, the brigade escaped. In the action, Crook lost
forty-six men killed and wounded ; the loss of the enemy was
not ascertained. Pursuit w^as resumed the next morning, but
Crook could not reach McMinnville in time to save its garrison
and stores. The troops holding the place surrendered without
offering any resistance, and when General Crook arrived, he
found that a large amount of public and private property had
been destroyed, and that the enemy was in rapid movement
toward Murfreesboro. Pursuing without delay, he overtook
Wheeler's rear-o-uard two miles from the town. Stubborn re-
sistance was offered to give free motion to the main column,
but a saber charge by the Second Kentucky, led by Colonel
Long, dislodged the force. Pursuing rapidly. General Crook
compelled Wheeler to halt and give battle, A spirited engage-
ment ensued lasting until dark, the enemy yielding two posi-
tions and suffering loss. Wheeler then moved rapidly toward
Murfreesboro to destroy the railroad at that point. He sent
squads acquainted with the country, to cut the telegraph wires
between Murfreesboro and ISTashville, hoping to be able to fol-
low and destroy the railroad also. For the double purpose of
avoiding ambush and saving the railroad, General Crook crossed
over from Readyville to the Liberty turnpike, to interpose his
force north of Murfreesboro, This movement turned Wlieeler
toward Shelbyville, saved Murfreesboro from pillage, and the
railroad at that place and northward, but did not prevent the
interruption of telegraphic communications.

On the 6th, the corp-commander. General Mitchell, with
McCook's division, reached Murfreesboro, and the following
night the whole command bivouacked seven miles from Shel-
byville. In moving forward to the town the next morning, it
was ascertained that Wheeler had divided his forces into three
columns, directed severally to Wartrace, Shelbyville, and Union-
ville. General Mitchell sent McCook with his division to
TJnionville, and Crook with his toward Farmington, as the

390 SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA.

column which had sacked Shelbyville had moved upon a road
leading to that place. General Crook found Davidson's divis-
ion encamped on Duck river. The mounted infantry were in
advance, and as the enemy seemed to be in confusion, they
charged without dismounting. Having driven the foe a short
distance they dismounted, and Colonel Long's brigade passed
to the front. Colonel Long made a furious charge, drove the
enemy thirteen miles, killing and capturing large numbers.
Wlien Davidson reached a position against which the cavalry
could not operate, the infantry drove him in rout toward Far-
mington. Here resistance was offered, the enemy being in po-
sition in a dense cedar thicket. General Crook had with him
onl}^ Long's and Miller's brigade ; Minty's was unexpectedly
in the rear. The enemy was greatly superior, and was in a po-
sition which could not be attacked by cavalry. Opening with
artiller}^, he attacked the mounted infantry, in effort to turn
both flanks. Captain Stokes could find position for only one
of his guns, but this he used so effectively that he threw the
enemy's artillery into confusion. At this juncture Colonel
Miller charged, broke through the enemy's line, and captured
four pieces of artillery, but General Crook's force was too small
to take advantage of this success, as Wheeler had united his
command against him.

On the morning of the 8th, General Crook moved toward
Pulaski, having learned from scouts that Wheeler had retreated
in that direction. The other division, General Mitchell ac-
companying, moved on roads to the right. Wheeler's com-
mand was at this time greatly disorganized ; many of his troops
had deserted, others were roaming over the country, and those
under their colors were scattered on the lines of retreat. He,.
however, moved with great speed toward the Tennessee river,
and succeeded in crossing not far from Rodgersville. He left
two regiments at Sugar creek to cover his retreat. These, Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Patrick, of the Fifth Iowa, charged with the
sabre, killed ten, wounded nine, captured seventy, and scat-
tered the remainder in the mountains.

The cavalry divisions were united at Eodgersville, October
9th, where fifty -two thousand dollars' worth of cotton belong-
ing to the Confederate government was destroyed. On the

SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA. 391

lltli, the command was put in motion toward Stevenson, Ala-
bama. At Hnntsville, in the evening, it was ascertained that
the rebel general, Roddy, had crossed the river and was moving
toward Winchester and Decherd. Pursuit was commenced
at daylight on the 12th, via 'New Market, and late at night
the enemy was encountered, but the darkness was too dense
for opportunity to press him beyond a skirmish. The next
morning the fact was revealed that Roddy had counter-
marched, and was hastening to recross the river. He was pur-
sued for a day, but the impossibility of overtaking him being
evident, the command was again turned eastward. Roddy's
movement was doubtless intended to be co-operative' with
"Wlieeler's, and the direction of his march indicated that the
quick disposition which had been made of the main column
was entirely unexpected. General Bragg had placed his
hope of forcing General Rosecrans from Chattanooga upon
the possibility of so deranging his communications that his
army could not be supplied so far from his base. His plan
contemplated the movement of three columns of cavalry upon
the long line of railroad, whose maintenance intact was the
ruling condition of the continued occupancy of Chattanooga
by the national army. Wheeler's defeats, and his hurried re-
crossing of the Tennessee river so far to the west, admonished
the leaders of the other columns that their co-operation was
impracticable. Hence, Roddy sought safety on the southern
bank of the river. And General Lee, who, with a large force
of cavalry, reached Courtland, Alabama, the day that Wheeler
recrossed, learned that liis own advance would not be per-
mitted. That Wheeler's raid was disastrous, his own report,
which does not compass all the truth, plainly reveals. He
put his losses far l^elow the computation made by the general
officers who followed him through Tennessee, but spoke in
severe terms of the incapacity of many of his officers, and the
shameful conduct of a portion of his men. General Crook
estimated his losses at two thousand men and six pieces of
artillery. He left on the field at Farmington eighty-six dead
and one hundred and thirty-seven wounded. One entire regi-
ment deserted, and scattered through the mountains.

General Crook lost fourteen killed and ninety-seven

392 SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA.

wounded. Among the slain was the gallant Colonel Monroe,
of the One Hundred and Twenty -third Illinois, who fell in
leading his regiment at Farmington.

In this campaign, marches were made on several days,
ranging from forty to fifty-seven miles, the saber was justified
as the weapon for cavalry, and a remarkable revelation of en-
durance was made. Many of the men were in need of cloth-
ing, and they had but three days' rations in twenty of almost
incessant rain, hard marching, and frequent fighting.

Meanwhile, the situation of the army at Chattanooga be-
came exceedingly critical. At the commencement of the
occupation, there were large trains in good condition, and the
prospect of transporting supplies was somewhat promising.
But early in October the rain began to fall. With its contin-
uance, the roads became almost impassable. The destruction
of hundreds of wagons and animals by "Wheeler was nearly
fatal to the army. The remaining animals, from necessity,
were pressed beyond endurance. The roads rapidly grew
worse ; the mules became exhausted by constant motion and
lack of forage ; each successive trip to Bridgeport compassed
a longer period of time, and each trip reduced the number of
wagons and the weight of their contents ; at each succeeding
issue the ration was diminished ; the artillery horses, being
least useful in the emergency, were deprived of forage and fell
dead in great numbers day by day ; and the alternative of
surrender, or retreat with great peril and certain loss of all
material, seemed only delaying its demand for the desperate
election of the army. The thought of surrender could not be
entertained, as no large army had yet lowered its colors at
the demand of the foe, and the Army of the Cumberland
could not be the first to experience this humiliation ; and the
shortest rations, as long as actual starvation could be averted,
could not force that army to turn its back to the enemy. So,
with full appreciation of the situation, it bravely awaited the
issue.

Early in October, General Hooker, with the Eleventh and
Twelfth Corps, took position on the iN'ashville and Chatta-
nooga railroad. His troops, disposed from ITashville to
Bridgeport, gave security to the communications between

SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA. 393

those points. But this did not give immediate relief to the
army at Chattanooga. The Eastern troops had moved by
raih'oad, and were without transportation. They were not
needed at Chattanooga, as beyond an imposing but harmless
cannonading from the crest of Lookout Maintain, the enemy
was not demonstrative. But if they had been essential to the
defense of the place, their going was impracticable ; and if
their adrance had not been barred, their presence would have
been the harbinger of starvation. It was some relief to the
national army to know that reinforcements were so near; and
this fact, coupled with the imminence of starvation, was a
spur to the origination of a method to open the river and util-
ize it as a channel of supply. The enemy had firm hold of
Lookout Alountain, and his batteries and sharpshooters com-
manded the river, the roads on the south bank, including the
railroad, and the shortest road north of the river. This
mastery of the shortest communications forced the supply
trains to move from Bridgeport, up the Sequatchie valley, and
over the mountains, to Chattanooga, a distance of sixty miles,
and at the same time gave Bragg the power to interpose such
forces as would overwhelm Hooker should he attempt to ap-
proach Chattanooga on the south of the river. In anticipa-
tion of an open river, steamboat-building had been com-
menced long before, at Bridgeport, and a steamboat captured
at Chattanooga had been repaired. General Rosecrans had
in view the opening of the river, and the erection of store-
houses on "Williams' Island, situated opposite the termination
of Lookout valley, and gave orders to General Hooker to
concentrate such portions of his command at Bridgeport as
the safety of the N'ashville and Chattanooga railroad would
permit, and hold himself in readiness to move toward Chatta-
nooga. He also gave orders for the construction of pontoons
for a bridge down the river. On the 19th, he directed
Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, his chief engineer, to recon-
noiter the I'iver in the vicinity of Williams' Island, with a
view to making the island a cover for a steamboat landing and
store-houses. That day he was relieved as commander of the
Army of the Cumberland,

This change was the offshoot of another of broader com-

394 SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA.

pass. All through the summer there had been an evident
lack of co-operation in the movements of the three armies,
Avhose fields of operation were penetrated by the Tennessee
river. Orders from Washington had, to some extent, required
indirect or remote co-operation. But the Armies of the Ten-
nessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio, being not only organ-
ically distinct, but without defined relations, their operations
had been directed to widely separated objectives, under cir-
cumstances which were adapted to defeat even indirect co-
operation.

To secure the future intimate co-operation of these three
armies, which in consequence of the issues of their recent cam-
paigns was especially imperative, the Military Division of the
Mississippi was created by the President, and General Grant
assigned to its command. The posture of afiairs at Chatta-
nooga doubtless precipitated this measure as the expression of
a radical change of policy in the central theater of war. The
President and his counselors feared that General Posecrans
could not extricate himself from the embarrassments which
environed him, and that he would abandon his position before
reinforcements could reach him. The general's dispatches did^
manifest that he was not sanguine that he could hold Chatta-
nooga, unless the assistance which he suggested could be
afibrded ; but in no Avay did he indicate that he thought of
withdrawing, except as an absolute necessity, and on the last
day of his command of the army, was intent upon maturing
the scheme which subsequently was the means of opening the
river and the roads on the south bank.

The President's order of October 18th, which created the
Military Division of the Mississippi with General Grant in
command, placed General Thomas at the head of the Army
of the Cumberland. He assumed command formally on the
19th, and General Posecrans having dictated a farewell to his
army, left for Cincinnati before it was generally known that
he had been relieved.

At the time of this change of commanders, the Army of
the Cumberland comprised the Fourth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and
Fourteenth Corps and three divisions of cavalry. In compli-
ance with the President's order of September 28th, the Fourth

SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA. 395

was formed on the 9tli of October, by the consolidation of the
Twentieth and Twenty-first, and at the same time the Reserve
Corps was attached to the Fourteenth. The compression of
four corps into two necessitated a corresponding reduction in
the number of brigades and divisions. Under the new organi-
zation, there were tliree brigades in each division, designated
as the First, Second, and Third, and three divisions in each
corps, similarly distinguished. Major-General Gordon Gran-
ger was assigned to the command of the Fourth Corps, and
his division commanders in the numerical order of divisions
were Major-Generals J. M. Palmer and P. H. Sheridan and
Brigadier-General T. J.Wood. The commanders of the First,
Second, and Third divisions of the Fourteenth Corps were
respectively Major-General L. H. Rousseau and Brigadier-
Generals J. C. Davis and A. Baird.

The dominant prol^lem was that of supplies. Upon its solu-
tion rested the fate of the army. To this General Grant's
first order and General Thomas' first act as army commander
pertained. General Grant telegraphed to General Thomas :
" Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as
possible. Please inform me how long your present supplies
will last and the prospect for keeping them up." The response
was : " Two hundred and four thousand and sixt3'-two rations
in storehouse. Ninety-six thousand to arrive to-morrow, and
all trains were loaded which had arrived at Bridgeport up to the
16th ; probably three hundred wagons. "We will hold the
town till we starve. The same day, October 19th, the day
the command of the army was formally relinquished by Gen-
eral Rosecrans, General Thomas directed General IR)oker to
hasten the concentration of his command and his preparations
to move, in accordance with the previous instructions of Gen-
eral Rosecrans.

General Grant reached Chattanooga on the 23d in the even-
ing, and the projected plan for securing a lodgment of troops
on the left bank of the river, at Brown's ferry, as the initial
step in opening the river and shorter roads to Bridgeport, was
at once submitted to him. The day following, in company
with Generals Thomas and Smith, he made a thorough recon-
noissance north of the river, with reference to the feasibility

396 SIEGE OF CHATTATv^OOGA.

of tlie plan proposed. Agreeing witli those who had matured
the scheme, he authorized its execution. Fortunately, the prep-
arations were far advanced and their completion required little
time. General Smith was charged with the enterprise and
directed to perfect the necessary arrangements.

General Thomas at once gave specific instructions to General
Hooker with regard to the advance of his troops in co-operation
with the movement from Chattanooga. He was directed to
leave General Slocum, the commander of the Twelfth Corps,
with one division, to guard the railroad from Murfreeshoro to
Bridgeport, and to concentrate the Eleventh Corps and one
division of the Twelfth at Bridgeport, in readiness to cross the
Tennessee river ; move first to Bankin's ferry and afterward
to Brown's ferry. He was advised that two brigades of
Palmer's division of the Fourth Corps would move on the
north side of the river to Rankin's ferry, and that there
would he co-operation at Brown's ferry also. These instruc-
tions were given at 2.30 p. m. on the 24th, and General Hooker
replied promptly that he would move by daylight on the 27th.

The night of the 26th was fixed for the expedition from
Chattanooga. The plan of operations was elaborated with
great care, and involved the nicest adjustment of co-operative
movements as a condition of success. By the river, the dis-
tance from Chattanooga to Brown's ferry is nine miles ; but
across the peninsula, less than half as far. The direction of
the river, after curving round a high hill directly west of the
town, is to the southwest until it touches the base of Lookout.
From that point it trends northwest to Williams' Island. The
course of the river defines to the view, from the top of Look-
out Mountain, a peninsular hill of singular shape, not unlike
the moccasined foot of an Indian, which, in harmony with the
conceit, bears the name of Moccasin Point. Brown's ferry is
opposite the narrowest part of this hill, south of west from Chat-
tanooga. As a pontoon bridge was to be thrown at this point,
General Smith concluded that it would involve less risk of
failure to float his boats and a portion of his troops, and land
them on the left bank of the river, than to transport them
across the peninsula, and operate from the right bank in lay-
ing the bridge. Each course suggested disastrous probabili-

SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA. 397

ties. lu pursuing tlie former, Ms boats must pass the enemy's
pickets, stationed for seven miles along tlie left bank of tlie
river, and land under their fire ; and in attempting the latter,
the enemy might be able to concentrate a sufficient force to
prevent the laying of the bridge. His decision to float the
boats was made in view of two probabilities — one, that his
movement could be made so quietly as not to be perceived by
the pickets ; and the other, that should the enemy's camp be
alarmed, a concentration of troops would not be made at his
place of landing. Accordingly, he divided his forces, embark-
ing fifteen hundred picked men under General Ilazeu, and
sending General Turchin with his own brigade, the remainder
of Hazen's, and three batteries of artillery under Major Men-
denhall, to take position in the woods above the ferry, in readi-
ness to move down to cover the landing on the opposite bank,
and cross in support as quickly as practicable, or cover the
other troops, in the event of disaster.

The boats moved from Chattanooga at 3 a. m. on the 27th.
A slight fog veiled the moon, and the boats, directed by
Colonel T. R. Stanley, glided noiselessly with the current.
Hugging closely the right bank, they rounded Moccasin Point
and moved unperceived to the place of landing. The boats
had been called ofi" into sections before starting, and each sec;-
tion was placed under an officer, who knew beforehand his
exact place of landing. As the foremost section neared the
shore at its appointed place at earl}^ dawn, the surprised
pickets fired a harmless volley and fled. In quick succession
the several sections landed, and the men leaped upon the bank
and ascended the adjacent hill to meet and drive back a small
force that had hurried forward in response to the warning vol-
ley. There was a sharp engagement for a moment, and then
all was quiet. The boats first brought over the remainder of
Hazen's troops, and soon after Turchin's brigade. Hazen
took firm hold of the hill above the gorge through which the
Bridgeport road passes to the ferry, and Turchin the one be-
low it. As soon as skirmishers could be thrown sufficiently'
forward to prevent a surj)rise, detachments with axes went
vigorously to work felling trees and constructing barricades
and abatis. In two hours the defenses were such as to bid de-

398 SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA.

fiance to the enemy. This accompUshed, the pontoon bridge
was speedily thrown under the skillful supervision of Captain
P. V. Fox, First Michigan Engineers. Although the force
engaged was exposed to a vigorous cannonading by the
enemy's batteries on the front of Lookout Mountain, General
Smith's loss was six killed, twenty-three wounded, and nine
missing. The loss of the enemy was probably not less, as six
of his dead were left on the field, and six prisoners were cap-
tured. Twenty beeves and two thousand bushels of corn were
added to the slender rations of the troops. These supplies of
hardly appreciable value to a large army under ordinary cir-
cumstances, were of very considerable moment at a time when
soldiers gladly gathered the fragments of crackers and grains
of corn which fell to the ground in transfer.

The conditions of success in the expedition were numerous
and intricate. Had any one of the responsible ofiicers failed
in his special duty, the movement might have miscarried, but
there was no serious default. There was such brilliancy of
plan and execution as to call forth the following notice from
General Thomas : " To Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, chief
engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity
which conceived, and the ability which executed the move-
ment at Brown's ferry. The preparations were all made in
secrecy, as was also the boat expedition, which passed under
the overhanging cliffs of Lookout, so much so, that when the
bridge was thrown at Brown's ferry on the morning of the
27th, the surprise was as great to the army within Chatta-
nooga, as it was to the army besieging it fi-om without."

Though this success was a source of great mortification to
General Bragg, he did not at first discern its full significance.
And while he was wasting powder and shells in bombarding
the floating bridge, Hooker was moving eastward to give the
full revelation of what the lodgment at^Brown's ferry was the
prophecy — an open river and short lines of supply.

Pursuant to orders. General Hooker put his command in
motion toward Chattanooga early on the 27th, crossing on a
pontoon bridge which had been thrown the day previous. He
advanced to Whitesides, and thence deflected into Lookout
valley. At 3 p. M. his head of column was at Wauhatchie,

SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA. 399

and as he knew that Longstreet could strike him at pleasure,
farther advance was made with caution. Many circumstances
favored Longstreet. His points of observation were so numer-
ous and elevated that he could discern all the movements of
Hooker's troops, while such was the topography of the valley
that he could conceal his own. Between Lookout and Rac-
coon Mountains there were several sharply defined hills, sepa-
rated l)y deep depressions. Through the npper depression the
railroad passes to the base of Lookout, where it touches the
river, and farther down, the wagon road to Chattanooga de-
flects to the right through another, wdiile the road to Brown's
ferry courses along the western base of these hills.

The road to Kclley's ferry, a few miles farther down the
river, turns to the left, where the Chattanooga road turns to
the right. The enemy held the hills commanding these roads,
and it was anticipated that he would dispute their possession.

The approach of a large force from Bridgeport in a few
hours after the lodgment of the national troops at Brown's
ferry, must have revealed to General Bragg that the co-
operative movements were designed to raise the siege of Chat-
tanooga. It must have been apparent, also, that to prevent
such a result, he must cither crush Hooker or interpose a very
heavy column between him and Brown's ferry. Why this
was not done is as inexplicable as the loss of his advantages
before the battle of Chickamanga. He did indeed offer resist-
ance to Hooker's advance beyond Wauhatchie, but it was too
feeble to prevent it, and another failure was added to the nu-
merous preceding ones.

The head of column of the Eleventh Corps, when a short
distance north of the railroad, received a volley of musketry
from the adjacent hills. As the exact nature of the attack
was concealed by the dense woods. General Howard, by
direction of General Hooker, threw a brigade on the right
and another on the left. The enemy then fled, and burnt the
railroad bridge over Lookout creek in his flight, A few of
Howard's men fell at this point, and others were killed as from
time to time the column was exposed to the batteries on
Lookout Mountain. At 5 p. m. the troops halted for the
night, and went into camp about one mile from Brown's ferry.

400 SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA.

General Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps remained at
"Wauhatchie, three miles distant, so as to hold the road lead-
ing to Kelley's ferry. Pickets were thrown out from each
camp ; but no effort was made to maintain continuity of line,,
the force being too small to afford substantial communications
for such a distance, and the troops were divided, as it was
deemed important to retain positions which commanded the
two roads.

During the first watches there was no alarm; but about
midnight, a regiment that had advanced toward Lookout was
involved in a skirmish, and an hour later the roar of musketry
from Geary's position announced an assault, but not a sur-
prise, as the isohited division was in line of battle before the
enemy approached. Fearing that Geary might be overpow-
ered. General Hooker dh'ected General Howard to double-
quick Schurz's division to his support. Wlien this division
had proceeded a short distance, it received the fire of the
enemy from the central hills, which was the first intimation
of his presence in such close proximity. In the emergency,
Tyndale's brigade was ordered to charge, and the other bri-
gade to hasten forward.

Soon, Steinwehr's division came up to Tyndale's position,
when it was discovered that the enemy was occupying another
hill in the rear of the one held by the troops which had fired
upon Schurz. Smith's brigade of Steinwehr's division was
at once ordered to carry the hill with the bayonet. This
small brigade marched up the steep acclivity, receiving, but
not returning the fire of the enemy ; drove a greatly superior
force from the intrenchments on the summit, captured
prisoners, and scattered the rebels in all directions. Tyndale
encountered less resistance, and soon pressed the enemy from
his front.

In the meantime, the noise of battle from musketry firing,
and occasional discharges of artillery, was of such character
as to indicate the progress of a fierce struggle at Wauhatchie.
The reinforcements failed to reach Geary, and for nearly three
hours he resisted the furious assaults of superior numbers.
At last he assumed the offensive, and breaking Longstreet's
line, drove his troops from the field.

SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA. 401

The enemy had doubtless observed the distance between
Howard and Geary, and had interposed his troops in the hope,
no doubt, of crushing them in turn. The night attack ex-
pressed the enemy's consciousness of the emergency, and his
plan to meet it was well devised, but his columns had too
little weight to assure success.

General Hooker's loss in killed and wounded was four
hundred and sixteen. Among the severely wounded were
General Green, and Colonel Underwood, of the Thirty-third
Massachusetts. The estimated loss of the enemy was much
greater, as one hundred and fifty of his dead were buried in
Geary's front, and more than one hundred were captured.

To strengthen Hooker's grasp of the valley, Whittaker's
and Mitchell's brigades of Davis' division were moved over
the river. The problem of supplies was soon solved. The
steamboat which had been repaired at Chattanooga passed the
enemy's batteries on Lookout the night of the 28th, and the
one at Bridgeport was soon in motion up the river loaded with
rations for the army. A good road was soon made from
Chattanooga to Brown's ferry, and thence to Kelley's, and
work was commenced on the railroad from Bridgeport east.
The question now was not how long should the Army of the
Cumberland hold Chattanooga, but how long should the rebel
banners be permitted to wave on Lookout Mountain and Mis-
sionary Ridge. This change of problems had been produced
by measures commenced by General Rosecrans, continued
under General Thomas, elaborated by General Smith, and
which, having been approved by General Grant, were executed
by his authority.

Headquarters Departmekt of the Cumberland,
Chattanooga, September 23, 1863.
A. Lincoln, President:

"We hold this point, and can not be dislodged except by very superior
numbers, and after a great battle. Immediate disposition should be
made for covering our communications, by ordering down every available
man from Kentucky to Bridgeport and Stevenson, and having all rein-
forcements you can send hurried up.

Official: W. S. EOSECRANS,

Major-General

26

402 SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA.

Washington D. C, Sepfember 24, 1863 — 3 a. m.
Major-General Hosecrans, Commanding Department of Cumberland :

In addition to the expected assistance to you from Burnside, Hurlburt
and Sherman, fourteen or fifteen thousand men from here, will be in
Nashville, in about seven days. The government deems it very im-
portant that Chattanooga be held till reinforcements arrive.

H. W. HALLECK,

Commander-in- Ch ief.

Chattanooga, September 29, 1863.
Major-General Hallech, Washington, D. C. :

I would not advise the withdrawal of our forces from East Tennessee.
Kingston should be strongly garrisoned, the bulk of the troops concen-
trated for movement in any direction, the cavalry thrown this way to
co-oiDerate with vis. If forces from Mississippi and Potomac reach us
soon, and with the expected strength, it will be sufficient for our success.
It is now too late for Burnside to do more than protect our flank, but his
forces should be held in readiness to help us in case of emergency. Do

not hear from Grant's troops.

W. S. EOSECRANS,

Major- General.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,

Chattanooga, October 15, 1863 — 1 p. m.

Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. :

It is of prime necessity that we should have an efficient and able chief

of cavah-y, and that every possible exertion should be made to swell our

anounted force. I fear that the rebel cavalry force has crossed the river

TPest of us, but without serious damage. We must have mounted force

to keep it in check, or it will paralyze this army and compel it to retire

from its position.

W. S. EOSECRANS.

Headquarters Department of the Cujujerland,
Chattanooga, October 16, 1863 — 5.30 p. m.
Major-General Hallech, Washington, D. C :

Evidence increases that the enemy intend a desperate effort to destroy
this army. They are bringing up troops to our front. They have pre-
pared pontoons, and will probably operate on our left flank, either to
cross the river and force us to quit this place and fight them, or lose our
communications. They will thus separate us from Burnside. We can
not feed Hooker's troops on our left, nor can we spare them from our
right depots and communications, nor has he transportation. The rains
have raised the river and interrupted our pontoon bridge; the roads
are very heavy. Our future is not bright. Had we the railroad from
here to Bridgeport, the whole of Sherman's and Hooker's troops brought

SIEGE OF CHATTAXOOGA. 403

lip, we should not probaljl,y outnumber tlie enemy. This army, with its
back to barren m.ountain.s, roads narrow and difficult, while the enemy has
the railroad and the corn in the rear, is at much disadvantage. To secure
this position, at least McMinnville should be made a strong fortified depot,
Kingston the same; and for ulterior operations, twenty or thirty thousand
more troops put into Tennessee, at easy points to cover the railroad, and
subsist until called to the front for advance on the enemy. Additional
cavalry force is indispensable to a good future for this army. Burnside
must be within supporting distance of us, if we lose this point, his hold
on East Tennessee is gone; if we hold it, the rebs can not make much
use of the country above, and we shall dispossess them.

W. S. EOSECEANS,

Major-General.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Chattanooga, Tenn., October 19, 1863.

The general commanding announces to the officers and soldiers of the
Army of the Cumberland, that he leaves them, under orders from the
President.

]\Iajor-General George H. Thomas, in compliance with orders, will as-
sume the command of this army and department. The chiefs of all the
staff departments will report to him.

In taking leave of you, his brothers in arms — officers and soldiers — he
congratulates you that your new commander comes not to j^ou as he did,
a stranger. General Thomas has been identified with this army from its
first organization. He has led you often in battle. To his known
prudence, dauntless courage, and true patriotism, you may look with
confidence, that, vmder God, he will lead you to victory.

The general commanding doubts not you will be as true to yourselves
and your country in the future as you have been in the past.

To the division and brigade commanders, he tenders his cordial thanks
for their valuable and hearty co-operation in all that he has undertaken.
To the chiefs of the staff departments, and their subordinates, whom he
leaves behind, he owes a debt of gratitude for their fidelity and untiring
devotion to duty.

Companions in arms — officers and soldiers — farewell; and may God
bless you !

W. S. EOSECEANS,

Major-Gcnerul.

Headquarters Department op the Cumberlaxo,
October 19, 1863—11 p. m.
Major-General Hooker, Stevenson:

Major-General G. H. Thomas directs me to state that in obedience to
tlie orders of the President of the United States, he has assumed com-
mand of the Department of the Cumberland. He desires that you will

404 SIEGE OF CHATTATs^OOGA.

use all possible dispatch in concentrating your command and preparing

to move, in accordance with the instructions of General Eosecrans,

leaving proper railroad guards.

J. J. REYNOLDS,

Major-General and Chief of Staff.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Chattanooga, Tenn., October 20, 1863.
In obedience to the orders of the President of the United States, the
undersigned hereby assumes command of the Department and Army of
the Cumberland.

In assuming the control of this army, so long and ably commanded by
Major-General Rosecrans, the undersigned confidently relies upon the
hearty co-operation of every officer and soldier of the Army of the Cum-
berland to enable him to perform the arduous duties devolved upon him.
The officers on duty at the various departments of the staff at these
headquarters will continue in their respective places.

All orders heretofore published for the government of this army will
remain in force until further orders.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

Major General U. S. Vols.

Headquarter? Department of the Cumbeklaxd,
Chattanooga, October 24, 1863.— 2.30 p. m.
Major-General Hooker, Stevenson :

You will leave General Slocum, with one division of the Twelfth Corps,
to guard the railroad from Murfreesboro to Bridgeport. The Eleventh
Corps and one division of the Twelfth will be concentrated at or in the
vicinity of Bridgeport, preparatory to crossing the Tennessee river and
moving up the south side to take possession of Rankin's ferry, between
Shellmound and Running Water Creek. Look well to your right flank,
which may be approached via Island Creek, the Moore road, McDaniel's
Gap road, and the Nickajack road.

Two brigades, under General Palmer, leave here this p. m. fos' Rankin's
ferry, which point they will probably reach on Monday evening. It is
reported that the steamboat at Bridgeport will be completed by Monday
evening. The railroad may also be available. If you can do so, it is
better not to move wagons to the south side of the river at present.
You will, however, exercise your judgment on this point. Report by
telegraph when you are ready. We will co-operate at Brown's ferry, as
well as Rankin's ferry. Inform yourself with regard to the roads from
Rankin's ferry, via Whiteside's, to Brown's ferry. The object of the move-
ment is to hold the road and gain possession of the river as far as
Brown's ferry.

By command of Major-General Thomas.

J. J. REYNOLDS,

Major-General and Chief of Staff.

CHAPTER XXTI.

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

The Confederate leaders and the army commander were san-
guine of the success of the siege of Chattanooga up to the very
moment of its faikire. General Bragg had, for a time, just
ground for sanguine expectations, as the elements were his
allies. At the time of greatest promise, the oracular Confed-
erate President appeared on Lookout Mountain, and from
" Pulpit Rock," as he looked down exultingly upon the be-
leaguered army, predicted its total ruin. But the loss of
Lookout valley, the river, and the direct roads to Bridgeport
virtually threw Bragg upon the defensive. It is true that he
maintained his lines on Lookout Mountain and Missionary
Bidge, and through the intervening valley, in semblance of be-
sieging effort, until the army with which he had so often bat-
tled, leaped from its intrenchments and hurled him and his
oft-defeated army from their lofty battlements. But he made
no movement of actual offense against Chattanooga during the
time the Army of the Cumberland was preparing to assume
the boldest aggression.

For four weeks Chattanooga was the scene of the most com-
prehensive activities. In the rebound from the constraint of
investing lines, the menace of starvation, and the foreshadows
of direct disaster, the Army of the Cumberland displayed new
vigor and spirit, while the resources of the military division
were made tributary to the concentration of forces to operate
offensively. All the troops of the Army of the Cumberland
that could be spared from the rear, especially cavaliy and ar-
tillery, were ordered forward, and General Sherman, long be-
fore ordered to Chattanooga, but delayed hitherto by repairing

(405j

406. BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

roads, was directed to move the Fifteenth Corps as rapidly as
possible, paying no further attention to the roads than the
swift movement of his troops required. General W. F. Smith,
chief engineer, and General J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery,
of the Army of the Cumberland, were charged with preparing
the fortifications for heavier guns than those with the army,
and the latter was empowered to send for as many guns of
heavy caliber and such ammunition as should be needed. To
facilitate the movements of troops, General Smith was directed
to construct pontoons for two additional bridges. The coming
of troops, supplies, and munitions, and the din of preparation
for a battle, known to be imminent, would have made Chat-
tanooga historic, without the clash of arms which soon electri-
fied the continent, or the previous battle involved in. gaining
possession.

Battle-fields become a part of history equally with the story
of the conflicts enacted upon them. They are mapped on stone
and steel, and delineated in pen pictures, appear in historic nar-
ration in intimate association with the deeds of heroes. Not
alone do the topographical features which suggest plans of
battle aud dominate tactical combinations become historic, but
those also of mere grandeur and beauty, whenever the hosts of
war commingle in deadly strife, where nature has been lavish
of her gifts. Even the name of him who may perchance ofier
his humble cot for the fire of war to burn, or its enginery to
level, has association on the historic page with him who com-
mands an army. And in all that is grandly concomitant with
grandest battle, Chattauooga is pre-eminent.

The town is surrounded with almost all the types of the
grand and beautiful in nature. Mountains far and near, rising
from water and plain, sharply defined by low valleys and the
river curving at their feet ; subordinate hills with rounded sum-
mits and .undulating slopes, and broad plains delicately pen-
cilled here and there by winding creeks and rivulets, are the
prominent features of nature's amphitheater, in the center of
which is Chattanooga.

Looking to the southwest, Lookout Mountain,* with bold

*This mountain vises two thousand eight hundred feet above the ocean,,
and one thousand four hundred and sixty-four above the Tennessee river.

BATTLES NEAR CIIATTAXOOGA. 407

front and craggy crest, is seen rising abruptly from the river
and the valleys on either side ; to the west Raccoon Mountain
appears, trending from its river front far to the southwest,
parallel with Lookout ; to the north, Waldron's E-idge forms
the sky line far to right and left ; to the east, Missionary
Ridge, with indented summit, more humbly takes position,
hiding the lofty ranges far beyond ; to the south, the east, and
to the northeast, stretches the plain where the armies were
marshaled for the assault of Bragg's army on Missionary
Ridge ; and to the southwest, twice across the river, lies the
valley from which Hooker crept slyly up the mountain steeps,
covered with trees and shrubs, standing and fallen, and with
huge fragments of stone, which during the ages have dropped
from the ledges overhanging the crest, to give battle on a field
suited to the stealthy belligerence of the Indian, but adverse
in every phase to the repetition of all the precedents of mod-
ern warfare. Rut this battle-field defies description, and he
who would fully appreciate either battle or field, must read
the story of the one as he looks down from Lookout Moun-
tain upon the magnificence of the other.*

* Historians have made effort to transmit to the future the signifi-
cance of the names which distinguish the natural features around Chat-
tanooga. It is no pleasant task to leave groundless the many pretty
conceits which have so long passed for facts; but he who would write
the truth, must not hesitate to dissipate a myth or disclose a false hypoth-
esis. With only occasional allusion to the various interpretations of
Cherokee names, which have so long been accepted as true, their actual
meaning, as derived from John Ross, the celebrated Cherokee chief, and
from Lewis Ross, his brother, are here given.

"Chattanooga," originally was thename of asmall Indian hamlet, situated
near the base of Lookout Mountain, on the bank of Chattanooga creek.
It means, in the Cherokee language, " to draw fish out of water," and
hence was applied to the collection of huts, which were occupied by In-
dian fishermen. The humble hamlet disappeared, and its name, at first
suggestive and appropriate, was inherited by the town of the white man,
with meaningless application. A somewhat similar name was applied by
the Cherokees to the clifl:s, rising boldly from the river above the town,
which was derived from "Clanoowah," the name of a warlike but dimin-
utive hawk, which was supposed to embody the spirit of the tribe. These
cliffs were the favorite nesting-place of the bird, and hence a name was
given which expressed this fact, and which, perhaps, has suggested the
myth, that "Chattanooga" means " eagle,s nest."

408 BATTLES NEAR CHATTA?fOOGA.

By a strange misapprehension of the situation, after the
coming of Hooker, and the establishment of rehable and ade-
quate lines of supply. General Bragg detached Longstreet's
corps, and sent it to East Tennessee to overwhelm Burnside,
and regain what had there been lost, with the ulterior object
of returning to strike a heavy blow upon Grant's left flank.
It is believed that this movement originated with the Confed-
erate President, during his visit of exultation and prophecy.
But by whomever suggested or ordered, it was a palpable
blunder. If made upon the supposition that Bragg would yet
be strong enough to maintain the siege of Chattanooga, it
rested upon a conjecture, without warrant from any approxi-
mately just apprehension of the posture of aifairs at Chatta-
nooga ; if upon the supposition that his investing lines would
not soon be changed to defensive use, the reason for the
movement was equally remote from the truth. The Confed-
erate commander could not have been ignorant of the fact
that Longstreet fought a reinforcing column in Lookout
valley, and he ought to have known, that as he had drawn

The Cherokee name for Lookout Mountain did not mean an outlook,
but " to look at," and embodied some Indian's fancy, that this mountain
was looking at Raccoon Mountain, across the intervening valley. Its
present name, however, is infinitely more appropriate ; for as an outlook,
it is unrivaled, seven states being in view.

Missionary Ridge was called by the Indians, Missionaries' Ridge, from
the fact that the missionaries, in passing from their station, at the present
site of the "Mission Mills," to Chattanooga, the landing-place for their
supplies, crossed it. It was theirs, because they used it.

Taylor's Ridge, near Ringgold, Georgia, made classic for another moun-
tain fight of Hooker's, was so named because Richard Taylor, the second
chief of the tribe, during the latter portion of his life, used this ridge in
the same way. By a modification of this conception of the relation of
persons to places, the Cherokees gave a name to one of their mission-
aries, Avho, on preaching tours, frequently crossed the mountains, a name
which signified " the one who crosses the mountains."

Will's Valley was named for William Webber, who lived in it, and
whose common name was " Will." Webber's Falls, in the Arkansas
river, above Fort Smith, derived its name from this man, who, after the
removal of the Cherokees to the West, settled at the falls.

Brown's ferry bears the English name of a prominent Cherokee.

The meaning of " Chickamauga " was not known to the Cherokees, and
was supposed by them to be a word from the Chickasaw language.

BATTLES XEAR CPIATTAXOOGA. 409

troops from Mississippi to figlit the battle of Chickamauga,
the victorious army at Vicksburg coukl be easily transferred
to Chattanooga. And ^'et, in the face of possibilities and
probabilities that would have deterred a prudent commander
from the first diminution of his strength, other portions of
his army were subsequently started to Longstreet's support.

As soon as it had been ascertained with certainty that
Longstreet's corps had been detached, General Grant became
€ager to attack the enemy on Missionary Ridge, to compel
him to retain his remaining forces, and recall those that he
had detached, as he feared for Burnside, and could help
him only indirectly, if at all. Accordingly, on the 7th of
November, he instructed General Thomas to attack aud carry
the north end of Missionary Ridge on the following morning.
And having carried this point, to threaten and attack, if pos-
sible, the enemy's communications between Cleveland and
Dalton. To render the movement possible, he ordered that
mules should be detached from the wagons, the horses from
the ambulances, and private horses of officers should be taken,
if necessary, to move the artillery.

General Thomas and General Smith agreed in the opinion,
that the army was not in condition for battle, unless in defense.
And after a thorough reconnoissance of the ground, and a
full consideration of the condition and paucity of the ani-
mals, and the inadequacy of his forces, General Grant decided
that the movement was " utterly impracticable until Sherman
€Ould get up." * But the considerations which induced the
general commanding to order it, in the first place, found ex-
pression tlirough the activity of the army in preparation for
the operations which were to drive Bragg from his position
before Chattanooga, and open the way for support to Burn-
side.

Having revoked his order for an immediate movement
against the enemy. General Grant busied himself with the
formation of a plan of operations for his combined armies,
and urged General Burnside to maintain his position at Knox-
ville, until a battle could be fought and a column moved to

* Statement in his report.

410 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

his assistance. His plau proposed primary movements by
Hooker and Sherman — the former against Bragg's left, on
Lookout Mountain, and the latter against his right on the
northern extremity of Missionary Ridge.

General Sherman reached Bridgeport with his leading di-
visions on the 15th, and hastened to Chattanooga to confer
with General Grant. After his arrival, Generals Grant,
Thomas, Sherman, and Smith made a thorough reconnois-
sance of the region north of the river, which disclosed the
fact that there were good roads from Brown's ferry to the
mouth of the ISTorth Chickamauga, north of the first range of
hills, which Sherman could use, with good prospect of con-
cealing his movement to the place designated for his crossings
to reach the right flank of the enemy. His troops would be
in ]3lain view of the enemy at the ferry, but their subsequent
concealment by the hills, would leave him in doubt as to
their destination, whether to Ivnoxville, or to some point on
the north side of the river, to participate in operations at
Chattanooga. It was observed, also, that the north end of
Missionary Ridge was imperfectly guarded, and that the bank
of the river, from the mouth of the ISTorth Chickamauga to
his main line, was watched only by a small picket of cavalry.
These facts determined General Grant's plan of operations,^
the first object of which "was to mass all the forces possible
at one given point, namely, Missionary Ridge, converging
toward the north end of it." This ruling object induced
a change of the first plan, so far as it contemplated Hooker's
attack upon Lookout Mountain, that Howard's corps might
give weight to the proposed assault upon the northern ex-
tremity of the ridge. This reconnoissance, made upon the
north bank of the river, and conducted in such way " as
not to excite suspicions on the part of the enemy," did not
develop the fact that Bragg's right flank, at least the ex-
tremity of his main line, did not rest upon the summit
farthest to the north, but was to rest in battle upon the third
one to the south, which was a much stronger position, sepa-

BATTLES NEAK CHATTANOOGA. 411

rated from the second by a deep depression — a circumstance
wliicli greatly modified the conduct of the battle.

Having formed his plan, General Grant announced it to his
army commanders on the 18th, and mentioned the 21st as the
time for its execution. It required that Sherman, with his
own troops, and one division of the Army of the Cumberland,
should effect a crossing of the Tennessee river, just below the
mouth of the South Chickamanga, on Saturday, JSTovember
21st, at daylight, his crossing to be protected by artillery on
the heights to the north, and after crossing the river, to carry
Missionary Ridge from its northern extremity to the railroad
tunnel. It contemplated that Thomas w^as to co-operate by
concentrating his troops on his left tlank in the valley, leaving
only the necessary force to hold the fortifications on the right
and center, and one division as a movable column, and after
Sherman had carried the ridge to the tunnel, and the conjunc-
tion of their forces had been effected, by advancing as nearly
simultaneously with him as possible, to sweep the enemy
from position. It proposed that Lookout valley should be
held by Hooker, with Geary's division and the brigades which
had been detached from the Fourth Corps to co-operate with
him in his advance from Bridgeport, and that Howard's
corps was to be held in readiness to act with either Thomas or
Sherman.

Upon its announcement, the army commanders and their
respective subordinates addressed themselves to the preliminary
movements. General Thomas at once directed General
Howard to take position between Brown's ferry and Chatta-
nooga, and the two brigades of the Fourth Corps, Whittaker's
and Grose's, recalled from position down the river to fill the
place of Howard's corps in the valley. He also designated
General Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps, Major-Gen-
eral J. M, Palmer commanding, as the support to General
Sherman, and ordered Colonel Long, with his brigade of cav-
alry, to first move on Sherman's left, and when no longer
needed, to cross Chickamauga Creek and make a raid upon
the enemj-'s communications. These movements were all
made before the 21st.

A heavy rain-storm, which commenced on the 20th and

412 BATTLES XEAR CHATTAXOOGA.

continued throngh the 21st, delayed General Sherman, and
necessitated the postponement of the battle till the 22d. On
the 22d, General Grant proposed further delay, as two of
Sherman's divisions had failed to cross the river at Brown's
ferry in consequence of the parting of the bridge. At this
juncture. General Thomas suggested that Howard's corps
should be sent, if needed, to take the place of the divisions
that were behind, and that the latter, with Hooker's troops,
could form a column to attack the enemy on Lookout Moun-
tain, or at least divert his attention from the movement against
his right tiank. He thus counseled against further delay, fear-
ing that the enemy should become advised of the plan of
operations, and greatl}^ desiring that Hooker should make the
movement which he proposed for him. These suggestions
were in part approved, though the engagement was postponed
as General Grant had proposed. On the 22d, Howard's
corps was moved over the river to Chattanooga, and posted
between Sheridan's and "Wood's divisions in the line to lead
the enemy to believe that Sherman's troops, whose passage of
the river at Brown's ferry was in plain view, were reinforcing
the town rather than moving up the river on the north bank.
During the 22d, rumors reached the national lines that the
more recent movements of the enemy's forces indicated their
withdrawal. Deserters reported that troops had been sent to
McLemore's Cove.* This fact, and the detachment of forces
to march to General Longstreet's support in East Tennessee,
X^roduced the impression in the Confederate army that a re-
treat was meditated by General Bragg. In view of the state-
ments of deserters and a formal notification from General
Bragg to remove all non-combatants from Chattanooga, sent
on the 20th, General Grant directed General Thomas to order
a reconnoissance in front of Chattanooga, that General Bragg
might not withdraw his army in quietness, if such was his
intent. Under the general direction to ascertain the truth or
falsity of the report of General Bragg's retreat, General
Thomas organized a movement, which in expression and un-

*This movement was induced by the appearance of General Ewing's
division of General Sherman's command, at Trenton, in Will's valley.

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 413

expected issue was a suitable prelude to the grand battle of
whicb it coustituted the initial aggression.

General Bragg could not have been ignorant of the vast
concentration of national forces at Chattanooga, and how
then he could have felt so secure in his position, or so free to
leave it, as to weaken his army to give support to General
Longstreet in aggression, or even to save him from destruction,
is unaccountable. His greatest weakness was in the length of
his lines, and there was extreme hazard in the attempt to hold
them with diminished forces. He had with him, after Gen-
eral Longstreet's departure, two corps of infantry, comprising
eight or nine divisions, holding, it is true, a position of great
strength ; but there were nevertheless such advantages to an
army of superior strength, having impregnable fortifications
and shorter lines, as should have deterred him from detaching
any of his remaining forces for any purpose. This, however,
he did, and some of his troops in motion toward General
Longstreet were recalled in time to participate in the battle.*
There is concurrent testimony from various Confederate
sources, to the fact that General Bragg expected General
Grant to detach forces to support General Burnside in East
Tennessee ; but yet, after he knew that none had been sent to
follow General Longstreet, he still dared to weaken his army
before Chattanooga.f

The enemy's first line of pickets rested a short distance east
of the "Western and Atlantic railroad, passing in front of the
hill which was crowned with Fort Wood, a fortification of
marked elevation and strength. Between this fort and tlie
railroad, the ground at first descends abruptly, but soon gently
and smoothly, and blending with the slopes of other hills,
forms a broad area, suited for the review of an army or its
formation for actual battle. Upon this space, about noon on
the 23d, several divisions formed in line of battle, in plain view
from all the commanding positions held by the enemy. The
order from General Thomas to General Granger required that

* Statement in General Grant's report.

J This fact is stated in the narrative of the " Richmond Dispatch," and
also in a letter, descriptive of the battle, written by a member of General
Hardee's staff.

414 BATTLES NEAR CHATTAXOOGA.

he should throw forward one division of his corps supported
by another, in the direction of Orchard Knob, " to discover the
position of the enemy, if he still remain in the vicinity of his
old camps." General Wood's division having been designated
to lead, first deployed before the fort. Then General Sheri-
dan's moved to the right and rear of General "Wood ; General
Howard's corps formed in mass in rear of these two divisions,
and General Baird's division took position on the right of
General Sheridan, refused in echelon. General Johnson's di-
vision was in arms in the intrenchments, in readiness to give
support whenever assistance might be needed. These move-
ments were regarded by the enemy as indicating the extension
of the national lines to obtain wood,* or as a mere pageant,
and he made no special preparation to resist them.

Orchard Knob, in the direction of which the movement was
ordered, is situated half-way from Chattanooga to Missionary
Ridge. It rises abruptly to a considerable elevation above the
plain. Between it and the lines of the national troops the
ground is low, and being at the time covered in part with
trees and bushes, Avas favorable for the concealment of de-
fenses and forces. Along the western base of Orchard Knob,
as also over its rocky summit, and for a half mile to the south-
west, the enemy had barricades of logs and stones. His line
of rifle-pits extended for more than a mile to the north, fol-
lowing the curvature of Citico creek, while across this little
stream there were two parallel lines stretching still farther
northward. In front of these, which were for the grand
guards, were insulated defenses for the picket reserves.

About 2 p. M., General Wood moved rapidly forward, with
Hazen's brigade on the right, Willich's on the left, and
Beatty's in reserve. This pageant, and yet more than a
j^^iageant, attracted the attention of both armies, and in its de-
velopments re^'ealed to each the nearness of a general battle.
If General Bragg had previously fancied that his position Was
so strong as to preclude attack, he now had cause to appre-
hend that the trial of its strength was at hand. And it was

* This supposition was mentioned by prisoners, and was stated in a terse
narrative of the battle in the " Richmond Dispatch."

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 415

soon evident to the national commanders tliat the enemy was
still in position, and that his withdrawal was improbable,
except when forced from plain, hill, and mountain.

General Wood's troops, in harmony with the grandeur of the
scenery, the pageant which heralded their advance, and the
inspiration which the consciousness of making the initial
movement of battle in view of contending armies is adapted
to create, pressed rapidly forward. His compact lines, marred
by no straggling to the rear, swept from position, first the
pickets and their reserves, and then moved, without halt or
slackened pace, to the attack of the strong line on the hill.
"VYillich meeting with less resistance than was anticipated in
the defense of so important a position, at once hurled the
enemy from the base and summit of Orchard Knob. Hazen
did not so soon carry a loAver hill to the right, as the troops
holding it fought in a manner better suited to the sur-
roundings and issues of the conflict. But though resisting
bravely, they were soon forced by the bayonet to yield posi-
tion, leaving for capture the Twenty-eighth Alabama regi-
ment and its flag. General "Wood lost one hundred and
twenty-five men killed and wounded — a fact which attests the
gallantry of the quick dash which secured an important posi-
tion, and gave the tj^pe of the grander assaults by which one
of the most dicisive victories of the war was gained.

As soon as General Wood had driven the enemy from
position. General Sheridan moved his division to the right of
General Wood, and refused it on a series of small hills trending
to the southwest. The hills occupied by Generals Wood
and Sheridan comprise nearly all the high ground between
Fort Wood and Missionary Ridge, and afl[:brded a good base
for operations against the enemy's main lines beyond. From
the summit of Orchard Knob, these lines, first and second,
were plainly visible running along the base and summit of
Missionary Ridge, as also the iDtervening ground over which
the national forces were to pass in the final assault.

At 4 p. M., General Wood was instructed by General Thomas
to hold and fortify the position which he had unexpectedly
gained, and was informed that General Howard's corps would
form on his left. In compliance with instructions, both Gen-

416 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

eral "Wood and General Sheridan threw up iutrenchments in
their front, and the former constructed an epauhnent for a
six-gun battery on Orchard Knob, in which Bridges' battery
was placed during the night. As soon as practicable, the
Eleventh Corps advanced to form on General Wood's left,
and met resistance from the double line of rifle-pits on the
north of Citico creek. As, while General Wood was advanc-
ing, General Howard had thrown forward Battery A, Fourth
Artillery, to cover his left flank, so now, in reciprocal assist-
ance, the former sent Colonel Manderson, with two regiments,
to strike in flank the force across the creek. Manderson's fire
soon relieved General Howard's right from pressure in front,
and the corps attained position.

Thus a most important advantage was gained by a mere
tentative movement to discover the position of the enemy —
an advantage upon which hinged the final decisive assault of
the battle. And not only did this advance on the 23d give
the central column a good position from which to assault on
the 25th, but it caused General Bragg to transfer Walker's
division. General Gist commanding, from Lookout Mountain,
to sustain his right against what seemed a most threatening
demonstration.

After Orchard Knob had been gained by the national troops,
and a long battle front had been formed, with that summit as
the center, General Bragg was compelled to elect between a
strong left flank on Lookout Mountain and the strengthening
of his right, which covered his depot of supplies across the
South Chickamauga, at the expense of his left. In removing
AYalker's division to the right flank, the Confederate com-
manders were not ignorant of the resulting contingencies, as
General Stevenson signaled from the summit of the moun-
tain, at 11 p. M., his conviction that if an attack was intended,
it would be upon that position. This action, then, on the 23d,
had most intimate relations to General Hooker's success, on
the front of Lookout Mountain, the next day.

During the 23d, another of General Sherman's divisions
crossed the river, at Brown's ferry, but the bridge again parted,
leaving Osterhaus' division, General Woods commanding, on
the left bank. As General Sherman had three divisions in

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 417

hand, General Grant decided not to delay operations any
longer. And as it was improbable that his Fourth could cross
in time to participate in his movement against the northern
extremity of ^Missionary liidge, General Thomas advised Gen-
eral Hooker that if it should fail to cross, he should endeavor
with it and his own troops, " to take the point of Lookout
Mountain." Later, he informed him that General Grant still
hoped that General Woods could cross ; but if he could not, in
time to join General Sherman, that the mountain should be
taken, if a demonstration should develop its practicability.
That General Sherman's division might not be prevented, if
it was possible for it to cross in time to join him. General
Hooker sent a staff officer to the river to ascertain the fact
that the bridge could not be joined. As soon as this officer
reported. General Hooker made dispositions for his movement,
to result either in demonstration or actual attack. Thus it
appears that another modification of General Grant's pre-
announced plan hinged upon the failure of one division to cross
the river, though the consequent movement resulted in turn-
ing Bragg's left flank.

At 4 A. M. General Hooker reported that he was ready to
advance against Lookout Mountain. His command, Geary's
division of the Twelfth Corps, Osterhaus' of the Fifteenth,
and two brigades of Craft's division of the Fourth, were all
strangers to each other, representing three corps, and allowing
Geary's division to go back to recent relations, three distinct
armies. But officers and men were true soldiers, and made
the acquaintance necessary for unity of action as quickly as
the combinations of the battle-field placed them side by side.

General Hooker sent Geary's division and Whittaker's bri-
gade of Craft's division to Wauhatchie, to cross Lookout
creek, and then to sweep down its right bank, to clear it of the
enemy and cover the crossing of the remaining forces. He
ordered Grose to seize the common road bridge just below the
railroad crossing and repair it, and directed Woods to move
np his division from Brown's ferry, under cover of the hills^
to the point designated for crossing the creek, and support the
batteries — one, Battery " K," First Ohio Artillery, on a high
27

418 BATTLES NEAE CHATTANOOGA.

Wll without trees, a little north of the stream, and the other,
Battery " K," First New York Artillery, on a hill to the rear
of the other. He also sent a portion of the Second Kentucky
cavalry up the valley to Trenton, to observe the enemy and
give warning of danger from that direction. The picket line
of the enemy was on the right bank of the creek ; the picket
reserves were in the valley beyond, and the main force of the
■enemy was encamped on the mountain side.

On the front of Lookout Mountain, intermediate between
base and summit, there is a wide open space, cultivated as a
farm, in vivid contrast with the natural surroundings of wild-
est types. The farm-house, known as Craven's or " the white
house," was situated upon the upper margin of the farm.
From the house to the foundation of the perpendicular cliff
or palisade, which crops out from the rock-ribbed frame of
the mountain, the ascent is exceedingly steep and thickly
wooded. Below the farm the surface is rough and craggy.
The base of the mountain, next the river, has a perpendicular
front of solid rock, rising grandl}^ from the railroad track,
which, though in part cut through the deep ledges, does not
perceptibly mar nature's magnificent architecture. Over the
top of this foundation front the narrow road passes, which, in
the western valley, throws oif various branches, leading west
and south. East and west from Craven's farm the surface is
broken by furrows and covered with shrubs, trees, and frag-
ments of stone. On the open space the enemy had constructed
his defenses, consisting of intrenchments, pits, and redoubts,
which, extending over the front of the mountain, bade defi-
ance to a foe advancing from the river. At the extremities of
the main intrenchments there were rifle-pits, epaulements for
batteries, barricades of stone and abatis, looking to resistance
against aggression from Chattanooga or Lookout Valley. The
road from Chattanooga to Summertown, an elegant village for
summer resort, winding up the eastern side of the mountain,
is the only one practicable for ordinary military movements
within a range of many miles. So that, except by this road,
there could be no transfer of troops from the summit to the
northern slope, or to the valley, east or west, to meet the emer-

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 419

gencies of battle, and this road was too long to allow provision
from the top for sudden contingencies below.

At 8 A. M. Geary crossed the creek, captured the pickets of
the enemy, and then crept up the mountain side until his right,
which was his front in the ascent, touched the base of the pal-
isaded summit. The fog which overhung the mountain top
.and upper steeps, and the dense woods, concealed the move-
ment. Then, with his right clinging to the palisades, he swept
round toward the mountain's front. Simultaneously with
Geary's first movement, Grose attacked the enemy at the
bridge, and having driven him back commenced its repair.
The noise of this conflict called the enemy's nearest forces
from their camps. They formed in front of their intrench-
ments and rifle-pits, and one detachment advanced to the rail-
road embankment, which formed a good parapet and admitted
a sweeping fire upon the national troops advancing from the
bridge. To avoid the loss of life inevitable in a direct advance,
General Hooker directed Osterhaus, now commanding his
division, to send a brigade to prepare a crossing a half mile
farther up the creek, under cover of the woods. A portion
of Grose's brigade having been left at the bridge to attract the
attention of the enemy, the remainder followed Woods' bri-
gade to assist in the construction of the bridge. In the mean-
time, additional artillery had been posted, which, with the bat-
teries first planted on the hills west of the creek, enfiladed all
the proximate positions of the enemy. A section of 20-pounder
Parrotts had also the range of the enemy's camp on the moun-
tain side ; and on Moccasin Point, Bran nan's guns were in
position to open a direct fire upon the front of the mountain.

At 11 A. M. Woods completed the bridge, and soon after,
Geary's division and Whittaker's brigade, in line, sweeping the
mountain from base to palisade, came abreast. The batteries
then opened fire, and Woods and Grose crossed the creek and
aligned their troops on Geary's left as it swept down the valley.
The troops of the enemy, in the first positions, that escaped
the artillery fire, ran into the infantry lines, so that quick over-
throw occurred to all the troops that had taken position in the
valley and near the western base of the mountain. Many were

420 BATTLES NEAE CHATTANOOGA.

killed, more were wounded, and the remainder were captured^
and then the line moved onward toward the mountain's front. -

The booming of the heavy guns with interludes of light ar-
tillery and musketry fire, announced to friend and foe in the
distant lines that an action was in progress where battle had
not been expected. Quietness reigning throughout the other
hills and valleys compassed by the long lines of the contending
armies, the contest on the mountain side, revealed by its noise,
but as yet hidden from sight, commanded the profoundest at-
tention and interest of far more than one hundred thousand
men. Those not held by duty or the constraint of orders, in
crowTls sought the elevated outlooks, and with glasses and
strained vision, turned their gaze to the woods, fog, and battle-
smoke, which concealed the anomalous contest. As the in-
creasing roar of musketry indicated the sweep of the battle to
the east, the anxiety for its revelation on the open ground be-
came intense. Soon through the clefts of the fog could be seen
the routed enemy in rapid motion, followed by Hooker's line,
with its right under the palisade and its continuity lost to view
far down the mountain. Whittaker held the right, under the
clifls, and below were the brigades of Cobham, Ireland, and
Creighton ; and this line hurled the enemy from position after
position, climbing over crags and bowlders for attack and pur-
suit, and reached at noon the point where orders required a
halt for the readjustment of lines and a more cautious approach
toward the Summertown road. But as on the following day,
in the assault made by other portions of the Army of the Cum-
berland, the restraint of orders did not arrest the pursuit of
the flying foe, so now these victorious troops swept on. With
a plunging fire from above and behind they rolled up the ene-
my's line, and lifting it from its intrenchments made no halt
until the middle of the open ground was gained. Here the
enemy met reinforcements and made a more determined stand.
Soon, however, Grose's brigade of Craft's division, and Oster-
haus' command, having gathered up the captured on the
lower ground, closed on the left, and then the enemy was driven
from all his defenses on the open ground, and with broken
ranks retreated down the eastern descent of the mountain.

The heavy Parrotts and the Tenth and Eighteenth Ohio bat-

BATTLES Ts^EAR CHATTATs^OOGA. 421

teries, under Captain !N"ajlor, on Moccasin Point, rendered im-
portant aid to the assaulting forces, by preventing the concen-
tration of the enemy's troops. But the potent cause of the
victory was the fact that brave men reached the flank and rear
of the enemy's defenses.

The heavy fighting ceased at 2 p. m. General Hooker's troops
had exhausted their ammunition and it could not be supplied
in the ordinary way, as no trains could reach them. Besides
this want of ammunition, as a bar to further fighting, the fog
which had overhung the mountain during the day, settled down
densely over the enemy. But for these obstacles, and the fact
that the enemy could now concentrate heavily to prevent the
insulation of his troops on the mountain top, an effort would
have been made to seize the Summertown road. Hooker, there-
fore, waited for ammunition and reinforcements. At 5 p. M.
Oarlin's brigade of the First division of the Fourteenth Corps
crossed Chattanooga creek, near its mouth, and ascended the
mountain to Hooker's right. The troops of this brigade car-
ried on their persons ammunition for Hooker's skirmishers, in
addition to the ordinary supply for themselves. Severe skir-
mishing was then maintained until nearly midnight.

As General Sherman's movement had been regarded as the
leading one compassed by the general plan of operations, the
engineer department, under the management of General W.
F. Smith, had been pressed to the utmost activity to provide
means for crossing his army to the south bank of the Ten-
nessee. Lieutenant Dressen had collected all tlie pontoons
"between Brown's ferry and Bridgeport, and Captain P. V.
Fox had been engaged in preparing boats for a new bridge.
The river at the point selected for crossing, at the time of
measurement, was thirteen hundred feet wide, and two bridges
were proposed, and one also at the mouth of the South Chicka-
mauga, one hundred and eighty feet in length. As it was
expected that the enemy would contest the passage of the
river if aware of the purpose to eifect it, every precaution had
been used to keep the projected bridges a profound secret.
The pontoons had been hauled on by-roads to the Korth
Chickamauga creek, eight miles above Chattanooga, and
were there launched and concealed in readiness to be floated

422 BATTLES NEAR CHATTAXOOGA.

down to the place of crossing. The citizens in the vicinity
had been put under guard to prevent them from giving infor-
mation to the enemy. As Saturday, the 21st, had been desig-
nated for Sherman's attack, the boats and a brigade to man
them were in readiness on the night of the 20th. Subse-
quently, the causes which delayed Sherman for a time threat-
ened failure to the bridges, as the high water and driftwood
which parted the bridges at Chattanooga and Brow^n's ferry,
created the apprehension that the bridges could not be
thrown, and that if thrown, they could not be maintained as
long as needed.

But when General Sherman was ready to cross, a bridge
was promptly thrown. At midnight on the 23d, one hundred
and sixteen boats, with a brigade, left the N^orth Chickamauga
and floated quietly to the place of crossing. They were landed
on the enemy's side of the river, at points above and below
the mouth of the South Chickamauga, and were first used to
transport troops from the opposite shore. By daylight two
divisions were over, and the throwing of a bridge and the
construction of a bridge-head were under vigorous prosecu-
tion. According to previous arrangements. General J. H.
"Wilson took the steamer Dunbar from Chattanooga to aid in
the transportation of troops. This steamer's help was the
more essential, as in consequence of the greater breadth of the
river from high water, but one bridge could be thrown. Just
as the last boat was connected. General Howard, with Busch-
beck's brigade of Steinwehr's division and a small cavalry
escort, reached the position. His unresisted advance from
Chattanooga developed the fact that the enemy had yielded
the river and the greater portion of the valley between the
river and Missionary Ridge. At General Sherman's request,.
General Howard loft his brigade to skirmish on the right
flank of his line in its advance, and returned to Chattanooga
with his escort.

The bridge was finished at 11 a. m., and at 1 p. m. General
Sherman moved forward with three divisions in echelon, the
several heads of column being covered with skirmishers and
supporting forces. Meeting with no serious resistance, the
advancing columns soon passed the foot hills, and at 4 p. m.

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 423

occupied the two northernmost summits of Missionary Ridge,
Artillery was used on the right of the line late in the after-
noon, but beyond this and slight skirmishing, the lodgment
near the right flank of the enemy involved no action. There
was now one summit between General Sherman and the tun-
nel. Had he gained this, his distinct part of the battle, as first
planned, would have been performed. General Grant had ex-
pected that he would be able to carry the ridge to about the
tunnel before the enemy could concentrate against him, but
the intervening hill was the one upon which Bragg's right
flank rested.

The crest of Missionary Ridge is divided into distinct sum-
mits throughout its whole length by numerous depressions.
The deepest of these, between the Tennessee river and Ross-
ville, separates the second summit, which General Sherman
had gained from the third, which was the strongest position
for lateral defense within Bragg's lines. Here Cleburne's
famous division was placed. The top of the hill was broad
enough for a strong force, and yet sufficiently narrow to per-
mit the formation of strong lines. Heavy barricades, or rather
fortifications, constructed of logs and earth, covered the troops
on the first defensive line, while the higher ground to the
south gave room for successive supporting columns.* A
somewhat thickly planted forest gave additional protection to
the enemy. It was the strength of this position rather than
ignorance of the strength of the combination against his right
flank that induced General Bragg to yield the first two hills
to General Sherman. Their abandonment shortened his line,
wdiile the depression on his right, and the slopes east and west,
placed his enemy under his guns on every practicable line of
attack.

At night. General Grant announced to General Thomas that
General Sherman had carried the ridge to the tunnel, and
advised him that General Sherman had been instructed to
advance at daylight the next morning, and that his own at-
tack should be simultaneous and co-operative, either to carry

* Subsequently, Cleburne's position became the salient of the line of the
right wing, when troops were thrown to the rear to confront Genei'al
Sherman's left, which rested on the Chickamauga.

424 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

tlie rifle-pits and ridge in his front, or move to the left, as the
presence of the enemy might require. He also gave directions
with regard to General Hooker's action, requiring that if his
position on the mountain could be maintained with a small
force, and the ascent to the summit should be impracticable
from it, that he should move up the valley- and ascend by the
first practicable road.

After receiving these instructions. General Thomas, in a
formal order, congratulated General Hooker and his troops
upon their glorious victory, and thanked them for their valor-
ous conduct. He then directed General Hooker to be in read-
iness to advance into Chattanooga valley, hold the Summer-
town road, and co-operate with the Fourteenth Corps by
supporting its right, informing him that General Grant had
ordered General Sherman to move along Missionar^^ Ridge in
the morning with the Army of the Cumberland co-operating.

Before daylight the next morning, anticipating the with-
drawal of the enemy from the summit of Lookout Mountain,
General Hooker dispatched several parties to scale the pal-
isades. Some daring soldiers from the Eighth Kentucky were
the first reach the top and unfurl the national banner. When
the morning light first kissed its waving folds, the whole army
apprehended the completeness of the victory which had been
won the day before. And as cheer responsive to cheer pro-
longed the expression of joy and exultation, there was a par-
tial utterance of the inspiration, which, at the setting of the
sun, found historic revelation through an assault most glori-
rious in conception, execution, and issue.

The evacuation of the mountain top did not give full proof
that the enemy had left Hooker's front, and the low-lying
mist during the early hours of the day prevented the measures
necessary to develop the situation. The fog lifted between 9
and 10 A. M., and the retreat of the enemy was then apparent.
His left flank had been turned, and the forces which had held
the mountain fortress and the valley to the east had been
transferred to Missionary Ridge. General Bragg's defensive
line was now only half its original length, and he no doubt
still entertained the hope of successful resistance, at least such

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 425

SiS would afford Inm tlie safe withdrawal of Lis army. One*
of his subordinates, at least, advised him to retreat without-
further battle ; but the necessity or practicability of this step
was not obvious to him, and he made preparations to maintain
his position upon Missionary Ridge.

General Bragg now had his entire army on Missionary
Ridge. Cleburne's and Gist's divisions were on the extreme
right opposed to General Sherman ; his left was held by Stew-
art's division ; his center, by Breckinridge's old division, and
portions of the commands of Buckner and Hindman, under
General Anderson ; and the divisions of Cheatham and Ste-
venson, fresh from defeat on Lookout Mountain, were in motion
toward the right. The two parts of his army before Generals
Sherman and Thomas, were commanded respectively by Gen-
erals Hardee and Breckinridge.

It Avas evident early in the morning that General Grant
had misapprehended the degree of General Sherman's success
the evening previous. The ridge had not been carried to the
tunnel, and hence the condition precedent to the co-operation
of Thomas and Sherman in a general attack was yet wanting.
And as the battle had been delayed to enable General Sher-
man to get into position on the northern extremity of Mis-
sionary Ridge, so now the co-operative movement was deferred
that he might carry the one summit between him and the tunnel.
General Thomas' troops were therefore restrained from action
until late in the day, except in the movement of General
Hooker's column toward the enemy's left flank, and the trans-
fer of three divisions to General Sherman.

General Sherman opened the battle of the 25th, in an inde-
pendent movement, soon after sunrise, by the advance of
Corse's brigade from his right center.

General Corse moved down the southern slope of the second
hill gained the night before, and under a destructive fire as-

* General Hardee's " staff officer " asserted, in his letter, that his chief
advised the withdrawal of the army after the loss of Lookout Mountain,
and in the account of the battle in the Richmond Dispatch, it is stated
that General Bi-agg gave orders for this movement, and afterward decided
that he had not time to make it, and then massed his forces on Mission-
ary Ridge.

426 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

cended toward Cleburne's fortified j^osition. He gained a
lateral elevation, about eighty yards distant from the enemy's
defenses, and held it firml3\ Advancing repeatedly from this
position, he was as often driven back, and in turn repulsed
every attack of the enemy. Back and forward, in the alter-
nations of offense and defense, the struggle was long continued
without decisive advantage to either side. In the meantime,
General Morgan L. Smith's division advanced along the east-
ern base of the hill, and Loomis' brigade, supporting Corse
on the left, was sustained by the two reserve brigades of Gen-
eral John E. Smith's division, Morgan L. Smith pressed his
attack to the enemy's works, but gained no permanent lodg-
ment.

The character and issue of this contest was -observed by
General Grant from Orchard Knob, and at 10 a. m. he directed
Howard's corps, in position on the left of General Thomas'
line, to General Sherman's support. This corps, upon arrival,
was formed on the left of Sherman's line, with its own left on
Chickamauga creek, in room of troops that had previously
been sent to the right, to support the attacking column.
General Sherman then had six divisions — three of his own
under General F. P. Blair, Steinwehr's, and Schurz's of
Howard's corps (the Eleventh), and Davis' division of the
Fourteenth Corps.

Pending General Sherman's first series of attacks, there had
been some activity on the right flank of the national army.
Early in the morning. General Thomas had directed General
Hooker to move with the force that he had led from Lookout
valley, except two regiments to hold the mountain, on the
road to Rossville. Later, he had ordered him to advance
upon the enemy's works, in conjunction with Palmer's corps —
the Fourteenth, using General Sheridan, on the right of the
Fourth Corps, as a pivot. General Hooker advanced to Chat-
tanooga creek rapidly, but was there delayed to restore a
bridge which the enemy had destroyed in his flight from the
mountain.

It was evident from the issue of the first conflict on the left
of the national line, and from the importance of the position,
that General Bragg would maintain his right flank if possible.

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 427

General Sliermaii was threatening not only to turn that flank,,
but was also menacing his rear and his depot of supplies at
Chickamauga Station. Wlien General Grant gave open empha-
sis to his determination to turn his right flank, by sending Gen-
eral Howard's corps to General Sherman, General Bragg sent
his floating divisions, Cheatham's and Stevenson's, to General
Hardee, Thus, both commanding generals massed heavily in
the vicinity of the tunnel — General Grant, to give weight to his
ruling attack, and General Bragg, to maintain liis right against
the vast concentration to turn it, deeming his left and center fully
secured by the left half of his army. Between the two wings
of the Confederate army there was now a chasm, correspond-
ing to the interval separating the columns under Generals
Sherman and Thomas.

Soon after General Howard had attained position. General
Sherman renewed his efibrt to turn the enemy's right flank.
Corse's* and Buschbeck's brigades again pressed forward, and
when the right of their line became exposed, the brigades of
John E. Smith advanced in support. The extreme right of
the line thus extended, reached well toward the depression
or gorge in the western slope, through which the railroad
passes to the tunnel. In this gorge, in complete concealment,
General Hardee massed a heavy force, and then throwing it
upon Smith's brigades drove them in disorder down the hill.
This success, however, was only temporary, as this assaulting
force was in turn taken in flank by Corse's and Loomis'
brigades, and then there was a return to the previous status :
Corse's brigade holding the latteral hillock first gained in the
morning, with Loomis and Buschbeck in support.

When General Grant perceived that the troops that had ad-
vanced almost to the enemy's defenses near the tunnel, had
been driven down the slope, true to his purpose of massing
forces against the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge, he
ordered Baird's division from line on the right of Johnson's
to move to General Sherman's support. This order gave Gen-
eral Sherman seven of the thirteen divisions before the enemy.

* General Corse having been wounded, Colonel Walcutt assumed com-
mand of the brigade.

428 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

Wlien Baird moved to the left, General Thomas had eight
brigades in line between Chattanooga and the ridge, and
General Hooker had seven as far removed on his right as
was General Sherman on his left. At noon, when General
Grant ordered Baird's division to General Sherman, it could
not have been his intention to make an independent move-
ment from his center, since to give overwhelming strength
to the turning column on his left, he had detached nearly
half of the central forces which were under General Thomas
in person. The strength of his left under General Sherman,
compared to that of his center under General Thomas was
then as seven divisions to eight brigades.

General Baird moved as ordered, following the road on the
bank of the river until he had reached the rear of General
Sherman's right. He was then informed by the latter that he
did not need him, and he then returned to the center and
formed his division on the left of Wood. He was ordered to
this position to lessen the interval between General Thomas'
left and General Sherman's right. His division was in line at
2h p. M.*

In the meantime, General Hooker had attained position on
the enemy's left flank. As soon as the stringers of the bridge
across Chattanooga creek were in position. General Osterhaus
threw over the Twenty-seventh Missouri, and soon his entire
division, which was followed by the remaining forces. The
leading regiment was deployed to skirmish and cover the rapid
advance toward Rossville. General Hooker directed the Mis-
Bourians to engage the enemy briskly as soon as he should be
met, and when the skirmishing became spirited, he ordered
General Osterhaus to move "Woods' brigade to the right and
Williamson's to the left. Finding his flanks thus endangered
the enemy retreated beyond Rossville. General Hooker then
disposed his troops to sweep Missionary Ridge toward the
north. He directed General Osterhaus to cross to the east
side, General Cruft to advance on the summit, and General
Geary on the western slope and edge of the valley. While
General Hooker was forming to advance and turn the enemy's

* Statements in General Baird's official report.

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 429

left flank, other movements were ordered which broke his
center and routed his army.

Soon after Baird's return, General Grant ordered an advance
from the center. His order expressed the third radical de-
parture from his pre-aunounced j)lan. In it, no movement
against the enemy by the central forces in independent action
had been prescribed, and yet one had already been success-
fully made. And now, though the instructions for this day re-
quired that General Thomas should move in co-operation with
General Sherman, an independent assault was ordered. Gen-
eral Grant had waited for Sherman's success in turning the
enemy's right flank since early morning; during the afternoon
he had expected General Hooker to move against his left.
The day was now nearly gone, and some new measure was
necessary, or the sun would set with General Bragg in posses-
sion of Missionary Ridge. Four insulated divisions were in
line in front of General Bragg's center, now held by less than
four divisions, as a portion of Stuart's, on the extreme left,
under the personal direction of General Breckinridge, had
been directed against General Hooker. Wood's and Sheri-
dan's divisions were in the position attained on the 23d,
Johnson's was on the right of Sheridan, and Baird on the left
of Wood. These divisions were formed by brigades, from
right to left, in the following order: Carlin's and Stoughton's
of Johnson's; Sherman's, Harker's, and Wagner's of Sheri-
dan's ; Hazen's, Willich's, and Beatty's of Wood's , and Tur-
chin's, Yanderveer's, and Phelps' of Baird's. Two lines of
skirmishers covered the battle front, and such troops as were
designated as reserves were massed in rear of their respective
organizations.

Between 3 and 4 p. m. six successive cannon shots from the
battery on Orchard Knob gave the signal for the advance.
General Grant's order required that the enemy should be dis-
lodged from the rifle-pits and intrenchments at the base of
Missionary Eidge. The statement is made in his official re-
port that it was his design that the lines should be readjusted
at the base for the assault of the summit ; but no such instruc-
tions were given to corps or division generals. Neither does
it appear from his report whether he meditated an independent

430 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

assault of the summit from his center, or one co-operative
with Sherman on the left, or Hooker on the right, as the orig-
inal plan prescribed for the former or as the issues of the day
suggested for the latter.

As soon as the magnificent lines moved forward, the bat-
teries of the enemy on the ridge opened upon them with great
activity. General Brannan's large guns in Fort "Wood, Fort
Cheatham, Battery Rousseau, and Fort Sheridan, and four
light batteries on the intermediate hills, which had not been
silent hitherto, gave emphatic response. Their fire was first
directed to the enemy's inferior intrenchments, and when this
endangered the advancing lines, their missiles were thrown
upon the summit. This change of direction was soon neces-
sary, as leaping forward at the signal, the eager troops in rapid
movement first met the enemy's pickets and their reserves,
then his troops occupying the intervening woods, and finally
his stronger line in his lower intrenchments, and drove all in
confusion to the crest of the ridge. In vain had General
Bragg made effort to strengthen his lower line. The advance
of the national troops had been so rapid and their movement
had expressed such purpose and power, that the very forces
that had so often repeated their furious assaults at Chicka-
mauga lost courage and made no soldierly eftbrt to maintain
their position, though supported by at least fifty guns, which,
at short range, were fast decimating the assaulting columns.

Having executed their orders to the utmost requirement,
holding the enemy's lower defenses, the four divisions stood
under his batteries, while the troops they had routed threw
themselves behind the stronger intrenchments on the summit.
General Bragg's right flank had not been turned as first pro-
posed, and General Hooker's attack on his left, though suc-
cessful, was too remote to aflect immediately the central con-
test. To stand still was death ; to fall back was not compassed
by orders, and was forbidden by every impulse of the brave
men, who, with no stragglers to mar the symmetry of their
line or make scarcely a single exception to universal gallantry,
had moved so boldly and so successfully upon the foe. There
are occasional moments in battle when brave men do not need
commanders, and this was one. The enemy held a position

BATTLES NEAR CHATTAT^OOGA. 431

of wonderful strength several hundred feet above them. He
had two lines in one behind earthworks, where nature had
provided a fortress. These men, however, did not stop to con-
sider the enemy's position or strength, but from a common
impulse of patriotism and the inspiration of partial success,
leaped forward and dashed up the hill. The color-bearers
sprang to the front, and as one fell, another bore the flag aloft
and onward, followed by their gallant comrades, not in line,
but in such masses as enabled them to avail themselves of
easier ascent or partial cover. They advanced without firing,
though receiving a most destructive fire of artillery and mus-
ketry, from base to summit. The ofiicers of all grades caught
the spirit of the men, and so eager were men and ofiicers
throughout the line, that the crest was reached and carried at
six different points almost at the same moment. The enemy
was hurled from position with wonderful quickness; his artil-
\evy was captured, and in some cases turned against him as he
fled. General Hooker soon swept northward from Rossville,
and then the Army of the Cumberland held Missionary
Eidge the whole length of its front. General Hardee's forces,
opposite General Sherman, alone maintained position.

To this general result, each of the four central divisions
and those with General Hooker contributed, in co-ordination
and harmony unprecedented in an improvised attack. Each
one was successful, though each was not equally prominent in
success. From General Bragg's declaration that his line was
first pierced on his right — that is, to the north of the house
which he occupied as his headquarters — and from the observa-
tion of those occupying elevated positions, there is no room
to doubt that General Wood's division first reached the sum-
mit. Sheridan's and Baird's, on the right and left, almost
simultaneously gained the crest. General Wood's troops en-
filaded the enem3^'s line to the right and left as soon as they
l)rokc through it, and the other divisions pressed against other
points so quickl}', that General Bragg's effort to dislodge tlie
troops who first gained his intrenchments by sending General
Bate to the right, miscarried at its very inception. After
portions of the several divisions had gained the crest, mauy

432 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

isolated contests were conducted with spirit by the enemy, but
the fragments of his line were speedily brushed away.

The impulse to carry the summit of the ridge was seem-
ingly spontaneous, though not entirely simultaneous, through-
out the four divisions, and from different points several
"brigades passed beyond the limit fixed by General Grant's
order, before there was any concerted action toward a general
assault. The division commanders did not arrest their troops,
and for a time the corps generals did not give official sanction
to their advance. The impression, indeed, so far prevailed,
that the movement would not be authorized, that Turchin's,
brigade, on the right of Baird's division, was halted when far
up the ascent, and Wagner's brigade, on the left of Sheridan's
division, was recalled from an advanced position by a stafi"
ofiicer who was returning to General Sheridan from General
Granger, with the information that General Grant's order re-
quired only that the enemy's intrenched line at the base of
the ridge should be carried. Soon, however, it was apparent
to all, that the eagerness of the troops had created a necessity
superior to the limitations of orders, and this conviction gave
unity and energy to an assault, whose transcendent issue jus-
tified its otherwise unauthorized execution.

To prevent defeat, Generals Bragg, Hardee, Breckinridge,
and others of inferior rank, exerted themselves to the utmost.
General Bragg, in the center, was nearly surrounded before
he entirely despaired and abandoned the field. General
Breckinridge resisted General Hooker, as he ascended the
ridge at Rossville, availing himself of the fortifications which
had been constructed by the national army after the battle of
Chickamauga. His first resistance was quickly overcome by
the iSTinth and Thirty-sixth regiments of Grose's brigade.
General Cruft's division was then formed in four lines on the
summit, and with the lateral divisions abreast, moved rapidly
forward, driving the enemy in turn from several positions.
Many of his troops, that fled east or west, were captured by
Osterhaus or Geary, and those who tried to escape northward,
fell in Johnson's hands. As soon as General Hardee heard
the noise of battle to his left, he hastened to join his troops
under General Anderson, on the right of their central line.

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 466

But before he could cross the chasm corresponding to the in-
terval between General Sherman's right and General Thomas'
left, Anderson's command was thrown into a confused retreat-
He then hurried Cheatham's* division from the vicinity of the
tunnel, and formed it across the summit to resist Baird's divis-
ion, which had advanced northward, after carr3nng its entire
front, in the assault. In a severe contest, in which Colonel
Phelps, a brigade commander, fell. General Baird pressed this
fresh division northward from several knolls, but was finally
compelled to al)andon the conflict by the peculiar strength of
a new position and the approach of darkness.

The victory was gained too late in the day foi* a general pur-
suit. General Sheridan's division and Willich's brigade of
General Wood's division pursued the enemy for a short distance
down the eastern slope. Later, General Sheridan advanced and
drove the enemy from a strong position, captured two pieces
of artillery, numerous small arms, and several wagons from a
supply train.

During the night General Hardee withdi-ew his forces from
the position which he had persistently held against General
Sherman.

Wliile General Grant had been hurrying his preparations
for the battle, his anxiety for Burnside had been intensified
by uu avoidable delays. He knew that Burnside's supplies
would not permit him to refuse terms of suri-ender much be-
yond the 3d of December, and it was by no means certain that
he could resist Longstreet as long a~s his supplies would last.
'Now that General Bragg had been defeated. General Grant
gave attention equally to the pursuit of the routed enemy and
the relief of his lieutenant at Knoxville ; and during the even-
ing of the 25th, gave orders looking to the accomplishment
of both objects. He directed General Thomas to recall the

* General Hardee's staff officer said: "At this juncture, matters looked
terrible, and I will never forget the look of anguish written on poor Gen-
eral II 's face. He sent me hurriedly to make some changes in his other

■divisions, yet intact, and to hurry one forward to stem the tide of defeat."
General Bragg's report mentions Cheatham's division as the one perform-
ing this service.

28

434 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOaA.

Fourtli Corps to prepare for forced marches to Kuoxville, aud
iu conjunction with General Sherman to pursue the enemy
with his available troops. Accordingly, General Thomas or-
dered "Wood's and Sheridan's divisions to return to Chatta-
nooga, and Generals Hooker and Palmer — the latter with two
divisions — to move in pursuit of the enemy.

These generals moved on the morning of the 26th, as or-
dered, Hooker leading. On reaching the West Chickaniauga,
Hooker found that the bridge had been destroyed and that the
water was too deep for fording. Pontoons had been ordered
for such emergencies, but none were up, and the columns were
delayed until a temporary bridge could be constructed. After
some hours, the men crossed the bridge, the horses swam the
stream, and pursuit was resumed without artillery. At Pea-
vine creek there was another stop from similar cause. A
bridge was here constructed as quickly as possible, and the-
troops crossed and moved forward. At this creek the road
forks, the right branch leading to Ringgold, the left to Grays-
ville. Hooker took the former and Palmer the latter. Car-
lin's brigade leading, toward Graysville, soon heard the noise
of men and wagons in motion. As the proximity of the enemy
was thus revealed, dispositions were made to intercept him if
possible. At 9 p. m. his rear-guard was overtaken, and upon
receiving a volley from Stoughton's brigade, fled in all direc-
tions. The troops proved to be a remnant of Stewart's divis-
ion, that Hooker had handled so roughly on the ridge the
evening previous, and in flight left behind them three iN'apo-
leon guns, their colors, and a large number of small arms.

The pursuit was continued, and at 11 p. M. a brigade of the
enemy was routed at Graysville, and one gun and a number
of prisoners were captured.

On the following morning the two columns advanced ta
Ringgold. The artillery was still behind, as the pontoon
bridges had not been thrown, but the enemy was nevertheless
closely pursued. Before reaching the East Chickamauga
creek, many captures were made, and the enemy was driven
from the bridge and pursued into the town. But a stand was
made, beyond where the railroad passes through the gap in
Taylor's ridge. General Hooker was still without artillery,.

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 435

but he determined to feel the enemy at once. Accordingly,
skirmishers advanced, and Woods' brigade deployed in their
rear under cover of the railroad embankment. The skirmish
line of the enemy was soou driven upon the main line, and
the exact position of a battery which had been very active was
ascertained. To silence the battery by picking off the gun-
ners, the Thirteenth Illinois regiment was thrown forward to
seize some houses at suitable distance for this purpose. This
movement provoked the enemy to advance against "Woods'
line. His skirmishers fell back, and the main line repulsed
the enemy most handsomely, and followed into the gorge.
Cleburne's division was engaged, and its dead and wounded
were abandoned as it gave ground. In the meantime, Oster-
haus had detached four regiments under Colonel Williamson
to move a half mile to the left, ascend a hill, and turn the en-
emy's right. The enemy was found in heavy force, and Col-
onel Creighton with four more regiments was sent still farther
to the left. Attacks were then made by both Williamson and
Creighton, but despite the display of great daring, the troops
of both were repulsed with heavy loss. Creighton's brigade
held position on the side of the ridge, well sheltered in a de-
pression, and Williamson's returned to the railroad. The
enemy having been developed in force in a strong position,
troops were moved to support those who had been engaged,
and the action was arrested in waiting for the artillery. Be-
tween 12 and 1 p. m. the guns came upon the field and were
put in position, and other dispositions were made to renew the
attack. The heavy guns were planted to enfilade the gorge,
and a regiment was sent to ascend the hill on the right, to
throw a plunging fire upon the enemy below. But the enemy
had succeeded in delaying pursuit, which was the object of his-
resistance, and upon the opening of Hooker's guns, withdrew,
attempting to burn the bridges beyond the town. He was so
closely followed, however, that the bridges were saved.

General Grant having reached the field, gave orders to dis-
continue the pursuit. But in the afternoon, to make the im-
pression of purpose to pursue. Colonel Grose was sent forward
with his brigade toward Tunnel Hill. Grose soon encoun-
tered the enemy's cavalry and drove the force upon the infan-

436 BATTLES ?^RA.K CHATTANOOGA.

try. Ascertaining tliat there was a strong column in a strong
position, he returned to Ringgold,

General Hooker lost, according to his report, sixty -five killed
and three hundred and seventy-seven Avounded ; Colonel Creigh-
ton and many other officers fell. The enemy left one hundred
and thirty dead upon the field, and two hundred and thirty as
prisoners ; his wounded was not computed.

Very early on the morning of the 26th, General Davis was
ordered by General Sherman to cross his division on the pon-
toon bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga and pursue the
enemy, and General Howard was ordered to repair a bridge
two miles up the creek and follow. The repair of the l^ridge
threatening too much delay, the latter moved down the stream,
and crossing his corps on the pontoon bridge, moved on toward
the depot of Bragg's army at Chickamauga Station. Davis, in
advance, reached that point at 11 a. m., in time to witness the
burning of the depot building and the greater portion of the
supplies. A short distance beyond, the enemy was found par-
tially intrenched, but was speedily forced to retreat ; General
Davis pursued and at dark overtook the enemy, when a sharp
conflict ensued, but the darkness covered his escape. In the
morning, Davis reached Graysville, and found himself in rea.T
of Hooker's command, which he followed to Ringgold.

General Howard advanced through Parker's Gap, farther
east, and detached a column to destroy railroad communica-
tions between Dragg and Longstreet. Having destroyed a large
section of the railroad between Dalton and Cleveland, the de-
tached forces joined the corps.

These movements terminated the pursuit of the enemy.
Burnside's condition was exceedingly critical, and General
Grant deemed his relief and the continued possession of East
Tennessee more important than the farther pursuit of Bragg.
He therefore directed General Sherman to give his troops a
rest of one day before starting to raise the siege of Knoxville.
In consideration of the importance of promptl}^ relieving
Burnside, General Grant committed the enterprise to Sher-
man, giving him Howard's and Granger's corps, and Davis'
division of the Fourteenth, in addition to the three divisions
of his own.

The destruction of railroad by Howard's troops, added to the

BATTLES NEAE CHATTA^^OOGA. 437

results of Long's raid, efl'ectiially prevented tlie passage of
troops by rail from Bragg to Longstreet, or from the latter to
the former, if their future plans should require such transfer.
Colonel Long having moved on the flank of General Sherman's
forces, as directed, crossed the river on the 24th, on the pon-
toon bridge, and reached Tyner's station on the Knoxville road
that night, destroying supplies and rolling-stock at that point.
Colonel Long then proceeded to Ooltawah, and captured several
wagons loaded with forage. At Cleveland he destroyed a cop-
per-rolling mill, and a large depot of commissary and ordnance
stores. From Cleveland he moved rapidly to Charleston, hoping
to capture a large wagon train which had been detained tliere
by the parting of a pontoon bridge. Learning, however, that
the bridge had been connected, and that the train was beyond
his reach, as there was a large force of the enemy on the op-
posite shore, he returned to Cleveland. Then, having damaged
the railroad for several miles toward Dalton, he moved in safety
to Chattanooga.

General Grant ordered General Hooker to remain at Ring-
gold until the 30th, to cover General Sherman's movement
toward Knoxville, and keep up the semblance of pursuit.

The official reports of the commanders-in-chief of the two
armies do not give their strength. It is probable that General
Grant had sixty thousand men in action, and General Bragg
forty thousand. The former had thirteen divisions, including
two detached brigades, and the lattei' had eight, with perhaps
a corresponding diminution.

General Bragg's loss in killed and wounded is not known.
He lost by capture six thousand one hundred and forty-two
men, forty-two guns, sixty-nine gun-carriages, and seven
thousand stand of small arms. His loss in material was im-
mense, part of which he destroyed in his flight, but a large
fraction, which was uninjured, fell to the national army.

The aggregate losses of the armies of the Cumberland and
Tennessee were seven hundred and fifty-seven killed, four
thousand five hundred and twenty-nine wounded, and three
hundred and thirty missing. These losses were small com-
pared with those of other battles of similar proportions, and

438 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

exceedingly small in view of the fact that the enemy generally
resisted behind intrenchments.

These engagements, in general issue, were exceedingly de-
cisive, both in their proximate and more palpable results,
and in their remote and more occult consequences. The
blood of " Chickamauga," " Wauhatchie," " Lookout Mount-
ain," " Missionary Ridge," and " Einggold," and even that
of anterior battles, had been directly shed in decision of the
question whether a national or Confederate army should
hold Chattanooga — a position inviting to each for defense or
aggression. Fortified in its outer lines by ranges of moun-
tains, after the battle of Chickamauga, it had been made
strong in its inner lines by a broad and high circumvallation,
manifold forts and redoubts, and heavy guns. Situated at
the confluence of many streams, the diverging valleys sug-
gested aggressive marches, and especially as the gateway to
Georgia it was the natural base for an overland bisection of
the Gulf States. This martial throne, dominant of strategy
far and near, had been the objective of the Army of the Cum-
berland for nearly two years, and as the result of a battle
compassing all the elements of the most brilliant warfare, it fell
in perpetuity to its possession, when this grand army cheered
in proudest triumph on the crest of Missionary Ridge. The
mere possession of Chattanooga, while Bragg's lines stretched
over mountain, plain, and hill, from the river on the south-
west to the river on the northeast, was of little moment. But
the Southern leaders and people knew that a national army at
Chattanooga, with full mastery of river, railroads, and di-
verging' routes of ao-srression, was a direct menace to the
existence of the rebellion. And the issue of the battle which
gave the Army of the Cumberland the fruits of all its con-
flicts in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia, produced a start-
ling surprise throughout the South. It is true that there were
some in the South who said that the loss of Lookout Valley
was equivalent to the loss of Chattanooga. But, as Bragg
had detached Longstreet's corps after this loss, and held liis
lines, notwithstanding the gathering of Grant's forces at Chat-
tanooga, the hope was entertained, that if he could not retake
the place, he could at least neutralize it as a base for offensive

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 439

operations, and the Southern people were not prepared for the
rout of his army from a position deemed impregnable. And
his own official acknowledgment of the total defeat and panic
of his army was couched in language which made prominent
his own surprise at the issue. He said, " The position oughc
to have been held by a skirmish line against any assaulting
column." This statement, though expressive of his opinion
of the strength of his position, was by no means true. !N"o
skirmish line could have held Missionary, Ridge against even
a small portion of the brave men who dashed up the steep ac-
clivity. Besides, it was not altogether surprising that his
troops were routed. The moral forces were with the assault-
ing column. The peculiar features of the field revealed to the
enemy the transcendant array of the national troops. The
battle had opened with the splendid charge of "Wood's divis-
ion, and Lookout Mountain had been wrested from his hands
in such a way as to change the martial tone of each arm}^
Those assaulting Missionary Ridge had Chickamauga to
a.veuge, and Lookout Mountain to surpass. And the dashing,
yet firm and resolute sweep of the assaulting column for more
than a mile, expressed in advance the resistless character of
the attack. When moi-e than a half-hundred battle flags,
forming the foremost line, approached the crest, the Confed-
erate soldiers knew that they would wave over their defenses,
or those who bore them, and a moiety of the twenty thousand
men who followed, would fall. The men who fled before this
revelation of strength and fiery inspiration, had proved them-
selves brave on other fields, and were perhaps less to blame
than their impassive general, who had failed to perceive the
ruling conditions of the battle. The loss of more than twenty
per cent, in the two central divisions, in a contest of less than
an hour, shows that the enemy did not yield his position with-
out a struggle. There was a panic, but its cause was not
mere fear, but the overwhelming impression that resistance
was useless.

440 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

Headquarters Military Divisiox ok the Mississippi,
Chattanooga, Texn., November 7, 1863.
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding Department of the Cumberland.

General: — News just received from Majoi'-General Burnside, taken in
conjunction with information given by a deserter just in, whose statement
you have, is of such a nature that it becomes an imperative duty for your
forces to draw the attention of the enemy from Burnside to your own
front. Already the enemy have attacked Burnside's most easterly gar-
rison of two regiments and a battery, capturing the battery and about
half of the forces. This corroborates the statement of the Georgia lieu-
tenant, as to the designs and present movements of the enemy.

I deem the best movement to attract tlje enemy, to be an attack on the
northern end of Missionary Ridge, with all the force you can bring to
bear against it, and when that is carried, to threaten and even attack, if
possible, the enemy's line of communication between Dalton and Cleve-
land.

Rations should be ready, to issue a sufficiency to last four days, the
moment Missionary Ridge is in our possession — rations to be carried in
haversacks. When there are not horses to move the artillery, mules
must be taken from the teams, or horses from ambulances, or, if necessary,
officers dismounted, and their horses taken.

In view of so many troops having been taken from this valley and from
Lookout, Howard's corps of Hooker's command can be used in this
movement.

Immediate preparations should be made to carry these directions into
execution. The movement should not be made one moment later than
to-morrow morning.

You having been over this country, and having had a better opportu-
nity of studying it than myself, the details are left to you.
I am, general, very respectfully,

^ Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

Major- General.

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
Chattanooga, Tenn., November 18, 1863.
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding Department and Army of tlie Cum-
berland.
General : — All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's
position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday morning at daylight. Not
being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountain,
and other places, such definite instructions can not be given as might be
desirable. However, the general plan you understand is for Sherman,
with his force brought with him, strengthened by a division from your
command, to feffect a crossing of the Tennessee river just below the mouth
of Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights
on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery),

BATTLES NEAR CHATTAXOOGA. 441

and to can-}' tlie heights from the northern extremity to about tlie rail-
road tunnel, before the enemy can concentrate a force against him.

You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga valley
should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary
force to defend fortilications on the right and center, and a movable col-
umn of one division, in readiness to move whenever ordered. This divis-
ion should show itself as threateningly as possible, on the most practicable
line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort then will be to form
a junction with Sherman, making your advance well toward the north
end of Missionary Eidge, and moving as near simultaneously with him
as possible. The junction once formed, and the ridge carried, communi-
cations will be at once established between the two armies, by roads on
the sovith bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on
those of the enemy.

Lookout valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's division and
what troops you may still have there belonging to the old Army of the
Cumberlai^d. Howard's corjDs can then be held in readiness to act either
with you, at Chattanooga, or with Sherman. It should be marched on
Fridaj^ night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down
than the first pontoon bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders
as may become necessary.

All the troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in their
haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of
each infantry soldier.

Special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is
not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You will call on the engineering
department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for crossing
your infantry and artillery over Citico creek.

I am, general, very respectfully.

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GEANT,
Major- General U. 8. V. Commanding.

Chattanooga, Tenn., November 20, 1863.
Major-General Thoynas, Commanding Department of the Cumberland.

General : — A note just received from General Sherman, giving present
position of the forces, shows an entire impossibility for him to get all his
troops up and over Brown's ferry before to-morrow night. His attack can
not be made, therefore, before Sunday morning, if then. I have written
to him to use all dispatch to be ready by that time. You can make your
arrangements for this delay.

You can exercise your own judgment about bringing Howard across
to-night, as previously directed. The only advantage in it will be in get-
ting continuous use out of the bridges.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,

Major- General.

442 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
Chattanooga, Tenn., November 21, 1863.
Major-General G. H. Thomas^ Commanding Department of the Cumberland.

General: — I have just received a report of the position of Sherman's
forces. The raise last night has thrown them back so much that it will
"be impossible for him to get into position for action to-morrow morning.
He will be up, however, against all calamities that can be foreseen, to
commence on Monday morning.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,
Major-General Commanding.

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
Chattanooga, Tenn., November 22, 1863.
Major-General G. H. Thomas, Commanding Armij of the Cumberland.

General : — The bridge at Brown's ferry being down to-day, and the
■excessively bad roads since the last rain, will render it impossible for
Sherman to get up either of his two remaining divisions in time for the
attack to-morrow morning. With one of them up, and which would have
been there now, but for the accident to the bridge, I would still make the
attack in the morning, regarding a day gained as of superior advantage
to a single division of troops. You can make your arrangements for this

delay.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General Commanding.

Headquarters Army of the Tennessee,
In the Field, November 20, 1863.
Major-General V. S. Grant, Commanding United States Forces at Chattanooga.

General: — As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga,
I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early
withdrawal.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BRAXTON BRAGG,

General Commanding.

Headquarters Department and Army of the Tennessee,
Near Chattanooga, November 22, 1863.
Operations for Monday, November 23d :

The Fifteenth Army Corps, reinforced by one division of the Army of
the Cumberland, is to cross the Tennessee at the mouth of East Chicka-
mauga creek, and advance and take possession of the end of Missionary
jiidge—viz., from the railroad tunnel to Chickamauga— hold, and fortify.

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 443

The 'Army of the Cumberland and General Hooker's command are to
assist by direct attack to their front.
Details :

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.

R M. SAWYER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Headquarters Second Division Fourth Army Corps,
Chattanooga, November 22, 1863.
Colonel : — David Gardner, first lieutenant, company B, Thirty-seventh
Tennessee Infantry, Tyler's brigade, Bate's division, Breckinridge's corps,
vv'ho resides near Knoxville, Tennessee, came in last night, making the
following statement: Buckner's and Anderson's divisions moved day be-
fore yesterday to McLemore's and Pigeon Coves. Indications are that a
general movement is to be made. Baggage is being reduced, and hard
bread is being issued. Most of the army is massed between Bragg's head-
quarters and Lookout Mountain; but few troops on the right of Bragg's
headquarters. Reported yesterday that Longstreet occupied Knoxville.
Bragg's army now here is composed of four corps, two divisions in each
corps, four brigades in each division. The corps are commanded by Har-
dee, Breckinridge, Walker, and Buckner. Total strength about sixty

thousand.

1 am, colonel, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Lieutenant- Colonel J. S. Fullerton, Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of
Staff, Fourth Army Corps.

The movement to McLemore's Cove was made to meet Sherman, who

■was expected to attack Stevens' Gap.

P. H. S.

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
Chattanooga, November 23, 1863.
Major-General G. H. Thomas, Commanding Army of the Cumberland:

General : — The truth or falsity of the deserter who came in last night,
stating that Bragg had fallen back, should be ascertained at once. If he
is really falling back, Sherman can commence at once laying his pontoon

trains, and he can save a day.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,

Major-GeneraL

444 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

Headqcarteks Department of the Cumberland,
Chattanooga, November 23, 1863.
Major-General Gravger, Commanding Fourth Corp-^ :

The general commanding department directs that you throw one divis-
ion of the Fourth Corps forward in the direction of Orchard Knob, and
hold a second division in supporting distance, to discover the position of
the enemy, if he still remains in the vicinity of his old camps. Howard's
and Baird's commands will be ready to co-operate, if needed.

■ J. J. REYNOLDS,

Major-General and Chief of Staff.

Headquarters Fourth Army Corps, November 23, 1863.
Brigadier-General Wood with his division will, as soon as possible, carry
out the foregoing instructions, and will be supported by General Sheri-
dan's division, to be posted along near the line of railroad, its right resting
about midway between Moore's road and the brush knob in front of Ivi-

nette Palmer.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. GRANGER,
Major-General, Commanding.
12 o'clock M.
Brigadier-General Th. J. Wood, Commanding Third Division Fourth Army Corps.

11 p. M.

Hardee : — 1 observed from the point the movements of the enemy,

until dark. The object seemed to be to attract our attention. The

troops in sight were formed from center to left. Those on the right

moved to center. The troops from Raccoon were in line in full sight. If

they intend to attack, my opinion is it will be on our left. Both of their

bridges are gone.

GENERAL STEVENSON.

EXTRACTS FROM THE NARRATIVE IN THE RICHMOND DIS-
PATCH.

When the movement — that of the 23d — was going on, it was observed
that the enemy threw a considerable column up the river, further to our
right, as if he intended to overlap our line, and compel us to stretch it
out to a length that would render it very long and very weali. Can it be
that he means to threaten our depot of supplies at (Jhickamauga Station,
and at the same time to draw us away from Lookout Mountain ? The
idea that Grant desires to advance his lines, in order to get more room
and a further supply of firewood, as has been suggested, will not bear the
test of reason. A movement on so large a scale looks to ulterior objects,
and is intended to initiate operations upon a broad and comprehensive
scale.

The result of such a movement will be to compel General Bragg to

BATTLES NEAE CHATTANOOGA. 445

weaken his forces on Lookout Mountain (his left), to reinforce his right,
which is comparatively weak. Indeed orders to tliis effect have already
been given, and are now being executed. It will never do to let the en-
emy turn our right, and get possession of our depot at Cliickamauga.

General Bragg must therefore choose between Lookout Mountain and
Chickamauga. The demonstration to-day was intended, doubtless, to force
him to make his election between the two. If he decides to hold Chick-
-amauga, then he must yield the mountain, and throw his army between
the enemy's encroaching left wing and the railroad. If he gives the
preference to Lookout, then the railroad and his depot must go.

Headquarter.s Military Divisio>.^ of thk Missis.sippi,
Chattanooga, Tenn., November 24c, 1863.
General: — General Sherman carried Missionary Eidge as far as the
tunnel with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel
and on top of the hill ; his left at Chickamauga creek. I have instructed
General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and
your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in co-operation. Your
command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of
them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If
Hooker's present position on the mountain can be maintained with a
small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he
is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force
he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,
Major-General Commanding.-
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding Army of tJie Cumberland.

Headquarters Department of Cumberland,
Chattanooga, November 23—10 p. m.
Major-General Hooker, Lookout V alien :

If Woods' division does not get across the river Jdj^ daybreak, he is or-
dered to report to you, and in that event the general commanding de-
partment directs that you endeavor to take the point of Lookout Moun-
tain.

J. J. REYNOLDS,
Major-General and Chief of Staff.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL THOMAS' REPORT TO THE "COM-
MITTEE OF CONGRESS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR."

Feeling, as I did, the necessity of avoiding delay, for fear that the en-
emy should become advised of our plans, immediately upon the receipt
of the above letter, (General Grant's, of the 22d), I went to General
'Grant and advised against any further postponement of our movement,

446 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

and suggested that, if needed, the Eleventh corps, then between the two-
bridges, could be sent to General Sherman to take the place of troops
that could not join him, whilst these last, together with the troops already
in Lookout valley, would form a column to attack the enemy on Lookout
Mountain, or at least divert his attention from Sherman's crossing above.
This met the approbation of the commanding general, and on it was
based my order of the 23d to General Hooker, to demonstrate on Look-
out, and if practicable, to carry the position.

Headquarters Department of Cumberland,
Chattanooga, November 24 — 12.30 a. m.
Major-General Hooker, Lookout VaJJcy :

Intercepted rebel dispatches are to the effect that rebels expect us to
attack them on their left in the morning. General commanding desires
that you make demonstration early as possible after daybreak, on point
of Lookout Mountain. General Grant still hopes Woods' division will
get across to join Sherman, in which case your demonstration will aid
Sherman's crossing. If Woods can 't cross, you can take the point of
Lookout, if your demonstration develops its practicability.

J. J. REYNOLDS,
Major-General and Chief of Staff.

Hooker's Headquarters, November 24 — 2 a. m.
Major-General Hepiolds, Chief of Staff:

I am just informed that Woods' division will not be able to cross the
river for twelve (12) hours, and in consequence have given directions for
it to take position for an advance on Lookout Nose, to be there at sun
rise. That there be no mistake as to the crossing, I will send a staff

officer to ascertain positively.

MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Chattanooga, November 24, 18G3 — 9.30 p. m.
Major-General Hooker, Lookout Valley :

The general commanding department congratulates you most heartily
upon your glorious success to-day, and desires that you convey his warm-
est thanks to the troops imder your command for their valorous conduct.
General Grant has just directed that General Sherman move along Mis-
sion Ridge to-morrow with his force, whilst our force advances to the
front, co-operating with Sherman, and compelling the enemy to show
whether he occupies his rifle-pits in our front. Be in readiness to advance
as early as possible in the morning into Chattanooga valley, and seize and
hold the Summertown road, and co-operate with the Fourteenth Corps by
supporting its right. Map sent by courier at 8 o'clock this evening.

J. J. REYNOLDS,
Major-General and Cluef of Staff.

BATTLES NEAK CHATTANOOGA. 4^:7

EXTRACT RELATING TO THE BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUN-
TAIN, FROM THE NARRATIVE IN "RICHMOND DISPATCH."

Very few details have j^et been received — too few, indeed, for me to at-
tempt to enter into particulars. The impression prevails in well-informed
circles, that the affair has not been well conducted by the Confederate
officers in command on the mountain. Our forces had been much weak-
ened the night before by the withdrawal of Walker's division, which was
sent to the right, leaving only Stevenson's and Cheatham's divisions be-
hind, both under the command of General Stevenson. General Cheat-
ham arrived on the ground late in the afternoon, having just returned to
the army. Up to the time of his return, his division was under the com-
mand of General Jackson, the senior brigadier in the division. It was
thought that these two divisions would have been sufficient to hold the
position against a largely superior force ; but not so.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
November 25, 1863—8 a. m.
Major-Oeneral Hooker :

Leave Carlin's brigade at Summertown road to rejoin General Palmer.
Move with remainder of your force, except two regiments to hold Look-
out, on the Rossville road toward Mission Ridge, looking well to your
right flank.

By command of General Thomas.

J. J. REYNOLDS,
Major-General and Chief of Staff.

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Orchard Knob, November 25, 1863.
Major-General Hooker:

I wish you and General Palmer to move forward firmly and steadily
upon the enemy's works in front, using General Sheridan as a pivot.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Major- General.
[Passed through Mission Station at 10 a. m.]

EXTRACT RELATING TO THE ACTION ON MISSIONARY RIDGE
FROM THE NARRATIVE IN THE "RICHMOND DISPATCH."

Grant deployed his immense masses in two heavy lines of battle, and
sometimes in three, supported by large reserve forces. The spectacle was
magnificent as viewed from the crest of Missionary Ridge. He advanced
first against our right wing about 10 o'clock, where he encountered that
superb soldier, Lieutenant-General Hardee, who commanded the right
wing, while Major-General Breckinridge commanded on the left. Har-
dee's command embraced Cleburne's, "Walker's (commanded by General

448 BATTLES XEAR CHATTAXOOGA.

Gist, General Walker being absent), Cheatham's, and Stevenson's divisions.
Breckinridge's embraced his old division, commanded by Brigadier-Gen-
eral Lewis,'* Stewart's, part of Buckner's and Hindman's, commanded
by Patton Anderson. The enemy's first assault upon Hardee was repulsed
with great slaughter, as was his second, though made with double lines
supported by heavy reserves.

The attack upon the left wing was not made until about noon.j Here,
as on the right, the enemy was repulsed, but he was obstinate, and fought
with great ardor and confidence, returning to the charge again and again
in the handsomest style, until one of our brigades near the center, said
to be Reynolds', gave way, and the Federal flag was planted on Missionary
Ridge. The enemy was not slow in availing himself of the great advan-
tage of his new position. In a few minutes, he turned upon our flanks,
and poured into them a terrible enfilading fire, which soon threw the Con-
federates on his right and left into confusion. Under this confusion, tihe
gap in our lines grew wider and wider and wider, and the wider it grew,
the faster the multitudinous foe rushed into the yawning chasm. The
confusion extended until it finally assumed the form of a panic. Seeing
the enemy in possession of a portion of the heights, the men hastily con-
cluded that the day was gone, and that they had best save themselves.

EXTRACT FROM THE OFFICIAL KEPORT OF MAelOR-GENERAL

U. S. GRANT.

Proceeding directly to Chattanooga, I arrived there on the 23d of Octo-
ber, and found that General Thomas had, immediately on being placed in
command of the department of the Cumberland, ordered the concenti'a-
tion of Major-Geueral Hooker's command at Bridgeport, preparatory
to securing the river and main wagon-road between that j^lace and
Brown's ferry, immediately below Lookout Mountam. The next morning
after my arrival at Chattanooga, in company with Thomas, and Brig-
adier-General W. F. Smith, chief engineer, I made a reconnoissance of
Brown's ferry, and the hills on the south side of the river, and at the
mouth of Lookout valley. After the reconnoissance, the plan agreed
upon was, for Hooker to cross at Bridgeport to the south side of the river,
with all the force that could be spared from the railroad, and move on the
main Avagonroad, by way of Whitesides, to Wauhatchie in Lookout
valley. Major-General J. M. Palmer was to proceed by the only practica-
ble route north of the river, from his position opposite Chattanooga to
a point on the north bank of the Tennessee river, and opposite White-
sides, then to cross to the south side, to hold the road passed over by
Hooker.

In the meantime, and before the enemy could be apprised of our inten-

''■■ Gt'ueral Bate was probably meant.
t A mistake in time.

BATTLES XEAR CHATTAXOOGA. 449

tion, a force under the direction of Brigadier-General W. F. Smith,
chief engineer, was to be thrown across the river, at or near Brown's
ferry, to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout valley, cover-
ing Brown's ferry, and orders were given accordingly.

*********

Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was detaching
Longstreet from the front, and moving him in the direction of Knoxville,
Tenn., evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling strongly the necessity
of some move that would compel him to retain all his forces and recall
those he had detached, directions were given for a movement against
Missionary Ridge, with a view to carrying it and threatening the enemy's
communications with Longstreet, of which I informed Burnside, on the
7th of November, by telegraph.

After a thorough reconnoissance of the ground, however, it was deemed
utterly impracticable to make the move until Sherman could get up, be-
cause of the inadequacy of our forces, and the condition of the animals
then at Chattanooga; and I was forced to leave Burnside, for the
present, to contend against superior forces of the enemy, until the ai*-
rival of Sherman with his men and means of transportation. In the
meantime, reconnoissances were made, and plans matured for operations.
Dispatches were sent to Sherman informing him of the movement of
Longstreet, and the necessity of his immediate presence at Chattanooga.
On the 14th of November, I telegraphed to Burnside as follows:

" Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell
better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your
showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment, and save
the most productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now
made to throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the
mouth of Chickamauga creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack
on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Mission-
ary Ridge, and from there rush on to the railroad between Cleveland and
Dalton. Hooker w^ill at the same time attack Lookout Mountain. The
enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This

favors us. . . . (Signed,)

"U. S. GRANT,

' ' Major- General.
^'To Major-General A. E. Burnside."

*********

Upon further consideration — the great object being to mass all the
forces available against one given point, namely, Missionary Ridge, con-
verging toward the north end of it — it was deemed best to change the
original plan so far as it contemplated Hooker's attack on Lookout
Mountain, which would give us Howard's corps of his command, to aid
in this purpose, and on the ISth the following instructions were given to
Thomas. [See plan of battle, p. 440, 441.]

*********

Early in the morning of the 25th, the remainder of Howard's corps
29

450 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

reported to Sherman, and constituted a part of his forces during the day's
battle, the pursuit, and the subsequent advance for the relief of Knoxville.
Sherman's position not only threatened the right flank of the enemy,
but, from his occupying a line across the mountain and to the railroad
bridge across Cliickamauga creek, his rear and stores at Chickamauga
Station. This caused the enemy to move heavily against him. This
movement of his being plainly seen from the position I occupied on
Orchard Knob, Baird's division of the Fourteenth Corps was ordered to
Sherman's support; but receiving a note from Sherman informing me
that ho had all the force necessary, Baird was put in position on Thomas'
left.

The appearance of Hooker's column was at this time anxiously looked
for, and momentarily expected, moving on the ridge, with his left in Chat-
tanooga valley and his right east of the ridge. His approach was intended
as the signal for storming the ridge in the centerwith strong columns, but
the time necessarily consumed in the construction of the bridge near
Chattanooga creek detained him to a later hour than was expected.
Being sati&lied from the latest information from him that he must, by this
time, be on his way from Rossville, though not yet in sight, and discover-
ing that the enemy, in his desperation to defeat or resist the progress of
Sherman, was weakening his center on Missionary Ridge, determined me
to order the advance at once. Thomas was accordingly directed to move
forward his troops, constituting our center — Baird's division (Fourteenth
Corps), Wood's and Sheridan's divisions (Fourth Corps), and Johnson's
division (Fourteenth Corps), with a double line of skirmishers thrown out,
followed in easy supporting distance by the whole force — and carry the
rifle-pits at the foot of Missionai\y Ridge and, when carried, to reform his
lines in the rifle-pits with a view to carrying the top of the ridge.

These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the
base of the ridge like bees from a hive, stopped but a moment, until the
whole were in line, and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right
to left almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy
without further orders. They encountered a fearful volley of grape and
canister from nearly thirty pieces of artillery, and musketry from well-
filled rifle-pits on the summit of the ridge. Not a waver, however, was
seen in that long line of brave men; their progress was steadily onward
until the summit was in their possession. In this charge the casualties
were remarkably few for the fire encountered. I can account for this
only on the theory that the enemy's surprise at the audacity of such a
charge caused confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces.

* * -s * * w * -» *

The resistance on Thomas' left being overcome, the enemy abandoned
his position near the railroad tunnel in front of Sherman, and by 12
o'clock at night was in full retreat; and the whole of his strong posi-
tions on Lookout Mountain, Chattanooga valley, and Missionary Ridge
were in our possession, together with a large number of prisoners, artil-
lery, and small arms.

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 451

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL SHERMAN'S REPORT.

I took the first boat during the night of the 14th, for Kelley's, and
rode into Chattanooga on the 15th.

I then learned the post assigned me in the coming drama was supplied
■vvitli the necessary maps and information, and rode during the l(Jth, in
company uith Generals Grant, Thomas, W. F. SmitJi, Brannan, and others,
to the position on the west ban-k of the Tennessee, from which could be
seen the camps of the enemy compassing Chattanooga and the line of
Missionary hills, with its terminus on Chickarnauga creek, the point that I
was expected to take, hold, and fortify.

-;:- •>;- -;;• ->r * * * * *

As soon as General Corse had made his preparations, he assaulted, and
a close, severe contest ensued, lasting more than an hour, giving and
losing ground, but never the position lirst obtained, from which the en-
emy in vain attempted to drive him.

(Jeneral Morgan L. Smith kept gaining ground on the left spur of Mis-
sionary Ridge, and Colonel Loomis got abreast of the tunnel and the
railroad embankment on his side, drawing the enemy's fire, and to that
extent relieving the assaulting party on the hill crest.

The suddenness of the attack disconcerted the men, and, exposed as
they were in the open field, they fell bock in some disorder to the lower
end of the field, and reformed. These two brigades were in the nature
of supports, and did not constitute a part of the real attack.

The movement, .seen from Chattanooga, five miles off, gave rise to the
report, which even General Meigs had repeated, that we were repulsed on
the lel't. Not so. The real attacking columns of General Coi-se, Colonel
Loomis, and General Smith were not repulsed. They engaged in a close
struggle all day, persistently, stubbornly, and well. When the two re-
serve l)rigades of General .John E. Smith fell back as described, the enemy
made a show of pursuit, but were caught in flank by a well-directed fire
of our brigade on the wooded crest, and hastily sought his cover behind
the hill.

EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL GEORGE II. THOMAS' REPORT.

In consequence of the bad condition of the road-!. General Sherman's
troops were occupied all of Sun<lay (22d November) in getting into posi-
tion. In the meantime, the river having risen, both pontoon bridges were
broken by rafts sent down the river by the enemy, cutting off Osterhaus'
division from the balance of Sherman's troops. It was thought this
would dehiy us another day; but during the night of the 22d, two de-
serters reported that Bragg had fallen back, and that there was only a
strong picket line in our front. Early on the morning of the 2od, I re-
ceived a note from Major-General Grant, directing me to ascertain by a
demonstration the truth or falsity of this report.

452 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

Orders were accordingly given to General Granger, commanding Fourth
Corps, to form his troops and to advance directly in front of Fort Wood,
and thus develop the strength of the enemy.

*********

The Tennessee river having risen considerably from the effect of the
pi'evious heavy rain-storm, it was found difhcult to rebuild the pontoon
bridge at Brown's ferry. Therefore, it was determined that General
Hooker should take Osterhaus' division, which was still in Lookout val-
ley, and Whittaker's and Grose's brigades of the First division, Fourth
Corps, under Brigadier-General Cruft, and make a strong demonstration
on the northern slope of Lookout Mountain, for the purpose of attract-
ing the enemy's attention in that direction, and thus withdrawing him
from Sherman while crossing the river at the mouth of South Chicka-
mauga. General Hooker was instructed that in making this demonstra-
tion, if he discovered the position and strength of the enemy would jus-
tify him in attempting to caiTy the point of the mountain, to do so.
**-»*** -X- * *

Instructions were sent to General Hooker to be ready to advance on
the morning of the 25th, from his position on the point of Lookout
Mountain to the Summertown road, and endeavor to intercept the ene-
my's retreat, if he had not already withdrawn, which he was to ascertain
by pushing a reconnoissance to the top of Lookout Mountain. The re-
connoissance was made as directed, and having ascertained that the enemy
had evacuated during the night. General Hooker was then directed to
move on the Ivossville road, with the troops under his command (except
Carlin's brigade, which was to rejoin its division), carry the pass at Eoss-
ville, and operate upon the enemy's left and rear. Palmer's and Gran-
ger's troops were held in readiness to advance directly on the rifle-jDits in
front, as soon as Hooker could get into position at Rossville.

*********

About noon. General Sherman becoming heavily engaged by the enemy,
they having massed a strong force in his front, orders were given for Gen-
eral Baird to march his division within supporting distance of General
Sherman. Moving his command promptly in the direction indicated, he
was placed in position to the left of Wood's division of Granger's corps.
Owing to the difficulties of the ground, his troops did not get into line
with Granger's until about half-past 2 p. M. Orders were then given him,
however, to move forward on Granger's left, and within supporting
distance, against the enemy's rifle-pits on the slope and at the foot of
Missionary Ridge. The whole line then advanced against the breastworks,
and soon became warmly engaged with the enemy's skirmishers ; these
giving way, retired upon their reserves posted within their works.

Our troops advancing steadily in a continuous line, the enemy
seized with panic, abandoned their works at the foot of the hill and
retreated precipitately to the crest, whither they were followed by our
troops, who, apparently inspired by the impulse of victory, carried the

BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 453

liill simultaneously, at six different points, and so closely upon the heels
of the enemy, that many of them were taken prisoners in the trenches.

•K- * * * * * » * *

It will be seen by the above report, that the original plan of operations
was somewhat modified, to meet and take the best advantage of emer-
gencies which necessitated material modification of that plan. It is
believed, however, that the original plan, had it been carried ovit, could
not possibly have led to more successful results. The alacrity displayed
by officers in executing their orders, the enthusiasm and spirit displayed
by the men who did the work, can not be too highly appreciated by the
nation, for tlie defense of which they have on so many other memorable
occasions nobly and patriotically exposed their lives in battle.

EXTRACTS FROM MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON GRANGER'S RE-
PORT.

General Sherman was unable to make any progress in moving along the

ridge during the day, as the enemy had massed in his front; therefore,

in order to relieve him, I was ordered to make a demonstration upon the

works of the enemy directly in my front, at the base of Mission Ridge.
*********

In the meantime, the troops holding the woods were driven back to
the works at the base of the ridge, their pursuers rapidly following.
Here they halted and made a stout resistance, but our troops, by an im-
petuous assault, broke this line in several places; then scaling the breast-
works at these points, opened a flank and reserve fire upon them, which,
throwing them into confusion, caused their precipitate flight. Many
prisoners were left in our hands, and we captured a large number of
small arms.

My orders had now been fully and successfully carried out, but not
enough had been done to satisfy the brave troops who had accomplished
so much. Although tVie batteries on the ridge, at short range, by direct
and enfilading fire, were still pouring down upon them a shower of iron,
and the musketry from the hillsides were thinning their ranks, they
dashed over the breastworks, through the rifle-pits, and started up the

ridge. They started without orders.

*********

Above these men were an additional line of rifle-pits, filled with troops.
What was on the summit of the ridge they knew not, and did not stop to
inquire. The enemy was before them, and that was sufficient. At
several points along the line, my troops were ascending the hill and
gaining positions less exposed to the enemy's artillery fire, though more
exposed to the fire of musketry. Seeing this, 1 sent my assistant
adjutant-general to inquire, first of General Wood, and then of General
Sheridan, whether the troops had been ordered up the ridge by them, and
to instruct them to take the ridge if jjossible. In reply to this, General
Wood had told him that the men had started up without orders, and

454 BATTLES NEAR CHATTANOOGA.

that he could take it if he could be supported. In the meantime, an
aid-de-camp from General Sheridan had reported to me that the general
wished to know whether the orders that had been given to take the ride-
pits, "meant at the base of the I'idge, or those on the top." Mj' reply
w-as that the order Imd been to take those at the base. Conceiving this
to be an order to fall back to those rifle-pits, and on his way to General
Sheridan, so reporting it to General Wagner, commanding Second brigade
of Sheridan's division, this brigade was withdrawn from a position
which it had gained on the side of the ridge to the rifle-pits, which were
being raked by the enemy's artillery, and from this point starting again
under a terrible lire, made the ascent of the ridge.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL BAIRD'S REPORT.

The march of Turchin's brigade was directed to a prominent knob,
on which were several pieces of artillery, and a small house, used after-
wai'd for a hospital. It may be recognized readily by the marks. This I
believe to be the first point carried by my command. It is diflicult to
determine questions of slight precedence in point of time, in a rivalry
of this nature. And when all act nobly, they are unimportant. The sec-
ond brigade, in line going from troops toward the right, perhaps that of
General Willich, may possibly have reached its point of aim a little be-
fore mine reached theirs, and soon after opened communication with us.

As we gained ground toward the left, we approached close by the large
bodies of ti-oops collected bj- the rebel commander to resist or crush
General Sherman, and as the attacks of the latter had been repulsed, oi
were suspended about the time that Ave commenced our assault, these men
were at liberty to be used against us. Tlie time whicli it took for us to
mount the hill was enough for 1 hem to recover from their first surprise,
and before we had gone far a strong force was ready to confront us.

SECOND EXTRACT FROM GENERAL G. GRANGER'S REPORT.

Erigadier-General Woods had just driven the enemy from his front on
the summit of the ridge, when I observed a large force of the enemy com-
ing from that part of the hill occupied by Major-General Sherman, and
moving in the direction of our flank. Before General Woods could get his
troops in shajje to meet them, Brigadier-General Baird opportunely arrived
with his division, and went into position on our left. When the enemy
came vip, a sharp contest here commenced, which afterward lasted till
dark.

LIBRARY OF THE VETERANS,

Ninth fiegiment,N.G. S.N. Y,

NEW YQRK» N, Y,

•>1' w